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Abstract
Fishery managers face two problems that are endemic to all renewable resource 
management: how much of the resource should be extracted, and how should 
resource users be managed to ensure efficiency and fairness? The predominant 
fishery management approach addresses these problems through fish stock 
assessment and resource economics. However, my review of the literature and 
analysis of the situation in the Danube Delta Biosphere Reserve show that both 
methodologies face serious difficulties: they deal inadequately with uncertainties 
about the causes of observed behaviour and the likely effects of different policies; 
they are too focused on readily measurable objectives; and they do not address the 
effects of the institutional context on management.
In Chapter 3, I examine previous applications of Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis 
(MCDA) with a view to see if they can be applied to fishery management. My analysis 
shows that until now MCDA has been used to address only the first two sets of 
fishery management problems: systematically incorporating uncertainty and multiple 
objectives into policy development. I also argue that existing proposals for the use of 
Decision Analysis can be classified as variations of one version of MCDA, namely 
Multiple Stakeholder Decision Analysis (MSDA). The main problems that remain to 
be resolved relate to the interaction between experts, stakeholders, and managers 
when there are conflicting interpretations of evidence, and situations of high 
institutional inertia.
In Chapter 4 , 1 examine these problems within the context of ecological management 
experience and New Institutional Economics. I argue that for complex problems, such 
as those in the Danube Delta, management that aims to attain narrowly defined 
optimal fishing yields through command and control measures is unfeasable and 
undesirable. A more promising approach would seek to strengthen resilience, 
promote organisational variety, and increase the leverage of stakeholders over those 
who provide services for them. When one seeks to achieve such a transformation of 
management, I argue that the intervention needs to take into account the specific 
institutional circumstances of the client. In Chapter 5, I show how management 
procedures, problem perception, and strategy development are influenced by 
organisational structure and the hierarchical position of managers. That is why 
decision analysis interventions must address both technical as well as institutional 
needs of clients.
In Chapter 6, I discuss Decision Conferencing, an alternative MCDA approach, and 
argue that it is more suitable for dealing with management problems such as those of
the Danube Delta Biosphere Reserve. Decision Conferences can provide a structure 
for expert, manager, and stakeholder interaction and can lead to the transformation 
of social realities. In Chapters 7 and 8, I review the context and concrete 
environmental and institutional problems that led to the first Decision Conference on 
an environmental management problem. I report the processes of the Decision 
Conference, the agreements reached, and anlyse both the short and medium term 
effects of the intervention. On the basis of that evidence I make claims about the 
general utility of the approach. The thesis concludes with proposals to improve 
Decision Conferencing through a framework that provides guidance for context 
specific process management and helps to ensure that a requisite variety of 
viewpoints are incorporated into management strategy development.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
The question of how to handle the uncertainty and trade-offs among competing 
objectives associated with renewable resource management has been identified as 
crucial in the endeavour to make management more successful (Gulland, 1983; 
Holling, 1978; Thompson, 1993; Walters, 1986). Decision theory is the normative 
theory of how the relative probabilities and desirability of different decision options 
ought to be combined if a decision maker wants his decision to be logically consistent 
and to conform to certain axioms of rationality (Phillips, 1988). Decision analysis is 
the technology that has developed from decision theory for practical applications. It 
gives advice on how to deconstruct problems, on how to analyse the value and 
probability components of the problem, and then on how to re-aggregate both by 
using explicitly stated and logical principles of probability and utility theory (von 
Winterfeldt, 1992).
The aim of this thesis is to analyse how decision analysis can be used to develop a 
fishery management strategy in the Danube Delta Biosphere Reserve (DDBR). There 
are two sets of reasons that warrant this work:
On the practical side, the fishery sector in the Romanian part of the Danube Delta is 
of great national and international importance, but was not managed sustainably. 
Until now, there have been very few applications of decision analysis to renewable 
resource management problems. When this research was started there were only 
three hypothetical studies (DiNardo, Levy, and Golden, 1989; Maguire, 1986; Norton 
and Walker, 1985), and since then there have been two actual applications (Gregory 
and Keeney, 1994; McDaniels, 1995) and a few hypothetical ones. This increase in 
applications of decision analysis to renewable resource management problems 
suggests that there is interest and it has the potential to assist decision-makers, such 
as managers of the DDBRA, to deal coherently with important management 
problems. At the same time, it is still very surprising that there have been so few 
applications of decision analysis in a field in which uncertainty and multiple objectives 
are considered by many to be an important source of the problems encountered 
(Gulland, 1983; Walters, 1986; Pearse, 1992; Gunderson, 1995).
On the theoretical side, there are several decision analysis approaches which differ 
in the rationales, methods, and processes used. In the current literature on the 
application of decision analysis to renewable resource management (or even 
environmental management more generally) there are no comparative analyses of 
the strengths and weaknesses of the different approaches. As a result, there is no
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guidance on which approach to use when. Another shortcoming of the existing 
literature on the use of decision analysis to environmental management is that it has 
not dealt with a number of criticisms that have been levied against its use.
This thesis contains an analysis of the existing literature in the fields of Multi Criteria 
Decision Analysis, fishery management using the Bio-Economic Equilibrium model 
and Total Allowable Catch quotas, New Institutional Economics, Adaptive 
Environmental Management and Assessment, Cultural Theory, and some elements 
of the Organisational Theory, and the Strategic Choice Approach.
I also report the results of my extensive fieldwork in the Danube Delta Biosphere 
Reserve (Romania), as well as the processes and outcomes of the first Decision 
Conference concerned with environmental management. On the basis of this 
research, I provide working hypotheses about the appropriateness of different 
decision analysis approaches for renewable resource management, deal with the 
questions posed about their use in resource management, and provide a framework 
for using the Decision Conferencing approach.
In this chapter, I introduce the Danube Delta Biosphere Reserve (DDBR) fishery and 
show that managers there were faced with difficult problems. The theories, methods, 
and processes they were using did not enable them to develop a coherent fishery 
management strategy. I argue that the problems faced can be grouped into three 
categories:
•  problems relating to the handling of uncertainty;
• problems relating to making trade-offs between competing objectives;
• problems relating to the institutional context within which management takes 
place.
I then introduce Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis and argue that although existing 
proposals hold great expectations from the application of decision analysis to 
environmental management problems, at present only the first two of the three 
problem categories encountered in resource management are addressed: 
systematically incorporating uncertainty and multiple objectives into policy 
development. Core problems relating to the interaction between experts, 
stakeholders and managers, and those dealing with institutional inertia remain 
unresolved.
I propose to address these issues by using Decision Conferencing, a Multiple Criteria 
Decision Analysis approach that has not been suggested, applied, or assessed 
before in relation to environmental management problems. The essence of this thesis
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is a discussion and partial resolution of the theoretical and practical problems of 
choosing between different decision analysis approaches, applying the Decision 
Conferencing approach to environmental management for the first time, and drawing 
lessons from this application.
1.1 Background
The Danube Delta, shown in Figure 1-1, is Europe’s largest (5,800 km2) and least 
developed wetland (EBRD, Euroconsult, and IUCN, 1993). It is a heritage site of 
national and international importance. Its fishery is important because it harbours a 
great diversity of different fish species, it contributes to the livelihood of the 
population living in and around the Delta, and as a part of the Danube Delta as a 
whole is of national and international importance.
Figure 1-1 The Danube Delta
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Fishing in the Danube Delta has been practised for many centuries. Historical
records show that organised fishing took place as far back as the Roman period. In
the early 1920s, 4,000 - 5,000 fishermen were active in the Danube Delta and fish
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catches were as high as 14,000 tonnes (de Graaf, 1994:5, Staras, 1994). Today, the 
number of fishermen is reduced to 600 - 1,000 and the reported catch is less than 
6,000 tonnes.
Since the 19th Century there have been repeated attempts to increase the 
contribution of the fishery to the welfare of Romania through “rational management” 
of the Delta. At the turn of the century Grigore Antipa, who was the Administrator for 
the Lower Danube Region, conducted detailed studies on the biological and 
hydrological conditions of the fishery, as well as on the way it was organised in this 
area (Antipa, 1895, 1905, 1911, 1914,1916,1935). On the basis of these studies he 
made a number of recommendations on how to increase the proportion of the most 
valuable fish species in the total catch and how to organise the fishing industry so 
that the catch would be of the greatest benefit to Romania. His studies are 
considered to hold many important lessons for the fishery today (Staras, 1994).
At the heart of Antipa's proposals for “rational management” were identification and 
enhancement of the breeding and living locations and conditions of the different 
species, and a more systematic and efficient organisation of the fishery. A number of 
his suggestions and policies were implemented and records (Antipa, 1916; Antipa, 
1935) indicate that the quantity of fish caught increased and distant markets were 
reached.
The era of Antipa (approximately 1895-1940) came to end after the Second World 
War, when the Communist Regime took power in Romania. Since then, there have 
been systematic attempts to exploit intensively other natural resources of the Danube 
Delta as well. Researchers at the Danube Delta Research Institute (DDI) have 
identified three distinct phases: “the reed production programme, 1950-1960”, “the 
fish production programme, 1960-1970”, and “Complex Plan for the Exploitation of 
the Danube Delta, 1982-1989” (Savulescu and Volcov, 1993:1). None of these 
“programmes” are considered to have been successful but instead they are viewed 
has having damaged the ecological balance of the Danube Delta. For example, reed 
beds have been destroyed through the use of heavy harvesting machinery which 
damaged the rhizomes, and “empoldering” (the construction of dams around areas 
which would normally be flooded in the spring, for the purpose of agricultural or fish 
farming) led to a loss in biodiversity.
During this period, dramatic changes in the fish population took place. Figure 1-2 
shows that the overall catch decreased from almost 14,000 tonnes per year in 1967 
to less then half of that in the 1990s. Furthermore, the composition of the catch 
changed from one that was characterised by a variety of species to one dominated 
by Prussian carp and bream.
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In addition to ecological damage, the policies pursued by the Ceausescu Regime 
(1967-1989) also affected the population of the Delta negatively. For example, 
traditionally households relied on a wide variety of income and subsistence activities 
(fishing, agriculture, horticulture, animal rearing), whereas now many are more 
vulnerable because they are employees of either agricultural or fishing companies. 
After the revolution of 1989, when many of the subsidised services, such as food and 
transport, were cut back and employment opportunities decreased, the younger 
generation started to migrate to the cities.
Since the 1970s commercial exploitation of the natural resources in the Delta has 
been assisted through research and planning by a number of Romanian research 
and design institutions. One of these, the Danube Delta Research Institute (DDI) is 
located in Tulcea - the capital of the Judet (county) and the biggest city on the border 
to the DDBR. These organisations prepared the plans for polders, identified areas for 
reed harvesting, tested and developed farming methods (agricultural and fish), 
monitored and advised on fish catch, studied the hydrological regime, etc. Their 
programmes and research aims were largely dictated by the Communist Regime and 
they had little room to bring their concerns to bear. For example, even though they 
knew that shallow and flooded areas were important fish breeding grounds, they still 
had to build polders in accordance with central plans for agricultural surface area 
increases or fish farming.
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During the 1980s all economic activities in the Danube Delta were conducted through 
the “Centrala Delta Dunarii”, a centralised and state-owned company. Immediately 
after the Revolution, this holding company was broken up into 21 separate, state- 
owned, companies along lines of activity and geographical concentrations. As part of 
their endowment they received building, equipment, polders, and access to different 
fishing grounds. The future of these companies was uncertain. There is evidence that 
some were able to operate with profit while others reduced activities (Fischer, 1993). 
They were under the control of the Prefecture of the Judet and were going to be 
privatised in the future. During the course of this research private fishing companies 
operating the Danube Delta also emerged but fishermen associations were not 
allowed to harvest resources.
In December 1989 the Ceausescu dictatorship was overthrown and in the immediate 
aftermath, Romania, like the other Eastern European countries that had rid 
themselves of their Communist rulers, strove for a renewal - a break and cleansing 
from the past excesses. This hoped-for renewal encompassed the political, moral, 
social, and environmental spheres (Fischer, 1992).
New leaders took over the government and they quickly moved to halt some of the 
earlier excesses. Among the first actions was the halting of the “Complex Plan for the 
Exploitation of the Danube Delta”. The new Minister of the Environment, a Professor 
of Ecology from the University of Bucharest who had been engaged in research on 
the Danube Delta and the upstream floodplains, was primarily concerned with the 
conservation of the Danube Delta.
As a result of these endeavours, the Danube Delta was declared a Biosphere 
Reserve in August 1990 (Government Decision Nr 983 of 27 August), with its own 
Administration: the Danube Delta Biosphere Reserve Authority (DDBRA). The 
Danube Delta was also declared a Wetland of International Importance in May 1991 
(by the Ramsar Convention Bureau), and parts of Delta were put on the UNESCO 
World Heritage List in December 1991.
1.1.1 The Danube Delta Biosphere Reserve
The first nature reserves with limited protection in the Danube Delta were the marine 
levees of Letea and Rosca-Buhovina in 1940 (Gastescu, 1993:65). Between 1956 
and 1970, five additional reserves were created (reaching a total of 41,511 ha), and 
an additional 600 ha were seasonally protected (Kiss, 1988:233).
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Four birds species (egretta alba, egretta garzetta, pelicanus crispus) have been 
protected from 1933 onwards and a further four (tadoma tadoma, tadoma ferruginea, 
platalea leucordia, himantopus himantopus) since 1955 (Kiss, 1988:233).
On August 27, 1990 through Article 5 Governmental Decree 983 the Danube Delta 
Biosphere Reserve was created. It includes the whole delta and the adjacent Razim 
and Sinoie Lagoon Complex, as well as a management and wardening authority (the 
DDBRA). Initially the DDBRA incorporated a research organisation, the Danube 
Delta Research Institute (DDI), that already existed before the Revolution and which 
at that time executed most of the research and planning work for the State-owned 
companies. The DDI separated again from the DDBRA but they still work together 
closely. In fact, currently most of the research work of the DDBRA is contracted out 
to the DDI.
The DDBR can be divided into six discrete geographic units according to their 
morphological and biological characteristics: (i) the delta itself (including the three 
main river branches of the Chilia, Sulina, and Sf. Gheorghe channels, totalling 4172 
km2)1; (ii) the Razim-Sinoie lagoon complex; (iii) the Black Sea coast out to 20m 
depth; (iv) the undivided River Danube eastwards to Cotu Pisicii; (i) the Isaccea- 
Tulcea flood plain; and (vi) the Murighiol-Plopul saline plains (Baboianu and Goriup, 
1995:6).
1.1.2 Rationale of Biosphere Reserves
Due to the increased concern for the global environment as a whole, UNESCO 
launched the Man and Biosphere (MAB) Programme in 1971 to describe the 
characteristics of the global ecosystem and monitor its evolution and responses to 
human intervention. In 1974 a Task Force of the MAB Programme originated the 
concept of a Biosphere Reserve. Since the launch of the Biosphere Reserve Network 
in 1976, it has grown to include 324 reserves in 83 countries by March 1995.
“This network is a key component in MAB’s objective of achieving a 
sustainable balance between the sometimes conflicting goals of 
conserving biological diversity, promoting economic development, 
and maintaining associated cultural values. Biosphere reserves are 
sites where this objective is tested, refined, demonstrated and 
implemented" (UNESCO, 1990).
Biosphere reserves are terrestrial and/or coastal/marine ecosystem areas that are
internationally recognised within the UNESCO MAB framework. They are nominated
1 82%, or 3446 km2 are situated within Romania, the rest, including a smaller secondary delta, is in the 
Ukraine.
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by national governments and must meet a set of minimal criteria and adhere to a set 
of conditions. Like all other Biosphere Reserves, the Danube Delta Biosphere 
Reserve (DDBR) is intended to fulfil the following three functions:
1. preserve genetic resource, species, ecosystems, and landscapes;
2. foster sustainable economic and human development;
3. support demonstration projects, environmental education, training, research 
and monitoring related to local, national and global issues of conservation and 
sustainable development. (UNESCO, 1990)
There is therefore an explicit recognition and emphasis on the relationship between 
society and nature. In the case of the Danube Delta Biosphere Reserve, the overall 
aim is: “to ensure conservation and protection of existing natural heritage and 
promote ecologically sustainable use of these natural resources” (Baboianu and 
Goriup, 1995:45).
All Biosphere Reserves contain areas of three different levels of protection (see 
Figure 1-3):
1. Core areas: these are securely protected sites for conserving biological 
diversity, monitoring of minimally disturbed ecosystems, and the undertaking 
of non-destructive research and other low-impact uses (e.g. education);
2. Buffer zones: these are clearly identified areas surrounding or adjoining the 
core areas to be used for co-operative activities compatible with sound 
ecological practices (e.g. education, recreation, eco-tourism, applied and 
basic research)
3. Transition or co-operation areas: these are flexible areas which may contain a 
variety of agricultural activities, settlements and other uses and in which local 
communities, management agencies, scientists, non-governmental 
organisations, cultural groups, economic interests and other stakeholders 
work together to manage and sustainably develop the area’s resources. 
(UNESCO, 1990)
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“Biosphere reserves are intended to become models of how we should live with 
nature. They are multipurpose protected areas established to conserve species and 
natural communities, and to find ways to use environments without degrading them. 
Research and monitoring in biosphere reserves will tell us much that we need to 
know about how ecosystems work, how we are changing them, and how we should 
adapt our practices to keep those ecosystems, and the societies that depend on 
them, healthy.” (UNESCO, 1990)
1.1.3 The EBRD Technical Assistance Project
Along with this increased international recognition a number of international technical 
co-operation projects were started. Among these was a major two-year technical 
assistance project for the DDBRA that began in 1993. It was administered by the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and implemented by 
EUROCONSULT, a Dutch consultancy, and IUCN (The World Conservation Union). 
The main beneficiary of this project was the Danube Delta Biosphere Reserve 
Authority (DDBRA). The overall aim of the EBRD project was “to develop the
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capabilities of the DDBRA so that it can produce the first integrated environmental 
management plan for the DDBR” (DDBRA and Douse, 1993:iii).
The objectives that this project was to achieve by assisting the DDBRA to develop 
the “integrated management plan” were determined in 1991 at a seminar held at 
Uzlina (a former residence of Ceausescu inside the Delta and now used as a 
conference and information centre by the DDBRA). The attendees (international and 
local experts2, local political representatives, and staff of the new administration) set 
the following objectives:
1. Provide a legal framework to secure the aims and governance of the 
Biosphere Reserve over the long term.
2. Establish appropriate qualitative and quantitative management 
capacity for meeting the Biosphere Reserve objectives.
3. Establish management procedures and planning processes.
4. Ensure that the local population is aware of the aims, goals and 
operations of the DDBR and their representatives actively and fully 
participate in planning and decision-making.
5. a) Ensure wise use of the natural resources of the Delta.
b) Protect populations of rare, endangered and typical species, their 
communities and habitats.
c) Support recolonisation and re-establishment of species now extinct 
in the Delta.
6. Ensure that all economic activity is ecologically sustainable.
1. Arrest the decline in local population levels.
8. Maintain the cultural heritage of the local population.
9. Maintain or restore the natural operations and functions of the Delta 
ecosystem.
10. a) Create an integrated monitoring system.
b) Evaluate and analyse trends in support of management.
c) Integrate research initiatives and strengthen and link institutions 
engaged on research and monitoring.” (IUCN, 1991)
In early 1993 I had started to look for a suitable place to do my research. As I was
bom in Romania, speak Romanian, and because of the knowledge that I had gained
through my M.Sc. dissertation on “The environment in Romania’s economic
transition”, I contacted the EBRD to explore the possibility of organising my PhD field
work in Eastern Europe. On their advice, I contacted the project managers who had
already started their work in the DDBR, and was invited to join their team as a
researcher and trainer. The Terms of Reference of my involvement are detailed in
Section 10.2 (Appendix). I was asked to work closely with the Resident Advisor and
2 The experts constituted the “International Steering Committe for Conservation of the Danube Delta” 
and comprised the following organizations: IUCN - The World Conservation Union, Birdlife International, 
International Waterfowl and Wetlands Research Bureau, World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), 
Foundation for International Nature Protection, UNSCO - World Heritage Secretariat, and the Bureau of 
the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat. See 
also EBRD, Euroconsult, and IUCN (1993:19) and IUCN (1991).
23
other members of the technical assistance programme and “to transfer expertise to 
appropriate staff of the newly formed DDBRA, Planning, and Investment Department” 
(my Terms of Reference).
My Terms of Reference also specified that I was to organise a Decision Conference 
on one of the natural resource sectors that I was required to investigate. Although the 
Decision Analysis approaches that I proposed to evaluate could have been used for 
dealing with a number of resource management questions faced in the DDBR, I 
finally chose to apply it to the fishery for three reasons. First, the fishery management 
problems were considered by all to be important and difficult. They included multiple 
competing objectives (for example, conservation vs. sustainable use), and they 
involved many uncertain elements (e.g., what was the real state of the fish stock and 
what caused the observed changes, how many fishermen are there, what gear do 
they employ, what management interventions are most likely to succeed, etc.). These 
characteristics meant that decision analysis would be the appropriate technology to 
assist and guide the development of internally consistent management strategies.
Secondly, since the fishery is considered to be one of the most important resources 
of the DDBR, any headway one could make (in terms of making its management 
more consistent with the objectives for the DDBR) would be of great benefit to the 
local population and at the same time contribute to biodiversity conservation. The 
third reason for choosing the fishery sector relates to the feasibility of drawing 
important local and internationally relevant lessons for management of complex 
natural resource systems. There is a very large literature on fishery management and 
that made it possible to build on the knowledge and experience gained in other parts 
of the world.
1.2 Development of Fishery Management Strategies
An outline of current fishery management practice and examples in support of my 
argument that the methodologies employed face three kinds of difficulties is 
presented below. The difficulties are that they deal inadequately with uncertainties 
about the causes of observed behaviour and the likely effects of different policies; 
they are too focused on readily measurable objectives; and they do not address the 
effects of the institutional context on management.
1.2.1 The basis of current fishery management practice
Modern fish management, like that practised in the DDBR, which uses quotas 
determined by the study of fish population dynamics to regulate fishing intensity, has 
been developed only this century (Rettig, Berkes, and Pinkerton, 1989). It consists of
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two main elements: (i) a scientifically established maximum quantity of fish that can 
be harvested which leaves enough fish in the water so that the stock can regenerate 
itself for the next season (this is called the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY)), and 
(ii) a set of rules (or property rights regime), which are incentive and enforcement 
mechanisms aimed at ensuring that fishermen harvest fish sustainably.
The concept of MSY was developed by biologists on the premise that fish 
populations tend to develop to a maximum size within any given ecosystem (this is 
called the “carrying capacity”) and that populations below carrying capacity generate 
a certain harvestable surplus. If fishing was stopped, the surplus would lead to the 
growth of the biomass and the fish stock would return to its carrying capacity size. 
Therefore, if one was fishing only this surplus, a given stock size of fish could be 
maintained, together with a sustainable yield.
To calculate such a sustainable yield, four variables need to be considered: (i) the 
natural rates of growth of the fish, (ii) the rate of reproduction of fish (called 
“recruitment”), (iii) actual intensity of fishing (called “fishing effort”), and (iv) the 
natural mortality of the fish. All of these variables are usually uncertain because they 
are affected by many factors about which fishery scientists need to make 
assumptions. The results or recommendations about how much fish may be 
sustainably harvested are always associated with uncertainty. However, one of the 
main complaints in the literature is that very often the recommendations by scientists, 
such as those in the Danube Delta, do not include indications of this uncertainty 
(Gulland, 1983; Walters, 1986; Pearse, 1992; Gunderson, 1995).
From the economists’ perspective, fishing is valuable insofar as it is “capable of 
yielding harvests of a value greater than the costs of harvesting. This surplus or net 
value is referred to as resource rent” (Pearse, 1980:13). As long as marginal costs 
are smaller than marginal revenue it is economically worthwhile to increase effort and 
to catch more. Where access to the fishery is open and people cannot be excluded 
from fishing, the result is that the quality and/or quantity of fish caught decreases to 
the point where the fishery collapses because there are not enough fish left over to 
regenerate the stock. To avoid this, rules have been devised to govern the extraction 
of fish.
Such rules can be based on traditional knowledge, or may be scientifically 
determined, and they can be formal or informal. However, they always need to 
address the following issues: how much to extract, how to extract, who is to extract, 
how benefits are to be shared, and how to enforce these rules. The rules governing a 
fishery must also take into account the characteristics of the resource (how quickly it
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grows, how it interacts with other species and other environmental factors, minimal 
stock levels for reproduction, where and how it reproduces).
Restrictions on fishing have not changed much over time. They have always included 
a variety of restrictions on gear, time and areas for fishing, incentives for sustainable 
fishing practices, quotas, and methods for revenue redistribution.
In the Danube Delta Biosphere Reserve the DDBRA is responsible for managing the 
fishery. From the time that they were given this mandate they sought to re-design the 
existing management regime to one that protected the fish stocks from 
overexploitation and reversed the decline of fish landings experienced over the past 
years. The DDBRA started this reform process by contracting the DDI to conduct fish 
stock assessments and to make proposals for how the fishery could be managed 
sustainably.
Although there was no written account of the management system the DDBRA was 
seeking, my interviews with staff of the Authority and the fishery scientists of the DDI 
indicated that they sought to establish the state of the fish stocks in the different parts 
of the Danube Delta, then issue Total Allowable Catch quotas to the fishing 
companies, and then make sure (through a combination of policing and awareness 
raising) that fishermen did not fish more than what they were supposed to. In spite of 
the apparent simplicity of this approach, the DDBRA and DDI encountered a number 
of problems. The problems can be grouped into three categories: difficulties in 
dealing with uncertainty, multiple objectives, and the institutional context within which 
the fishery management strategy process took place.
In the following three sections I briefly present some evidence for these problems, 
giving first some examples from the Danube Delta and then summarising the general 
problem.
1.2.2 Dealing with Uncertainty
The first difficulty with the prevailing approach to fishery management was that the 
studies that were conducted and the envisioned management approach did not deal 
with the uncertainty of fishery management satisfactorily. Although the DDI scientists 
and DDBRA managers were unable to establish the causes for many of the 
phenomena they observed, due “insufficient data”, and even though they were 
unsure of what the effects of different management measures would be, the findings 
they presented in their reports did not include any reference to uncertainty. Instead, 
they produced some spuriously exact figures for how much fishing yields would 
change if fishing was done with fishing gear with different characteristics.
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Two examples are sufficient to illustrate this point. The first relates to the fact that 
even though reports only briefly refer to the problem of poaching and under-reporting 
of landed catch, researchers, managers, and fishermen all acknowledge in private 
conversations that as much as 30-50% of the real catch does not appear in the 
official records. Instead of incorporating this knowledge in their analysis, the fishery 
studies and the management proposals make recommendations only on the basis of 
the officially reported data that is known to be very inaccurate.
A second example relates to the implications of the Danube Delta being a complex 
ecosystem, which is very dynamic and subject to strong seasonal variations. In the 
Inception Report of the EBRD Technical Assistance Project, Paul Goriup, an 
ecologist appointed by IUCN to be the resident advisor for the project, characterised 
the DDBR ecosystems thus:
“Even under entirely undisturbed, natural conditions a delta 
ecosystem is highly dynamic. The fundamental physical processes 
of water flow and sedimentation transport can vary enormously from 
season to season, and from year to year. Aquatic and terrestrial 
habitats associated with the delta can arise and disappear with a 
single flood. Over long periods of time (measured in centuries) a 
certain degree of stability may be attained, but any sudden changes 
in the ecosystem (whether due to local or upstream events) can 
have rapid and far-reaching consequences, causing a major and 
permanent shift in ecosystem characteristics.” (EBRD, Euroconsult, 
and IUCN, 1993:11)
Under such dynamic ecosystem conditions, leaving the dynamics of the social 
systems in a time of transition from the communist to a free market regime aside for 
the moment, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to determine precise and enforceable 
Total Allowable Catch quotas. This assertion is bom out of the fact that even though 
fishing companies have stated in their official reports to the authorities that they have 
fished more than their allocated quota, the DDBRA and the DDI were not able to 
conclude that they were over-fishing because they had to admit that there may have 
been natural factors at work that produced unexpected high fish stocks that year 
(Navodaru etal., 1993:21).3
In spite of these circumstances, the DDBRA adopted a fishery management 
approach that sought to determine optimum levels of fishing intensity for different 
zones of the DDBR. This choice also meant that they needed accurate information
3 For example, one can see in Figure 1-2 that the proportion of Prussian Carp suddenly increased 
around 1973. It is not clear what caused this. Scientists assume that an unexplained change in 
environmental conditions - maybe the extraordinarily severe flood of 1970 - brought these changes. How 
exactly this relates to the increase of that species is not clear.
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on the number of fishermen and the gear with which the fish were being caught. 
However, the quality of that information was even worse than that of the landed 
catch, but again, the implications of that were only discussed verbally but they were 
not reflected in the written recommendations.
These examples highlight two problems: first, from a technical perspective there is 
the question of how one can incorporate uncertainty into the analysis; and secondly, 
from a process perspective, it shows that there is also the problem of managing 
interdisciplinary and collaborative work, since neither the DDBRA manager, nor the 
DDI scientists, nor the fishermen were in a position to overcome these problems on 
their own. Instead, all these stakeholders needed to collaborate and bring their 
expertise and knowledge to bear in the development of a management strategy that 
was sustainable (for evidence that this situation is not unique to Romania, see for 
example Gulland (1983), Pearse and Walters (1992), McDaniels (1995), or Walters 
(1986)).
1.2.3 Dealing with conflicting objectives
All fishery management must deal with conflicting objectives. Whenever there is 
more than one objective then there are trade-offs because not all objectives can be 
maximised at the same time. The most basic trade-off in fishery management is 
about the short-term intensity of fishing and longer-term conservation (leaving 
enough fish in the water for the fish stock to survive).
Another example of conflicting objectives in fishery management concerns the 
advantages and disadvantages of Total Allowable Catch (TAC) management. The 
advantages relate to fact that it is widely used, it is easy to understand, and it often 
works quite well when there is sufficient reliable data. However, TAC management 
also has disadvantages because fishermen are often not willing to declare true 
amount of fish that they caught, fearing that this might have negative repercussions 
on the quota they get in the following year. When choosing a management approach, 
fishery managers need to make judgements about whether the advantages or 
disadvantages are bigger. These judgements are often made very difficult because 
there are a many stakeholders, alternatives, and objectives to consider. In addition to 
that, I have indicated in the previous section, the data about all these elements is 
usually uncertainty.
A second example from the DDBR shows some more aspects of the difficulties 
involved in handling conflicting objectives: Biosphere Reserves are supposed to 
conserve important resource and provide lessons for how we should interact with 
nature. One of the most visible aspects of the environment that the Ceausescu
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Regime has produced is the polders created for agriculture and fish farming. They do 
not look natural because they run mostly in straight lines, the dams are elevated The 
vegetation in them is usually very domesticated and typical of dry areas, not as one 
expects in flood prone area such as a Delta.
The DDBRA and DDI would like to break these embankments down and let the 
Danube flood those areas naturally. Ironically, one of the problems encountered in 
the management planning work of the EBRD technical assistance project was that 
the water in the polders and canals of the Delta which were cut off from the Danube 
river was cleaner and probably the last refuge of the most threatened fresh water fish 
species. When this conflict and trade-off was pointed out by the EBRD project 
consultant, it sparked quite a debate not only among the staff of the DDBRA and 
DDI, but also among politicians, laymen, fishermen, members of the Romanian 
Academy of the Sciences, and others.
For most of the people who took part in these discussions the issues I raised in these 
examples were not surprising because they had experienced them, but none of the 
many reports that were prepared over the previous years mentioned them. This, I 
argue, is further evidence for my hypothesis that the methods they were using were 
falling short of what was required of them.
In addition to the measurement, comparison, and process difficulties that I have 
already mentioned in relation to dealing with conflicting objectives, another factor that 
probably affected the choices made in the DDBRA's approach for dealing with these 
problems was the long communist history and the associated command and control 
management. Under communism, management objectives were much narrower than 
those of the Biosphere Reserve, focusing primarily on maximising the quantity of fish 
produced. In some ways the choice of the DDBRA to focus exclusively on the 
improvement of fish stock and the monitoring of fishing activity with the aim of putting 
management on a ‘rational basis’ can be seen as a continuation of the traditional 
narrow focus - though the specific objective sought to be maximised was replaced.
1.2.4 The Effects of the Institutional Context
Until now the MCDA literature has not taken the institutional context into 
consideration. The existing literature either ignores the issue altogether or it 
considers it only from a behavioural standpoint.
The first reason for taking the institutional context into consideration is that it affects 
the process by which management policy is formulated. For example, part of the 
reason why collaboration between DDI scientists and DDBRA managers, or between
29
departments of the same organisation was difficult, was that both were highly 
specialised organisations in which communication was very formal. Both had 
elaborate administrative structures, and the power of decision making in both was 
very centralised. These institutional characteristics also made interaction with 
stakeholders, such as fishermen, very strenuous. One of the effects of this was that 
in the preparation of fishery management policy between 1991 and 1994, 
stakeholders were not consulted and as a result, when the DDBRA presented a new 
fishery licensing framework to the public in early 1994, they were faced with much 
criticism from fishing companies, the media, as well as individual fishermen who went 
to protest against it at the DDBRA headquarters.
The following quote from Walters (1986), who is fishery management scientist, 
captures many of the issues that I have raised in the last three sections well:
“So throw together some hatchery managers, law enforcement 
officers, ecological biologists, administrative personnel, and perhaps 
quite a few others. Call this a management agency. Now ‘interface’ 
it somehow with its constituents, ranging from politicians worrying 
about the next election, to concerned conservationists, to careful 
business entrepreneurs, to ‘cowboys’ out to take the biggest catch 
this year. Be sure to throw in a few characters with complex 
motives, like an operator of sport fishing charters who loudly 
opposes fishing regulations that would make it easier to catch fish 
without his help. Finally, consider the resource itself, a complex 
ecological system that is too expensive to monitor thoroughly, 
changes unpredictably in response to environmental factors, and 
generally offers all sorts of conflicting signals that are open to every 
interpretation from imminent disaster to grand opportunity. There 
you have your modem management situation. It is little wonder that 
progress appears to be almost non-existent, that only major cnses 
seem to elicit concerted response, and that resource managers are 
often branded as cynics with little concern for resource husbandry. ”
(Walters, 1986:30)
1.3 Decision Analysis and Environmental Management
Decision Theory on which Decision Analysis (DA) is based, has at its core the 
principle of coherence: “people strive to make decisions that at a point in time fit 
together, are consistent, and do not contradict each other" (Phillips, 1986).
In 1968 the term “Decision Analysis” was created by Ronald Howard of Stanford 
University through the combination of Decision Theory with Systems Analysis 
(Howard, 1966). The first full exposition of DA was then provided by (Raiffa, 1968).
Up to that point the theory applied only to the comparison of uncertain decisions
which differed only in one respect. Through the work of Keeney and Raiffa (1976)
decision theory was extended to cover those cases where the consequences of
decisions differed in more than one way. They showed that the overall expected
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utility of such a decision can be calculated by assigning importance weights to each 
of the utilities for the different dimensions of the decision consequence and then, in 
the simplest model, adding these all up to give the overall utility.
The methodology of decision analysis consists of decomposing a decision problem 
into its factual and value parts, analysing the factual parts as probability problems, 
analysing the value parts as utility problems, and re-aggregating both by using 
explicitly stated and logical principles of probability and utility theory (von Winterfeldt, 
1992:321).
Over the past thirty years Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) has benefited 
from the contributions of many disciplines: operational research, management 
science, psychology, economics, and many others. The traditional intellectual home 
of DA is in the USA. The early developers of DA were based at Stanford (R. 
Howard), Harvard (Howard Raiffa, and Ralph Keeney in the 1970’s) and at the 
University of Southern California (Ward Edwards, Detlof von Winterfeldt, and since 
the 1980’s Ralph Keeney). In Europe the leading Decision Analysts were based at 
the London School of Economics (Lawrence Phillips), London Business School 
(Bunn, Moore), and Cambridge University (Watson). Today decision analysis is being 
taught and practised in many different countries. The field is still characterised by a 
close connection to academia and by a strong influence of different disciplines.
A number of different schools have developed within the decision analysis field and a 
number of different groupings have been proposed over time in the literature (for 
example Merkhofer (1987), Phillips (1989), and Watson and Buede (1987)). In this 
thesis I argue that with respect to the use of decision analysis in the renewable 
resource management field, existing applications can be classified as variations of 
only one major decision analysis approach: Multiple Stakeholder Decision Analysis 
(best summarized in Winterfeldt, 1992).
1.3.1 Existing Applications: The Multiple-Stakeholder Approach to DA 
(MSDA)
Considering the fact that fishery managers continuously grapple with uncertainty and 
multiple objectives, it is very surprising to find only the following few Decision 
Analysis papers where decision analysis is being used specifically for fishery 
management Keeney (1977); Walker, Rettig, and Hilbom (1983); McDaniels (1995); 
McDaniels, Healey, and Paisley (1994).
Of these, only Keeney (1977) and McDaniels, Healey, and Paisley (1994) report 
actual applications, the others are hypothetical case studies. The main arguments
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made in these publications is, as I will discuss in detail in Chapter 3, that Decision 
Analysis can help decision makers analyse problems by aiding them to decompose 
the problem into a value part (which may be analysed through value or utility 
functions), and a factual part (which is analysed through probabilities). The 
Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) Theorem is then used to bring the two components 
together again.
I will argue in Chapter 3 that it is useful to take von Winterfeldt (1992) as the key 
reference for the existing applications of Decision Analysis to environmental issues 
(even if it does not deal with fishery management) because it contains the most 
comprehensive methodological summary and the other decision analyses referred to 
above can be seen as elaborations of various aspects of the approach presented in 
von Winterfeldt (1992). Von Winterfeldt (1992) calls that approach the Multiple 
Stakeholder Approach to Decision Analysis (MSDA). It is characterised by “division of 
labour” between technical experts who provide estimates on consequences, and 
other stakeholders who provide the value judgements regarding the consequences in 
the form of utility judgements. The justification given for employing this approach is 
that it resolves the dilemma that: “Experts should not control technological choices 
but the public and political representatives are not sufficiently informed to assume 
complete control themselves” (von Winterfeldt, 1992). The techniques used are quite 
formal probability and utility elicitation methods, the approach uses multiple 
stakeholders and expert inputs, and the key advantages are broad input, assistance 
to stakeholders to solve common problem in co-operative way, and to assist experts 
in their analysis.
Another important paper is Gregory and Keeney (1994). They report on workshops 
held with stakeholders, where an environmental management problem (in their case 
a proposed coal mining development in a biodiversity rich location in Malaysia) is 
structured in a decision theoretic way. Through work with stakeholders on a precise 
articulation of their values the basis for an improved set of policy options is created. 
This, Gregory and Keeney (1994) argue, “assists governments to make wise and 
defensible decisions which are in the long-term interest of the people”. Some of the 
advantages referred to in the paper include: “Consensus” and “constructed balanced 
compromises” which avoid polarised views. Other published applications which could 
be classified under this approach include (Keeney, 1988; Keeney, von Winterfeldt, 
and Eppel, 1990) which are concerned with the clarification of public values for 
making public policy decisions in the energy field in Germany, and alternatives in the 
shipment of spent nuclear fuel from power plants to a repository respectively.
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An example of the application of Multiple-Criteria Decision Analysis in a more 
traditional form (working with only one set of stakeholders, following Keeney and 
Raiffa, (1976)) in a hypothetical fishery management case is McDaniels (1995). The 
key argument is that the mathematical modelling and simulation through which 
experts and managers try to understand the fishery better does not pay enough 
attention to the key judgements that need to be made. As in the Multiple-Stakeholder 
Approach the separation of judgements (by stakeholders) on values and experts (on 
technical judgements) is also made. However, the emphasis is then on the work with 
the experts and decision-makers as they deal with conflicting objectives, biological 
uncertainties, structural complexity, compressed time frame, and potentially high 
stakes. The stated key advantages are guidance on the avoidance of biases in 
judgement and enhanced resource modelling.
Within the MSDA literature there are also questions about use and possible 
limitations. Von Winterfeldt (1992:339-342) raises the following questions regarding 
the appropriateness of the MSDA approach:
• If you have multiple stakeholders and multiple experts under what conditions 
can you still use DA, which is really a theory for how an individual decision 
maker ought to make decisions if he wants his preference to be coherent?
• The approach relies heavily on the distinction between the value and fact 
dimension. The question therefore becomes: how far should you take this 
analysis if you acknowledge that values and facts shape each other, as well 
as problem formulation, etc.?
• The approach is “silent” about process issues, even though “in many cases 
the process is at least as important as the methodology itself’. He considers 
that the following process issues have not been resolved satisfactorily: when 
should stakeholders meet? What forms should the meetings take? How long 
should stakeholders and experts interact? Should experts be encouraged to 
develop consensus opinions, and how could this be achieved? How could the 
role and influence of the analyst be limited?
1.3.2 Decision Conferencing
Decision Conferencing is an alternative Decision Analysis approach. The most 
notable difference to MSDA is that much of the analysis is being conducted in a 
workshop setting where stakeholders, experts, decision makers interact with a 
trained the facilitator and a decision analyst. Most of the analysis is conducted on- 
the-spot, while with MSDA most of the analysis is done away from the client.
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Decision Conferencing (DC) is best captured in Phillips (1984) and Phillips, (1988). 
His rationale for developing and using DC is based on Jaques’ (1976; 1996) 
definition of human work: “exercising discretion within prescribed limits”. Exercising 
discretion means “considering uncertainty, forming preferences, and taking 
decisions”. In a complex environment, where the likelihood of events and preferences 
is unclear, decision theory can be used to ensure that preferences are coherent. 
Using Jaques’ Stratified System Theory, he argues that the “prescribed limits” are set 
by the organisational context and with higher management levels the complexity 
becomes greater. In organisations it is always individual managers who are 
accountable for decisions, even if responsibility for implementation can be delegated 
to others, and much of managerial work takes place within a managerial team 
setting. His work is therefore directed towards helping groups of people exercise 
discretion, in the sense of forming preferences, making judgements, and taking 
decisions within complex environments such that their preferences are coherent.
DC is characterised by an interactive, consultative process between problem owners 
and specialists (analysts), where decision theory is used more as a framework than a 
mathematical technique. Data are handled quantitatively as well as in a ‘soft’, 
qualitative way. In his 1988 paper Phillips summarised DC as integrating three 
elements (see also Figure 1-4): (i) Decision Theory (ii) trained facilitators who are 
aware of the effects of group processes on the effectiveness of the work of 
individuals in groups, and (iii) Information Technology for the purpose of processing 
data efficiently and effectively and displaying results in interactive sessions.
















Phillips argues that the key advantages of this approach are that it leads to a shared 
understanding of a problem, encourages creative thinking, builds commitment in a 
group, generates action plans, captures all perspectives on a problem, and it reveals 
assumptions made by people in a useful way.
Decision Conferencing (DC) has not yet been applied to environment related 
problems in a form that is compatible with Phillips’ rationale and methods. Examples 
of applications which differ significantly from Phillips would be Reagan-Cicerone et 
a/., (1991) who apply, characteristically for all Decision Conferences, a facilitated 
workshop approach with the use of information technology, but instead of using 
decision analysis to model participants perception of the problems, they used 
systems simulation models and other techniques; or Hamalainen and Leikola, 
(forthcoming) who worked with Finnish parliamentarians on their judgements about 
energy policies for Finland.
There have been a number of explanations offered for why divisions or differentiation 
exist within DA. Some argue that some approaches are simply wrong - or at least do 
not apply real DA. Others relate it more to marketing different brands of a similar 
product (Keeney, 1994). Keeney, for example, argues that there is competition 
between the different schools, and the academics around which the different models 
have developed, and that the strategy adopted is to concentrate on a particular field 
of application (military, technological choice, nuclear or electricity field, medicine, 
pharmaceuticals, etc.). Phillips, on the other hand, argues that the approaches differ 
in a number of respects:
“The schools differ in their emphasis on modelling uncertainty, 
modelling multiple criteria, modelling the environment or the 
individual’s view of it, the role of information, the focus on value or 
utility, the degree to which model building is seen as an iterative 
activity with full involvement of the client, and the focus on 
individuals or groups” (Phillips, 1989:86).
Later Phillips (unpublished) argues that there is also a deeper dichotomy, which he
locates in the positivism-empiricism versus social constructivism (naturalism) debate.
A positivist-empiricist worldview assumes “a single, existing reality that can be
studied in a value-free inquiry by an independent observer who examines the effect
of independent variables on dependent variables and arrives at time- and context-
free generalisations. On the other hand, naturalism assumes that reality is multiple
and constructed, to be studied holistically in value-bound inquiries by an investigator
who is part of the reality and who examines the mutual simultaneous shaping of
systems, leading to time- and context-bound working hypotheses” (Phillips,
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unpublished:2). The implication of these two metatheoretical assumptions for 
research in Decision Analysis is that a positivist “seeks to understand and predict 
behaviour, and our belief in reductionism leads us to the laboratory so we can 
exercise control in experimental settings over extraneous and unwanted influences. 
As social constructivists, we seek understanding both about what is and what could 
be, and we are more concerned with what could help people than with predicting 
their behaviour” (Phillips, unpublished: 13).
1.4 Study questions
1) Are previous applications of Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis to fishery 
management satisfactory?
The fact that there have been so few applications of Decision Analysis, the 
technology derived from the application of Decision Theory (the normative theory of 
decision making under conditions of uncertainty) to fishery management, which is a 
field in which uncertainty and multiple objectives are much discussed and 
problematic issues merits investigation. Is it a case where fishery managers have 
missed good opportunities to employ a technology that is already sufficiently well 
developed for their needs?
The hypothesis that I put forward on the basis of an examination of the existing 
literature in relation to a detailed analysis of the suitability of MCDA in the case of the 
Danube Delta Biosphere Reserve, is that stakeholder collaboration and participation 
in decision making, particularly under conditions of sharply differing interpretations of 
evidence, are not handled well enough. Since these are issues that relate to the 
interaction between individuals (intra- and inter organisational) I refer to it as the 
institutional context.
Furthermore, Decision Conferencing has not yet been applied, even though it is a 
valid approach which, due to the successful application in other fields, should be 
relevant for cases such as the DDBR as well.
There is also some criticism of DA within the fishery management literature 
(especially Walters (1986), and Pearse and Walters (1992)) that needs to be 
addressed.
2) How does the institutional context influence the development of fisheries 
management strategies?
We need to examine the institutional context within which managers of the DDBRA 
are operating. Specifically, we first need to examine alternative views of the 
interaction between the social, economic, and ecological systems that together form
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the DDBR, and secondly examine the organisational characteristics of the DDBRA 
and the effects that these have on the work of staff of the DDBRA.
The New Institutional Economics literature argues against centralised command-and- 
control management because of the high transaction costs. Instead, we need quite a 
fundamental change in the management approach of the DDBRA towards co­
management. The important point here is that the DDBRA need not (and possibly 
can’t) determine all those parameters that it set out to establish. Instead, it must 
make much more fundamental changes in its management role within the DDBR.
3) Can the Decision Conferencing approach be used to assist the Danube Delta 
Biosphere Reserve Authority develop an adaptive fishery management 
strategy?
My analysis will show that theoretically Decision Conferencing is a promising 
approach for assisting the DDBRA develop an adaptive fishery management 
strategy. Until now, however, Decision Conferencing has not been applied in practice 
to natural resource management problems. In order to learn more about the benefits 
and shortcomings of the approach it is therefore necessary to apply Decision 
Conferencing in practice.
I will argue that Decision Conferencing is the preferred Decision Analysis approach 
when the task is one of transforming the shared problem understanding among a 
diversity of stakeholders, strengthening management capacity, and there is little time 
available. While DC courts the representation of a diversity of viewpoints in a 
Decision Conference, the existing approach can be supplemented by a more 
proactive pursuit of diversity. A possibility that merits further examination is the use of 
Cultural Theory.
1.5 Research Organization and Methodology
1.5.1 Timing and organization
I started my PhD research on the subject of “operationalizing sustainable 
development through the use of Bayesian statistics” in the fall of 1992.
The first half year was spent reviewing the literature and refining the research 
questions and agenda. Within this period two important developments took place: 
first, I learned about the existence of Decision Analysis and realized that many of the 
probability and preference assessment aspects necessary for my fieldwork had 
already been developed within the field of Decision Analysis. Though the applications 
of Decision Analysis were wide ranging, curiously it had not been applied within the
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sustainable development field. The second important development was that the 
review of the literature enabled me to choose a particularly interesting area of the 
‘sustainable development’ field as the focus of my research: common pool resources.
Having decided on common pool resources I started to seek a suitable fieldwork 
project. I investigated two lines in particular: first, coral reef management and fishery 
management. In early 1993 I learned about the EBRD financed project in the Danube 
Delta. I used the background information on the project that I received from the 
EBRD project manager to develop several possible lines of investigation that would 
fit with my research interests and be of use for the project. The latter was important 
because (i) my limited research funding meant that the only way in which I could do a 
significant amount of fieldwork was if I received some subsistence payment; and (ii) 
the best way of testing and developing the use of Decision Analysis for renewable 
resource management was through the application to a real and live problem.
In the summer of 1993 I first met with Paul Goriup, who was the IUCN appointed 
resident advisor of the EBRD project, in England, and in late August 1993, almost 
exactly one year after starting my PhD, I first visited the Danube Delta. In the course 
of the month of my first visit I worked with the project manager to complete the 
economic survey (Fisher, 1993). I discussed with the resident advisor and the project 
manager my research agenda explaining the rationale of my research and that 
illustrated the potential usefulness of my research for a variety of different aspects of 
protected area management strategy development. My Terms of Reference (see 
Appedix 10.2) were written on the basis of those discussions.
My TOR show a number of different aspects: first, I was not a regular consultant 
member of the project team, but instead my status as “researcher” was formally 
acknowledged (and also reflected in the subsistence pay I received); second, the 
core of my work related to the intersection between economics and management, 
and more specifically the analysis of alternatives for situations where there is great 
uncertainty (objective 1 refered primarily to the fishery since that is the most 
important economic sector but it was stated vaguely so as to give me sufficient 
flexibility to focus on what I considered most suitable for my research; objective 2 
acknowledged the fact that policy analysis needed to take into account the situation 
of many different stakeholders which had not been considered up that point; 
objective 3 refers to road construction projects which were discussed in 1993 but 
which were not taken any further). Objective 4, “compiling and assessing the extent 
and quality of existing information pertinent to management planning within the 
DDBR” formally required me to report on the data and information that I was going to 
analyse for the purpose of my PhD research. Objective 5, “assist the resident advisor
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and other members .... and to transfer expertise to appropriate staff of the DDBRA 
Planning, Policy and Investement Department”, clarified my relationship to the project 
team and, most importantly for the action research that I was conducting, my 
relationship to the DDBRA. I discuss the organizational specifics of the DDBRA in 
detail in Chapter 5, but at this point it is important to note that the Department 
referred to was headed by the Executive Director.
In the first half of 1994 I contucted two more month long visits to the DDBR (one in 
February, other in April-May). During this time I collected and examined the primary 
data that I report in Chapters 1, 2 and 5. In addition to the research reports of the DDI 
which form the core of my analysis with respect to the adequacy of the 
methodologies used for fishery management I also conducted numerous interviews 
with DDI, DDBRA, and University of Bucharest researchers (faculties of Biology, 
Ecology, and Geography), fishing companies, as well as extended visits to the 
villages in the Delta and surrounding area. The analysis of the data took place mostly 
in London. During this period I analysed the suitability of the different decision 
analysis approaches for the problems faced in the DDBR and developed plans to 
apply both MSDA as well as Decision Conferencing.
The longest visit to the DDBR took place in the summer /  fall of 1994 .1 spent most of 
the period between August and October in the DDBR, interrupted only by one short 
visit to London where I finilized the arrangements for Peter Hall’s 4 day visit in 
October (the decision conference facilitator that I arranged through the London 
School of Economics).
After the Decision Conference of October 1994 that I report in this thesis I had two 
more occasions to visit the DDBR iri first half 2000. These visits were as part of a 
World Bank project which sought to help the DDBRA incorporate economics into their 
decision making process on ecological restoration and to conduct economic 
feasability analyses on the GEF projects executed over the past 3 years -  one of 
these projects (the Pilot fishing association with their own ‘cherhana’4) is the direct 
result of the decision conference reported in this thesis. The delays in the completion 
of my dissertation that came about due to financial and other personal events were 
unforseen, but they enabled me to examine the far reaching effect that my work has 
had on fishery management and the wider aspects of protected area management in 
the DDBR.
4 Fish collection point.
39
1.5.2 Methodology and Scope
The choice of the methodological approach in general and the specifc research 
components in particular were informed by the research questions -  as presented in 
Section 1.4 above.
I limit my examination of the Decision Analysis literature to the Multiple Criteria 
Decision Analysis field that uses Expected Utility theory and which has reported 
applications or suggestions for use in the environmental management field. This 
means that I am not dealing with applications of the Analytic Hierachy Process 
approach (see for example Saaty (1994) or di Nardo, Levy, and Golden (1989)), or 
with approach to Decision Analysis developed by the Strategic Decision Group (see 
for example Howard and Matheson (1989)).
Within this thesis I will be using the terms Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) 
and Decision Analysis (DA) interchangeably, mostly because otherwise MCDA may 
be confused with Multiple Stakeholder Decision Analysis (MSDA).
In the following I discuss the research steps associated with each of the hypotheses I 
am investigating.
1) Are previous applications of Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis to fishery
management satisfactory?
To answer this question my method involves the following steps:
(i) Describe and analyse the problems and issues that need to be addressed 
in fishery mangement. I examine the situation of the fishery in the DDBR 
using the original research and management reports by the DDI as my 
primary literature. I also refer to the older literature on the Danube Delta, 
and wider management literature. One needs both the methods and the 
immediate context of fishery management. (Chapter 2)
(ii) Determine the extent to which the existing fishery management approach 
and the methods employed are able to deal with the issues so as to be 
work out the criteria by which one should judge wether the existing MCDA 
approaches are satisfactory (Chapter 2)
(iii) Present the previous applications of MCDA which are to be examined. In 
Chapter 3 I review all published MCDA approaches and analyse how one 
could use them in order to overcome these three problem types.
(iv) Describe how these approaches could be used in the DDBR
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(v) Predict the likely outcomes of applying the MCDA approaches and 
methods.
(vi) Compare the likely effects of applying MCDA against the criteria 
developed. Judge how satisfactory the outcomes are.
On that basis I then decide whether or not to apply that approach or to develop ro try 
to apply new or modified approach.
I conclude that three types of problems remain unsatisfactorily resolved: (i) those 
relating to conflicting objectives; (ii) those relating to uncertainty; and (iii) the 
institutional context. The crucial stumbling block is how they are dealing with inter- 
and intra-organizational issues (i.e. the institutional context). Even though all the 
existing decision analysis literature that deals with environmental management 
problems draws attention to the importance of the interaction between stakeholders 
(even if that is limited to expert risk assessment), none of them incorporate coherent 
theories for institutional aspects.
2) How does the institutional context influence the development of fisheries 
management strategies?
Two core issues emerge with respect to the institutional context:
(i) the wider institutional context within which fishery management takes 
place. Fisheries are common pool resources and the DDBR exhibited 
many of the features associated with the tragedy of the commons. Trying 
to determine an MSY and then inforcing it through central regulation was 
the default position. Addressing this problem was very relevant because if 
viewed in that light, the main question posed is if MSDA/DA would be able 
to deal with the uncertainty and the differences in interpretation and the 
varying objectives, not only in a technical way supporting the bioeconomic 
fisheries model but also wether it would be able to handle the process.
3 possibilities of applying existing MCDA approaches. I do not follow
through with that practical case study however, because through close
examination of the institutional context and the way it relates to plausible
alternative views of the ecosystem (Chapter 4 discusses NIE, and
adaptive management literature, and Cultural Theory) I conclude that
determining MSY for a fishery such as the DDBR is unfeasible (because
there is good reason to believe that there are multiple equilibria) and
inappropriate (because variation in fish stock is natural and desirable). But
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even if one were to argue that there is room for improvement in the 
estimates, then the problem of managing the resource - from an 
organizational & institutional point of view still remains. A review of the 
common pool resource management literature shows that some form of 
co-management will be necessary. That is a great departure from the way 
the fishery was managed at the time.
Since fishing is a very important resource world-wide and management of 
it has frequently resulted in failure, much has been written about possible 
ways to improve fishery management. Within the context of this thesis, 
which is dealing with the situation in the Danube Delta, I have chosen two 
main strands of the literature that provide alternative and complementary 
theories to those used in the Danube Delta. In relation to the natural 
science aspects of renewable resource management I chose to review 
Adaptive Management and Environmental Assessment (AMEA), and in 
relation to the social science aspects New Institutional Economics (NIE), 
particularly the literature relating to co-management of common pool 
resources.
(ii) the specific organisational characteristics within which fishery 
management policy is developed also needs to be considered.
Organisational theory is a very large field. I chose to review the 
implications of Stratified System Theory (SST) (Jaques, 1996) because it 
is important in the Decision Conferencing literature and presents the 
strongest case for a differentiation of managerial work, and by implication 
support requirements, according to managerial hierarchy levels. However,
I go further and also deal with Mintzberg's (1989) analysis of 
organisations because Mintzberg's work presents a very different analysis 
of organisations compared to that of Stratified Systems Theory and he is 
particularly concerned with the effects that different organisational 
configurations have on the strategy development and planning. Cultural 
Theory and AMEA can also be seen as variants on institutional context, 
so my work really tries to see some of the implications of the differences 
brought out in the literature for DC.
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3) Can the Decision Conferencing approach be used to assist the Danube Delta 
Biosphere Reserve Authority develop an adaptive fishery management 
strategy?
Note that unlike many other decision conferences or decision analyses, the decision 
conference that I conducted did result in a decision and a number of action steps. 
This is very useful because I will show that the development of adaptive 
management strategies does not only require coherent decisions (the principle 
criterion used in all decision analysis) but also transformation of approach and 
‘enabling others to work together*. Especially for the 2nd main objective of my 
intervention, medium to long term evidence is useful for determining the extent to 
which a transformation has been achieved.
To answer this question, my method involved the following steps:
(i) Analyse the way in which the Decision Conferencing approach seeks to 
incorporate and address the institutional setting within which problem 
solving takes place. (Chapter 6)
(ii) Preparation of the intervention - in addition to the wider context that I 
discuss earlier, needed to take into account the more immediate 
circumstances (i.e. how the EBRDTechnal Assistance Project had 
advanced matters).
Choosing the DA approach
Building support for the intervention - hold small conference on a more 
limited problem problem (Sinoie Lagoon)
Ensure that the Executive Director also attended a personalized training 
course the LSE with Prof. L.Phillips on Decision Analysis as part of his UK 
study tour. EBRD project financed his course.
Secured Peter Hall as facilitator for the Decision Conference in the DDBR 
because I had little experience with actual facilitation. The LSE financed 
his participation.
Gain agreement with DDBRA and Technical Assistance project staff to 
conduct decision conference.
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(iii) Develop specific intervention objectives that can serve as criteria for 
judging wether or not the intervention leads to an adaptive fishery 
management strategy. In the conclusion I use these objectives to frame 
the general recommendations about the use of MCDA for the 
development of adaptive fishery management strategies.
(iii) organized 3 preparatory workshops that lead up to the decision 
conference. Their purpose was to create the motivation and momentum 
for the Decision Conference. It also led to the specific focus for DC. Data 
for this analysis are the posters from the sessions supplemented by some 
transcripts.
(iv) 2-day decision conference and presentation of results. The DC is reported 
in greater detail than any other existing account of a DC. Particular 
attention is paid to examing the extent to which the DC facilitated the 
achievement the coherence, transformation and collaboration objectives 
necessary for adaptive management strategy development. The process 
is reported both in aggregate as as well as with the individual participants 
during the DC. The primary data used for this analysis are the detailed 
model transcripts from the sessions (Appendix 10.4 and 10.5).
(v) Follow-up analysis of all the points agreed to in the Decision Conference 
over a period of 4 years, as well as examination of the wider impact on 
fishery management and ecosystem management in DDBR. The primary 
data used for this analysis are the government decisions passed, concrete 
changes in management approach as brought into evidence about how 
and what licences are issued, what is monitored, what data is reported, 
how and to whom, commitments and projects resulting directly from the 
Decision Conference being implemented.
I am examining the interface between MSDA and DC within the context of fishery 
management and analyse how they can be used (not only theoretically, but 
practically). My focus for analysis is on the use of these approaches as tools for 
intervention and I am not examining questions relating to the systemic integration of 
Decision Analysis as a decision making technique by organisations, nor am I 
examining how Decision Analysis could be integrated into fishery management 
science.
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Chapter 2 Management Problems of the DDBR Fishery Sector
This Chapter sets out the context of my fieldwork, outlines the methodologies used in 
fisheries management, and argues that the existing approaches to fishery 
management dealt unsatisfactorily with three problems: integrating uncertainty and 
multiple objectives into analysis, and addressing the effects of the institutional 
context on management.
2.1 The Danube Delta Biosphere Reserve Setting
2.1.1 The Ecological and Social Importance of the Danube Delta
The Danube is Europe’s second largest river, draining an area of 805,300 sq. km 
through a system of streams including 120 important tributaries. Excluding the delta 
itself, it is 2,860 km long (Gastescu, 1993:57). “Today, 76 million people from ten 
nations live in the basin of the river, whose main waterway passes through ten cities 
of over 100,000 inhabitants” (Cousteau, 1993:1). According to IUCN (The World 
Conservation Union) (IUCN, 1993:5) the role of the Danube river and delta are 
“inestimably” important in the preservation of world biodiversity as it is one of only 
two active deltas in Europe (the other being the Volga in Russia).
Because of the Delta’s geographic position (it is half-way between the North Pole and 
the Equator) and because it is a wetland, the Delta has a great influence on the 
migratory pathways of birds (Baboianu and Goriup, 1995:5). The total bird population 
of the Delta exceeds two million. Globally threatened bird species have their habitat 
there, including the majority of pygmy cormorants, red-breasted geese, four species 
of herons, 5% of the world breeding population of Dalmatian pelicans, white tailed 
eagles, the slender-billed curlews and lesser white-fronted goose occur on migration.
Seventy-five fish species occur in the Danube Delta. Of these, 44 are freshwater 
species, while the rest are migratory species that travel up from the Black Sea to the 
Danube Delta and beyond to breed. Important among the latter group are sturgeon, 
semi-migratory carp, zander, and bream. Important freshwater species include the 
pike, perch, and roach.
The richness of the natural resources of the Danube Delta, and the remoteness of 
the area, have attracted people seeking to make a living and fleeing persecution 
since ancient times. Use of the natural resource over time has led to the 
development of traditional economic activities and characteristic cultural and social 
habits.
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Today, Cousteau (1993:1) points out, the many users of the river put increasing
pressure on this fragile resource through their many competing uses:
“Energy production requires dam construction; navigation 
relies on a steady, concentrated flow through a single channel; 
the aliuvial ecosystem depends on floods and on irregular 
flows; the diversity of fish species is directly linked to flood 
levels and to the surface of the alluvial ecosystem; farming 
necessitates irrigation; industrial production and thermal and 
nuclear power stations draw on the river for cooling; and, most 
important, the population needs a healthy, pollution-free 
supply of drinking water. The conflicting interests are all the 
more complex to solve because they are not only national but 
international. ”
One of the most important indirect benefits derived from the Danube Delta is its 
ability to cleanse the waters that flow through it. When deltaic ecosystems function 
properly, they act like immense filters, trapping many of the agricultural and industrial 
pollutants bome in the waters of the rivers, before they are discharged into the sea.
The Danube Delta was formed in a gulf when the sea was 50-60 meters above 
current levels (Gastescu, 1993:58) and the ‘initial offshore bar* has been estimated 
(through carbon 14 dating) to have formed about 12,800 years ago (Baboianu and 
Goriup, 1995). Over the course of the following 3,300 years successive ‘offshore 
bars’ have blocked the mouth of the Danube and thereby gave rise to the delta’s 
formation. Since then, the three branches of the Danube (Sf. Gheorghe, Sulina, and 
Chilia) successively formed a series of secondary deltas, starting in the south.
The fundamental physical processes by which the Delta is formed and transformed 
are the water flow and the sediments that are carried and deposited or eroded with 
them. The sediment load has declined from an average of 67.5 million tonnes per 
year (1921-1960) to 52.7 million tonnes over the extended period to 1983 as a result 
of the construction of dams and changes in the river flow (Bondar, 1991) quoted in 
Gastescu (1993:57). Nevertheless, the delta is still expanding - possibly even at a 
faster rate because the successive straightening of the river course meant that more 
sedimentation is carried to the mouth of the river rather than being deposited inside 
the delta. Evidence of this expansion is that the Chilia sub-delta has advanced by 40- 
80 meters per year further out into the sea over the last century, and Sahalin island 
(at the mouth of the Sf. Gheorghe branch) is also growing. The canal which has been 
dug at the entrance of the Sulina branch from 1894 onwards in order to allow access 
to deep-sea ships now extends more than 10 km out into the sea and 200 metres are 
added every year (Gastescu, 1993:61-62).
The deltaic part of the DDBR is a highly dynamic area which derives its shape 
through the erosion and sedimentation arising from inundations.
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2.1.2 The Razim-Sinoie Lagoon Complex
The Razim-Sinoie lagoon complex at the southern part of the DDBR is not strictly a 
part of the Danube Delta. It extends over a total area of 1,015 km2, of which 863 km2 
are flood valleys (limans) and lakes. The lakes used to be marine bays (collectively 
known as Gulf of Halmyris) but over the past 1,500 years (through the sediments that 
are earned eastwards from the mouths of the Danube and the advance of the delta 
itself over the past 3,000 years) they became successively isolated from the sea as 
sand bars and dunes built up. Lakes Agighiol and Babadag are the principal limans 
(flooded valleys), while Razim, Golgovita, Zmeica, and Sinoie are lagoons (Baboianu 
and Goriup, 1995: 9).
In this century this lagoon complex has experienced a number of significant human 
modifications. In the early 1970s the complex was divided into two units: (i) Razim, 
Babadag, Golgovita and Zmeica lakes were cut off completely from the sea by a 
sluice built at Gura Portitei and thus transformed from brackish water to a freshwater 
reservoir into which Danube water from the Sf. Gheorghe branch was diverted 
through a channel that was cut at the beginning of the century. Thus this part 
became an irrigation reservoir out of which water was pumped up the surrounding 
hillsides for irrigation of crops, (ii) The second unit is made up of the Sinoie and 
Nuntashi lakes. These continue to have a link with the Black Sea through a sluice at 
Periboina and thus maintain their brackish character. In the period of 1960-1978 the 
western shores of the Razim and Golgovita lakes were empoldered for fish farming 
(Baboianu and Goriup, 1995:9).
There has been much intervention by people in the ecosystem. The project 
preparation team for a Global Environmental Facility project for the Danube Delta 
(Huntington Technical Services Ltd and Partners, 1993:14) distinguished between six 
episodes in the development of the Danube Delta, three before World War Two, and 
three after the War:
1. Human settlement from well before Roman times and the establishment of 
traditional land use practices.
2. The creation of the European River Danube Commission in 1856 after the 
Crimean War, and subsequent engineering works to improve navigation.
3. The creation of Protected Areas starting in the 1930’s.
4. Proposals to develop the Delta, and the construction of pilot polders in the 
1930s and 1940s.
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5. The creation of the Danube Delta Company (Centrala Delta Dunarii) in 1979, 
the adoption of an economic development plan and widespread polder 
development.
6. The 1989 Revolution in Romania, the creation of the DDBR, and associated 
DDBRA in 1990 and the end of polder development.
Table 2-1: Chronology of development in the Danube Delta and Upstream, late 
19th Century -1990
Date Development
(a) in the Danube Delta
Late 19th Century Mahmudia and Murighiol pilot polders
1889-1902 Canalisation of Sulina Branch
1903 Canalisation of Dunavat channel between Sulina Branch and Lake 
Razim
1912 Canalisation of Dranov channel between Sulina Branch and Lake 
Razim
1938-40 Tatarul Polder (3500 ha)
1944 Canalisation of Litkov channel linking the Rosu Lake complex to Sf. 
Gheorghe Branch
1948 Canalisation of Peritensca channel between Lake Razim and Black 
Sea
1950 Matiuc Island embanked for reed
Early 1950s First fish polders constructed: Matita I (1955), Rusca (1957)
1950-1965 Major canal dredging period Danube Delta (reed production)
1955-1965 Construction of agricultural polders, including Tulcea Nufarui (ca 
2500 ha), Victoria-Bestepe-Mahmudia (ca 1000 ha), Popina (3500 
ha), and Carasuhat (3300 ha)
1964-65 Construction of Pardina polder (27,000 ha)
1965 - present Six meander cuts on Sf. Gheorghe Branch, dredging of Crisan- 
Caraorman canal (for sand transport), and the Tudor Vladimirescu- 
Pardina channel (linking Chilia and Tulcea Branches of Danube)
1975 Lake Razim cut off from the Black Sea
1979-1989 Construction of agricultural polders: Murighiol-Dunavat (2680 ha), 
Babina (2000 ha), Cernovca (1500 ha), and Sireasa (7500 ha)
(b) Upstream of Danube Delta
Early 1960s Construction of the flood banks along Danube left bank
1969-1989 Construction of irrigation intakes along the Danube
1969-1989 Empowering of Great Braila Island
1969-1989 Construction of dams on the tributaries to Danube
1978 Construction of Iron Gates Dam on Danube
1990 Completion of Danube-Black Sea Canal
Source: Huntington Technical Services Ltd and Partners (1993:33)
2.1.3 The Population of the Danube Delta
Archaeological, cartographic and documentary evidence show that the eastern coast
of Romania, including the Delta, has been settled for thousands of years. The Control
over the land changed hands several times in history. For example between 1442
and 1877, the Danube Delta was under Turkish rule. At the same time, the
construction works on the Sulina branch for navigational purposes initiated by the
European Commission of the Danube in 1856 brought workers and technicians from
Moldavia, Wallachia, and abroad into the region and further settlements arose
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(Gastescu, 1993:57). One of the effects of these different occupations of Romania 
and in particular the area around the Danube Delta has experienced is that a unique 
tapestry of different cultures emerged. More than a dozen of different ethnicities 
inhabit, live and work together.
5,700 people live in Sulina, and remaining 9,300 residents live in 28 small villages. 
There are also an unknown number of people living temporarily in the Delta (Fischer, 
1993:3).
The distribution of people living within the Delta is shown in Figure 2-1. In 1956, 
20,000 people lived in the Danube Delta. Since then, this number has decreased but 
over the past years it remained at approximately 15,000. There are two factors which 
presently cause concern: (i) the poor living conditions of the population, and (ii) the 
changing age structure of the population. In 1977 only 29% were older than 50 years 
but this number has increased to 56% in 1992.
Figure 2-1: Population Distribution around DDBR
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The majority (61%) of the population is of Romanian origin, 13% are Russian 
Lipovans, and 23% are Ukrainian (Baboianu and Goriup, 1995:21) The 28 
settlements in the Delta are divided into 7 communes and one town (Sulina). Social 
services for these settlements are provided in the largest villages of the respective 
municipalities. Not all the villages have schools and only Tulcea and Sulina have 
secondary schools. Four of the villages do not have electricity but all have phone 
connections. Five of the larger villages have partial drinking water supply systems but 
all the other ones have none (Baboianu and Goriup, 1995:21).
Two towns are close to the Delta: Tulcea, which is the capital of the Judet and the 
main entry point to the Delta with 96,000 inhabitants, and Constanta, which is an 
important shipping port and Black Sea resort with 400,000 inhabitants. A number of 
villages surrounding Delta are at least partially dependent on the DDBR for
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resources. Along the Romanian border of the DDBR, there are 37 villages and 3 
towns (Tulcea, Isaccea, and Babadag) with an overall population of 170,000 (of 
which 103,000 are in the urban setting - see also Figure 2-2) (Baboianu and Goriup, 
1995:23).
Figure 2-2: Population change in and around Danube Delta 1985-1991
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Source: Statistical Office, Tulcea
2.1.4 A profile of economic activity in the Danube Delta
Three aspects of the economic system are important to note within the context of this 
thesis. First, that fishing is the most important economic activity but that people were 
actually engaged in a wide variety of economic activities. Secondly, that there were 
many institutional changes taking place and that meant that the status quo was 
changing and as a result it was a time of great political and economic uncertainty. 
Thirdly, institutions (including the DDBRA) were seeking to determine new 
relationships but the long history of pervasive state involvement and only distant 
memories of decentralised activities, as well as a weak civil society, meant that 
transformations were slow and difficult.
Fishing is the single most important activity in the Danube Delta Biosphere Reserve, 
followed by livestock rearing and agriculture (see Table 2-2). The exact number of 
fishermen currently active in the DDBR is not known. About 2,400 persons are
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employed in the nine state companies whose main activity is fishing (while a slightly 
lower number (2,000) are employed in companies engaged in agriculture and 
livestock production (see Table 2-3 and Table 2-4). Family income is often 
supplemented by agriculture, cattle breeding, and vegetable growing in gardens 
(Fischer, 1993).
Fishing has traditionally been the most important sources of income and subsistence. 
(Giurescu, 1964) provides much documentary evidence that trade in fresh and salted 
fish was at the centre of economic activity throughout the centuries.
Today too, fishing (together with reedharvesting) represent “the most extensive and 
important forms of natural resource use in the DDBR” (Baboianu and Goriup, 
1995:19, see also Staras, 1994:1) Together these two activities are being conducted 
on over 3,306 km2 (57%) of the reserve where there is a natural flooding regime. 
Fish farming is taking place in endyked areas called ‘polders’ which occupy about 
406 km2 (7%). Both of these areas are state-owned and exploited by state-owned 
companies. However, while the open flooding areas are controlled by the DDBRA, 
the polders are controlled by the Tulcea County Council.
Commercial fishing is undertaken by nine state-owned companies. Most of these 
companies are engaged in both fish farming and fishing of wild fish. In 1992 the total 
reported fish catch was 5,445 tonnes. This is approximately the same catch level as 
the one reported in the early 1960’s (5,000 tonnes). The peak catch was recorded in 
the 1966-68 period (14,000 tonnes). After that fish catch decreased to 10,000 tonnes 
and remained at that level until 1979. Since then catch has been decreasing.
There are a total of 51,000 ha empoldered areas designated for fish farming, but 
approximately 14,000 ha have been abandoned by the companies (Fischer, 1993:7). 
In 1988, approximately 9,000 tonnes of fish were produced but this had fallen to 
3,710 tonnes in 1992. With the exception of two fish farming companies (Jurilovca 
and Ecodelta) yield per hectar is very low (under 100 kg per hectar) and very varied 
(ranging between 28 and 151 kg per hectar). The primary reason given for these low 
production levels were insufficient inputs, inappropriateness of the polders (Fischer, 
1993:7).
Within the DDBR, agriculture was traditionally restricted to parts of the Caraorman 
and Letea marine levees and along the river banks (Gastescu, 1993:61). Today, 
however, agricultural land covers about 696 km2 (12%) of the DDBR. Most of the 
arable land (about 58%) was derived mainly from empoldered and drained 
marshlands, while the remaining agricultural land is natural grassland (42%) that is
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situated on the higher sandy oils and dry summer pastures (Baboianu and Goriup, 
1995).
63% of the agricultural land is state owned under the direct control of the Tulcea 
Judet and largely used by six state owned companies and some small companies 
and bodies operated by the County itself. A further 29% is also state owned but 
under the administration of the local councils represented by majors and only the 
remaining 8% of the agricultural land is privately owned by the inhabitants of the 
Danube Delta. About 36% of the total agricultural land is used for animal rearing, a 
traditional activity in Danube Delta (Baboianu and Goriup, 1995).
As indicated above, the population in the Delta has decreased and especially the 
young people left the villages because of poor living conditions and few possibilities 
of earning a living. About 41% of the population in the DDBR is in the labour force. 
Most of the 8.7% who are registered as unemployed live in larger settlements of Sf. 
Gheorghe, Chilia Veche, and Sulina.
Until 1990 the state companies listed in Table 2-4 formed part of a single state 
holding company called Centrala Delta Dunarii. Through Law 15/1990 that company 
was dissolved. The newly independent companies report to the Tulcea County 
Council through the Bureau for Delta Matters. Their future is uncertain as the 
Government has plans of privatising them.
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Table 2-2: Main non-industrial goods and services produced in the DDBR, 
1993/4
Goods and Services Volume+ Value*
Freshwater fisheries 6,4001 5,245,400
Coastal fisheries 1,0281 1,007,500
Sturgeon fisheries (excl. 6 t 2,650,000
caviar)
Sturgeon farming Fillets, fingerlings, caviar 75,000





Oats 654 t 35,500
Other cash crops








Milk 5,000,000 I 858,000
Eggs 6,000,000 530,000
Honey 6,000 kg 50,000
Wool 1001 195,000
Timber 28,000 m3 84,000
Tourism 42,500 person days 850,000
+figures based on 1993/1994 data (probably understated for most products)
*estimate in US$ at $1 = 2040 Lei
Source: Baboianu and Goriup (1995:18)
Table 2-3: Employment Profile in DDBR, 1993
Fishing and fish farming 32.5%
Agriculture 31%
Industry, construction, transport 22.5%





Source: Baboianu and Goriup (1995:22)
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Table 2-4: The state-owned companies operating in DDBR, 1992
Company Name Turnover 1992 
(‘000,000 Lei)
Employees Area of activity and production
Piscicola Tulcea 180.0 333 Wildfishing, fishfarming
Piscicola Mila 23 55.7 120 Wildfishing, fishfarming
Piscicola Chilia Veche 79.0 130 Wildfishing, fishfarming
Piscicola Sulina 87.6 300 Wildfishing, fishfarming
Piscicola Murighiol 100.8 125 Wildfishing
Fish Farms Murighiol 150.8 168 Fishfarming
Piscicola Jurilovca 553.0 313 Wildfishing, fishfarming, reed 
harvesting
Piscicola Sf. Gheorghe 143.4 178 Wildfishing
Piscicola Isaccea 49.0 71 Wildfishing, fishfarming
Piscicola Macin 110.4 135 Wildfishing, fishfarming
Ecodelta 1,079.2 544 Fishfarming, reed (19,0001), 
canning, procurement, tree 
cutting
Subtotal 2,588.5 2417
Agrodelta Sireasa 115.0 83 Cattle, land cultivation 2564 ha
Agrodelta Pardina 278.5 332 Cattle, cultivation 6,081 ha, dairy 
farming
Agrodelta Tatanir 170.0 116 Cattle, cultivation 5,484 ha
Agrodelta Chilia Veche 229.1 300 Cattle, cultivation 6,235 ha, dairy 
farming, milk processing
Agrodelta Sarinasuf 275.0 237 Cattle, land cultivation 2,935 ha
Subtotal 1,067.6 1068
SIAJ Tulcea 488.3 585 Ship building and repair
Deltacons Tulcea 542.3 475 Construction
SCUT Tulcea 363.0 450 construction and dredging
Transnav Tulcea 288.7 329 transport
Silvodelta 66.7 146 forestry
Delta System Tulcea 20.0 39 “Water Union"
Sub-Total 1,769 2,024
Total 5,425.1 5,509.0
Source: based on Fischer (1993:4)
2.2 The EBRD Technical Co-operation Project
The beginnings of the EBRD Technical Co-operation Project can be traced back to 
the Planning Seminar that was held by the International Steering Committee for 
Conservation of the Danube Delta together with the DDBRA in September of 1991 at 
Uzlina, in the Danube Delta. At that meeting the overall management objectives for 
the DDBR were agreed (as described in Chapter 1). After negotiations with the 
Romanian Government the following mandate for the project was agreed to (DDBRA 
and Douse, 1993:2):
1. undertake a review of current legislation and establishing an 
effective and comprehensive legal framework;
2. strengthen the DDBRA, particularly developing planning 
capacity and establishing a planning process (providing 
training where appropriate);
3. support the development of a work plan and a management 
plan;
54
4. assist the DDBRA to develop more effective co-ordination of 
the activities of international organisations in the Delta (e.g. 
further inputs from the Global Environmental Facility); and
5. prepare proposals for investment projects designed to promote 
sustainable development by the local population.
The following reasons for the conservation and careful management of the Danube
Delta were put forward (EBRD, Euroconsult, and IUCN, 1993:iii):
1. it is the largest and least damaged example of a delta in 
Europe, and as such is a unique landscape and model for 
scientific research and environmental management
2. it provides a high degree of water regulation and cleansing 
function that, if lost, could have an irreversible deleterious 
effect on the Black Sea
3. its natural resources have in the past, and could in the future, 
provide a basis for sustainable economic development, as well 
as provide a source of human enjoyment and cultural 
enrichment.
The EBRD project started in May of 1993 and lasted until February of 1995. The 
work was organised such that a core team of foreign experts (a resident advisor, and 
economist/planning expert, a training expert, and a financial/administrative expert 
who was to work with a local counterpart) were scheduled to be intermittently in the 
Danube Delta throughout the project and that in the second half of the project 
additional experts were brought in on a shorter term basis.
In the first half of the project, work concentrated on the administrative structure of the 
DDBRA (its human resource capacity was evaluated and recommendations for 
restructuring were made, the filling of vacant positions were prioritised, the legal 
framework under which the DDBRA was working was analysed and 
recommendations were made for amendments). At the same time, basic background 
research was conducted. The economist, for example, produced a survey of the 
economic activities conducted in the Reserve (Fischer, 1993). The fieldwork for this 
thesis began at the end of this first phase. As can be seen from my Terms of 
Reference as the Economics Researcher (see Section 10.2) my area of work was 
concerned with socio-economic issues related to management planning.
On the basis of the recommendations of the human resource review a number of 
training and exchange visits to other protected areas were initiated. Staff of the 
DDBRA travelled to Switzerland and the UK to visit with IUCN, the Broads Authority, 
and others. At my recommendation, the Executive Director of the DDBRA also had a 
three day training course in Decision Analysis with Dr L.D. Phillips at the London 
School of Economics.
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The second half of the project was organised around a series of workshops. Local 
researchers and experts prepared sectoral background papers in the area of their 
speciality. Towards the end of their work, a series of short-term consultants came 
and assisted in the review and analysis of that work. The outputs were then 
submitted for discussion in a series of management workshops for each of the 
different parts of the DDBRA.
The specific questions to be addressed by these workshops were outlined in the 
Inception Report as follows (EBRD, Euroconsult, and IUCN, 1993):
1. What are the minimum and optimal levels for the various 
physical, chemical and biological processes in order to 
maintain ecological balance?
2. What are the impacts of human activities upon the 
environment?
3. How does the Delta ecosystem react to changes in the 
environment?
The management process that this workshop series was to initiate is illustrated in 
Figure 2-3: Once an adequate understanding of the site’s present conservation 
status was gained and measured against international standards, objectives were to 
be set, and management prescriptions (including adequate monitoring systems, pilot 
studies, field trials and sustainable use of natural resources) were to be carried out 
using a rigorous scientific approach. Fortunately, there was already a considerable 
body of information available to permit rapid identification of urgent actions to prevent 
further degradation of the delta ecosystem. Finally, implementation of the plan itself 
was to be continuously controlled and evaluated. This feedback was to be 
incorporated in the planning process and any necessary modifications to the plan 
made on a regular basis. “Clearly” the Inception Report (EBRD, Euroconsult, and 
IUCN, 1993:44) noted, “this mechanism can only work properly under the auspices of 
a single authority, namely the DDBRA.”
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2.3.1 Historical development of fishery management in DDBR
According to the account of Staras (1994:1-4), between the 15th and the 17th 
Century the fishery of the Danube Delta was exploited through taxes and agreements 
between landowners and fishermen. Between 1879 and 1894 the fishery was then 
regulated mainly through leasing of fishing zones to fishermen, but still without any 
form of centralised co-ordination.
After the first fishery law was passed in 1895, the state became involved in 
organising the fishery for “the purpose of generating revenue and incomes for 
fishermen on a sustainable basis” (Antipa, 1911). For the following 50 years Grigore 
Antipa5, a former Director of the Natural History Museum in Bucharest, became the 
principal regulator and scientific advisor on the Danube for the Romanian 
Government. Antipa’s proposals for the creation of habitats most suitable for valuable 
fish and the re-organisation of the fishery were far reaching. His studies of hydrology, 
biology, and commercial exploitation of the Danube Delta were quite detailed and are 
still considered by many (particularly in the Danube Delta) to be of great relevance to 
today’s problems.
The state only gradually took control of the different fishing areas along the lower 
Danube. However, by 1928 all of the important fishing areas were understate control 
and the state collected taxes on the fish landed, and executed maintenance and 
‘improvement’ work throughout the delta (see also Antipa, 1914).
The era of Antipa ended in 1947, when the first Socialist government took power. 
Already during Antipa’s time the first fishermen collectives were formed (according to 
Staras (1994) in Tulcea Judet the first was formed in 1914). By 1947, 80% of 
fishermen were organised in co-operatives and in 1953 the first state companies 
began to replace these co-operatives. The zones that these fishing companies would 
fish on had to be obtained through auctions. Unfortunately, there is very little 
information on the circumstances and the events that surrounded these take-overs, 
or on the effects these changes in regime have had.
From 1961 onwards some of the state companies also started to become active in 
fish farming (Staras, 1994). In 1974 a nation-wide Fishery Law that regulates the 
ways in which Romania’s fish resource is exploited was passed and has remained in 
effect into the 1990s.6 During the 1970s these individual fishing and fish farming
5 Antipa was not in charge of Government Affairs throughout this period (but instead intermittently).
6 During the time of this project the fishery law was being revised, but changes had not been agreed to 
yet and it was not promulgated.
58
companies were integrated into one holding company: the Centrala Delta Dunarii. 
During the 1980s this holding company came to control all of the commercial 
exploitation of natural resources in the Danube Delta.
There is not much documentation beyond the catch and harvest statistics available 
on natural resource management in the Danube Delta during the communist period. 
The scientific research on the Danube Delta that was started by Grigore Antipa has 
been carried on by a number of academic and industrial research institutes. In the 
1970s the Danube Delta Research and Design Institute (DDI) was formed and once 
the Centrala Delta Dunarii was created, it’s main task became the design of canals, 
polders and irrigation schemes and the testing or development of various plant, 
animal species, or farming methods for the latter. Research on natural resources 
focused on maximising quantitative outputs, with little regard for social, economic, or 
conservation values.
2.3.2 The legal mandate of the DDBRA
After the Revolution in Romania (December 1989), the Centrala Delta Dunarii holding 
company was split into 21 independent state companies. Of these companies 11 
were engaged in fishing in open waters and fish farming (see Table 2-4 on page 54).
At the same time, in 1990, the Danube Delta was declared a Biosphere Reserve 
through a Government Decision (after the appropriate applications were made to 
UNESCO). The Ministry for Water, Forests, and Environmental Protection (MWFEP) 
set up the DDBRA. However, responsibility for management of natural resources in 
the DDBR remained unclear.
Finally, in 1993, when the law that governs the DDBR (Law 82/1993) was
promulgated, an important part of the confusion was resolved. DDBRA was given the
following power and responsibility7:
“to develop and apply a special management regime for the 
conservation and protection of the biological diversity of the 
natural ecosystems of the reserve, for the development of 
human settlements and the organisation of economic activities 
in accordance with the carrying capacity of these ecosystems"
(Article 5, Annex 2).
For the fishery this would include the following specific elements:
• “identification and protection of zones populated by 
endangered wild species of flora and fauna and of the zones 
preferred by migratory species; (Art. 6b)
7 The following is my own translation of the law from Romanian.
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•  preventing the of capturing, imprisoning, and killing of the wild 
fauna in periods of prohibition; (Art. 6b)
• protection of the breeding, resting, and feeding zones of the 
fauna (Art. 6b)
• preventing the use of unselective catching gear of fauna; (Art.
6b)
• developing proposals for the regulation of environmental 
protection and of the use of the natural resources within the 
Reserve; (Art. 6d)
• proposes for approval by the Tulcea County Council the user 
fees for economic, tourism, and recreational activities by 
physical or legal persons, on territory that belongs to the public, 
private, local, or County domain; (Art. 6r)8
• organise, in accordance with the law, the concessioning of the 
renewable resource use; (Art. 6s)
• the Scientific Council of the DDBRA approves the annual levels 
of use of the renewable resources, the technology through 
which it is used, and the zones for use;" (Art. 6g)
2.3.3 Reasons for concern about the state of fishery management in the DDBR
The following two sub-sections outline the two main reasons why the state of fishery 
management was considered to be unsatisfactory. The first relates to the fish stock, 
because it showed signs of decline in size and diversity. The second reason relates 
to the management system in operation, because even though the DDBRA had been 
given the mandate to manage the fishery sustainably, in practice they had little 
control over what was going on.
2.3.3.1 Problems with the fish stock
Figure 2-4: illustrates how fish diversity in the DDBR fishery has declined over time. 
Staras (1994:5) highlights the fact that until 1972-1975 a broad variety of fish were 
caught. After this period the proportion of pike (Esox lucius), perch (Perea fluvialis), 
crucian carp (carassius carassius), and tench {tinea tinea) caught declined quite 
sharply. In 1992 almost 60% of the catch was made up of prussian carp (C. auratus 
gibelio).
The decline in total catch has not been uniform throughout the DDBR (see Figure 
2-5). While catch in the Danube Delta itself has been declining quite steadily since 
the mid-1970s, catch in the Razim-Sinoie complex remained relatively steady. On
8 Art 39 provides that “the local population may pursue renewable resource use activities with traditional 
and non-polluting tools” without the payment of taxes - in the case of fish it is specified that one’s own 
traditional gear must employed and only for the purpose of private consumption.
fin
average, only 22 kg/ha where produced in the Danube Delta compared to 38kg/ha in 
the Razim-Sinoie Complex.
Figure 2-4: Changes in Species Composition in Danube Delta Fishery, 1960- 
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In addition to this different variation in total fish yields, the change in species 
composition evolved differently in the Razim and Sinoie lakes (compare Figure 2-6 
and Figure 2-7). Staras (1994) argues that these differences in evolution patterns can 
partly explain why total catch has declined less in Razim and Sinoie compared to the 
Danube Delta: prussian carp, the species that currently represents the proportionally
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biggest catch, has developed much more vigorously in the Razim and Sinoie lakes 
than it has in the Danube Delta.
Figure 2-6: Lake Razim Species Composition, 1961-1993
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Source: based on Staras (1994:4d)
Figure 2-7: Species Composition Lake Sinoie, 1961-1993
S pecies Com position of S ino ie Lake, 1961-1993
Source: based on Staras (1994:4d)
The overall trend, however, has been a continuous decline of the most valuable 
species (common carp, pike, sheat fish, perch, zander, sturgeon, Danube shad, and 
tench) (Navodaru et al. 1993). According to Navodaru et a/.'s (1993) analysis, before 
1963 these species constituted 68.4% - 75.6% of the total catch (see Figure 2-4:). In 
the period between 1964 and 1974, especially through the decline of common carp, 
the economically most valuable group constituted only 35% of the total catch in 1974 
(7,823 tonnes). Since then, the most valuable species, especially sturgeon, have 
declined even more (see Figure 2-8).
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Figure 2-8: Sturgeon catch in Danube Delta, 1953-1993
Sturgeon catch in DDBR, 1953-1993








Source: based on Staras (1994:17f)
2.3.3.2 Problems with the management system in operation
The second reason why the state of fishery management in the DDBR was 
considered unsatisfactory was that since the breakdown of the Communist system, 
within which only state companies were operating in the Danube Delta and the prime 
objective was the achievement of ever increasing catch targets, an informal and 
ineffectual management regime had emerged.
After the Revolution of 1989 the system of control over fishermen, the fishing 
companies that employ them, and fish merchants had broken down, as companies 
had become independent and the old control mechanisms were replaced by the 
DDBRA. At the same time, however, incentives to sell on the black market had 
increased because other food had become more expensive (the purchasing power of 
Romanians had decreased, and state subsidies had been removed on many food 
items). This combination led to a large number of different poaching activities that 
included under-reporting of the size and type of fish caught, fishing without licences, 
fishing in the prohibition period, fishing with improper gear, improper use of licences 
(e.g., leasing them to third parties), or use of fake licences. Fish stock assessment 
did not take account of poached fish and nobody knew what state of the fish stock 
really was.
Licences were issued by the DDBRA but they were quite meaningless because they 
were not based on real analysis of the fish stock or fishing effort. Instead, the nine 
state companies and two private companies received licenses which specified fishing 
limits on the basis of the catches declared in the previous season, companies do not 
pay for them, and an unknown number of fishermen or fishing companies are actually 
fishing.
Under these conditions enforcement by the DDBRA was poor because not even the 
DDBRA believed that the quotas they issue were accurate. For example, it was often
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said that there is over-fishing but evidence for that was inconclusive. Figure 2-9 
shows that the overall catch for 1992 was almost 2,000 tonnes greater than the 
allowed fishing limit. However, the scientists who set that fishing limit, argue that the 
surplus catch does not necessarily mean over-exploitation but instead that the fishing 
limit was set too low, as the unexpected fish movements that occurred during that 
year could not have been predicted (Navodaru et al., 1993:21).
In the case of Prussian carp, scientists argue that unexpected large number migrated 
to the Danube Delta from further upstream in the large flood of 1991. The other the 
two fish species that yielded higher catches than the predetermined limit, Danube 
shad and “other species”, either larger than expected migrations, or “unprecedented” 
rises in the populations were to blame (Navodaru et al., 1993).
Figure 2-9 : Comparison of limits set and fish caught, Selected species, 1992
□  Unit 
D Yield
□ Lin#-Yield
Source: Fischer (1993:19) using 1992 data from DDI
The DDBRA and DDI were trying to develop new system but that did not work out. In 
the remainder of this chapter I will argue that the DDBRA and the DDI were 
unsuccessful in their endeavour because they were unable to deal with the problems 
related to uncertainty, conflicting objectives, and institutional context within which 
management took place.
2.4 Shortcomings o f the Fishery M anagem ent Approach used in the  
Danube Delta
The purpose of this section is to present the reasons why I argue that the staff of the 
DDBRA and DDI were not be able to develop the management system outlined 
above with the techniques, theories, and processes they were using. Since the 
DDBRA and the DDI were employing widely used fish stock assessment methods,
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the problems illustrated here faced by the DDI and DDBRA are not unique to the 
Danube Delta.
The section draws heavily on two publications, both of which are authored by 
scientists from the Danube Delta Institute (DDI): Navodaru et al. (1993) and Staras 
(1994). Navodaru et al. (1993) is the most recent annual report by the Fisheries 
Research Unit of the (DDI). It forms part of the five-year research programme 
commissioned by the DDBRA that started in 1991. Staras (1994) is the Fishery 
sector report that was produced for the purpose of discussion in the Management 
Planning Workshops of the EBRD project. The objective of that report is to 
summarise all the research that has been done on the Danube Delta Biosphere 
Reserve Fishery. There are no other publications that are as recent or detailed as 
these two publications. Furthermore, the DDI research is the basis for the DDBRA 
fishery management policy, and that means that it is particularly important in the 
context of this thesis.
My analysis of the fishstock assessment and the effort restriction approaches are 
based largely on Jones (1984) the DDI scientists chose to use that text and it 
appears to be used quite widely. There are alternative texts such as Gulland (1983), 
which describes methods that are very close to those used in the Danube Delta, or 
Walters (1986) which describes a number of methods not used in the Danube Delta 
(but which is based on a fundamentally different view of fishery and ecological 
management, to be summarised in Chapter 4).
2.4.1 The DDBRA's approach to fishery management
Up to September 1994 (that is three years into the existence of the DDBR), when I 
conducted the first workshops as part of my fieldwork (see Chapters 8 and 9), there 
were no written statements on the principles of the existing or future fishery 
management. Also, there were neither concrete accounts of the system in operation 
at the time, nor what the management problems were (except for the writing by the 
DDI fishery scientists which focused on the resource aspects), nor a written 
statement of what principles or policies the future fisheries management system 
should be based on. Not even the socio-economic survey by Fischer (1993) was able 
clarify how the fishery was really managed at the time.
One possible explanation for that lack of clarity could be that the DDBR law was not 
promulgated until late 1993 and as a result there was no legal basis for the DDBRA 
to proceed to implement a regime that was likely to provoke resistance from the 
fishing companies as it interfered with (restricted) their current operations. An 
alternative explanation for this lack of clarity could be that the scientific information
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necessary for the establishment of an adequate management regime was not yet 
available. However, I argue in the following Sections that the persistence of this lack 
of clarity has also to do with difficulties of applying existing fishery management 
methods in circumstances such as those encountered in the DDBR.
By integrating the DDBRA’s legal mandate (Law 82/1993), the research programme 
that the DDBRA commissioned, the methods used by the DDI in their research9, and 
the interim management procedures that the DDBRA had adopted, I would argue 
that the DDBRA pursued a management regime with the following structure10 and 
rationale:
1. The DDBRA is the manager of the DDBR because it is being held 
accountable and has been assigned the authority to ensure that the aims of 
the Biosphere Reserve are achieved.
2. Previous management efforts did not pursue the same aims as those of the 
DDBR. In fact, the policies of the Ceaucescu regime threatened biodiversity 
and the cultural heritage because the policies were misguided and politically 
motivated. Research and science were politically restrained and limited by 
resources from pursuing what would have been professionally correct.
New policies should not ignore or go against scientific interests and 
knowledge. Instead, the new or future management regime would start with 
a sound scientific understanding of nature. In the case of the fishery, the 
questions that need to be addressed are as follows:
2.1 What are the important species and what is their current condition? This 
needs to be established through scientific research. The value of a species 
is a combination of the price it commands on the market and its rarity (for 
example, sturgeon is the most valuable fish both because it fetches the 
highest price and because it is threatened with extinction world wide). There 
are other fish which are counted as “valuable” such as pike perch because 
it fetches a relatively high price on the market.
2.2 Can they be commercially exploited? In other words, is the stock large 
enough to allow additional pressure (besides those affecting ‘natural 
mortality’) to be exerted on it through fishing. The most important objective 
is the maintenance of all the fish stocks.
9 I will use Mr Staras’ sectoral report (1994) again for this explanation because it provides the best 
summary of work and thinking from before the fishery workshops that I organized.
Fishery scientists have two approaches for the determination of stock: one 
is “holistic” and the other “analytical” (Staras, 1994:27). The holistic 
approach is based on the “production surplus model” (Schaefer, 1954 and 
1957). It requires long and accurate time series data on the catch and the 
amount of effort required to make the catch. Such data are not available for 
the DDBR fishery. Therefore, the scientists of the DDI use the analytic 
approach which is based on the analysis of fish samples.
Fish stock assessment of the Danube river fishery cannot be done with the 
same models as those used for lakes because the exploitable river stocks 
depend on the migration patterns of semi-migratory fish (those that move 
between different lakes or hydrogeographical areas) and migratory fish 
(those marine species that swim into the delta and beyond to reproduce) 
(Navodaru, 1992; Navodaru et al., 1993). Problems also arise because the 
same stocks are exploited by several countries, the estimates one would 
obtain would not be extendible to neighbouring areas, and their validity 
would be of very short duration while the research effort would be very large 
(Staras, 1994:28). Instead, it was suggested that a sonar system or a 
tagging and recapturing system would be appropriate for stock estimation 
on the Danube River itself. Most stock estimation work attempted to relate 
Danube shad stocks to the hydrological regime of the Danube (Navodaru, 
1992; Navodaru et al., 1993) and frequent reference was made to 10-11 
year cyclical variations (which may have links with solar cycles which 
causes changes in the hydrometereological and especially hydrological 
regime) (Staras, 1994:22, quoting Ivanov (1985), Leonte (1957), Navodaru 
(1992), Navodaru et al. (1993); Niculescu (1960), Niculescu and Nalbant 
(1965)). The conclusion was that stock estimation for the Danube can be 
improved, but that it would also require substantial costs as it would be 
necessary to do work on a large, international, scale where all the countries 
that exploit this resource become involved.
3. At the end of this work the DDI is supposed to provide the DDBRA with 
detailed prescriptions about the Total Allowable Catch Limit (TAC) for the 
different species and fishing regulations (e.g., what gear to use, restocking 
of lakes with fingerlings, and maintenance work on breeding grounds) for 
different fishing zones of the DDBR.
10 I have numbered these paragraphs because the structure involves both content and process issues .
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This auction/leasing system was expected to produce sufficient income for 
the state (estimated at about USD 350,000 per year)11 and allow the 
DDBRA to undertake the necessary research and investments in the 
fisheries of the DDBR.
5. Once the leasing contract with the different fishing companies were made, 
the DDBRA expected that it would be able to get much better fishing effort 
data. The clarity with which the fishermen would be required to report to the 
company on where they caught the fish, would enable the DDBRA and DDI 
to manage the fishery (except for the Danube River and the Black Sea 
fishery) much more reliably and accurately towards optimal levels because 
they will be in a position to also determine the optimal effort levels 
(something that, according to Staras (1994:28-29), is not possible with 
current data). The TAC were to be reviewed annually for each zone.
6. Better management would result in higher and more stable fish yields, and 
that prospect would make the fishermen interested in participating in the 
attainment of the management objectives of the DDBR. The Ecological 
Guards (wardening) department of the DDBRA would assist to ensure that 
the fishing companies comply with the agreed conditions.
2.4.2 Problems relating to the handling of uncertainty
There were two main problems with respect to the way in which the DDBRA and the 
DDI handled uncertainty. First, even though they mentioned occasionally that not all 
catch was reported, the implications of this problem (and many other sources of 
uncertainty) were never specified. Secondly, the DDBRA insisted that the DDI was to 
prescribe exact catch limits and optimal fishing restrictions in spite of overwhelming 
problems of uncertainty relating to almost all variables of the fishery management.
According to fishery biologists “rational and scientific management of fisheries must 
depend on a fundamental understanding of fish biology and ecology; that is, what 
sort of animals fish are, and were and how they live” (Pitcher and Hart, 1982:9). Only 
in that way can one attempt to answer the question asked by all those involved in 
fishery management: “how can the harvest of fish biomass be maximised without 
impairing the prospects of exploiting the fishery in the future?” (Pitcher and Hart, 
1982:219) To answer this question fishery scientists seek to estimate how many fish
11 1,000 million Lei at 3,000 Lei per USD (Staras, 1994:30)
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there are in the water at a given time and to what extent and how quickly a stock can 
recover after different amounts of fish have been extracted (Gulland, 1983).
It must be noted that fishery biologists are aware that in fishery management not only 
the existence of the resource matters, but also the benefits that one can expect to 
draw from them. They point out, for example, that the Maximum Sustainable Yield 
(i.e. the maximum amount that can be extracted on a sustainable basis) is seldom 
also the amount that is most beneficial to extract, as that calculation also needs to 
take the costs of harvesting into account. That is why biologists do not argue, like the 
DDBRA's approach suggest, that fishery management is primarily about establishing 
the Maximum Sustainable Yield as an indication of the carrying capacity of the 
Danube Delta. Instead, they speak of “optimal control”, where the yield determined 
for allowable extracting each year “reflects as many factors as are necessary for the 
long-term survival of the fishery”12 (Pitcher and Hart, 1982:354&356). Or, in the 
words of Pearse (1980:356): “Fishery management is an exercise in optimal control 
using appropriately selected models.”
However, the reason why the DDBRA is drawn to fishery science is that the following 
recommendation is common (see also Gulland, 1983:1):
' The best policy seems to us to produce a sound purely biological 
recommendation, decide what regulations might achieve them, 
and then bring in economic and other considerations as a way of 
choosing between alternative strategies of gaining the optimal 
biology, which may of course include conservation aspects as well 
as fish yields. To run things the other way round seems a path 
fraught with dangers, since only by putting the stock biology first 
can we be sure of continuing to use the valuable naturally 
renewable resources of fisheries” (Pitcher and Hart, 1982:366).
Such recommendations appear to suggest that the only way that one can start
fishery management is through scientific fish stock assessments. The following
examples show why the implementation of such an interpretation has proven to be
very difficult (in the Danube Delta, as well as elsewhere).
The process of making "biological recommendations" involves two steps: first, 
scientists seek to determine the state fish stock, and in a second step, they attempt 
to predict the effects of changes in fishing effort on the fish stocks.
12 Note that a in the biologists view a “fishery” consists of both the resource as well as the humans 
exploiting it.
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2.4.2.1 Determining the state o f  the fish stock
Figure 2-10 illustrates that many factors influence fish stocks. Fish stock analysis 
also has to be repeated for different species and different habitats, as the factors that 
affect them will differ and change over time.
Figure 2-10: Flow diagramm illustrating variables and sub-systems affecting 
the expoitable stock biomass
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Source: Pitcher and Hart (1982:251)
The methodology for fish stock assessment used by the DDI is the Beverton-Hold 
method (Jones, 1984). The main idea behind this method is to establish a 
relationship between the size of the catch on the one hand and growth and mortality 
of fish on the other through analysing samples of the fish landed. One of the greatest 
advantages of this method is that when sufficient accurate data is available as little 
as two years data may be required for a preliminary assessment.
The Beverton-Holt model (Beverton and Holt, 1957) is based on the assumption that 
in the long-term fish stocks is constant. Such constancy is only achieved when the 
rate at which new fish are added to the population (called “recruits”) equals the total 
number of fish dying (both from natural causes and fishing). By dividing the fish 
population into different age groups, and by predicting the weight of fish in each age 
group (e.g. average from past catch, together with assumptions about growth etc.), 
the total yield of fish through fishing can be calculated for different intensities of 
extraction and age of first capture (which is determined by the mesh size).
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To implement this model Danube Delta Institute (DDI) scientists have taken random 
samples from commercial fish collection points in nine hydrographical zones of the 
Danube Delta and the Razim-Sinoie complex since 1989 (there is no stock 
estimation for the Danube River fishery - because of technical and methodological 
difficulties). The months of October and November were chosen for this sampling, 
since it is during this period that fish congregate in preparation for the winter months. 
The length and weight for 1000 fish are taken, and scales (which indicate the age of 
fish) are taken from 100 fish, in order to develop a statistical model of the length- 
weight relationship. The growth rate of fish, and the natural mortality rate are also 
estimated. These parameters are then used to statistically fit a gear selectivity curve 
and a total mortality curve. It is then possible to perform a Virtual Population 
Analysis, which is used to estimate the total number of fish in the water. By applying 
the Thompson-Bell model, the DDI scientists then estimate how much fish could be 
sustainably harvested using different intensities of fishing. In the final step different 
ways of “optimising fishing” are evaluated by applying the Beverton-Holt yield per 
recruit model.
According to Jones (1984), in practice it is often quite easy to determine when a 
species is overexploited but one needs a lot of data to determine the maximum 
sustainable yield (MSY). Jones (1984) also points out that analytical methods, such 
as those employed in the Danube Delta, are justifiable only for teleost fisheries (i.e. 
not a multi-species fishery where species interaction may play an important part in 
determining recruitment), because for telost stocks recruitment of juveniles appears 
to be independent of spawning stock size over a wide range of stock sizes.
In practice recruitment levels are difficult to predict because they are very variable 
and the relationship between stock size and recruitment is not know precisely. 
Beddington and Rettig (1984) argue that the problems caused by this uncertainty are 
exacerbated because data accumulate typically very slowly and the techniques for 
analysing stocks are unable to predict successfully into the future (Gulland, 1977; 
Pope, 1979; Pope and Sheperd, 1982). Furthermore, data on recruitment and stock 
size obtained through stock assessment techniques often fail to produce enough 
evidence to justify reducing the amount allowed to be fished until the process is so 
far advanced that that strong corrective measures need to be taken (see Saetersdal, 
1980, or Gulland, 1983:9-10, for examples).
Since the recovery rate following over-exploitation varies with species, it is hard to 
predict it accurately. The recovery is also affected by species interaction. Daan 
(1980) shows that it is hard to predict when and to what extent a species that was 
reduced through over-fishing will be ‘replaced’ with other species. Such changes in
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the community structure may further complicate forecasts if the initial target species 
was a predator of others and afterwards the prey becomes the object of fishing. 
Sustainability for the initial target species is then threatened both from potential 
recruitment collapse and from a reduction in their food supply.
In the Danube Delta fish stock estimation based on the methods outlined above are 
particularly difficult because there is evidence that in addition to fishing, fish stocks 
are influenced by a wide variety of environmental factors. The following two 
examples illustrate this point.
Artificial polders and canals
Physical alterations of the Danube Delta through the construction of polders and 
canals are believed to have influenced the habitats of several fish species. The 
following two examples support this hypothesis:
Carp rely on shallow and relatively still waters to spawn. In the past they used the 
flooded areas east of the Danube Delta and the small ravine-like entries into the 
branches of the river and the main canals for this purpose. Figure 2-11 shows that 
there appears to be an inverse relationship between carp catches and empoldered 
areas, suggesting that empoldering has diminished their numbers.
Figure 2-11: Carp catches and polder construction, 1961-1993
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Among the most dramatic effects of canal constructions were those brought about by 
two canals constructed at the turn of this century that directed fresh water from the 
Danube Sf. Gheorghe branch into the Razim-Sinoie lagoon complex. At the same 
time the natural opening that linked the lagoon with the Black Sea was closed off by 
a sluice. The result was that the originally brackish water of the lagoon complex 
turned into fresh water (see also Antipa, 1914:39-51).
Many other canals have been dug throughout the Delta since then but not all of the 
effects were so clear as the one mentioned above. Some lead to increased silt 
deposits and a worsening of the water quality in the lakes because polluted river 
water is reaching the flood lakes directly through the canals without being filtered by 
the reed beds it previously swamped. This may have been the main mechanism by 
which many lakes have become eutrophic (depleting oxygen levels in the water 
through increased algae growth).
Seasonal variations in fish stocks
Research on fish species diversity in 1993 by the DDI (Navodaru et al., 1993) 
indicated that there were 57 fish species of which 37 were freshwater species, 18 
species living in both salt and freshwater, and two salt water species.13 Monitoring of 
the fish stock developments based on catches has been hampered by the fact that 
the fishing gear used could retain only about 35 species. Statistics, covering the 
period from 1963 to 1993, have been kept for only 10 or 11 species (Staras, 1994:4). 
Some of the fish species exhibit large and unpredictable seasonal variations
When there are large spring floods, breeding conditions for those fish species that 
reproduce in the Danube Delta improve. As a result more fish than normal are bom, 
when there are abnormally large floods. Exactly what the proportions are is not 
known, but it has been repeatedly observed that some years after a large flood, when 
the fish bom in the year of the flood mature, fish catches rise to surprising levels. 
One such example, is the nine-fold increase in east-asian species between 1991 and 
1992 that led Navodaru et al. (1993) to argue that “this strengthens the hypothesis 
that they reproduce under very specific conditions”. Floods were also thought to be 
responsible for a large part of the 1993 catch of 4,669 tonnes in the Danube Delta 
which was 1,494 tonnes greater than the Total Allowable Catch determined for that 
year (Navodaru et al., 1993:21). The fact that flooding has a much smaller influence 
on the Razim-Sinoie Complex than on the Danube Delta lakes may partially explain 
why the fish catch in the latter varies much more than in the former.
13 Bacalbasa et al. (1984) reported 73 fish species for the year 1983.
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2.4.2.2 Predicting the effects of changes in fishing effort
The second step in the production of "biological recommendations" (Pitcher and Hart, 
1982:366) for fishery management is a prediction of what happens to a fish stock 
when it is fished with different intensities. Fishing intensity is a function of the type 
and amount of gear, number of fishermen, and the time spent fishing. The problems 
with respect to effort data in the Danube Delta were that the little effort data that was 
available was both uncertain as well as ineffectively used.
In order to determine the effects of changes in mesh size, DDI scientists employed 
the widely used methods of Cadima (1978) and Gulland (1961, 1964). In both 
methods one starts by calculating the immediate effect of, for example, enlarging the 
mesh size so that less fish are captured.
With the Gulland method one can also calculate the long-term effect of increasing the 
mesh size: some of the fish not retained in the first period will be caught at an older 
age and larger weight. The calculation is based on the following idea: only part of the 
fish not caught initially will survive to the time when they could be caught (depending 
on the mortality rate and the time required to grow to the new mesh size length). Of 
those only some will be caught (depending of the fishing effort). The number 
calculated being caught is then multiplied by the average weight of the individuals 
that make up the enlarged catch. This calculation can be made more complex if one 
takes account of the movement of the fish into areas where fishing is not done with 
the same mesh size.
Data on fishing effort is very important for the fish stock assessment methodology 
that the DDI uses. They would need to know how many fishermen fish for how long, 
with what gear. These different data then need to be calibrated so that a relative 
effort equivalence between the different gears can be established. However, this is 
particularly complicated in the DDBR due to the slow speed of the current through 
the Danube Delta (0.3-2 m/second), the great variation in width of the channels (400- 
1000 m), non-uniform and changing river beds, a great variety of fishing methods and 
fishing gear have developed (see Table 2-5).
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Table 2-5: Fishing methods on the lower Danube and Danube Delta branches






Shore line resting place rod, castnet, 
hooks, scoop nets




resting place scoopnets, stiks welsh limited use
Shallow shore 
line
feeding area fikes, hooks, 
seines
all species limited use





















seine nets all species limited use
Electric
fishing
feeding and migration electricity all species prohibited
Trawling migration trawl all species recently
introduced
In the middle and 
surface area of 
the river
migration Gill nets Danube
shad
Industrial fishing
Source: Staras (1994:8-9) based on Bacalbasa (1965)
In the Danube Delta data on effort is, however, extremely poor. In 1992 eleven 
fishing companies operating in the Biosphere Reserve employed on average 1,186 
fishermen and an overall fishing effort of about 138,951 man days, of which about 
18,000 man days in the Black Sea. Navodaru et al. (1993) noted that this data is 
supplied by the fishing companies and therefore its "reliability may not be very high", 
especially regarding fishing with smaller gear.
There is only one set of statistics on effort that summarises the number of employees 
and the type and number of gears used for the whole DDBR (see Table 2-6). Staras 
(1994:5) notes, however, that the real numbers are likely to be "much higher".
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Table 2-6: Employment and gear used in DDBR, 1993
Fishing Zone Average nr Person Vintire* Taliene* Navoade Ave 25-40* Ave 50-60* Ohane* Talian* Carmace*
fishermen days- units units * units units units units units licenses
Fortuna 21 2,388 105 110 3 204 111
Gorgova 29 4,256 640 183 203 210
Uzlina-lsacova 54 13,390 2,360 317 3 147 200
Somova 47 11,750 2,502 147 9 275 190
Baclanesti 8 909 60 60 46 40
Trei lezere 11 1,500 63 89 10 81
Matita - Merhei 40 8,055 252 101 4 74 210 34
Danube
Puiu - Rosu 63 9,015 1,700 200 3 315 390
Razim - Sinoe 372 79,112 800 1,156 74
Bogdaproste M 23 4 810 28 36 24 35
Crisan 21 5,080 830 12 4 235 180
Agro. Nufarul 36 4,800 5 144 60 21
(Razim)
Sulina 156 17,400 80 16
Isaccea (Danube) 52 6,240 32 32 312 40 80
Jurilofca (Black Sea) 269 1,614 2 48
Sf. Gheorghe (Black 72 11,260 2 200 3 3,000
Sea)
Pisc.Tulcea (Danube 18 4,320 260 90 6 28 54
and Canals)
TOTAL State 1273 181,899 9,632 2,533 115 2017 2,246 215 70 3,000
Companies
TOTAL Private 98 5,790 70 21 204 476
Companies
TOTAL DDBR 1,371 187,689 9,702 2,554 115 2,221 2,722 215 67 3,000
Source: Staras (1994:4f), * denotes Romanian names for different types of fishing 
gear.
The following tables from Staras (1994:11-12) shows the historical effort data 
available. It shows that there are many years for which there is no data.
Table 2-7: Fishing effort in Tulcea region, 1929-1924
Year Licences Employers/ Hired Lakes Danube Black Setci * Ave *
Selfem­ labour River Sea
ployed with without
own gear gear
1920 1,972 1,449 523 1,409 201 362 52,755 71,610
1921 2,177 1,630 547 1,622 190 365 58,407 76, 597
1922 2,321 1,722 594 1,666 198 457 50,885 15,802
1923 2,408 1,796 612 1,768 243 397 80,934 20,9246
1924 3,177 2,199 978 2,425 330 422 88,042 20,2114
* Total number of gear used in lakes, Black Sea, and Danube River.
Source: Staras (1994:11-12) quoting Daia (1926), * denotes Romanian names for 
different types of fishing gear.
In spite of the fact that so many of the variables that scientists and policy makers 
take into consideration in the formation of fishery management policy, and more 
specifically in the determination of fishing quotas as I have been discussing above, 
their recommendations do not include ranges, nor statements regarding the accuracy 
of their figures, nor a discussion of different scenarios.
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The following two quotes indicate that this situation is not unique to the DDBR: 
“rather than dealing with uncertainty explicitly in the management process, managers 
often resort to producing relatively conservative estimates of MSY” (Rettig, Berkes, 
and Pinkerton, 1989:284). Gulland (1983:18) argued in a similar vein: “almost 
inevitably ... the consensus would be reached on the lowest value.” He also laments 
the fact that TAC calculation results or predictions about the effect of a change in 
mess size rarely acknowledge the possibility of error.
2.4.3 Problems relating to the handling of Conflicting Objectives
The purpose of fishery management is to regulate the extraction of fish and this 
involves a basic trade-off: prohibiting all fishing maximises the likelihood that the fish 
stock will be in a good state but at the cost of forgoing all possible income. Once 
fishery managers decide that there should be some fishing, then they may have to 
take additional considerations such as equity and efficiency into consideration if they 
want to maximise welfare.
However, all of the DDBRA's analysis suggests that they were operating as though 
the mandate given to them through Article 5, Annex 2 of Law 82/1993 meant that 
they only needed to be concerned with was the specification of a Maximum 
Sustainable Yield for each fish species. This was wrong on at least two accounts: 
First, Biosphere Reserves are (see also Section 1.1.2):
"multipurpose protected areas established to conserve species ... 
to find ways to use the environment .... and the societies that 
depend on [the ecosystems] healthy." (UNESCO, 1990)
In view of this fact, the first problem relating to the handling of conflicting objectives is
that the DDBRA and DDI completely left out the social parts of the analysis.
A second reason why the exclusive concern with the Maximum Sustainable Yield 
was wrong is that the literature on the fishery management approach that the 
DDBRA and DDI were pursuing, explicitly raises issues relating to trade-offs that are 
inherent in fishery management policy. The following examples related to the 
development of Total Allowable Catch (TAC) quotas and the issuing of fishing 
licences illustrate the complexity of the trade-offs.
2.4.3.1 Trade-offs involved in the development of Total Allowable Catch quotas
Total Allowable Catch limits (TACs) have become the most widely used fishing effort 
regulatory procedure in the developed world. The principle behind it is quite simple: 
one decides how much fish one wants to extract and allocates this quantity to the 
fishermen involved. This limit is then enforced by monitoring how much they catch. In
77
practice, however, the regulation of fishing through TACs faces a number of 
problems.
Before scientists are able to give advice on TACs they need a management aim such 
as a specific MSY, a particular fishing mortality rate, or a long-term maximisation of 
yield per recruit. In the case of the Danube Delta, the DDBRA skirted this issue by 
simply mandating the DDI to determine a TAC that is within the carrying capacity of 
the ecosystem. One of the problems with such an approach is that theoretically there 
is a infinite number of different Total Allowable Catch quotas that would have some 
chance of maintaining fish activity within the carrying capacity of the ecosystem. The 
difference between all those TACs is, of course, that they are not equally likely to 
maintain fishing activity within the carrying capacity of the ecosystem. The choice of 
a particular TAC entails, therefore, a trade-off between different levels of risk of 
maintaining a species and different levels income from fishing. A related problem is 
brought out by Pope (1984), as he highlights the fact that managers seldomly specify 
the level of accuracy that they seek (in his words “would a systematic bias of 10% 
either way worry anyone?”).
While TACs are intuitively easy to understand, the establishment of wise TACs 
requires a lot of accurate data on the age or size composition of the catch, the effort 
and the catch per unit effort of the various components of the fishery (Caddy, 1984). 
At the same time, however, TAC based management system generate disincentives 
for fishermen to accurately report both how much fish they have landed as well as 
with the effort expended. The reason for this that is that accurate reporting of catch 
by fishermen may turn out to work against them (at least in the short run), since it 
could show that exploitation is too high (e.g. increasingly young fish are caught, or 
the total catch is decreasing). This shows that fishery managers must consider many 
different objectives and they must also examine the many individual decisions that 
together make up the management system in relation to one-another.
2.4.3.2 Trade-offs involved in the development of Licensing system
After TACs for different species and fishing zones are established, rights to fish the 
allowed catch must be specified and allocated to fishermen. According to the DDBRA 
(personal communication), up to the 1994 fishing season fishing rights were allocated 
in the form of licences by the DDBRA according to extremely simple principle: nine 
state and two private companies operating in the DDBR reported to the DDBRA how 
much gear they owned and how many fishermen they employed. The DDBRA then 
divided the total TAC for the Danube Delta proportionally between the companies.
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Nobody knows the extent to which companies over-reported their capital endowment 
and their employee numbers as an attempt to increase the TAC allocated to them.
The proposed new management system pursued by the DDBRA was for the DDI and 
the Licensing Department of the DDBRA to determine TACs for different fishing 
zones (without officially specifying any objectives, other than fishing within the 
“natural carrying capacity” stated by DDBRA Law) and then to auction the licences 
with associated TACs in a closed bidding system to the highest bidding registered 
company for a five year period, and to charge at least 18% tax on the landed catch.
As Rettig, Berkes, and Pinkerton (1989:278,284) note, “allocation is a political rather 
than a scientific issue” and the reactions of fishermen to different proposals is not 
certain. A wide variety of issues that need to be considered in allocation are 
mentioned in the literature (none of which were addressed in the analysis of the 
DDBRA and DDI). The issues include transfer issues (i.e. are fishermen or 
companies able to sell their licences to others - this influences their commitment to 
resource conservation), difficulties of changing TAC for the licences or the number of 
licences themselves if it is determined that there is either an over- or under-fishing 
capacity (there are overt and as well hidden costs in changing fishing methods and 
intensities); and many more (see for example Rettig, Berkes, and Pinkerton (1989), 
Jones (1984), Pomeroy and Berkes (1997)).
Gulland (1983:18) “most fishery management involves reaching a balance between 
different economic and social interests...” and “fishery biologists were not equipped to 
make these choices which should be left to the appropriate political body.” The 
second reason why Gulland (1983:19) found this unsatisfactory is that for the 
purpose of avoiding any mention of uncertainty scientists used “too often advice .. 
based on simple yield-per-recruit or similar calculations, and the other, less 
quantifiable results are ignored. Since these effects are often those that have the 
greatest long-term impact on fisheries, the scientific advice tends to be rather 
precise, but wrong, rather than being approximate, but right.” He concluded that “it is 
therefore highly desirable that when advice is being prepared on the basis of stock 
assessment studies that such advice is not confined to what appear to be reasonably 
confident statements, but that the uncertainties, especially those that such as the 
impact on recruitment, that could have a great effect on the fisheries, are fully 
described” Gulland (1983:19).
Two important observations need to be made at this point. First, even though the
fishery management literature raises a wide range of issues that need to be included,
and makes numerous reference to trade-offs, it is almost completely silent about the
process or the method by which these conflicts are to be resolved (in Chapter 3,
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when I discuss the existing Decision Analysis approach to these matters, I review the 
most important contributions within the fishery management literature to these 
problems). As a result, the DDBRA and DDI are not alone when they deal with the 
issue of trade-offs either choosing to concentrate on aspects that seem to be easily 
measurable (such as the quantity of fish fished and in the water). All other issues are 
then relegated to the "political domain" - outside of the reach of analysis.
The second important point is that the management approach pursued by the 
DDBRA, which, as mentioned before, is quite common elsewhere, is based on an 
assumption according to which the underlying fishery management problem is short­
term over-exploitation by fishermen that invariably results in the destruction of the 
resource base. The only way to overcome this tragedy is for the state to assume a 
role of regulator in the interest of societal welfare. I have shown that for such an 
approach to work, one needs to handle both uncertainty as well as multiple 
objectives better. In the following Chapter I will argue that there is evidence that the 
existing Decision Analysis approaches would be useful for this purpose and that they 
could be used to assist the DDBRA and DDI in dealing with some of their problems. 
However, there is also growing evidence (which I discuss in Chapter 4) that the 
premise on which the management approach itself is based is inaccurate and that 
there are alternative ways of managing a fishery.
In either case, whether one tries to assist the DDBRA and DDI to better implement 
the management approach on which they have embarked, or whether on seeks to 
assist them to develop an alternative management approach, I will argue in the 
following section that there is evidence of management difficulties that suggests that 
the institutional context is an important variable in fishery management. In Chapters 4 
and 5 I will discuss possible explanations for these observations and the implications 
for the use of Decision Analysis.
2.4.4 The effects of the Institutional Context on Management
Given the range of uncertainties that were encountered, the multitude of 
management and research choices that needed to be made, and the number of 
stakeholders with different objectives and perspectives it was not surprising that 
there were disagreements. In addition to the technical problems of encoding and 
handling uncertainty, or incorporating multiple objectives systematically into the 
analysis, the formal rules and informal constraints of behaviour that structure human 
interaction (following North's (1995) definition of institutions that I will elaborate in 
Chapter 4) must also be taken into consideration. Without the institutional context, it 
is difficult to achieve the objectives of the DDBR as defined by UNESCO (1995:5):
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“to preserve and generate natural and cultural values, through 
management that is scientifically correct, culturally creative and 
operationally sustainable”
In the informal process of policy discussion a number of different positions could be
identified: the Governor of the DDBRA insisted that DDI should be in a position to
provide unequivocal prescriptions of an optimal biology. In private conversation other
staff within the DDBRA recognized that univocal prescriptions might be difficult to
obtain because of various uncertainties but, at least officially, they supported the
position of the Governor.
Collaboration within the DDBRA and between the DDI and the DDBRA was difficult. 
There were many views expressed privately and hinted at the semi-annual 
presentations of the DDI to the DDBRA on the work completed (see Chapter 7), but 
constructive discussion very difficult. Many also expressed frustration that the 
different groups (scientists, managers, different disciplines, different organizational 
affiliations) did not understand each others' positions and points of view about what 
should or could be done and what the overall strategies should be.
It was difficult to know what fishing companies and fishermen were thinking because 
there was little communication between them and the DDBRA or the DDI. Formal 
interaction between fishermen or fishing companies and authorities was limited to the 
written reports produced at the fish collection points, the issuing of licences, and the 
enforcement activities of the wardens. There are a number of factors that made the 
interaction difficult. Among theses was the long history of command and control 
management in which a central government authority or company decided without 
much consultation how much fish was to extracted and by what methods.
The fact that the future management of the DDBR had been discussed since the 
creation of the DDBR in 1991 but that few systemic changes had been achieved over 
the course of four years is strong evidence for the difficulty of bringing about change. 
No matter how ideal and sophisticated the management system proposed, if it cannot 
be brought about it is of little use!
Commenting on such persistent disagreements, some eminent fishery scientists 
have argued that: “there are currently many plans for sustainable use or sustainable 
development that are founded upon scientific information and consensus. Such ideas 
reflect ignorance of the history of resource exploitation and misunderstanding of the 
possibility of achieving consensus concerning resources and the environment” 
(Ludwig, Hilbom, and Walters, 1993:17).
One aspect of this difficulty is simply the fact that in an environment were institutions 
are understaffed (particularly at the management level), there are so many demands
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made upon individuals that actual collaborative work between different departments, 
and even worse, different institutions becomes an elusive ideal. Instead everyone is 
busy dealing with the next unexpected demand that the system produces. Those who 
show some ability to deal with it are then swamped with even more demands.
Another aspect concerns the question of how this should be organised. The 
customary mode is through formal research of work agreements (the DDBRA 
commissions research from the DDI, who then presents it at an annual seminar 
where University Professors and members of the Romanian Academy are present to 
evaluate the methods used and results obtain on scientific criteria). The agreements 
and work process were formal, but the determination of the aims of the studies must 
have been much less formal as there were no documented rationales.
2.5 Conclusion
The DDBRA needed to develop an integrated environmental management plan for 
the DDBR. This management plan was to guide operations of the Biosphere 
Reserve, whose purpose is to demonstrate how man and nature can co-exist 
sustainably.
In 1991, the date of it’s establishment, the DDBRA commissioned a five year 
scientific research project from the DDI. The expectation from these studies were 
high: they were supposed to assess the existing fish stock and “determine the 
conditions for sustainable use14 through fishing." (Navodaru et al., 1993)
Three types of problems were observable (all related to the fact that even though the 
models they used were quite straight forward, in reality the DDBRA and DDI faced 
tremendous problems):
The DDI did a reasonably sophisticated job on the fish stock estimation but that too 
fell short because it did not include an analysis of the inter-relationships, or the 
possible causes for what was happening. I have indicated that many influencing 
factors identified were identified, but not all were equally likely and that should have 
been reflected in their conclusions. The analysis therefore fell far short of what 
needed for the approach to management they had embarked on.
The economics of fishery management were essentially ignored and the effort 
restriction TAC management considerations much too simplistic The most obvious 
reason for this might be that there was no economists (but since there seemed to be 
no demand for one either, the cause for this is deeper: the DDI and the DDBRA
14 The Romanian term “valorificare" literally translated means: ‘to transform into value.’
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shared the belief that it is possible to determine a natural carrying capacity coupled 
with a command-and-control attitude originating from the state management solution 
of the Tragedy of the Commons. One could also hypothesise that everyone realised 
that the available evidence for a carrying capacity did not allow the identification of a 
unique natural limit and that changing the status quo meant that there would be 
winners and losers. This in turn would have posed a very difficult problem: how could 
the DDBRA use uncertain information to impose restrictions on stakeholders in 
DDBR?
In the next Chapter I will discuss the extent to which existing proposals for the use of 
Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis, a technology that has been successfully applied 
in many other fields, are able to overcome the problems of encountered in fishery 
management that I have discussed in this Chapter.
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Chapter 3 Proposals of the existing Multiple Criteria Decision 
Analysis literature for dealing with DDBRA’s problems
3.1 Introduction
A central argument in the Decision Analysis literature that deals with environmental 
management (see for e.g. von Winterfeldt, 1992:322-324) is that too often experts 
have been given or taken on the roles of risk estimators, evaluators, as well as 
decision makers. This, it is argued, is inappropriate, because experts may be 
knowledgeable about the probabilities of different outcomes from different policy 
measures, but it is the task of the decision maker to combine that technical 
information with the wishes of the population.
As a result, much of the existing Decision Analysis literature that deals with 
environmental management matters, is concerned with the ways in which the 
Decision Analysis tools can be used for the following three tasks:
1. Assist experts in dealing with increasingly complex technical judgements
2. Inform the decision maker about the objectives of different stakeholders which 
can be used to evaluate alternatives
3. Help the decision maker to integrate the information, develop further 
alternatives and to make a choice
This chapter consists of three parts. I first present an outline of the complete Multiple 
Stakeholder Decision Analysis process and focus on the rationale of the different 
steps. This is followed by a discussion of the previous applications of MSDA. In the 
final section I examine the MSDA approach with respect to possible application in the 
DDBR.
3.2 Rationale of MSDA
Following work on offshore oil pollution von Winterfeldt (1980 and 1987) directed his 
work to problems in which several groups interacted in a complex way. The resulting 
approach is now known as Multiple-Stakeholder Decision Analysis (MSDA). 
According to von Winterfeldt (1992), MSDA is an intermediate approach between 
game theory and traditional decision analysis (in the latter, decision problems are 
analysed from the perspective of only a single decision maker). The decision problem 
is first analysed from the perspective of different stakeholders. The goal here is “not
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to find the best alternative (as in standard decision analysis), nor to find an 
equilibrium (as in game theory), but to clarify the values and opinions of the 
stakeholders, to pinpoint the sources of disagreement, and to develop compromise 
solutions” (von Winterfeldt, 1992:322).
In his work on prioritisation of research and development activities, air pollution 
control, offshore drilling and nuclear safety he often encountered conflicts between 
experts. As a result, the MSDA approach was extended to involve multiple experts 
“to provide diversity in judgements.” Von Winterfeldt (1992:322-324) states the 
central dilemma which this approach seeks to address thus: “The experts should not 
control society’s technological choices, but [on the other hand] the public and their 
political representatives are not sufficiently informed to assume complete control 
themselves. ” 15
Von Winterfeldt argues that this dilemma has now become more pressing because 
the traditional approach to risk management, where the expert was often risk 
estimator, evaluator, and decision maker, has become increasingly inadequate. 
There are three reasons why the traditional approach is inadequate: (i) with many of 
the new technologies (such as nuclear power, bioengineering, or chemicals in food), 
uncertainties in models and data, disagreements about model assumptions and 
interpretation of data, have often led to orders of magnitudes of differences among 
risk estimators. As a result, estimating risks has become much more difficult, (ii) 
Stakes are often so high that a trial and error approach is not viable because they 
can lead to disasters and therefore we should never let them happen, and they may 
also be so uncertain that no data accumulation will ever give final answers, (iii) 
Debates about “acceptable risk” are essentially controversies about expert versus 
public values that may be worsened by the danger that experts are not necessarily in 
tune with the concerns of the public. In these circumstances von Winterfeldt (1992) 
argues that MSDA is a constructive way forward because it prevents technological 
questions from becoming so politicised that they have to be resolved by voting or 
referendums.
15 Hamalainen (1991) assessed the preferences of politicians and nuclear power experts and found that 
for example “average prioritisations of the subcriteria were widely different" (page 469). That study was 
also the first where politicians were directly involved in decision analytic work on energy policy 
evaluations. “The main advantages were the building up of a balanced comprehensive picture of the 
problem and the revealing of questions where the decision makers lacked information’ (page 471).
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The essential claim is that DA can help overcome the dilemma of how to use both 
expert judgements and public value judgements in three ways (von Winterfeldt, 
1992:324):
1. “By exploring the value side of the problem and by highlighting 
multiple conflicting values held by different stakeholder groups;
2. By analysing the factual side of the problem through multiple 
elicitations of experts with differing views of the facts, data, 
models; and
3. By studying the implications of conflicting stakeholder values 
and differing expert judgements on the evaluation of the 
available policy alternatives.”
The methodology of MSDA consists of five major steps (see Table 3-1). The
methodology for the first two steps, problem formulation and development of
objectives and attributes, is best summarised in Keeney (1992), Keeney and Raiffa
(1976), and von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986). Their purpose is to provide
stakeholder value inputs into policy decision making. Stakeholders are identified,
their values and concerns elicited, and their evaluation strategies are then quantified
by a formal evaluation model. Through these models sources of agreement and
disagreements in evaluation strategies are identified and it is also possible to develop
compromise solutions. The methodology of the third step, in which multiple expert
judgements of risks, costs, benefits and other impacts are elicited, builds on the work
of Merkhofer (1987), Keeney and von Winterfeldt (1987b, 1991), and Mosleh, Bier,
and Apostolakis (1988). The methods for conducting the final two steps, elicitation of
a multiattribute utility model from stakeholders and sensitivity analysis and option
invention, are best summarised in Keeney (1992), Keeney and Raiffa (1976), and
von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986).
Table 3-1 Steps in a Multiple-Stakeholder Analysis
Problem Formulation • Translate the risk problem into a decision problem
• Identify stakeholders
• Obtain broad stakeholder input and objectives
Development of Objectives 
and Attributes
• Constructing separate value trees with stakeholders
• Building a combined value tree
• Developing alternatives
Estimation of Risks, Costs, 
Benefits and Other Impacts
• Identification and selection of experts
• Training and assistance in decomposition
• Modelling and data collection
• Elicitation
• Aggregation across experts
Elicitation of multiattribute 
utility model from 
stakeholders
• Elicitation of value judgements
• Testing and building a multiattribute utility model
Sensitivity analyses and • Putting the pieces together
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option invention • Sensitivity analyses
• Option invention
Source: von Winterfeldt (1992:325)
Other applications of DA to environmental problems use examples that are more 
readily related to the problems of the Danube Delta. These studies provide a number 
of additional reasons for why DA could be usefully applied to the problems of 
environmental management. After presenting them, I argue that the underlying 
rationale is so similar to that of MSDA, that they can be thought of as variations of the 
MSDA approach with different emphases. That is why I will use the MSDA approach 
von Winterfeldt (1992) as representing the current position of decision analysts 
dealing with environmental management problems. In the description of the approach 
in the next section I integrate their specific innovations from the other case studies.
A key feature in the MSDA literature is the distinction is made between decision 
makers (e.g. public officials), technical experts, and the stakeholders or lay people 
who will be affected by the outcomes, von Winterfeldt (1992:322-324) argues that is 
that all of these roles have been wrongly collapsed into one, where the expert is risk 
estimator, evaluator, and decision maker. This is inappropriate, von Winterfeldt 
argues, because while the expert may know about the probabilities of different 
outcomes from different policy measures, it is the task of the decision maker to 
combine that technical information with the wishes of the population. As a result, 
much of the MSDA literature is concerned with the ways in which an environmental 
management problem can be analysed as a decision problem and how the tools of 
Decision Analysis can be used to aid experts, stakeholders and decision makers.
3.2.1 Step 1: Problem Formulation
The task of the first step is to translate a usually ill-defined problem (e.g.. what can 
one do to ensure the sustainability of the DDBR fishery?) into a decision problem 
with properly formulated decision frame, that consists of both alternatives and the 
values considered in that decision. Keeney’s work on Value Focused Thinking 
(Keeney, 1992) provides the most detailed and elaborate structure for this. Here I will 
use Gregory and Keeney (1994); Keeney (1988); von Winterfeldt (1992) to outline 
the process:
The initial decision context is set by those facing the decision and those with factual 
knowledge about the decision. In the case of the DDBR this would be the DDBRA, 
the DDI, and the consultants assisting them with the management planning exercise. 
According to Gregory and Keeney (1994:1036) the key role of the decision analysts
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at this stage is to insure that decision context is set broadly enough so that all 
stakeholders can agree on the context because disagreements tend to occur when 
the initial statement of the decision context explicitly of implicitly rules out either 
objectives or alternatives that certain stakeholder groups consider important.
To achieve the initial consensus on the problem definition, maximise the usefulness 
of the set of objectives, establish the legitimacy of the decision process, and ensure 
the willingness of stakeholders to co-operate, Keeney (1988) recommends to:
• involve a broad group of stakeholders or their representatives
• involve stakeholders early in the decision process
• make the first meeting with stakeholders a common meeting so that all receive
the same information at the same time
• in the initial meeting, review the problem as it is currently understood, the 
purpose of involving the stakeholders (obtaining their value judgement to develop 
alternatives, combine with factual information of experts, evaluate alternatives, 
and inform decision makers about different view points and concerns), how they 
were selected (though the MSDA literature is not very clear on this point, because 
the following quote from Keeney (1988:396) is typical “common sense, 
reasonable moral principles, and numerous laws and regulations”), issues such 
as gaming (i.e. intentional biasing of objectives to enhance the eventual selection 
of a preferred alternative. This, Keeney (1988) argues, won’t work because all 
objectives and alternatives are included and no weighting is usually done at this 
stage.)
• base the stakeholder consensus on the decision context by agreeing to accept 
the union of stakeholders’ objectives as the set of objectives for the decision 
context and the union of all alternatives that any stakeholder wants considered as 
the set of alternatives (Gregory and Keeney, 1994:1036).
Other issues mentioned, but not systematically addressed, are the questions of 
recognising and involving stakeholder groups that are not represented by an 
organisation, and dealing with the stakeholders who refuse to co-operate. Von 
Winterfeldt (1992:326) gives the example of a radical environmental movement which 
refused to participate in an analysis of energy policies for West Germany because 
they disagreed with the fundamental formulation of the problem - see also Keeney, 
von Winterfledt, and Eppel (1990). It can also happen that too many stakeholder 
groups are found (in the offshore oil case over 100 (von Winterfeldt, 1992:326). In 
such a case the advice is to “keep in mind that all relevant values should be
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represented by the participating stakeholders, but not necessarily all groups 
representing similar values”. Usually five to ten groups are thought to suffice, and 
Gregory and Keeney (1994) also argue that more than one from each group should 
participate, so that a broad based discussion of each group’s perspective is ensured.
3.2.2 Step 2: Development of Objectives and Attributes
Once the problem framework has been set and agreed on, the second step in the 
MSDA approach consists in the construction of separate value trees (also called 
objectives hierarchies (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976)) for all stakeholder groups. Table 
3-2 presents some techniques that can be used in identifying objectives (for a more 
detailed discussion see Keeney (1992)).
Table 3-2: Techniques to use in identifying objectives
1. A Wish list. What do you want? What do you value? What should you want?
2. Alternatives. What is a perfect alternative, a terrible alternative, some reasonable 
alternatives What is good or bad about each?
3. Problems and Shortcomings. What is wrong or right with your organization? What 
needs fixing?
4. Consequences. What has occurred that was good or bad? What might occur that 
you care about?
5. Goals, Constraints and Guidelines. What are your aspirations? What limitations 
are placed upon you?
6 . Different Perspectives. What would your competition or your constituency be 
concerned about? At some time in the future, what would concern you?
7. Strategic Objectives. What are your ultimate objectives? Which of your values are 
absolutely fundamental?
8 . Generic Objectives. What objectives do you have for your customers, your 
employees, your shareholders, yourself? What environmental, social, economic, or 
health and safety objectives are important?
I 9. Structuring Objectives. Follow means-ends relationships: why is that objective important, how can you achieve it? Use specification: what do you mean by this objective?10. Quantifying Objectives. How would you measure achievement of this objective? Why, for example, is objective A three times as important as objective B?_________
Source: Keeney (1994:798)
In the elicitation process, two concepts are used repeatedly (Keeney, 1988:397). The 
first relates to the separation, so far as possible, of means and ends (or more 
recently called “fundamental objectives” (Keeney, 1992)). The difference between the 
two types of objectives is that one set relates to things that they fundamentally care 
about, such as environmental quality, and those that matter only through their effect 
on these fundamental concerns, such as waste disposal (which affects water quality, 
and in turn the environment) (Gregory and Keeney, 1994:1040).
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This does not imply that means objectives are less important than fundamental 
objectives. Instead, “the distinction between fundamental and means objectives is 
appropriate to evaluate alternatives. Otherwise, double-counting will distort the 
evaluation. On the other hand, means objectives are important to articulate and 
appraise alternatives and to indicate how some stakeholders’ concerns that were not 
stated as means objectives are accounted for in an evaluation” (Gregory and 
Keeney, 1994:1040).
The process of making the distinction is usually achieved by interviewing 
stakeholders. After they write down a private list of objectives and concerns, the 
analyst goes through the list with them and asks “why is this objective important?” 
When the response is that it contributes to achieving other objectives on the list, it is 
categorised as a means objective, otherwise as a fundamental objective. The usual 
process is to work with individuals or small group of stakeholders. Notable exceptions 
to this general rule are Gregory and Keeney (1994), who also used group discussion, 
and von Winterfeldt (1992:327), who argues that one should attempt to “enlist the 
highest-ranking representative of each stakeholder group, since such members are 
usually willing to participate and interested in exploring value questions”. Once these 
two lists have been developed, the analysts construct the fundamental objectives 
hierarchy and a means-objectives network (see Figure 3-1).
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Figure 3-1 influence of a means-ends objectives network on fundamental 
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Figure 3.7. Connecting fundamental objectives hierarchies 
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Source: Keeney (1992:91)
Keeney (1992:86-87) offers the following reasons for structuring fundamental 
objectives structured into a hierarchy:
1. “The higher levels of an objectives hierarchy relate to fairly 
general concerns, such as the environment, economics, 
health and safety, and flexibility. Consequently, they can be 
identified relatively easily.
2. Higher-level objectives provide a basis for specification of 
lower level objectives.
3. A hierarchy helps identify missing objectives, since logical 
concepts of the specification process can fairly easily identify 
holes in the hierarchy.
4. The distinctions between means objectives and fundamental 
objectives become clearer as the objectives hierarchy is 
structured.
5. Situations where redundancy or double-counting might occur 
can often be identified with the logic of an objectives 
hierarchy.
6. It is easier to identify attributes to measure the achievement 
of more specific (lower-level) objectives than of more general 
(higher-level) objectives.
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7. The attributes for lower-level objectives collectively indicate 
the degree to which the associated higher-level objective is 
achieved.
8. The complete set of lowest-level attributes for a fundamental 
objectives hierarchy provides a basis for describing the 
consequences in the decision problem and for assessing an 
objective function appropriate for the problem.”
In the following step, the individual fundamental objectives hierarchies built around a
common overall fundamental objective, are combined. This combined hierarchy
should include all the objectives in any individual hierarchy, and in a sense is only a
logical reorganisation of the individual hierarchies. The main strength of this
combined hierarchy is that a “seemingly chaotic diversity of concerns” (Gregory and
Keeney, 1994:1041) is presented clearly. All stakeholders should be able to identify
all their concerns either in the hierarchy or in the means objectives network. The draft
combined fundamental objectives hierarchy should then be tested for nine desirable
properties listed in Table 3-3 (Keeney, 1992:82).
Table 3-3: Desired properties of the set of fundamental objectives
1. Essential, to indicate consequences in terms of the fundamental reasons for interest 
in the decision situation.
2. Controllable, to address consequences that are influenced only by the choice of 
alternatives in the decision context.
3. Complete, to include all fundamental aspects of the consequences of the decision 
alternatives.
4. Measurable, to define objectives precisely and to specify the degrees to which 
objectives may be achieved.
5. Operational, to render the collection of information required for an analysis 
reasonable considering the time and effort available.
I 6 . Decomposable, to allow the separate treatment of different objectives in theanalysis.
7. Non-redundant, to avoid double-counting of possible consequences.
8 . Concise, to reduce the number of objectives needed for the analysis of a decision.
9. Understandable, to facilitate generation and communication of insights for guiding
the decision making process._____________________________________________
Source: Keeney (1992:82)
The last part in this step of the MSDA approach is to develop attributes that 
operationalise the meaning of the objectives in the combined fundamental objectives 
hierarchy. As shown in Figure 3-1, attributes are usually defined at the lowest and 
most specific part of the hierarchy.
The reason why the attributes are important is they “they provide the linkage between 
the factual and evaluative part of the analysis. The stakeholder representatives will 
need the attribute definitions to express their trade-offs in a meaningful way. The
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experts will need the attributes to understand what is being estimated and to develop 
models and estimation procedures that allow them to provide estimates on the 
aspects that are relevant to the stakeholders” (von Winterfeldt, 1992:331 ).
In the terminology of DA, there are two types of attributes: natural and constructed. A 
natural attribute uses a common quantitative scale, such as “number of local 
fishermen employed” that could be used to measure the objective “maximise the 
employment of local fishermen”. A constructed scale describes, often in words, 
several degrees of the level to which an objective may be achieved. 16 Once the 
attributes for the common fundamental objectives hierarchy has been revised by the 
analyst, von Winterfeldt (1992:331) recommends that the completed framework is 
sent to stakeholders and experts for review (stakeholders review it to determine 
whether the “attributes truly capture their concerns”, while the experts review it to 
determine whether “they can provide estimates of the alternatives’ performance on 
these attributes”.)
Figure 3-2 summarises the decision framework used in the MSDA. Noteworthy is the 
distinction between “strategic objectives” and “fundamental objectives” (Keeney, 
1992). Strategic objectives are those “that are intended to guide all decision making” 
in an organisation (Keeney, 1992:41). All the separate decisions made over time 
collectively determine how well the organisation performs, and they thereby serve as 
the mechanism by which management can guide decision making in an organisation. 
The fact that they are strategic also means that they will not change very frequently. 
If they are not well specified or not communicated, decisions made over time in the 
organisation are unlikely fit well together and decision opportunities may be missed.
In contrast to strategic objectives, fundamental objective are defined as objectives 
that are both essential and controllable, and they need to be specified for each 
decision problem separately (see Table 3-3). “A set of objectives is essential if each 
of the alternatives in the decision context can influence the degree to which the 
objectives are achieved. A set of objectives is controllable if all of the alternatives that 
can influence the consequences are included in the decision context” (Keeney, 
1992:83). This relationship is illustrated in Figure 3-2, which shows that that 
fundamental objectives must lie somewhere between the decision context and the 
strategic objectives. The requirement to be essential broadens the fundamental 
objectives by pushing them toward the strategic objectives, while the fundamental 
objectives push them back toward the alternatives.
16 Keeney (1992:Chapter 4) gives detailed guidance on how the attributes are best constructed.
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Figure 3-2 Value Focused Thinking and the need to balance requirements of 
fundamental objectives
The value-focused-t kinking framework with flow  
of information indicated
the strategic decision context
fundamental objectives
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Source: Figure 2.8 and Figure 3.4 of Keeney (1992:46 and 84)
In the case of the DDBRA, an outline of the strategic objectives was provided at the 
International Forum, discussed in Chapter 2. The task of the management planning 
development is to review them and articulate them more precisely if necessary. In the 
case of fishery management problem, a set of fundamental objectives that fall within 
the scope of the strategic objectives would need to be developed. The process and 
methodology that the MSDA approach proposes for that has been described in these 
first two steps.
The most distinguishing factor of this “value focused” approach is its emphasis on a 
careful and thorough analysis of values. The reason behind this that in this way 
decision makers are not only enabled to solve particular decision problem that they 
may have identified or feel uneasy about, but that they can also identify decision 
opportunities (Keeney, 1992:47-51, 241-267). The main difference between decision 
problems and decision opportunities is that decision problems are mostly precipitated 
by external events, while decision opportunities are identified and defined by the
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decision maker. A second distinguishing factor of this process is the separation of 
value judgements (which involves broad stakeholder input, as described above, and 
are also quantified, as described later), from the factual assessment process that 
involves work with experts (also indicated in Figure 3-2). The latter is discussed in 
the next sub-section.
3.2.3 Step 3: Estimation of Risks, Costs, Benefits, and other Impacts
After the values which should guide the decision process have been specified and 
the attributes by which the impacts of alternatives should be measured have been 
constructed, the next step in the MSDA approach is to identify and select the experts 
who will determine the risks, costs, benefits, and other impacts of the alternatives. In 
other words, the “factual information” part in Figure 3-2 is assessed.
In controversial problem situations von Winterfeldt (1992:331) recommends that a 
number of different experts are engaged because “experts are likely to take sides.” 
Bonano et al. (1990) and von Winterfeldt (1992) recommend that experts be selected 
on the basis of their professional competence, peer recognition, command of the 
subject matter, flexibility, their political views, preference among the alternatives. 
Since these experts usually have little or no background in decision analysis and 
probability elicitation, they are trained in the task of making probability judgements, 
and made comfortable in expressing their views and opinions in terms of 
probabilities. Through this training they will be also made aware of the (cognitive) 
biases in their judgements and how to avoid such biases. The experts are also 
assisted by the decision analyst in decomposing their judgmental task into smaller 
sub-tasks and in the re-aggregation of the sub-tasks.
The purpose of judgement elicitation is to provide a snapshot of the state of 
knowledge based on their modelling, experimentation, and data analysis in their own 
domains. Often the work with experts is an iterative process, over longer periods of 
time (months), where experts are given time to carry out data collection and analysis 
prior to the actual elicitation of judgements (Keeney and von Winterfeldt, 1991). The 
decision analyst and the expert usually interact in a one-on-one process, where the 
analyst first attempts to clarify the elicitation variable or even, to establish 
boundaries, and to elicit probability distributions over the variable or events. 
Subsequently, the analyst elicits judgements by asking probability questions and 
documents both the answer and the reasoning of the expert (Bonano et al., 1990; 
Keeney and von Winterfeldt, 1991; von Winterfeldt, 1992).
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Through this process agreements and disagreements between experts on 
probabilities of particular events as well conditional probabilities can be brought out. 
Von Winterfeldt (1992:334) claims that “it is not unusual to find order of magnitudes 
of disagreements in elicited probability distributions”. If disagreements exist, the 
decision analyst has two basic choices for aggregations of expert judgements: either 
to employ mechanical aggregation (e.g. averaging) or behavioural resolution (e.g. 
through the Delphi method or through “group interaction”). No clear rule has been 
established on how to make the choice between them or to combine them in the 
analysis. The guidance offered contains three elements:
First, consider the relative importance of highly accurate probability estimates, and if 
they are indeed central (which they are often not according to von Winterfeldt and 
Edwards, 1986:132), then use the available debiasing procedures, which according 
to Fischhoff s (1982) evidence, however, may not be that effective, or try to make the 
judgement task easier, and give more training to expert.
Second, consider averaging the assessments. Von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986) 
argue that while this may not be easy to grasp intuitively, they refer to Seaver 
(1978:11) who states that: “Since proper scoring rules are convex functions on the 
probability simplex, the score of the average of individual probabilities will necessarily 
be better than the average of the individual’s scores!” The approximate intuitive 
explanation is that any proper scoring rule (see von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 
1986:123-127) has the property that, as the assessment that a particular event will 
occur gets smaller, the penalty for not assigning that event a probability of 1 . 0  
increases disproportionally. The main problem with the proper scoring rules is that in 
the case of the logarithmic rule one of its properties suggests that if one happens to 
assign probability 0  to an event that in fact occurred, than you would lose an infinite 
amount of money. That is why this rule “is so unattractive that the score is seldom 
used” (von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986:126). An alternative proper scoring rule, 
the quadratic rule (used primarily in forecasts in meteorology) is more complex but it 
is difficult to judge the calibration process (von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986:125)
Third, consider using a group process for arriving at an estimate, because it could be 
that the different experts have different kinds or items of knowledge, all which should 
be considered in the estimate. The main question concerns the process by which the 
experts’ judgements should be brought to bear. Averaging of different estimates is 
still possible but means also that there is no real purpose of having the experts in a 
group. One may also insist that the experts come to an agreement. Von Winterfeldt 
and Edwards (1986:134) cite evidence that the latter is mildly preferable to averaging
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(especially if consensus itself is an important issue). However, there may be negative 
effects arising in group situations, such as domination by one group member, power, 
and conformity (see also the literature on the problem of “Group Think” (Janis, 
1972)).
Another approach is through the Delphi procedure (Dalkey, 1975; Dalkey and 
Helmer, 1963). In its original form, the Delphi procedure was a formal process in 
which group members never met and remained anonymous. Each expert in the 
group produced an estimate of whatever was of interest (not necessarily a probability 
or a distribution) together with written arguments for this judgement. Arguments 
produced in this way were exchanged anonymously, and a new estimate made in 
sequential rounds (usually about three). While the Delphi procedure has been 
applied quite widely (Linstone and Turoff, 1975), it has also been criticised, for 
example Sackman (1974) concluded that "the evidence did not match the method's 
popularity”. This leads von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986) to conclude that it is 
difficult to favour the Delphi method over a “free-form group discussion”.
As an alternative to the Delphi technique Delbecq, van de Ven, and Gustafson (1975) 
proposed the nominal group technique, in which experts are asked to make 
judgements silently in the presence of the group, present all their judgements, 
discuss them, reconsider their initial judgements, and then aggregate the judgements 
mathematically. Von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986) conclude that the evidence for 
which method works best is inconclusive, and cite Seaver (1978:52) who argues 
against group interaction of any kind: “The result of interaction among assessors is 
quite clear... it produces more extreme and less well-calibrated assessments. If all of 
the members of the group agree ..., the individual assessments tend to become more 
extreme. Apparently, subjects treat the information provided by the group members’ 
assessments as somewhat independent of their own on information, rather than 
redundant.” Von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986) present their own conclusions very 
frankly:
T o  our minds, the implications are clear. By all means use groups if 
you can; the mathematical advantages are convincing, and you can, 
by choosing group members carefully, cover the fields of knowledge 
relevant to your topic. But don't bother to get the members together, 
unless group pressures or other social factors make it necessary.
Instead, simply elicit the desired uncertainty measures from each 
member individually, using whatever methods of elicitation fit the 
problem best, transform the results into probabilities, and average 
them. The odds seem excellent that, if you do anything more 
complex, you will simply be wasting your effort.
The only context in which we have any reservations about this 
conclusion is that of very low probabilities. Here, interactions
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among kinds of information may be crucial to the formulation of 
models of the events of interest, and if so, there should be face-to- 
face discussion of those models. Moreover, for such extreme 
numbers, we would prefer averaging log odds to averaging 
probabilities." Von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986:136)
In the light of the above, it is not quite clear what model or process von Winterfeldt
(1992:334) has in mind when he recommends a “behavioural resolution” for cases in
which "averaging would hide the true sources of the disagreement” (e.g. when one
expert in his case study thought that two events were practically independent, while
another thought they were highly dependent.) In situations of wide disagreements
among experts, MSDA analysts are most likely to argue that “separate distributions
have to be carried throughout the analysis to provide sensitivity results with respect
to these differences” (von Winterfeldt, 1992:336).
3.2.4 Step 4: Elicitation of a Multi-attribute Utility Model from Stakeholders
The purpose of this stage is to develop a model of stakeholder values that reflects 
their relative preference for attainment of different attribute levels, the judgement of 
the overall importance of different attribute types, and their attitude towards risk. To 
accomplish this, two type of judgements are elicited from stakeholders: first, 
judgements about the relative desirability of different levels of an attribute. These are 
the basis for so-called single-attribute utility functions, and they assess a decision 
maker’s attitude toward risk. The second type of judgement concerns the trade-offs 
among changes in one attribute versus another.
The methods for developing a multi-attribute utility model were originally developed 
by Keeney and Raiffa (1976), and are extensively described in Keeney (1992), and 
von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986). The following summary, based on Kleindorfer, 
Kunreuther, and Schoemaker (1993:131-133), presents the assumptions of Expected 
Utility theory and outlines the process by which multi-attribute utility models are built.
According to Expected Utility theory an individual chooses that alternative A1 from a 
set of possible alternatives As (i = 1 . .  .m) with maximum expected value.
Axioms of utility theory. In utility theory, a person’s decision problem is solved 
through the evaluation of a set of outcomes (Oij) that result jointly from a 
choice of alternative i and the occurrence of some state of nature j with given 
probability (Pij). These elements are shown in Figure 3-3 for the case of a 
single attribute. If the following axioms are satisfied, it is possible to construct 
a person’s utility function. This utility function reflects both the person’s 
attitude toward risk as well as the person’s values for the outcomes under 
certainty.
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Figure 3-3 Lottery representation of risky options











Source: Kleindorfer, Kunreuther, and Schoemaker (1993:132)
1. Completeness. For any choice between outcomes Oi and 0 2, either Oi is 
preferred to 0 2 (denoted Oi > 0 2), or 0 2 > Oi, or both are equally attractive 
(denoted Oi ~ 0 2).
2. Transitivity. If Oi > 0 2 and 0 2 > 0 3> then Oi > 0 3. (Also if Oi ~ 0 2 and 0 2 ~ 
0 3, then Oi ~ 0 3).
3. Continuity. If 0 1 > 0 2 > 0 3l then there exists some probability p between zero 
and one such that such that the lottery
is as attractive as receiving outcome 0 2 for certain.
4. Independence. If outcome Oi is as attractive as outcome 0 2 under conditions 
of certainty then lottery
will be equally attractive (for any values of 0 3 and p). In other words, outcome 
0 3  and p are irrelevant to the final choice, provided Oi ~ 0 2. This is also 
known as the substitution axiom.
5. Reduction of Compound Lotteries. A compound lottery (i.e., one whose initial 
outcomes are themselves lotteries) is equally attractive as the simple lottery 
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These axioms imply the following key Expected Utility (EU) theorem (for proof 
see Kleindorfer, Kunreuther, and Schoemaker, 1993:402-410)
EU Theorem. A utility function U can be defined on the outcomes with the 
property that an alternative with a higher expected utility is always preferred 
to one with a lower level of expected utility.
To construct such a utility function, a person must make indifference judgements
between a sure option and a two-outcome lottery (usually with the help of a decision
analyst). For example, if the analyst wants to derive a utility function for different
levels of fish catch, he presents the assessee with the following choice:
A fish catch known for certain to be 0 2
A fish catch that is uncertain but will result in O 1 or 0 3 from the lottery with 
probabilities p and ( 1  - p) respectively
where O 1 > 0 2 > 0 3. The analyst can then elicit preference by specifying three of the 
four parameter (p, Oi, 0 2, 0 3) and asking the assessee to indicate the value of the 
fourth variable such that he is indifferent between the two fish catch levels. Two of 
the most commonly used methods for eliciting such indifference values are (i) the 
certainty equivalence method (where an indifference level for 0 2 is elicited for given 
values of p, O 1 , and 0 3); and (ii) the probability equivalence method (where an 
indifference level of p is elicited for given values of O 1 , 0 2, and 0 3). The shape of the 
resulting utility function is determined by both the strength of preference for the 
outcomes under certainty as well as the person’s attitude toward risk.
The utility function elicitation process outlined so far showed how the alternatives are 
evaluated when there is only one objective. In order to determine the preferred 
alternative the individual utility functions of a person need to be aggregated. This 
requires the establishment of a functional relationship between the attributes of the 
different objectives. The process requires two elements: first, determination of 





that the persons makes between the objectives), and secondly, a way of combining 
the individually weighted utilities.
In order to avoid very complex multi-attribute utility functions (see for example 
multiplicative or multilinear models in Keeney and Raiffa (1976)) decision analysts try 
to structure multi-attribute decision problems so that the following conditions hold:
Preference Independence: trade-offs between any pair of attributes are independent 
of a third attribute. This means that Xi and x2 are preferentially independent if and 
only if a persons trade-off between Xi and x2 do not depend on the level at which X3 is 
fixed. Furthermore, if every pair of attributes in preferentially independent of all other 
attributes (this condition is called mutual preference independence), then the proper 
form of aggregating the single attribute utility functions is through addition. Since 
each attribute Xj has its own utility function Ui(Xj), which can be constructed 
independently of the others, the overall utility is calculated as follows:
u, = 2
i
Utility Independence: a person's preferences for lotteries outcomes on one attribute 
(e.g. X2) do not depend on the levels at which other attributes are fixed (xi, X3 , . . . ,  
Xr). If this condition holds, then the utility function is either additive or multiplicative.
Additive Independence: if there exists no interaction between the attributes then the 
functional form of the multi-attribute utility function is additive. This condition can be 
tested by the following comparison of lotteries (using here a two-dimensional 
example):
If Li is attractive as L2 for any given values of x^ and x'-i, it means that the assessee 
is not influenced by how the outcomes from different attributes are combined 
(assuming also equal probabilities).
If the independence conditions do not hold, then the most common strategy that 
decision analysts employ is to restructure or redefine the attributes to avoid 
interaction effects. Once the analyst has ensured that the multi-attribute utility 
function is additive, he can proceed to determine the relative importance weights 
which reflect the trade-off which stakeholders make between attributes. The
versus
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procedure is the same as that for the determination of a single attribute utility 
function. 17
The expected utility index Uj that results from the evaluation of an alternative, for 
example 0.76, implies that the decision maker regards that alternative to being 
equivalent to a lottery which offers a 0.76 chance with the probability of the best 
outcome on all the assessed attributes and a complementary probability of 0.24 for 
the worst outcomes on all assessed attributes (Goodwin and Wright, 1991:93-94).
Keeney (1992:157-198) argues that the usefulness of such a detailed value 
assessment process, which contains both qualitative (identification and structuring of 
objectives) and quantitative (identification of attributes and utility functions) aspects, 
extends beyond the specification of an objective function that can be used to 
evaluate alternatives. Specifically, it can help identify implicit assumptions and hidden 
objectives of stakeholders (or decision makers), it can show what data are most 
relevant for the resolution of a particular problem, and most importantly, it is a 
thorough and systematic search for creative alternatives and for decision 
opportunities that may be improvements over those already identified.
Tocher (1977) cited in Goodwin and Wright (1991) argues that the hypothetical 
questions take the assessee away from the real world and so may not accurately 
reflect what he would really do.
According to von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986:213, 215):
In our opinion, the distinction between value and utility is spurious, 
because (1) there are no sure things, and therefore values that are 
attached to presumably "riskless" outcomes are in fact attached to 
gambles; (2) risk aversion can frequently be explained by marginally 
decreasing value functions and/or by regret attributes of a value 
function; (3) repetitive choices tend to eliminate risk aversion, and 
an argument can be made that all choices in life are repetitive; (4) 
error and method variance within value and utility measurement 
procedures overshadow to a great extent the subtle distinctions that 
one may extract from the theoretical differences.
“The conclusion of our assertion is that for theoretical, 
psychological, and practical reasons the distinction between utility 
and value are spurious. This conclusion is at odds with much of the 
literature on the topic.”
According to Howard Raiffa (1982), who is considered a leading proponent of the
utility approach:
17 For a simple example with three attributes see Goodwin and Wright (1991:90-92).
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*Many analysts assume that a value scoring system-designed for 
trade-offs under certainty can also be used for probabilistic choice 
(using expected values). Such an assumption is wrong theoretically, 
but as I become more experienced I gain more tolerance for these 
analytical simplifications. This is, I believe, a relatively benign 
mistake in practice.”
The conclusions of Goodwin and Wright (1991:85) is that they would recommend 
applying utility assessments (as opposed to the simpler value assessments) only 
when uncertainty is central to the decision maker’s or stakeholders’ concerns. Due to 
the problems with such assessments, they recommend that one thinks of the utilities 
as a useful tool for gaining a greater understanding of the problem.
3.2.5 Step 5: Sensitivity Analysis and Option Invention
The outputs of the MCDA process described so far produced the following elements: 
a jointly agreed decision problem with an objective hierarchy and attributes, an 
assessment by experts of the likely outcomes of the alternatives in terms of the 
attributes, and, a multiattribute utility model for each stakeholder representative that 
reflects the relative strength of preference for different attribute levels, attitudes 
towards risk, and trade-offs among the different objectives for that person or group 
separately.
Next, the judgements of experts (the factual model) and stakeholders (the value 
model) need to be combined to form an overall evaluation. This is done by integrating 
the judgements of one expert and one stakeholder. In the case where there are 
different experts for different attributes, von Winterfeldt (1992:338) recommends that 
“experts should be selected to represent a common point of view.” First, an expected 
utility is calculated for each alternative and attribute using the expert’s probability 
distribution and the stakeholder’s single-attribute utility function. Then a multiattribute 
utility model is used to calculated the overall utility across attributes.
This analysis is then repeated for all stakeholders and experts, resulting in as many 
overall utility evaluations of the options as there are combinations of experts and 
stakeholders. It is unlikely that there will be one alternative that dominates all others, 
both because of expert disagreements and different stakeholder value models.. In 
this way One can evaluate by how much one would need to change a judgement (by 
an expert or stakeholder) before a change in rank order occurs, by sensitivity 
analyses on expert and stakeholder judgements. This provides information on the 
importance of different judgements, and systematic differences between experts and 
stakeholder (groups). These insights can then be used to “facilitate the invention of
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new compromise solutions” and “the models become a vehicle for dialogue and 
communication” (von Winterfeldt, 1992:338).
3.3 Previous Applications of MSDA and Variations
I argued in the introduction that the majority of published decision analysis 
applications to environmental management problems fall within the MSDA approach, 
even if very few have applied (or proposed to apply) all five steps outlined above 
other than for nuclear industry related matters. 18 The two main characteristics which 
differentiate this approach from traditional DA are the attempt to assess the value 
and factual components of a decision problem with different people and that the 
analysis is carried out separately with different stakeholder representatives.
An important point that emerges from a detailed analysis of the literature is that the 
rationale for the different decision analysis approach can also differ substantially. In 
traditional DA the analyst would seek to work directly with the decision makers to 
help them clarify a problem and reach a decision on a most preferred alternative. 
With MSDA, the analysis is often done to inform the policy debate, and the analysis 
is intended as an input for the decision maker, who is often different from those who 
provide the value and probability judgements.
In order to substantiate my argument, I now provide an overview of the different 
types of applications. I am particularly interested in assessing the extent to which the 
applications differ from the MSDA approach outlined above and in inferring from the 
conclusions of the authors possible applications (or the relevance of DA for
applications) for the fishery management problems of the Danube Delta.
3.3.1 Applications of the whole MSDA process
The following three papers reflect the range of applications of the whole MSDA
process:
First, Keeney and von Winterfeldt (1987a) who worked with the U.S. Department of 
Energy to assist them choose an underground repository for nuclear waste. There 
are other publications that complement this paper (or similar nuclear energy related 
questions) such as Bonano et al. (1990), Keeney and von Winterfeldt (1987a),
18 For example, in Gregory and Keeney (1994) the decision problem was formulated, objectives were 
developed (with some attributes), objectives were ranked, and alternatives devised. This information 
provided a basis and guidance for a subsequent Environmental Impact Assessment process that 
evaluated a proposed mining activity in Sabah, Malaysia.
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Keeney and von Winterfeldt (1994), but it appears that full fledged MSDA has been 
applied very seldom. Von Winterfeldt (1992), which I used as the framework for 
outlining the MSDA approach, and which uses examples from a number of different 
applications (which I was not able to access in order to determine if they actually 
went through the whole MSDA process). Keeney and von Winterfeldt (1987a) also 
represents one of the most dramatic test for MAU to withstand audits of a decision or 
recommendation.
Second, the full fledged MSDA approach Gregory, Keeney, and von Winterfeldt 
(1992) has also been proposed as basis for structuring the existing Environmental 
Impact Statement process (Council on Environmental Quality, 1987). Among the 
expected results would be that alternatives are more effectively assessed, the scope 
of the assessment is widened, uncertainty is treated more effectively, the distinction 
between facts and values is made more clear, and the public participation is made 
more effective.
The third type of application is presented in Keeney, von Winterfledt, and Eppel, 
(1990) who called it a “Public Value Forum”. The aim of this process is to inform 
policy making using MSDA techniques about objectives and attributes that different 
groups of society consider relevant, the trade-offs that they consider reasonable, and 
their preferences for alternatives. There are two main differences between the “Public 
Value Forum” and the MSDA approach outlined earlier.
The first difference is that the participants in the Public Value Forum were “selected 
from two groups of the general public that were thought to represent somewhat 
different views”, instead of directly affected or involved stakeholders used on the 
MSDA approach (Keeney, von Winterfledt, and Eppel, 1990:1018).19.
Secondly, the first three steps of MSDA (problem formulation, development of 
objectives and attributes, and estimation of risks, costs, benefits and other impacts) 
were prepared in advance by experts (an “Enquete Commission on Energy Policy” 
and “leading representatives of 10 major German organisations”) and only revised by 
Forum participants (noteworthy also is the fact that participants representing “the 
different views” worked separately in two Forum workshops). After revising the
19 Keeney, von Winterfledt, and Eppel (1990) used a group of apparently self-selected engineers and 
social science teachers to represent the different views. I will show in the reviews of Adaptive 
Environmental Management and Assessment (AEMA), and Cultural Theory which I discuss in Chapter 5 
and Stratified Systems Theory in Chapter 6, that the neglect of organizational theory within the MSDA 
approach is a potentially serious shortcoming.
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prepared value tree, participants followed the remaining steps of the MSDA approach 
as described.
Two more features of the Keeney, von Winterfledt, and Eppel (1990) study are 
noteworthy. The first relates to how the authors view the links of the Public Value 
Forum to other methods to “illuminate and clarify public values in complex policy 
problems.” (Keeney, von Winterfledt, and Eppel, 1990:1011) The second point 
relates to the way the authors dealt with the resolution of inconsistencies between 
the results of the multi-attribute utility analyses and their own intuitive evaluations.
According to Keeney, von Winterfledt, and Eppel (1990), voting for political 
representatives is, and remains, the main mechanism for incorporating public values 
in policy making in a democratic society. However, voting at elections does not 
resolve the problem of how political representatives or policy makers should interpret 
public values in a specific policy context. Furthermore, the voting and political 
representation process, does not resolve the question about what roles experts and 
their values should have, and how expert recommendations and value interpretations 
should be combined in policy making. In the light of the existing methods for eliciting 
public values for specific policy questions, Keeney, von Winterfledt, and Eppel (1990) 
see the Public Value Forum as a combination of focus groups and direct value 
elicitation techniques (building on Brown (1984), Renn etal. (1984), von Winterfeldt, 
(1987). Keeney, von Winterfledt, and Eppel (1990:1029) come to the following 
conclusion about the advantages and disadvantages of the Public Value Forum:
• the value forum can provide very specific and useful information, especially 
about the trade-offs that participants feel appropriate for evaluating alternative 
policy options
• The acceptance of the expert assessments by the participants and the 
relative flexibility in their weights and intuitive evaluations indicate that there 
exists much room for negotiation and adjustment on the value side of the 
energy problem.
• The process of eliciting and reconciling value-relevant information can lead to 
changes in the participants’ evaluation (specifically “there was a shift toward 
moderation on both sides of the energy debate as the forum progressed” - 
which the authors interpret as an “educational effect”)
•  The greatest disadvantage is the time and cost of the forum (it took two 
professionals to design the forum and six to conduct it - approximately 60
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person days - and 46 person days as an aggregate of participants’ time - who 
were paid for participating).
• Another disadvantage mentioned is the small sample and the lack of 
representativeness.
The overall conclusion to which Keeney, von Winterfledt, and Eppel (1990:1029) 
come is that the best use of a value forum “might be for value elicitation and 
education with small groups of key representatives and leaders of stakeholder 
groups involved in specific policy debates.” My own interpretation of this conclusion is 
that this shows that the Public Value Forum is, in fact, almost indistinguishable from 
the MSDA approach presented in the beginning of this chapter.
The second point I want to make relates the way Keeney, von Winterfledt, and Eppel 
(1990) dealt with the resolution of inconsistencies between the results of the multi- 
attribute utility analyses and their own intuitive evaluations:
Participants were told that the results of their multiattribute utility 
analysis and their own intuitive evaluations probably showed some 
inconsistencies. The forum leader pointed out that these 
inconsistencies were nothing to worry about and they were also told 
that there were several reasons why these inconsistencies occur; 
including
1. an incomplete or inappropriate set of objectives and 
attributes;
2. an inappropriate aggregation rule for the multiattribute 
model;
3. biased intuitive evaluations of the futures or the paths;
4. biased weights;
5. biased single-attribute utility functions (ratings);
6. biased expert assessments of the impacts.
Participants were then handed out a form ... [where] the following 
additional information was provided:
1. the normalised swing weights;
2 . the ratings of the energy futures on the eight component
objectives;
3. the overall ratings of the energy paths;
4. the calculated multiattribute utilities of the energy futures
(combining 1 and 2).
Participants were asked to generate a final overall evaluation of the 
energy paths by referring to the above described reasons for 
inconsistencies. If they considered the objectives or aggregation 
rule inappropriate (reasons 1 or 2), they were asked to qualitatively 
describe the desired changes or additions.
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If, however, they wanted to make adjustments to their numerical 
evaluations based on reasons 3-5, they should either change their 
weights, objective ratings, or overall evaluations. If they disagreed 
with the expert assessments of impacts, they should note desired 
changes in the appropriate cells ... [on the formj and re-rate the 
impacts. Staff members assisted them in these tasks. The goal was 
to achieve at least ordinal consistency between the final overall 
evaluation of the paths and the multiattribute evaluation model of 
the [energy] futures (Keeney, von Winterfledt, and Eppel,
1990): 1022-1023)
What this passage shows is not, as some critics of DA have argued, that multi­
attribute utility analysis is not appropriate because the people’s elicited judgements 
often do not correspond to their intuition. I have already argued earlier (in the outline 
of the utility elicitation process) that people must only desire to make coherent 
judgements (as defined by the Axioms underlying the Expected Utility Theorem)20. 
Instead, the point I would make is that this passage shows that the MSDA approach 
seeks to elicit (and also help develop) a factual and value model that has some 
validity independently of the people who developed it. The part of the passage that I 
would highlight most is “that these inconsistencies were nothing to worry about” 
(because one of the experts, the analysts, or they themselves must have made some 
mistake which resulted in a less than perfect match). I will show in Chapter 7, when I 
discuss the Decision Conferencing approach to decision analysis, that this is a very 
important difference between the two decision analysis approaches. The analogy that 
Keeney (1992) makes in the following passage also supports my argument21:
The data needed for parameterising a value model rest in the minds 
of decision makers or people knowledgeable about a given problem.
The assessor (trained analyst) gathers such data by eliciting 
judgements from these people. This situation is analogous to many 
scientific problems where the knowledge necessary for
20 There are numerous examples, such as the Allais Paradox, which show that people do not always 
behave in accordance with the Subjective Expected Utility rule. The position that many decision analysts 
take (eg Goodwin and Wright (1991) or von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986)) is that utility theory does 
not attempt to describe the way in which people make decisions. Instead, it is a normative theory which 
prescribes what people should do if they accept the axioms of the theory. If a decision maker wants to 
ignore the indications then that is his prerogative. For further discussion see for example Kleindorfer, 
Kunreuther, and Schoemaker (1993:146-153).
21 This does not mean, however, that the assessee is expected to have the values (or the options) 
readily formed in his or her mind. Instead, as Keeney, von Winterfledt, and Eppel (1990) argued in their 
conclusions which I presented earlier, preference can change through the elicitation process itself. 
However, I would argue, following Phillips (1984) and Phillips (unpublished), that more is involved than 
just the “educational” effect, and that this can be a very potent source for working on a better 
understanding of the decision problem.
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parameterising a model is “out there”, and individuals need to collect 
it. If the information is about geology, one digs holes in the ground 
to gather data. If the information is about values, one "digs holes” 
into someone’s mind to collect the data. Keeney (1992:131)
3.3.2 Other Environmental Management related applications
The work of McDaniels (Keeney and McDaniels, 1992; McDaniels, 1994; McDaniels, 
1995; McDaniels, 1996a; McDaniels, 1996b; McDaniels, Healey, and Paisley, 1994) 
shows how the MSDA approach to decision analysis has been applied both through 
work with multiple-stakeholders and with one stakeholder but from several 
perspectives (except for McDaniels (1995)). His work is closely related to Keeney, 
von Winterfeldt, Gregory, and other researchers at Decision Research in Oregon. 
The reason why I discuss his work, especially McDaniels (1994) and McDaniels 
(1996a), separately from the MSDA approach above is that in these two papers he 
uses a very similar rationale to that of the MSDA approach but he does not actually 
work with different stakeholder groups (while the essence of McDaniels (1996b), and 
McDaniels, Healey, and Paisley (1994) in which he works with different stakeholder 
groups, is captured in the MSDA discussion above).
McDaniels (1994:1046-1047) identifies a number of reasons why implementing 
sustainability concepts (WCED and World Commission on Environment and 
Development, 1987) by electric utility companies22 is difficult. Among these he lists 
the following:
1. “Differences in opinion will always exist between social and economic groups 
about what ethics and justice mean.
2. Changes to the status quo that are viewed as harmful to established interests 
are likely to be opposed;
3. Organisations of all sorts are highly resistant to change, and without clearly 
structured new procedures that are mandated by organisational leaders, they 
are likely to hold on to old habits;
4. Decisions are often so complex that it is difficult to assess what is ethical and 
just and what is not.”
In the cases where, on the basis of a distinction between natural and man made 
capital, authors (such as Turner (1993)) recommend the use of decision rules that
22 McDaniels and Keeney worked with BC Hydro, Canada
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recognise sustainability or the carrying capacity23 of natural capital as a constraint of 
economic activity, McDaniels (1994:1046) argues that the following issues need to be 
confronted:
Sustainability in applied utility planning, or any other context, is not 
only a matter of establishing sustainability constraints and then 
meeting them. Rather, several important issues must be confronted 
in implementation. First, there are plausible public objectives that 
underlie several possible alternative sustainability constraints.
Second, there are different levels of costs associated with meeting 
constraints of different stringency. Third, the acceptability of a given 
constraint is greatly affected by the characteristics (benefits and 
costs) of the alternative possible constraints in a given decision 
context (Derby and Keeney, 1981) Fourth, even when the nature of 
the appropriate constraint is universally agreed upon, there will often 
be differences in costs associated with different ways to achieve the 
constraints, as well as differences in the incidence of costs (and 
benefits) among groups. These differences will require careful 
attention to ways to minimise costs in order to achieve the political 
support needed to turn concepts into action.
In the context of the DDBR this would mean that the carrying capacity which is
supposed to guide the DDBRA does not automatically result in a unique fishery
management option.
McDaniels proposes the use of MSDA to deal with these problems. The feature 
which distinguishes his argument most from the other MSDA authors is that he 
argues that the approach provides the necessary information about differences in 
preferences and distributional effects among groups, necessary to overcome “the 
fundamental obstacle to achieving sustainability: the political economy of change: the 
inevitability of specific winners and losers when major reallocations of resources 
occurs and the power of interests favouring the status quo (Samuelson and 
Zeckhauser, 1988).”
23 Since the carrying capacity concept is important in the context of the Danube Delta fishery, 
McDaniels' elaboration is interesting: “Carrying capacities (sustainability constraints) could be set on the 
basis of a wide variety of criteria: to protect human health, to protect the health of flora and fauna, to 
maintain current environmental quality, to enhance current environmental quality, to sustain a population 
base or economic base, to protect human values associated with the environment, to protect intrinsic 
(non-human) values associated with the environment, or to protect the complete physical stock of 
natural capital for future generations. Each constraint would lead to different levels of environmental 
protection, and different costs. Differences in costs and benefits among several plausible alternatives 
raises the question of how the ‘best’ sustainability constraints should be identified and implemented." 
(McDaniels, 1994:1046)
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The most disappointing feature of the McDaniels (1994) paper is that by its own 
admission, the actual case study was “a relatively simplistic application of 
multiattribute approaches”. I agree with his assessment and would go even further: 
the main thing his case study showed is that specifying values, thinking about the 
inter-relationship between different sectors, and considering the effects of 
alternatives on stakeholder groups helps decision maker to understand the problem 
better and to develop alternatives. This is, however, a conclusion which much of the 
earlier decision analysis literature has found repeatedly. McDaniels has fallen far 
short of showing how institutional inertia is overcome (except for the straight forward 
point that some leadership is required), or how different stakeholder positions can be 
rigorously assessed or integrated by a single assessor (or how the approach that he 
may have implemented would have differed from MSDA). I therefore conclude that 
the political economy of change and the institutional inertia questions are still 
unanswered.
In a more recent paper, McDaniels (1996a), also aims to assist electric utilities deal 
with their environmental impacts. From the perspective of this thesis, the most 
noteworthy feature of that paper is the fact that McDaniels (page 59) argues that 
“constructing an environmental impact index requires technical expertise to identify 
those factors [or “objectives”] that are important in judging impacts, and then requires 
value judgements by decision-makers or other stakeholders to establish relative 
priorities among these objectives”. The implication of this suggestion is, in a sense, in 
conflict with the MSDA process, where the importance (and feasibility) of early 
stakeholder involvement in problem definition is stressed. In some way, this paper 
also contradicts the rationale of McDaniels (1994), because in the development of 
the environmental index, the different view points, or information about different 
winners and losers (i.e. the political economy of change) which is important for the 
development of “compromise” options is not readily available.
Jones, Hope, and Hughes (1990), like Keeney, von Winterfledt, and Eppel (1990), 
tried to use decision analysis as a communication tool (facilitate learning within 
organisations and between organisations). Their approach was different from Keeney 
et al. in the following ways: It did not make a distinction between means and ends 
objectives. Instead, they developed a list of 41 attributes with 25 individuals from 16 
organisations (which they filtered out of a database of stakeholders containing 250 
individuals and 100 organisations) on the basis of their belonging to energy 
industries, political parties, government, pressure groups and trade unions. The
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options were developed from a number published energy scenarios. However, the 
two most distinguishing features of the paper are that it seems to have been self­
administered using a computer programme (because they speak of “users”, 
“Framework” software, and that model allows users to change scores or ratings and 
see immediately the effects), and that they used the Simple Multi-Attribute Rating 
Technique (SMART) (von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986) instead of more elaborate 
probability and utility elicitation techniques that other applications mentioned so far 
used.24 They reported some difficulties among users in understanding precisely what 
the attributes and the options meant and that only in a workshop format were users 
be able to understand more fully the reasoning of other stakeholders (instead of just 
inferring the reasoning from the “value sets” of other users).
The only other authors that come close to recommending a decision making process 
that is very close to a full-fledged MSDA, are Maguire and Boigney (1994). They 
combine the MSDA approach outlined in Gregory, Keeney, and von Winterfeldt 
(1992), Keeney (1988), and Keeney, von Winterfledt, and Eppel (1990) with conflict 
resolution and negotiation analysis (e.g. Sebenius (1992)). Maguire has applied the 
decision analysis framework to endangered species conservation decisions (several 
hypothetical cases are explored in Maguire (1986), black-footed ferrets in Maguire et 
al. (1988), captive tigers in Maguire and Lacy (1990), grizzly bears in Maguire and 
Servheen (1992) and northern white rhino in Maguire and Boigney (1994)). The 1994 
study benefited from direct discussion with stakeholders about the issues, but it did 
not actually elicit the values used directly from them and it appears as though this 
study is therefore a hypothetical illustration. Three issues are noteworthy about 
Maguire and Boigney (1994).
First, is their argument that alternative dispute resolution (or conflict resolution) 
techniques, such as those presented by Fisher, Ury, and Patton (1991), or Lax and 
Sebenius (1986), promote creative thinking and compromise, but that they lack a 
formal structure for identifying disagreements in complex disputes. The fact that their 
proposed process resembles that of MSDA very closely (in essence, it only contains 
some more explicit feedback loops between the different steps) can be taken as 
evidence that the MSDA is indeed useful (as MSDA authors argue themselves) for 
dealing with multiple stakeholder decision problems. Related arguments about the 
usefulness of decision analysis for negotiations and compromise or consensus
24 See Section 3.2.4 for a discussion of the difference between MAUT and SMART.
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solution development can also be found in Goodwin and Wright (1991), Keeney 
(1992), and Raiffa (1982).
Secondly, she points out that Adaptive Environmental Management and Assessment 
(AEMA), (see next Chapter, or Walters (1986)), is an alternative decision aid that has 
been employed to resolve policy disputes, but argues that it helps only with the 
modelling of the “factual” side of a decision problem and with the “value side of 
disputes” (Maguire and Boigney, 1994:33). In essence, the AEMA approach assists 
experts and decision makers to develop computer simulations which project 
consequences of different policy options.
Third, Maguire and Boigney (1994:32) summarizes the arguments for why 
environmental management disputes are difficult to resolve as follows:
1) limited information and uncertainty about natural and social processes affecting 
policy outcomes;
2) important and potentially irreversible outcomes or effects of alternatives;
3) multiple stakeholders that are affected by, or can themselves influence the 
outcomes;
4) even though stakeholders may have a common overall objective, they can still 
have conflicting sub-objectives because of differing financial, political, or 
technical capabilities;
5) stakeholders (or experts) who value possible outcomes very differently or 
disagree over the probability of uncertain events may influence 
disproportionately the outcome of policy actions.
To these they add a sixth one: “the necessity for consensus, since none of the
parties is capable of achieving the common goal on its own.” I will return the question
of the “necessity” of consensus in Chapter 7 and in the Conclusion, because this
requirement does not tally with the MSDA approach (as seen for example in my
discussion of the sensitivity analysis step of the MSDA approach above, Section
3.2.5)25. The discussion in the next two chapters (especially the AEMA and Cultural
Theory) will prove useful for the clarification of this point.
3.3.3 Applications to Fishery Management
According to Pearse and Walters (1992), the crucial task of fisheries managers is to 
determine the most appropriate level of harvest. The problem is that the information 
they have is never perfect, but instead, to widely varying degree it is incomplete, 
inconsistent, and contradictory (page 167). Pearse and Walters (1992) argue that
25 But I will show what it could mean within the context of the organizational structure of the DDBRA. 
Before I am able to do that I need to introduce some organizational theory in Chapter 6.
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disputes over harvesting regulation are aggravated because of the conflicting 
interests that are at stake. In their experience, governmental fisheries managers, who 
seek to specify a harvest that can be sustained tend to be very conservative in the 
face of uncertainty about stocks and the effects of fishing. Fishermen, on the other 
hand, who are more sensitive to economic pressures and to the short-term cost of 
foregone opportunities when harvests are constrained to lower levels, are much more 
willing to take risks. The essential problem in this conflict is to determine what 
constitutes ‘reasonably’ safe limits. The shortcoming in the current fishery 
management decision making framework is that it does not satisfactorily answer the 
question of who should decide on the acceptable levels of risk.
To resolve this problem, Pearse and Walters (1992) follow the argument of the 
MSDA literature very closely (referring also to Keeney (1988), Keeney and Raiffa 
(1976), and Keeney, von Winterfledt, and Eppel (1990)) distinguishing between 
assessing risks and making judgements about what risks should be taken. They 
lament “that too often biologists, trained to deal with the former, are burdened as well 
with the latter” (page 168). In their view the role of the scientist is clear: risk 
assessment (assessing the probability of possible outcomes).26
Pearse and Walters (1992:170-171) argue that fisheries scientists are “well equipped 
to make probabilistic statements about the consequences of policy choices”, and that 
probabilities are “a much more helpful way of recognising uncertainty than simply 
ascribing ranges or confidence limits to expected outcomes. They provide more 
information from the available data about degrees of risk, and they can be structured 
in ways that permit ranking and evaluation of policy alternatives.” In the light of the 
MSDA framework discussed earlier in this chapter, I argue that while decision 
analysts would agree that the fishery scientists have the necessary expertise, but 
that Pearse and Walters (1992) probably underemphasize the problems that 
scientists face even for this more clearly defined role.
Pearse and Walters (1992:170) admit that, “there is inevitable debate among 
scientists [between Bayesians and frequentists] about how historical fisheries data
26 They use the following analogy to make the point: "If an aeronautical engineer advises a traveller to fly 
in a certain aircraft because it has only a 2% probability of crashing, he strays beyond his competence. 
W e should defer to him about the probability of a crash, but not about his conclusion that the risk to the 
hapless traveller is worth taking. Similarly, biologists, whom we must depend on to predict the effects of 
harvesting stocks, have no business deciding how much risk we should take, or indeed how we should 
balance the various benefits and costs of resource management decisions” Pearse and Walters 
(1992:171).
114
should be used in probability calculations but these ‘esoteric’ debates are generally 
open and constructive. “Experts usually scrutinise them, and the stock assessments 
resulting from them, objectively and with healthy effects”. If there are still problems 
which cannot be stated in probabilistic terms (something which decision analysts 
generally deny because most are Bayesians), the problem can be “minimised by 
independent expert review and open debate”. Evidence that this is often not the case 
can be found in the MSDA applications mentioned earlier, where differences in 
expert judgement had to be carried throughout the analysis because they could not 
be resolved (and in the discussion of how to deal with expert disagreements - 
averaging, Delphi, etc.), (McDaniels, 1995) which I discuss later on, but most clearly 
in the fisheries literature (see for example Fairlie, Hagler, and O'Riordan (1995), or 
Smith (1995)).
Pearse and Walters (1992:173-174) also consider the use of decision analysis, and 
MSDA in particular, for “defining acceptable risks systematically in decision making of 
fisheries management. They conclude that formal decision analysis based on utility 
assessment has “much appeal as a way of forcing clarification of attitudes toward 
risk, but it presents certain practical difficulties”:
In public decision making as in fisheries management, it is often 
difficult to identify the decision maker whose attitudes toward risk 
should be the basis for assessing the utility function. Ministers of 
fisheries come and go, threatening inconsistency overtime; external 
advisers and bureaucrats raise questions about representativeness 
and accountability; resource users cannot always be relied upon to 
represent the broader public interest in long-term conservation. 
Moreover, these techniques are not so well developed and 
standardised that they can be routinely applied and readily 
understood. Nor are the results easily interpreted and evaluated in 
the usual arenas of political debate.
Consequently, responsibility for the decisions, and the choice of 
decision criteria, should be assigned, as far as practicable, to those 
who will incur the benefits and costs, thus ensuring that the relevant 
economic and political implications are brought to bear on these 
issues. ... This means that decisions about harvest levels must 
include fishermen, and to a greater or lesser extent it must include 
representatives of the broader public interest as well. Pearse and 
Walters (1992:173-174)
The solution that Pearse and Walters (1992) recommend could be called a “co­
management” arrangement (as defined by Jentoft (1989), and Pomeroy and Berkes, 
(1997)) because both a (governmental) management authority and individual TAC 
quota holders share authority and responsibility for the fish management decisions. 
More specifically, a management authority would be responsible for an initial 
allocating of (transferable) fishing rights and the catch among competing fishermen
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and fishing groups, but subsequently it would be up to the fishermen to exchange 
these rights through the market mechanism. The function of the management 
authority would be to maintain a register of quota holders, keep account of 
transactions, record catches against quota holdings, and determine the minimum 
stock size that must be maintained.
By organising the quota holders in an association through which they can take 
collective action and enforce their decisions (through a system of fines for non- 
compliance) this system of responsibility sharing would also be the means through 
which decision regarding risk are shared. The management authority would decide 
on a suitable minimum stock size required on behalf of wider societal interests, and 
the fishermen would make the decisions regarding in-season harvest level variations 
(trading off short terms reduction in catch against longer term security). Note, 
however, that the required minimum stock size can also be disputed and that Pease 
and Walters (1992) only uses examples of fisheries in countries where civil society 
and the free-market system are well developed (much of their discussion refers to 
New Zealand). The weak market system and the underdeveloped civil society mean 
that their proposal cannot be readily applied in Romania's case.
Hilden’s (1997) paper on the evaluation of fisheries management options using 
decision analysis is another example of the current difficulty in the Decision Analysis 
literature when it comes to dealing with different viewpoints. At first, the argument is 
put forward that fishery management is made more complex when wider 
environmental objectives than sustainable management of a particular fish stock are 
included. Hilden (1997:143) argues that the conflict between Shetland’s sandeel 
fishery and the aim of protecting sandeels as a food resources fora declining seabird 
population is an example of a “new type of conflict”. In describing the nature of the 
conflict he says:
Disagreement on resource management issues may arise due to 
differences in, for example, knowledge, utilities or world views (Amy,
1987; Charles, 1992). Utilities are used here to stress that it is not 
only a question of strict monetary values. "World view" is used to 
express a general conception of the world, including values and 
ethical judgements. Knowledge and utilities will in many cases be 
influenced by world views and other social factors. Thus a world 
view can make utilities and even the meaning of knowledge differ 
between actors to the extent that the same observations lead to 
diametrically opposite conclusions.
The differences in world view between the fisheries sector and bird 
conservationists have been important in the controversy on sandeel
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fisheries. It would, however, be a mistake to regard the fisheries as 
homogeneous with respect to world views (Hilden, 1997:144)
Hilden (1997) then goes on to show that different groups (particularly
conservationists and fisheries managers) may have different attitudes to risk, have
different utility functions, and put different weights on the various objectives. I am not
quite sure if that is sufficient to claim the problem he analysed is a “new type of
problem”. Instead he just showed that you can use techniques from decision
analysis, illustrating in particular the use of influence diagrams, to pinpoint sources of
disagreements and that, by making utility functions explicit one can assess
management alternatives in a more comprehensive manner. However, he did not
provide a clear account for how the different worldviews27 in “these kinds of resource
conflicts contain many qualitatively different sources of uncertainty and
disagreements”, and why they require different solutions. It is also not clear if
decision analysis could be categorised as such a “different solution” because he
concluded that:
disagreements which reflect different world views are the most 
difficult to deal with. There is no solution in the form of a common 
world view that could be achieved through new knowledge or 
bargaining (Hilden, 1997:152)
McDaniels (1995) is an example of how decision analysis can be used to develop a 
framework for in-season decisions about allowable catches by fisheries managers. 
The proposed framework is, in essence, an “expert-aiding system” designed to 
enable fisheries managers to use their knowledge and judgements more effectively in 
recurring, similar, circumstances. The proposal is based on an analysis of an in- 
season salmon management decision that actually arose in 1990 for the Fraser River
27 I believe the following is an example for what Hilden (1997:144) calls different worldviews: “The 
possibility of competition for fish between seabirds and fisheries has changed the focus in the debate on 
industrial fisheries. The statement "there may be good reason to catch them before they die from other 
causes" illustrates a common line of thought within the fisheries sector, but it has lost its validity. The 
failure of fisheries managers to see that for some "the other causes" may represent a valid use of 
sandeel resources appears to be one of the central causes of disagreement between the bird 
conservationists and the fisheries managers. This difference will affect for example risk attitudes and 
the evaluation of consequences of management actions. Conservationists will regard the possibility of 
any harm to sea birds as a  serious loss whereas the fishing industry will be willing to risk some 
reproduction of seabirds if losses of fish yield can be avoided.”
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sockeye salmon commercial fishery in British Columbia. McDaniels (1995) used the 
Keeney and Raiffa’s (1976) decision analysis for multiple objective framework which 
the MSDA approach described earlier is based on, but uses the judgements of only 
one expert, who is also the decision maker. Having described the MSDA 
methodology in detail already, the most interesting aspect of the paper is the 
characterisation of the complex decision problems faced by fishery managers:
• conflicting objectives (e.g. increased catch in the short term against increased 
catch in the future if more adults are left to spawn now)
• biological uncertainties (ranging from size and timing of runs to stock 
dynamics)
• structural complexity (intermingled stocks that should be managed separately 
but must be fished as one pooled stock)
• a compressed time frame (particularly for in-season decisions about daily 
commercial harvesting openings)
• potentially high stakes
Because of these complexities mathematical or simulation models are developed by 
fishery scientists. The problem with these models according to McDaniels (1995:415) 
is that:
• judgements about preferences are expressed as of the single objective: to 
maximise the present value of fish harvested. The problem with this is that 
modellers thereby ignore the fact that in practice there are other objectives 
and as a result their modelling efforts are less informative for real-world 
decisions. Within this context, he also laments the fact that multiple objective 
utility functions for salmon fisheries management have been used only to 
demonstrate how such functions could be constructed (Keeney, 1977) or why 
they are needed (Healey, 1984), but not actually used for decision making.
• instead of using probability to represent uncertainty, fisheries modelling often 
postulates “alternative states of the world” and then examines “optimal 
decisions given that each of these alternative assumptions is true”. This is a 
surprising claim which is refuted in much of the literature because the 
fisheries modelling literature emphasises Bayesian theory, which shows how 
subjective probability judgements by experts regarding these alternative 
hypotheses could be integrated into an overall analysis (e.g. Walters, 1986).
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By not representing these judgements as probabilities, the judgements are 
less explicit and therefore less open to discussion.
In the discussion of the alternative framework that he proposed, McDaniels 
(1995:424-425) noted that the analysis required several person-weeks to complete 
and involved several meetings with fisheries managers. In light of the need to make 
decisions quickly he argued that “huge dividends in insights” could be obtained from 
spending even a few hours on structuring the decision (especially preparing an 
“objectives by alternatives” matrix with some preliminary judgmental estimates of 
impacts). Also, once the framework is established the time required to make 
decisions in similar situations would be substantially reduced. While the fishery 
managers McDaniels worked with had no great difficulties establishing probability 
distributions (i.e. the “technical judgements”), they found the task of making 
preference judgements “daunting”. They would have much preferred to rely on 
“organisationally approved” utility functions and agreed that, ideally, stakeholders and 
senior decision makers should be relied upon to provide the preference judgements, 
while technical specialists should provide the technical judgements.
3.4 Implications for the DDBRA’s fishery management problems
The most fundamental issue from the MSDA perspective is that the complex 
management problem presented in Chapter 2 can be broken down into a factual and 
a value part, also called the risk assessment, and the risk management parts. The 
former deals with the likelihood of what might happen, the latter then with the 
desirability of the outcomes.
On the basis of previous applications of the MSDA approach, and in particular the 
(suggested) applications of decision analysis to environmental management 
problems, three main types of applications suggest themselves: (i) the MSDA 
approach, involving multiple stakeholders and experts, where the aim would be to 
deal with both risk assessment and risk management; (ii) working only with the 
DDBRA managers and DDI scientists, again on risk assessment as well as risk 
management (building on Hilden (1997), Maguire and Boigney (1994), McDaniels, 
(1994, 1995); and (iii) the approach suggested by Pearse and Walters (1992) where 
decision analysis is used only to assist DDI staff to deal with risk assessment.
119
3.4.1 Key assumptions, limitations, and remaining questions regarding the 
MSDA approach
Jointly agreed-upon problem formulation: For the MSDA approach to work, one must 
assume the existence of a jointly agreed-upon problem formulation, and at the very 
minimum stakeholders should be willing to agree on a set of alternatives (von 
Winterfeldt, 1992:339) In the case of the DDBR, where I have shown in the previous 
two Chapters that there was no jointly agreed problem, the MSDA approach would 
seek to establish one through individual interviews about fundamental and means 
objectives. Von Winterfeldt (1992:339) vaguely indicates possible limitations 
regarding the extent to which this process can be relied upon to produce a jointly 
agreed-upon problem formulation when he says: “in cases where the stakeholders 
have different agendas, choose among different types of alternatives, and have 
different values, a game-theoretic approach may be more useful.” von Winterfeldt 
also says that other political processes and other methodological approaches are 
preferable when there is “no agency with ultimate decision-making power, or when 
the agency is not truly motivated to respect conflicting values and expert opinions, or 
when stakeholders are essentially non-cooperative.” According to these conditions, 
the feasibility of applying the MSDA approach in the DDBR could be questioned 
because even though the DDBRA is the agency with ultimate decision-making 
power, earlier Chapters have shown that the DDBRA’s motivation to respect other 
stakeholders’ values or indeed dealing with conflicting expert opinions is limited. Also 
the stakeholders (the DDBRA, DDI, fishermen, fishing companies, the County 
Prefecture, communities in the DDBR, in Romania and the international community) 
have shown widely varying degrees of co-operative behaviour.
Interdisciplinary group work: In Section 3.2.3 (the discussion of Step 3: Estimation of 
Risks, Costs, Benefits, and other Impacts), and in the discussion of previous decision 
analysis applications to environmental management, I showed that the MSDA 
approach (and its variants) is not very clear on the usefulness or the actual process 
in which parties (experts and/or stakeholders) engaged in the analysis work in joint 
sessions together. Indeed, von Winterfeldt (1992: 340-341) acknowledges that, at 
present, process issues, which in many cases “is at least as important as the 
methodology itself’ are inadequately addressed. The MSDA approach only 
“prescribes a specific series of steps” and provides “some basic guidelines about 
how to interact with stakeholders and experts”.
At the same time, however, it is stressed that the value of the MSDA approach does 
not lie in any ability to provide an overall best alternative (as I have shown in Section
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3.2.5 that is not the intention), but instead is a vehicle for dialogue and 
communication which facilitates the invention of new compromise solutions. 
Furthermore, Gregory and Keeney (1994); Hilden (1997); Keeney (1988); Keeney 
(1992); Maguire and Boigney (1994); McDaniels, Healey, and Paisley (1994) have 
indicated that interdisciplinary work, usually in reference to scientists or stakeholders 
coming together, produced important new insights and advanced the work.
Nevertheless, the emphasis in the MSDA literature is on the separation of the facts 
and value elements (to the extent that that is possible),28 instead of on a theory which 
would explain and guide the work of decision analysts so that the positive insight and 
option development effects that can result from a better understanding and 
communication of different perspectives are maximised. I would suggest that two 
important factors contribute to the choice of this emphasis as well as inhibit more 
generative work with individual participants in the analysis (stakeholders, experts, 
decision makers, and decision analysts) separately and especially in groups.
The first factor is the use of a positivist framework which assumes that knowledge is 
not socially constructed, and that a problem can be presented and analysed 
independently of the organisations, groups, and individuals which grapple with or 
“own” them. This is why Keeney (1992) can speak of "mining" for value information in 
peoples heads. He does not mean to say that these preferences are necessarily 
readily available. In fact, that is why he, like Gregory, Lichtenstein, and Slovic (1993), 
would argue that they shape during the elicitation process and that by eliciting them 
in separate parts makes the task easier and avoids biases (i.e. deviations from what 
the “true” values or models are). The effect of this positivist stance is, however, that it 
discounts the generative value of working in groups (especially groups where 
stakeholders and experts interact). This may also be part of the reason why Hilden 
(1997) found that decision analysis could not effectively deal with different 
worldviews (the other part relates to a lack of clarity of what he meant by 
worldviews). In the case of the management planning process of the DDBRA, the 
position one takes on the epistemology of knowledge is therefore important because 
it determines the way one approaches and deals with the wide variety of views about 
the problems of fishery management.
28 For example, von Winterfeldt (1992:339-340) acknowledges that this is very difficult since “cleary, 
values will influence opinions, and opinions will shape values. Moreover, values and opinions can shape 
the formulation of the problem and the definition of alternatives, and thus precondition the analysis 
results.”
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The second factor contributing to the confusion regarding interdisciplinary group work 
in the MSDA literature is the remarkable minimalism regarding assumptions or 
theories about the institutional context within which the decision analytic work takes 
place. The only assumption that MSDA writers (e.g. Lichtenstein etal., 1990) make is 
that the work takes place within democracies, such as industrialised Western 
countries, where public policy “is, in fact, shaped by interactions among multiple 
stakeholders”29 (von Winterfeldt, 1992:341). Beyond this assumption of a democratic 
process, the MSDA literature does not mention anything about the effects that 
different institutional contexts have on all stages of the decision making process, 
from problem identification to the legitimisation criteria used.
Nevertheless, MSDA authors are aware that there are a number of process issues 
that have not yet been satisfactorily addressed:
‘When should the stakeholders meet, and what form should the 
meetings take? How should the stakeholders interact? Should 
experts be encouraged to develop consensus opinions and how 
could this be achieved? How can the role and influence of the 
analyst be limited? Many of the answers are likely to emerge from 
trial and error with the application of the approach over time” (von 
Winterfeldt, 1992:341).
I would point out three features of these questions: first, they all deal with the “value”
part of the decision problem (even the one about the desirability and feasibility of
achieving consensus among experts, because underlying the question is a concern
that the differences in opinion might provide insights about the problem and that it
may be unfeasible to disentangle “facts” from “values”); secondly, that these
questions are considered important and have already been recognised to be of
relevance in practice because, for example Gregory and Keeney (1994); Keeney
(1988) have recognised and stressed the importance of some procedural issues -
such as involving stakeholders from early on in the process, see also Section 3.1);
and thirdly, that the recommendation (or expectation) that the answers to the
questions will emerge from trial and error with application, is both proof of the lack
theories about the institutional context as well as an example why this situation is
unsatisfactory (because if they had a theory, then they could on answers, or at least
29 von Winterfeldt (1992:341) argues that the MSDA approach strengthens the democratic process 
because (i) it encourages stakeholder interaction, the foundation of democracy; (ii) it ‘ ensures the 
involvement of groups that should have a stake but are not yet organized”; (iii) it informs decision 
making and debate but does not force decisions; (iv) it counteracts an increasing reliance on experts 
who become the decision makers by default. In the MSDA approach, experts are given a very specific 
role that is appropriate to their knowledge and expertise.
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working hypotheses to the important questions they pose more quickly and 
systematically). Only by understanding the institutional context of decision making 
can decision analysts find the answer to these questions and thereby also deal with 
the challenge of overcoming the institutional inertia challenges identified by 
(McDaniels, 1994).
Another reason why the MSDA assumption that one need not differentiate between 
stakeholders beyond the question of whether or not they are representatives of 
stakeholders is that another explanation for the observation made below, which uses 
the hypotheses of Stratified Systems Theory (SST) (Jaques, 1976; Jaques, 1996) 
that there are very significant difference in tasks and capacity of individuals at 
different managerial strata in an organisation, described in Chapter 5, and also used 
by Phillips (Phillips, 1984 and 1992) in his argument for Decision Conferencing.
“It is interesting to note that the process of quantifying values seems 
much simpler with individuals higher up in an organisation. The 
"real decision makers" seem to like structuring their values more 
than do middle-level managers. One explanation is that these 
executives know very well that they are always making decisions 
involving such values and feel somewhat relieved that there are 
some formal techniques that may assist them. A second possibility 
is that middle-level managers have not thought about the values as 
much as have executives. Third, managers must try to take the 
point of view of someone else, namely their superiors, when 
proceeding with structuring values” (Keeney, 1992:153).
3.4.2 Decision Analysis for Risk assessment and market process for risk 
management
According to Pearse and Walters (1992), DA would be suitable only for the risk 
assessment part of fishery management, because there are so many decision 
makers that it is not clear whose utility functions should be used. I would argue that 
they are misinterpreting MSDA, because the aim of MSDA is to present different 
views, and to provide insight about the implications of combining different 
stakeholders value judgements (including those of fishermen and the wider public) 
with factual judgements of experts.
However, their paper also makes the point that it is possible to develop management 
systems in which fishermen share responsibility and decision making for fishery 
management with central agencies. Three aspects are noteworthy:
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1) The DDBRA does not have to be the only party engaged in risk management 
because co-management is an option (I will discuss this in greater detail in the 
next Chapter);
2) Since it is not possible to apply Pearse's and Walters' (1992) proposal directly to 
the Danube Delta (due to the great difference of the institutional context from that 
of New Zealand), the underlying principles of co-management need to be 
investigated further.
3) The Pearse and Walters (1992) proposal ignores the process by which such a co­
management regime would be developed. Nor does it deal with question of 
making trade-offs between the multiple objectives. As I have shown in Chapters 1 
and 2, developing a management strategy in the Danube Delta is a multi­
objective problem and I would argue that Decision Analysis can be used to assist 
in the dealing with the problem. Whatever approach one uses - MSDA or 
Decision Conferencing - it needs to deal with the institutionally specific questions 
(in the case of Pearse’s and Walters' proposal that is particularly obvious 
because the proposal departs so much from the way a fishery, such as the 
DDBR, has been traditionally managed).
3.4.3 Variations on traditional decision making with multiple objectives
Hilden (1997) and McDaniels (1994, 1995) are more concerned with aiding the 
decision making process of the fishery managers themselves. In the DDBR this 
would mean working with individual DDBRA and DDI staff and providing them with an 
expert-aiding framework.
While Hilden (1997) brought up the issue of different worldviews, he concluded that 
Decision Analysis had difficulty with incorporating that information, and in essence he 
seemed to have taken a position very similar to Lane and McDaniels (1998) in which 
individuals are simply aided to make decisions about TAC strategies in the light of a 
multiplicity of objectives and the most effective use of available information.
3.5 Conclusion
The predominant approach to using DA for environmental management problems is 
through the MSDA or classical decision analysis for multiple-objective problems 
restricted to work with one stakeholder or scientist at a time. The evidence from the 
existing publications suggests that the application of Decision Analysis would be of 
benefit in the case of the Danube Delta.
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However, I have shown that the MSDA approach and its variants did not deal 
satisfactorily with two big problems observed both in the DDBR as well as in the 
MSDA literature: (i) the institutional context within which they are operating and (ii) 
the ways in which interdisciplinary group-work (both within and between stakeholder 
and expert groups) could be harnessed to maximise the insights resulting from the 
analysis of different perspectives.
The existing MSDA does not deal satisfactorily with the problems presented by 
strong differences in worldviews that different stakeholders may have. In particular, 
the processes of collaboration between experts, as well as between stakeholders 
and experts, have been identified as critical for effective management, but MSDA has 
not provided a consistent framework for handling such interactions. ; (iii) if there are 
any differences between different levels of management (Keeney said that higher 
levels more comfortable; (McDaniels, 1995) talked about the discomfort that 
managers experienced in specifying value judgements, and (iv) if this would be 
sufficient to deal with the institutional inertia questions identified by (McDaniels, 
1994).
The existing MSDA approach is also unable to provide an explanation for the 
observation by McDaniels (1995) and Keeney (1994) that higher level managers 
were more comfortable with making certain value judgements. In cases where 
managers of different levels would need to collaborate, understanding the reason for 
these difficulties, would be important.
Even though numerous examples are cited within the MSDA literature that 
communication among stakeholders or scientists is beneficial, the discussion about 
the value of group work very ambiguous and the issue of interdisciplinary team work 
within one organisation is not even considered. Furthermore, even though MSDA 
decision analysists are aware that process issues relating to the interaction between 
stakeholders and/or experts affect the success of MSDA interventions (von 
Winterfeldt, 1992), they can only suggest to proceed through trial and error (instead 
of a systematic development effort) because the institutional context is not 
considered as a variable.
The proposal by Pearse and Walters (1992) for dealing with risk management 
through a particular type of co-management was not directly applicable because 
institutional conditions in Romania were very different from New Zealand, and to 
ascertain the feasibility of their proposal one needs to know more about the 
underlying institutional principles. Pearse and Walters (1992) also fail to discuss the 
process through which an innovative co-management regime could be brought
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about. I will argue in the following Chapters that DA could play an instrumental role in 
helping to bring that about - but it needs to be bound by an institutional context. The 
only time that "institutional inertia" is mentioned explicitly as a factor hindering 
transformation (McDaniels, 1994) that hinders the achievement of sustainable 
development objectives, it is dealt with very unsatisfactorily.
In order to deal with these questions and assess the possible use of DC approach I 
needed to deal with two sets of institutional questions: the first (dealt with in Chapter
4) relates to renewable resource management systems, and in particular the role of 
the DDBRA within the DDBR, and the second (dealt with in Chapter 5) relates to the 
organisational characteristics of the DDBRA and their effect on the management 
planning process.
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Chapter 4 The need for adaptive policies and co-management
In Chapter 2, I presented the models on which fishery management in the DDBR is 
based and then described how this management was to take place. I showed that 
many of the techniques, methods and models proposed for management in the 
Danube Delta were not easily applicable (because data was missing, data was very 
uncertain, there were numerous factors that could influence the development of 
fishery, etc.). In Chapter 3, I then showed that those were are all reasons which 
would suggest that decision analysis might be able to help. However, there were a 
number of questions left unanswered by the decision analysis literature. One of the 
most fundamental concerned the way conflicting assessments by experts should be 
dealt with.
One strand of the literature, cultural theory, has put forward an even more radical or 
dramatic argument. Cultural theorists (Schwarz and Thompson, 1990; Timmerman, 
1986) offer a contentious, but powerful, explanation that ties in with this alternative 
view of ecosystems but which goes further than AEMA (Adaptive Environmental 
Management and Assessment) in that it also puts forward an hypothesis for why one 
can often observe sharply differing explanations and policy by experts on the basis of 
the same evidence. The most important point of the cultural theorists’ hypothesis is 
that in situations where the data available are highly uncertain the institutional 
context within which individuals (including “experts”) operate exerts a very strong 
(even inescapable) bias on the interpretation of the data and the policies that are put 
forward. Within the context of this thesis the cultural theorists’ hypothesis is very 
relevant because it implies that mathematical averaging of different expert opinions, 
as the MSDA approach suggests, is inappropriate and may even be dangerous. In 
this Chapter, I argue that part of the answer to the debate about how to handle 
conflicting viewpoints can be found by examining possible reasons why the evidence 
of practical fishery management problems, such as that in the DDBR, conflict with the 
management models employed in the DDBR.
In the light of this literature, I argue that a major task for the DDBRA must be the 
transformation of their existing management strategy, which was based on a 
narrowly defined carrying capacity constraint (the Maximum Sustainable Yield) and 
command and control enforcement interventions, toward a co-management system 
aimed at maintaining or increasing the resilience of the social, economic, and 
ecological systems that together constitute the DDBR.
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4.1 Ecosystems as complex dynamic systems
The models employed in the DDBR were based on two important assumptions. The 
first assumption was that a unique long-term natural equilibrium state of fish stocks 
exists. The second assumption was that the DDBRA can and must determine how 
much, what kind, and in what way fishermen should fish in order to maximise their 
own and society's long term welfare.
An implication of the first assumption is that fishery management should try to 
determine the optimal rate of fish harvesting that maintains the equilibrium. In the first 
part of this chapter, I show that this assumption is in doubt because of the 
considerable evidence that there may be several different equilibria and that 
variability in ecosystems may, in fact, contribute to their resilience. The implication for 
fishery management is that it is wrong to seek to determine a stable equilibrium rate 
of harvesting because it both infeasible (there being multiple equilibria) and 
inappropriate (because variation in fish stocks is natural and desirable).
4.1.1 Ecosystem change in terms of cycles of succession
Since there has been a long interest in what happens when ecosystems are 
disturbed either naturally or by human intervention, the study of succession - the 
sequence of events that occur when complexes of plants are disturbed by, for 
example, fire, storms or pest - has had an important influence on our understanding 
of ecosystems and through that also on management policy.
Two concepts relating to ecosystem dynamics have dominated for most of this 
century: (i) that ecosystems develop naturally to a stable climax condition (Clements, 
1916); and (ii) that different species dominate the two generic periods in succession: 
exploitation (R-strategists) and conservation (K-strategists) (MacArthur and Wilson, 
1967)
The classical framework developed by Clements (1916) holds that succession leads, 
through a sequence of highly ordered events, to a stable climax community of self- 
replicating assemblages of plants. The species of these plant assemblages are 
determined by precipitation and temperature. After a disturbance, ‘pioneer* species 
(rapid growing and resistant to physical extremes) are the first to colonise the 
ecosystem. Their presence changes conditions and a succession of decreasingly 
robust but more competitive species will occur over time. In the course of these 
events, biomass accumulates, biological, chemical, and physical processes are 
increasingly regulated, and variability is reduced until the stable climax condition is
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reached and maintained. “This scheme represents a powerful equilibrium-centred 
view in which disturbances by fire, storm, or pest are treated as exogenous (and 
somehow not appropriate) intrusions into a natural order. Clements gave the analogy 
to an organism and its ability to repair damage” (Holling, 1986:298).
A second influential equilibrium-centred model was developed by MacArthur and 
Wilson (1967). They proposed a two-fold classification of organisms occurring in the 
process of succession: the first part is dominated by “opportunist” organisms that are 
naturally selected as they thrive in unpredictable environments (these are called R- 
selected) while the second stage is dominated by “equilibrium” organisms that are 
selected due to their efficiency of food harvests in crowded, predictable environments 
(called K-selected).30 Holling (1986:298) characterises R-strategists as having a high 
reproductive potential, short life, high dispersal properties, small size, and resistance 
to physical extremes. K-strategists have lower reproductive potential, longer life, 
lower dispersal rates, larger size, and effective competitive abilities. In Clement’s 
framework, these are the climax species that occupy stable, long-lasting habitats.
Holling (1986:298) argues that while there are communities that have developed a 
climax maintained through plant-by-plant replacement in the manner proposed by 
Clements, the view of succession as analogous to the recovery of an organism from 
injury, with an ordered and obligatory sequence of replacements of one species by 
another, has been shown to be oversimplified. Referring to evidence from extensive 
comparative field studies (West, Shugart, and Botkin, 1981), from critical 
experimental manipulation of watersheds (Bormann and Likens, 1981; Vitousekand 
Matson, 1984), from paleoecological reconstruction (Davis, 1986; Delcourt, Delcourt, 
and Webb, 1983), and from studies that link systems models and field research 
(West, Shugart, and Botkin, 1981), Holling (1995:21) argues that four main points 
have led to a revision of the useful, but essentially static and incomplete Clementian 
view of succession that allows for more than one possible ‘climax state’:
• The species that invade after disturbance and during succession can be highly 
variable and determined by chance events;
• Both early and late succession species can be present continuously;
30 The designations derive from the logistic equation and K defines the saturation density (stable 
equilibrium population) and R the instantaneous rate of increase.
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• Large and small disturbances triggered by the events such as fire, wind, and 
herbivores are an inherent part of the internal dynamics and in many cases set 
the timing of succession cycles;
• Some disturbances can carry the ecosystem into quite different stability domains, 
e.g. mixed grass and tree savannahs may be transformed into shrub-dominated 
semi-deserts;
In his 1986 paper, Holling (1986:306-308) combines this view of multiple equilibria
with understandings gained from population systems, to propose a synthesis that
emphasises four primary stages in an ecosystem cycle (see Figure 4-1). Starting with
the two functions that control the ecosystems in the Clementian succession model:
• exploitation, in which rapid colonisation is emphasised; and
• conservation, in which slow accumulation and storage of energy and material are 
emphasised;
Holling argues that the revised view of succession requires two additional functions:
• release, in which the tightly bound accumulation of biomass and nutrients 
becomes increasingly fragile and is suddenly released by agents such as forest 
fire, insects pests, or intense pulses of grazing;
• reorganisation, in which soil processes of mobilisation and immobilisation 
minimise nutrient loss and reorganise nutrients to become available for the next 
phase of exploitation.
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The sequence of events taking place during the stylised ecosystem cycle shown in 
Figure 4-1 are controlled by the above mentioned four functions and are unevenly 
spaced through time (Holling calls this biological time flow). The progression from the 
exploitation phase (box 1) to conservation (box 2) is slow; connectedness and 
stability among variables increase and a ‘capital’ of nutrients and biomass slowly 
accumulates in variables that are the dominant variables at that moment. That capital 
becomes more and more tightly bound, preventing other competitors from utilising 
the accumulated capital until the system eventually becomes so over-connected that 
rapid change is triggered (agents of change might be wind, fire, disease, insect 
outbreak, or a combination of these). The stored capital is then suddenly released 
and the tight organisation lost to allow the released capital to be reorganised to 
initiate the cycle again (box 3 through box 4 into box 1)
“This pattern is discontinuous and depends on changing multi-stable 
states to trigger and organise the release and reorganisation 
functions. Instabilities and chaotic behaviour trigger the release 
phase, which then proceeds in the reorganisation phase, where 
stability begins to be re-established. In short, chaos emerges from 
order, and order emerges from chaos! Resilience and recovery are 
determined by fast release (or creative destruction) and 
reorganisation sequence, whereas stability and productivity are
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determined by slow exploitation and conservation sequence.”
(Holling, 1995:22-23)
Holling (1995:26-27) argues that evidence from boreal forests, boreal region prairies, 
pelagic ecosystems, as well as the Everglades of Florida (Gunderson, 1992) is better 
explained by his hypothesis about succession than by alternative hypotheses about 
succession. Holling argued already in his 1986 paper (page 305) that there is strong 
evidence that:
• more than one locally stable equilibrium and stability domain around it can exist;
• jumps between stability domains can be triggered by exogenous events and the 
size of these stability domains is a measure of the sensitivity to such events;
• stability domains themselves expand, contract, disappear in response to changes 
in slowly changing variables. These changes are internally determined by the 
processes that link variables, and quite independent of exogenous events.
Holling (1986:306) concluded that “discontinuous change is an internal property of 
each system. For long periods change is gradual, and discontinuous behaviour is 
inhibited. Conditions are eventually reached, however, when a jump becomes 
increasingly likely and ultimately inevitable.”
4.1.2 Carrying Capacity vs. Resilience
In a recent article in Science a group of eminent economists and ecologists (Arrow et 
al., 1995) attempted to “establish a substantive dialogue ... to gauge whether an 
interdisciplinary consensus exists ... and to determine what can be said about the 
joint development of economic and environmental policy.” (Arrow et al., 
1995:footnote 1).
Arrow et al. (1995) argue that the world’s resource base is finite, that consequently 
there are limits to the throughput of energy through the economy, and that imprudent 
use of environmental resources may irreversibly reduce the capacity for generating a 
wide variety of services. To “even conceive” of further economic growth and 
population growth through improved resource management systems and resource- 
conserving structural changes, “signals that effectively reflect the increasing 
scarcities of the resource base need to be generated”. They go on to argue, 
however, that indices of the earth’s natural carrying capacity are not very useful 
indicators of sustainability. Carrying capacities31 are not fixed, static, or based on
31 For a general review of the concept see Grimble (1995).
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simple relations because they are contingent on technology, preferences, and the 
structure of production and consumption, as well as an the ever-changing state of the 
interaction between the physical and biotic environment.
Instead, they suggest that a better indicator of sustainability is resilience, which they 
define in the same way as Holling (1986:296): “the ability of a system to maintain its 
structure and patterns of behaviour in the face of disturbance.” It should be noted that 
this definition of resilience does not emphasise the speed with which an ecosystem 
returns to an equilibrium following a disturbance, as, for example Pimm (1984) 
suggests. Instead, the focus is on the parameter forces of a system that define the 
existence, shape, and size of stability domains, which may shift if variability patterns 
in space and time change.
According to Arrow et al. (1995:93), the only way one can test the resilience of an 
ecosystem is by “intelligently perturbing them and observing the response using what 
has been called ‘adaptive management’”. Adaptive management views regional 
development policies and management as ‘experiments’, where interventions over 
several scales are made to achieve understanding, produce social and economic 
products and to identify further management options (Arrow et al., 1995:footnote 12) 
Similar arguments are put forward in Gunderson, Holling, and Light (1995), Holling, 
(1978), Lee (1993), and Walters (1986).
4.1.3 Predictive Modelling Workshops
To deal with these concerns Adaptive Environmental Management and Assessment 
(AEMA) proposes a series of modelling workshops “that depend on a small group of 
people that interacts with a wider set of experts during a series of short-term, 
intensive workshops. Most of our workshops have used the construction of a 
quantitative model as a focus for discussion. The main participants are disciplinary 
specialists; methodologists who are familiar with techniques of analysis such as 
modelling; and decision makers who will ultimately use the information that results 
from the analysis.” The main purpose of such workshops is to “provide a brain for the 
body of the research team - they provide periodic reassessment and redirection” 
(Holling, 1978:49)
AEMA workshops usually involve three stages:
First-phase workshops: These last between 5 days and two weeks. At first problems 
are clarified, conceptualised and indicators and state variables are defined. This is 
followed by a listing of the interactions between variables, and the creation of 
subgroups that work on different aspects of the problem. Each of the subgroups
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develops sub-models which are then linked together in the final stages of the 
workshop. They note that “a special kind of leader is needed for such workshops. He 
must be someone with broad perspective on the problem, who is willing to make bold 
assumptions and move onward when proceedings bog down and who can channel 
trivial arguments into useful directions” (Holling, 1978:55).
Second-phase workshops: The incomplete models resulting from the first workshops 
are updated with new information and revised as appropriate. This may involve more 
than one workshop, phased over several months. “The same mix of people, though 
not necessarily the same individuals, should participate in these later workshops: 
methodologists, specialists, and decision makers.” The main value of these 
workshops is that they identify the critical issues, data needs, and questions. 
Evaluation of management policies is carried out by a small study team.
Transfer workshops: “...as the analysis or assessment nears completion, the phase 
of transfer to the contracting agency or other clients who were not involved during 
analysis begins.” The “client decision makers can ask various questions of the model 
through interactive simulation. The so-called “implementation phase is quite critical; 
without a smooth transition, even the best analyses are incomplete” (Holling, 
1978:56).
AEMA proponents argue that such a workshop process should be used whenever (1) 
the system has many variables; (2) there is a wide range of alternative hypothesis for 
the uncertain variables; and (3) and stakeholders have different sets of objectives 
(Walters, 1986:333) The main rationale for this workshop process is that
“...such technical developments [for dealing with the technical 
difficulties of modelling and formal optimisation for systems that 
involve a whole panorama of biophysical and economic variables] 
will be of little value unless they are accompanied by progress in 
dealing also with the very human problems of reaching consensus 
by embracing uncertainty, and of reaching some balance when 
there is, in fact, no identifiable decision maker and policies proceed 
from the competitive or co-operative activities of many actors 
(Walters, 1986:333)
Walters (1986) goes on to emphasise four essential steps in the “Adaptive Policy 
Design for Complex Problems.” Even though I will not use this process in this thesis, 
it is instructive to note the importance that Adaptive Environmental Managers place 
on working together, facilitation, and the process for generating options. While there 
are many similarities with Decision Conferencing, it is interesting that the 
protagonists of AEMA (unjustly, I argue later) criticise Decision Analysis. The steps of 
the "Adaptive Policy Design" process are as follows:
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(A) Modelling in order to pinpoint uncertainties: One should build predictive models 
even though it is known in advance that any predictions derived from them would 
have little credibility because “other processes for defining uncertainties will lack a 
necessary focus on and definition of policy options, and so will be used as a forum by 
various scientists to promote their own research interests.” Walters goes on to warn 
that “serious tactical and political difficulties usually arise at this step, because 
modelling almost invariably alienates (appearing threatening and superficial to) 
various members of the scientific community... Thus it is essential to include this 
community, challenge it to see the problem more broadly, and dispassionately 
embrace and evaluate various alternative hypotheses that have emerged from within 
the community” (Walters, 1986).
(B) Compression for understanding: This step involves the systematic development 
of a range of predictions about key policy indicators, using the alternative models and 
basic policy options identified during the initial modelling work. The key goals are “(1) 
to gain consensus about how large the range of future outcomes is and how deep the 
conflicts are about which outcome would be best; and (2) to engender a healthy 
frustration about the [existing] state of affairs”. This “motivates the search for a 
compressed representation in terms of a few extreme alternative hypotheses, 
management options, and scenarios of future development.” (Walters, 1986:335)
(C) Seeking the best option: “moving back and forth between the results based on 
formal objective functions and the reactions of actors whose objectives these 
functions are supposed to represent...[leads to ]... clarification of which objectives are 
really conflicting in terms of policy choice. Often, apparently conflicting objectives in 
fact imply the same best policy choice and so lead to coalitions of interests that 
would not be intuitively obvious. But basic conflicts usually still remain, between 
short-term and long-term values, and between temporal stability and informative 
variability” (Walters, 1986:336).
Walters (1986) then goes on to comment on Decision Analysis:
"Some analysts find it disturbing that modelling exercises intended 
to bring actors together often result initially in deepening of conflicts, 
by highlighting conflicts that cannot be avoided. It is somehow 
expected that co-operation in clarifying what the trade-offs are 
should be accompanied by a commitment to accept formal 
calculation of the best compromise policy. There has been much 
interest in “multiobjective decision analysis” (see (Keeney and 
Raiffa, 1976)), which emphasises precisely such formal methods.
But by seeming to provide a reasonable compromise among options 
that are all bad in the first place, such formal methods are a lot like
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sensitivity analysis mentioned above32: they may lull the actors into 
accepting a solution too early. Again, let us recall that there is value 
in allowing tension and conflict to build, as motivation for seeking 
innovative policy options" (Walters, 1986:336-337)
(D) Imaginative synthesis: The fourth important step in the “Adaptive Policy Design
for Complex Problems” that Walters has identified relates to the necessity “of
recognising that emotional involvement is a strong prerequisite for creative thinking, a
fact that is obvious to artists, but that many scientists (the bad ones) fear to admit”.
Relaxed and freewheeling ‘brainstorming sessions’ where participants are urged to
think up wild ideas while agreeing not to be critical of one another, he argues, are
unlikely to foster “leaps of imagination” or “intuitive jumps”. Only when emotions of
frustration and desperation about current static options have been built up among the
management actors is it likely that “the magic of imagination is likely to be displayed”
(Walters, 1986).
4.2 Cultural Theory
4.2.1 “Managerial heterogeneity” and “Dimensions of sociality”
In AEMA, as in the decision analysis literature reviewed in Chapter 3, as well as in 
New Institutional Economics which I deal with later, and most other theories of 
environmental management too, differences in view points of stakeholders or 
professionals who help stakeholders are seen to be a part of the problem in 
management and also as a resource to be harnessed in the management of complex 
resource systems. However, the reasons for differences in perspectives has not been 
very clearly explained. Some attribute them to different individual experiences with 
management attempts, others to different sets of knowledge, differences in problem 
foci, or differences in interests. However, this does not indicate how one should deal 
with such differences in perspective.
The problem is particularly acute in situations where it is even theoretically 
impossible to determine one ‘correct’ solution, such as in the DDBR fishery. 
Nevertheless, as I have shown, the DDBRA was quite determined to pursue one
32 Under (B) Walters argued that sensitivity analysis (where parameters and actions are changed and 
the effects on model predictions are observed) can be deceptive when applied to complex systems, 
particularly to those that exhibit multiple equilibria and other sudden qualitative changes in behaviour 
as parameters are varied. Sensitivity analysis is deceptive in such circumstances because “the 
possible behaviours have barely been touched". (Walters, 1986:336)
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particular management approach based on one particular interpretation of what was 
happening in the fishery.
Holling (1986) and Timmerman (1986), for example, have found that different 
managing institutions, facing very similar kinds of conditions, have undertaken 
remarkably different sets of interventions in those ecosystems. However, these 
different sets of interventions had some consistency, and as a result, the question 
that Holling (1986) and Timmerman (1986) posed was something like this: ‘What 
representations of reality would one need to ascribe to each managing institution in 
order to consider their actions to be rational (coherent)?’
In all, four different interpretations about ecosystem stability needed to be ascribed to 
the different management institutions, and each of these interpretations could be 
illustrated by a picture of a ball in a landscape (see Figure 4-2). Holling (1986) and 
Timmerman (1986) called these minimal representations of ecosystem stability 
“myths of nature”, defining a myth as “a cultural device that captures, in simple and 
elegant form, some essence of experience and wisdom.” Thompson (1991:248) 
argues, like Holling (1986) and Timmerman (1986), that these myths are not 
falsehoods, but “partial truths”. The essence of Thompson’s work lies in the 
associating of these myths with particular “ways of life: a particular pattern of social 
relationships and a particular set of moral justifications for the superiority of that 
pattern to other, rival, patterns.’’One of the important implications of this plurality of 
views of nature, and the actions they justify, is that they appear irrational from the 
perspective of the other views but, nevertheless, each actor is rational (coherent), 
given his or her convictions as to how the world is in circumstances where science is 
unable to determine the facts that would decide the matter. These observations of 
“plural (but far from infinite) rationalities” lead Thompson (1991:249) to ask how the 
actors obtained those convictions?
Figure 4-2: The myths of nature
O _________
Nature capricious
The world is essentially random. Managing 
institutions merely respond to erratic 
events but they do not really manage.
Nature Perverse / tolerant
World is forgiving of most events but is 
vulnerable to an occasional strong 
disturbance, which could knock the ball 
over the rim. Managing institutions must 
regulate against unusual occurrences. 
They need experts to discern the unusual, 
or strong disturbances. Without these 




The world is forgiving and no matter how 
strong the disturbances, the ball will 
always return to the bottom of the basin. 




The world is an unforgiving place and the 
smallest disturbances can lead to 
catastrophic collapse. Managing 
institutions (and everyone else) must 
“tread lightly on earth”.________________
Source: Thompson (1991:248) using Holling (1986) and Timmerman (1986)
Thompson argues that basic convictions about how the world operates can be linked 
to the typology of social relationships that has been developed by the anthropologist 
Mary Douglas and her co-workers (Douglas, 1978 and 1982; Gross and Rayner, 
1985; Thompson, 1983; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky, 1990). That typology is 
based on the answers to two “eternal questions of human existence: ‘Who am I?’ and 
‘How should I behave?’”
Douglas argues that personal identity is determined by an individual’s relationship to 
groups. Those who belong to a “strong group”, defined as a collective that makes 
decisions binding on all members, will see themselves “very differently to those who 
have weak ties with others and therefore make choices that bind only themselves.” 
(Thompson, 1991:249)
Individual behaviour is shaped by the strength of social prescription (the “grid” 
dimension) that the individual is subjected to. This grid dimension is a spectrum that 
runs from “the free spirit to the tightly constrained.” (Thompson, 1991:249)
In combination, these two “dimensions of sociality” generate four basic forms of 
social relationships and each of these is “stabilised” by just one of the four 
rationalities by lending it legitimacy and enabling operation (see Figure 4-3). 
Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky (1990) argue that Lindblom (1977), Weber (1958), or 
Williamson (1975) are only examples of scholars who have built entire theories on 
the distinction of two of the four forms of social relationships that result from 
combining the group and grid dimensions: markets and hierarchies. Market cultures 
stress the “autonomy of individuals and their resulting freedom to bid and bargain 
with each other: they have substantive rationality” (Thompson, 1991:250). 
Hierarchies, on the other hand, “are made up of bounded social groups, each of
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which is in an orderly and ranked relationship with each other. Their attempts to co­
ordinate these components, without violating status differentials, create procedural 
rationality that is more concerned with the properties of who does what than trying to 
evaluate the outcome” (Thompson, 1991).
Figure 4-3 The two dimensions of sociality and the four rationalities




















“Tread lightly on the earth...”
Prescribing (no externally imposed restrictions on choice)
Source: Thompson (1991:250)
However, the typology of social relationships based on the group/grid dimensions 
accounts for two further permutations: those who reject both the individualism of the 
market and the inequalities of the hierarchy prefer the “egalitarian groups ... They 
have a communal and critical rationality, which stresses the importance of fraternal 
and sororal co-operation, and therefore strive for social relationships that are 
voluntaristic and egalitarian. But, since this desired state of affairs is always 
threatened by the encroachment of hierarchy (which brings status differences) or by 
the excessive individualism (which all too easily introduces inequalities of wealth, 
power and knowledge), collective identity has all the time to be sustained by a shared 
and strident criticism of what goes on outside the group” (Thompson, 1991:250-251). 
Furthermore, not all those who are individualised are necessarily entrepreneurs. 
Many of these have numerous prescriptions on their behaviour and as a result 
minimal freedom or choice. These are the marginal members of society that 
Thompson calls the “fatalists” since their lack of ability to influence events one way or 
another has engendered in them a “fatalistic rationality in which outcomes, good or 
bad, are simply to be enjoyed or endured, but never achieved.”
“Each one of these rationalities, when acted upon, both sustains 
and justifies the particular organisational form that goes along with
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it. ... Hierarchists trim and pmne social transactions until they fit 
neatly into their orderly ambit, individualists pull them into the 
marketplace, egalitarians strive to capture them into a kind of 
voluntary minimalism (which, to those on the outside, often looks 
more like “coercive utopianism”), and fatalists endure with more or 
less dignity whatever comes their way” (Thompson, 1991:251).
By combining the four “myths of nature” identified by the ecologists (Figure 4-2) and
the “typology of social relations and rationalities” (Figure 4-3), Thompson (1991:251-
254) derives a synthesis (Figure 4-4) which shows “how each of the myths of nature
(the ecologist’s explanation for “managerial heterogeneity”) legitimates and
reproduces certain kinds of institutional relationships (the anthropologist’s cultural
categories).” The importance of this synthesis lies in the fact that it makes it possible
to go beyond the question of which viewpoint is right, but instead offers an
hypothesis for the emergence and persistence of the viewpoints themselves.
Figure 4-4 The myths of nature mapped onto the rationalities
Prescribed (externally imposed restrictions on choice)
GRID +
Nature capricious Nature Perverse / tolerant
THE FATALIST 
Fatalistic rationality 













“Tread lightly on the earth...”
Prescribing (no externally imposed restrictions on choice)
Source: Thompson (1991:252)
The following are the most relevant implications of this synthesis within the context of 
this thesis:
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4.2.2 Biases and the typology of surprise
The basic argument Cultural Theory argument presented so far is that in situations 
where scientific data are inconclusive about the workings of ecological or social 
systems, and in particular the effects of management interventions on the combined 
systems,33 individual perception of how the world works and strategies promoted or 
adopted will be a influenced by the type of social relationships that the individual 
finds himself or herself in. According to Schwarz and Thompson (1990) such cultural 
biases can be traced to the following two underlying hypotheses:
1. in addition to self-interest, individuals also need to justify or legitimate their 
decisions.
2. in addition to cognitive limitations, the rules of closure in individual decision 
making are also influenced by the type of social relationships that individuals find 
themselves in.
The implication of this cultural theory is not only that four coherent positions are 
possible in non-linear complex situations. The extended hypothesis regarding the 
four positions is summarised in (Schwarz and Thompson, 1990; Thompson, Ellis, 
and Wildavsky, 1990) but presented here only in the form of Table 4-1. The important 
point to note within the context of this thesis is the pervasiveness and coherence of 
the different positions.
33 Complexity theorists argue that scientific data can never be absolutely conclusive when one is dealing 
with non-linear complex systems (seeGleick, 1987; Kellert, 1987; Mullin, 1993; or Waldrop, 1992).
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Table 4-1 The four Political Cultures
Hierarchical Egalitarian Individualistic Fatalistic I















Nature ephemeral Nature benign Nature capricious
Rationality Procedural Critical Substantive Fatalistic
View of resources Scarce Depleting Abundant Lottery
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to outside world. 
Voice
Only if profitable 
to the individual. 
If not, then exit.
Source: Schwarz and Thompson (1990: 66-67)
Since each one is a partial truth and since the world will at times and places be 
actually best represented by only one of these, three of the positions will be surprised
142
when things do not turn out as they predicted. This is the basis for the “Theory of 
Surprise” (Clark and Munn, 1986; Holling, 1986; Price and Thompson, 1996; 
Timmerman, 1986).
According to cultural theorists, there are twelve varieties of surprises possible (see 
Table 4-2). For example, an individualist, who believes that an ecosystem is robust 
enough to recover from any perturbation, will be surprised when it collapses (or 
moves into a very different equilibrium state). Analogously, a hierarchist, who 
believes that ecosystems can be managed with predictable results, will be surprised 
when he or she finds out that precise predictions are impossible or that the 
ecosystems unexpectedly shifts into a new equilibrium (or totally collapses). An 
egalitarian would be surprised if, contrary to an expectation of a precarious nature, 
those who disregard the caution he advocated does not result in the predicted 
disaster.
Table 4-2 Cultural Theory’s Typology of Surprise
Actual World





windfalls do not 
happen
Unexpected 
runs of good 
luck
Unexpected 


















Unpredictability Total collapse Competition
Source: Price and Thompson (1996)
4.2.3 Surprises and never-ending change
Cultural Theory suggests that movement between these positions is possible through 
learning (Price and Thompson, 1996:11). In the case of the mentioned fatalist, once 
he or she can predict and expect the attainment of benefits, he or she will gradually 
embrace the myth of “Nature Benign”. As indicated in Table 4-2, Cultural Theory 
suggests that twelve types of transitions between myths of nature are possible. That 
means that cultural theorists do not share the hypothesis put forward by AEMA that 
there is a socio-cultural analogue to Holling’s cycle of ecosystem change (see Figure 
4-5). Such an analogue would only be possible if one particular sequence is
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“privileged” (Price and Thompson, 1996:11), but it is not clear what would be doing 
that privileging (Thompson, personal communication).34






















Weak -------------------------------------------------- ► Strong
Connectedness
Source: Gunderson, Holling, and Light (1995)
The following conclusion from (Price and Thompson, 1996) indicates why cultural 
theorists argue that it is impossible to develop ‘perfect’ policies in situations of great 
uncertainty. The best one can do is develop robust policies which stand up to the 
critique of different cultural perspectives.
34 It is very interesting to note that even though Thompson and the AEMA group have not been 
collaborating since the mid 1980’s (and Thompson was unaware of AEMA major publication 
(Gunderson, Holling, and Light, 1995) in 1995 when they wrote (Price and Thompson, 1996)) that 
seemingly independent research has lead to very similar conclusions (albeit with this very important 
difference about the strength of the sequence between myth which makes the cycle possible).
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“Throughout this process, changes in the environment result from 
the actions of the people or institutions whose strategy happens to 
be best suited to making the most of the environment in which they 
find themselves. As more and more of these strategies act, these 
endogenous changes accumulate, and the environment passes 
over a threshold into a state better suited to one of the other 
strategies, ad infinitum. Though this complex model may start at the 
same place as the simple one and have the same dynamics, its 
paths are infinitely more surprising and unpredictable. In this 
inherently complex system, in which ecological and socio-cultural 
components interact, each myth of nature captures some aspects of 
the world at some time. No one of them is ever right all the time and 
everywhere, and this means that each one of them has its vital part 
to play. If you can never get it right you can at least ensure that you 
have ‘covered all the bases': that is, that your management 
strategies incorporate the requisite variety” (Price and Thompson,
1996:12).
The resulting recommendation is to define problems not in just one way (based on 
one, of the four possible myths of nature), and avoid putting all transactions onto the 
pattern of social relationships that is supported by that myth, but rather that each 
myth be granted some legitimacy and that transactions be tentatively distributed 
among the various institutional bases.
4.3 New Institutional Economics and Renewable Resource 
Management
In addition to assuming that it must be possible to determine a unique long-term 
natural equilibrium state of fish stocks, the DDBRA also assumed that they (the 
DDBRA) had to determine how much, what kind, and in what way fishermen should 
fish in order to maximise their own and society’s long term welfare.
In this Section I review the New Institutional Economics (NIE) literature that deals 
with the principles of natural resource management and show that the DDBRA's 
second assumption was also wrong. The NIE literature shows that even if there 
existed unique parameters for fish stocks and for how best to exploit them, 
management through command and control measures by the DDBRA does not 
guarantee success; moreover, it is claimed that there are other management 
systems available which are more likely to work. Those alternatives are various forms 
of co-management regimes, where the DDBRA would share with the resource users 
(fishermen, fishing companies) at least part of the authority and responsibility for 
management of the resource. For the development of successful co-management 
arrangements a number of design principles have been worked out through case 
studies.
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J.S. Gordon (1954), in one of the most important fishery economics papers written, 
provides the following analytical explanation and prediction for what happens in an 
unregulated fishery: initially, as a fishery develops, fishermen experience high returns 
on their activity as competition is low and the resource abundant. These high profits 
attract other fishermen into the industry and encourage those already there to 
increase their investment. As a result, total fishing effort increases, competition 
between the fishermen rises, and the fish resource decreases. However, even 
though profits are decreasing, the effort in the fishery will continue to increase to the 
point where all the economic rent (the difference between the value of the landing 
and the cost of catching and delivering fish) is dissipated.
Scott (1955) contrasted Gordon's (1954) description of resource system where 
fishermen were able to enter the fishery and start fishing from a resource base that 
did not belong to any one in particular, with a fishery is under sole ownership. Under 
such an alternative arrangement, the profit incentive would automatically lead the 
sole-owning rational fisherman to conserve the resource so that his income is 
secured into the future.
4.3.1 Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” Model
In a challenging article Garrett Hardin (1968) argued that whenever many individuals 
are using a scarce resource in common it would be degraded because of a 
divergence between individual and collective rationality (Feeney et al., 1990:2). To 
make his point Hardin asked readers to envisage a village pasture that was “open to 
all” and where each of the herders using this pasture adds a few animals to his herd. 
Since any pasture can support only a limited number of animals, the outcome will be 
the overgrazing and therefore the loss of the resource for the entire community. 
However, from the perspective of the rational herder this is unavoidable because 
each receives immediate and direct benefits from the additional animal, whereas the 
costs from overgrazing are delayed and shared by all. Hardin concludes:
"Therein lies the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that 
compels him to increase his herd without limit. Ruin is the 
destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best 
interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons"
(Hardin, 1968:1244).
Although Hardin did not make reference to Gordon (1954), the latter describes the 
same dynamic as Hardin:
"There appears then, to be some truth in the conservative dictum 
that everybody's property is nobody's property. Wealth that is free 
for all is valued by no one because he who is foolhardy enough to
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wait for its proper time of use will only find that it has been taken by 
another ... The fish in the sea are valueless to the fisherman, 
because there is no assurance that they will be there for him 
tomorrow if they are left behind today" (Gordon, 1954:124).
Even a decade after his earlier article Hardin argued that the only alternatives to the
tragedy of the commons were what he called “a private enterprise system” or
“socialism” (Hardin, 1978:314). In other words, there are two options to avoid the
tragedy of the commons: either (i) central governments control natural resource
systems, and establish a strategy that will specify how the pasture should be used or
(ii) the herders would divide the meadow up and assign the different pieces to
individual herders. In this way herders would be playing “a game against nature in a
smaller terrain, rather than a game against another player in a larger terrain”
(Ostrom, 1990:12). Where there is private ownership it is presumed that herders will
graze only as many animals as their piece of the meadow can support in the long
run.35 If the value of the meadow differs over time (for example because of uneven
rainfall) then some herders will make more profit than others.36
While the allocation of private ownership may be relatively straightforward in the case 
of meadows (involving the division of the land into different parcels), in the case of 
non-stationary resources, such as fish, it is less clear how private ownership could be 
established. In fisheries private property usually means that some individuals are 
given a right to the resource system at a particular time and place or to harvest a 
particular quantity of fish. In other words, the resource system is still likely to be held 
in common rather than by individuals (Ostrom, 1990:13). This is also what Clark 
(1980:117) meant when he argued that “common ownership is the fundamental fact 
affecting almost every regime of fishery management.”
4.3.2 Common Pool Resources and Property Rights
Two major objections have been made to Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons model: 
first, there is empirical evidence that contradicts Hardin's hypothesis that destruction 
was the inevitable fate for resources which were held in common (for reviews of the 
evidence supporting this objection see for example Ostrom (1990) or Feeney et al. 
(1990)). The second objection, which is more important within the context of this
35 Ostrom (1990:219) points out that the decision on the rate of use of the resource is dependent on the
discount factor used by the herder. If the discount factor is high, for example because of uncertainty, 
then “mining” the meadow rapidly is the rational action.
36 For the case of non-homogenous resource development insurance schemes, compensation, or 
trading schemes may be set up but they may require substantial investment costs.
147
thesis because it helps to better understand the situation in the Danube Delta, is that 
Hardin’s model rested on a conceptual confusion: he did not distinguish between the 
intrinsic nature of the resource and the property right regime under which it is held. 
The rest of this subsection deals with this second objection.
There are, as Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker (1994) put it, different classes of goods 
that differentiate themselves in terms of excludability and subtractability (see Table
4-3). “Excludability” refers to the ease with which potential users can be excluded 
from the benefits of the resource. “Subtractability” refers to the extent to which the 
use of the resource by one agent affects the benefits that others may enjoy.







Public Goods Common Pool Resources
Easy
Exclusion
Toll Goods Private Goods
Source: Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker (1994:7)
Using these two dimensions, Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker (1994) classify goods into 
four different types. Two of the four types are frequently referred to: public and 
private goods. With public goods, such as radio broadcasts, it is virtually impossible 
to exclude people from benefiting from the service but at the same time the benefits 
that each individual listener enjoys are not diminished by the number of other 
listeners. For private goods, such as one’s own garden, the opposite is true (i.e. other 
people exploiting it does subtract from one’s own welfare but it is usually relatively 
easy to keep others out).
There are two further combinations of these dimensions. Goods for which use by an 
individual does not subtract much of the benefits that others can derive from it, but for 
which it is easy to exclude others from using it (e.g. a road for which a toll is charged) 
are called "Toll goods". For this thesis, and the renewable resource field in general, 
the case of "high subtractability" coupled with "low excludability" is of particular 
interest. Resources that share those characteristics have been called "Common Pool 
Resources" (CPRs) (Ostrom, 1986:604). Examples of CPRs are fisheries, wildlife, 
surface and ground water, range, and forests. It needs to be noted, however, that it is 
not the type of resource (e.g.. fish, forest, water, etc.) which determines what class of 
good it is, but the exclusion and subtractability criteria.
In order to understand the resource management systems one also needs to also 
differentiate between different types of ownership regimes (in addition to the
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differentiation between different types of goods presented above). In Hardin’s 
"Tragedy of the Commons" model there was a choice between three types of 
property right regimes: the meadow was either state owned, or privately owned and 
available only to the owner, or, it was “Common Property” and that he equated to 
mean “open to all”. The most widely accepted criticism of Hardin’s model is that he 
wrongly equated common property (usually presented as “an identifiable community 
of interdependent users”) with an open access situation where “access to the 
resource is unregulated and is free and open to all” (Feeney et al., 1990:4).
The typology of property right regimes as presented in Table 4-4 makes the 
distinction between an Open Access regime and a Common Property regime clear: 
under Common Property there is a clear set of owners who have an enforceable and 
legally recognised right to exclude others from exploiting the resource. These rights 
are coupled with a number of duties, namely to contribute towards the maintenance 
of the resource and to limit the rates at which they use it. Under an Open Access 
regime there are no owners (it is therefore, in fact, a non-property regime) and as a 
result there are also no duties imposed on those who use the resource.
Table 4-4: Types of Property Rights Regimes with Owners, Rights, and Duties
Regime Type Owner Owner rights Owner Duties
Private property individual socially acceptable 
uses; control of access
avoidance of socially 
unacceptable uses








none only capture none
Source: Hanna, Folke, and Maler (1995:15)
The main conclusion is that Hardin’s model has served to indicate the importance of 
property rights. Secondly, contrary to Hardin’s claim, CPR resources that are under a 
common property regime are not necessarily destined to ruin. There are many 
examples of CPR resource systems for which it is has been argued that common 
property offers the best chance for sustainable use (see for example Rettig, Berkes, 
and Pinkerton, 1989). The key requirement, therefore, of any effective property right 
regime is that it must provide effective means to limit rights of access to the resource 
and effectively regulate the rightful users.
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4.3.3 The Foundations of the New Institutionalist Approach
Over the past 20 years or so there has been an increasing amount of research into 
the types of rules and regulations humans have developed to deal with co-operative 
behaviour in a competitive environment under limited knowledge. This is the field of 
New Institutional Economics (NIE)37 (see for example Harriss, Hunter, and Lewis, 
1995b). NIE builds on the “fundamental neo-classical assumption of scarcity and 
hence competition” (North, 1995) but rejects the very restrictive notion of the market 
"as an abstract realm of impersonal economic exchange of homogeneous goods by 
means of voluntary transactions on an equal basis between large numbers of 
autonomous, fully-informed entities with profit-maximising behavioural motivation and 
able to enter and leave freely” (Harriss-White, 1995).
Instead, New Institutionalists argue that transaction costs exist. These are costs that 
arise in market transactions because “information is rarely complete, and individuals 
have different ideas (or mental models) of the way in which the world about them 
works”. Transaction costs arise in finding out the relevant prices, negotiating and 
concluding contracts, and then enforcing them. In NIE theory, the main function of 
institutions is to reduce such information and transaction costs (Harriss, Hunter, and 
Lewis, 1995b:3).38 This rationale is most succinctly captured by Bates (1995):
Rational individuals, confronted with the limitations of individually 
rational behaviour, create institutions that, by creating new 
incentives or by imposing new constraints, enable them to 
transcend these limitations (quoted in Harriss, Hunter, and Lewis 
1995b).
Within this context, institutions are defined as “the rules of the game of a society, or, 
more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. 
They are composed of formal rules (statute law, common law, regulations), informal 
constraints (conventions, norms of behaviour and self-imposed codes of conduct), 
and the enforcement characteristics of both” (North, 1995:23).
37 It is called 'new1 institutional economics because there exists an older school of institutionalism in 
economics that is associated with Thorstain Veblen, John R. Commons, Clarence Wendell and 
Allan Grunchy (see Harriss, Hunter, and Lewis, 1995b:4-5). This latter school 'rejects the emphasis 
on rational-maximising self-seeking behaviour of individuals which is at heart of both neo-classical 
economics and new institutionalism’ (Stein, 1995). Both old and new institutional economics are 
concerned with the determinants of change. NIE presents change as evolutionary and attaches 
greater importance to the role of the individual (Harriss, Hunter, and Lewis, 1995a:5).
38 See also Matthews (1986).
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"It is adaptive rather than allocative efficiency which should be the 
guide to policy. Allocative efficiency is a static concept with a given 
set of institutions; the key to continuing good economic performance 
is a flexible institutional matrix that will adjust in the context of 
evolving technological and demographic changes as well as shocks 
to the system. It is the creation of a stable polity with complementary 
norms that is the essential characteristic. Successful 
political/economic systems have evolved such characteristics over 
long periods of time. The critical issue is how to create such 
systems in the short run, or indeed, whether it is even possible to 
create them in short periods of time. However it is doubtful if the 
policies that will produce allocative efficiency are always the proper 
medicine for ailing economies. Efficient policies that are perceived 
to be inequitable will engender political reactions which can stall or 
reverse effective political reforms" (North, 1995:26).
North (1995) concludes that “there is no greater challenge facing today’s social
scientist than the development of a dynamic theory of social change that will fill in
many of the gaps in the foregoing analysis and yield an understanding of adaptive
efficiency.”
4.3.4 NIE and Renewable Resource Management
The focus of the New Institutional Economics literature that deals with renewable 
resource management is on property rights regimes (which contain both property 
rights, i.e. “the bundles of entitlements regarding resource use”, and property rules, 
i.e. “the rules under which the those entitlements are exercised” (Hanna, Folke, and 
Maler, 1995:15)), and the components that are critical to the structure of the property 
rights regimes and their ability to limit resource use, co-ordinate users, and respond 
to changing environmental conditions.
“The performance of property rights can be measured in any one or a combination of 
three dimensions: economic, social, and ecological. All three of these dimensions are 
interconnected, interactive, and embedded in a system” (Hanna, Folke, and Maler, 
1995:18). It is argued that the economic criterion relates to economic efficiency (least 
cost combination of inputs necessary to produce the best economic outcome) and 
may include damage effects of environmental use (Daly and Cobb, 1989). The social 
criterion focuses on equity considerations which reflect societies definitions of 
fairness in the distribution of costs and benefits. The ecological criterion is measured 
by the extent to which natural capital is preserved.
Hanna, Folke, and Maler (1995:18) further note that “unless resources are in surplus 
relative to demand, trade-offs between these performance measures are inevitable”. 
Furthermore, “uncertainty works at cross purposes in natural and human systems.” 
When there is uncertainty about the effects of management in natural systems, a
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rational approach dictates a precautionary approach to cover contingencies 
(Costanza, 1987). In contrast, uncertainty in human systems creates incentives for 
accelerated rates of use due to the lack of assurance that resources not used in the 
present will be available in the future (Hanna, Folke, and Maler, 1995:18-19). That is 
why there is a need for an institutional framework that constrains human actions, and 
property rights are a necessary, but not sufficient condition for resource 
sustainability.
In the development of the institutional framework one needs to choose between 
open-access, state control, communal governance, private property, or a number of 
mixtures between these different types. Fisheries are increasingly believed to need 
the sharing of authority among governments, local communities, and the private 
sector. Each of these actors, it is argued, brings “different interests, abilities, and 
perspectives to the resource management process” (Townsend and Pooley, 
1995:48). The sharing of management responsibility and authority between a 
Governmental agency and a community of users has been called co-management 
(see for example Jentoft (1989), or Rettig, Berkes, and Pinkerton (1989)). Figure 4-6 
illustrates the fact that co-management refers to a very wide range of the different 
arrangements. In general, the view is put forward that “just as government managers 
cannot manage the fishery without fishermen’s co-operation, neither can the 
fishermen manage the fishery themselves in today’s complex world” (Rettig, Berkes, 
and Pinkerton, 1989:285).
Figure 4-6 An illustration of a range of co-management arrangements

























Pomeroy and Berkes (1997)
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Source:
One of the co-management characteristics frequently highlighted is that the 
budgetary burden of fishery management agencies can be reduced. Using 
information from fishermen on fish populations and fishing activities reduces the 
amount of information needed from trained biologists, vessels and equipment. When 
fishermen or fishing companies are involved in designing a fishery management 
regime the costs of planning are reduced and local community acceptance is 
increased (Rettig, Berkes, and Pinkerton, 1989: 278-279).
“When incentives are well matched to the situation, individuals make 
decisions that produce outcomes that are both personally and 
socially rewarding. In such cases, the advantage that one individual 
derives also produces benefits for others” (Ostrom, Schroeder, and 
Wynne, 1993:9).
One suggested approach to differentiate between them is through a systematic 
comparison of transaction costs associated with different sets of regimes (Ostrom, 
Schroeder, and Wynne, 1993). The reasoning behind this suggestion is that the co­
ordination of the actions of all actors in terms of gaining agreement, monitoring 
activities, and evaluating performance requires considerable time and other 
resources. In a study on a new institutional economics approach to infrastructure 
project39 design and management Ostrom, Schroeder, and Wynne (1993) suggest 
that transaction costs could be evaluated by using a framework that I have 
summarized Figure 4-7.
In the examples that they work through they do not actually provide cost figures for 
the different heading items. Instead they perform a relative comparison between 
different types of institutional arrangements, indicating for each whether or not the 
respective transaction costs are small, medium, or large.
In fact, Hamss-White (1995) argues that NIE is a relatively blunt instrument for the 
empirical analysis of ‘real institutionalised markets’ (as opposed to the theoretical 
abstraction of neo-classical theory, see also Bates, 1995:41). Harriss, Hunter, and 
Lewis (1995a:7&12) also note that Bates (1995) and Toye (1995) find that NIE tends 
to tautological arguments for its justification such as ‘existing institutions minimise 
transaction costs because transaction cost minimisation is their function”. 
Furthermore, ‘some of the propositions derived from the NIE approach to the analysis
39 In Ostrom, Schroeder, and Wynne (1993) infrastructure such irrigation schemes, water supply, and 
roads are discussed, but I argue that the analysis also applies to fisheries such as the one in the 
Danube Delta.
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of markets, including property rights, are too indeterminate to bear empirical 
investigation.’
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Figure 4-7 Criteria for judging the comparative performance of alternative 
institutional arrangements
Intermediate performance criteria, provision costs
Transformation costs
the costs involved in (1) transforming citizen 
preferences about outcomes and their willingness to pay 
into articulated demands for packages of publicly 
provided goods and services; (2) arranging for financing 
and producing these packages; (3) monitoring the 
performance of producers; (4) regulating the use 
patterns of consumers, and (5) enforcing compliance with 
taxation and other resource mobilization measures 
(they are a function of the characteristics of the goods 
and services involved, the scale of the provision unit, 
the technologies used in aggregating interests, 
arranging financing and production, monitoring 
producers, regulating users, and enforcing compliance)
Transaction costs
increases in transformation costs associated with 
coordination, information, and strategic behaviour. 
(They are a function of attempts to counteract 
incentives associated with strategic behaviour.) 
Co-ordination costs
costs of time, capital, and personnel invested in 
negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing agreements about 
provision among actors
Information costs
costs of searching for and organizing information
Time and place
costs resulting from a lack of or an ineffective blend 
of knowledge about time and place
Scientific
costs resulting from a lack of knowledge about general 
scientific principles
Strategic costs
are the increased transformation costs produced when 
individuals use asymmetric distributions of information, 
power, or other resources to obtain benefits at the 
costs of others.
The most frequent are: Free riding; Rent seeking; and 
Corruption
Intermediate performance criteria, production costs
Transformation costs
costs of transforming inputs (land, labour, and capital) 
into outputs
Transaction costs
increases in transformation costs associated with 
coordination, information, and strategic costs 
Co-ordination costs
costs of time, capital, and personnel invested in 
negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing agreements among 
actors
Information costs
costs of searching for and organizing information and 
the costs of errors resulting from a lack of or an 
ineffective blend of: Time and place and Scientific
Strategic costs
are the increased transformation costs produced when 
individuals use asymmetric distributions of information, 
power, or other resources to obtain benefits at the 
costs of others.
The most frequent are: Shirking; Corruption; and Adverse 
selection/moral hazard 
Overall performance criteria
Efficiency; Fiscal equivalence; Redistribution; 
Accountability; Adaptability
Source: Ostrom, Schroeder, and Wynne (1993)
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Bates (1995:41-42) argues that NIE shows that people create institutions that allows 
them to move to the Pareto frontier, but it cannot specify which of the infinite number 
of non-equivalent points in the Pareto set will be the outcome (hence he calls it a 
‘blunt theory’). But because people are not indifferent between them and instead 
possess conflicting preferences over them (since different solutions have different 
distributional outcomes) Bates (1995) argues that NIE has so far failed to recognise 
the centrality of politics, since it is the political power of the players and the nature of 
the political setting that enables one player to gain a preferred institutional solution 
and thus achieve one outcome as opposed to another within the Pareto set. He 
contends that for NIE to “fulfil its own agenda, however, it must move into the study 
of politics. It needs to take into account the allocation of political power in society and 
the impact of the political system on the structure and performance of economic 
institutions” (Bates, 1995:44). That is why Bates (1995) concludes that the proper 
role of "the new institutionalism might be to provide diagnoses rather than to 
prescribe cure.”
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I have dealt with the implications of alternative, and more realistic 
(compared to the simple and more popular fishery management model used in the 
DDBR) views of the interaction between the social, economic, and ecological 
systems that together form the DDBR, and of which the DDBRA is a part. One of the 
important conclusions from this review of the literature is that due to the complex 
dynamics interaction within and between human and natural systems, the question of 
a ‘perfect’ management institution, catch limit, enforcement method, etc. does not 
arise.
More specifically, I have shown that The MSY concept used in the bio-economic 
model needs to be replaced with the concept of resilience. In order to deal with the 
problem of restricting effort, one needs to develop rules and regulations that are 
appropriate for the specific social, economic, and environmental conditions of the 
DDBR. To accomplish this, the metaphor of the Tragedy of the Commons and the 
traditional solution of either state ownership or privatisation were neither feasible nor 
conceptually helpful or appropriate. Instead, the NIE literature points to design 
principles that one can extract from the analysis of a wide range of management 
experiences (both successes and failures). However, little has been said about the 
type of interventions that would facilitate the development an appropriate set of rules, 
regulations, and institutions that can adapt to future changes.
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All the literature reviewed in this Chapter has also stressed the inherent limitations of 
knowledge, the effects of different kinds of institutional relationships, and has 
indicated that decision making is affected by social constraints or influences/biases in 
addition to the cognitive limitations that the MSDA literature has been mostly 
concerned with.
The use of different expert and stakeholder views in natural resource management is 
very important for assessing the resilience of ecosystems (because dynamic 
variability of ecosystems prevents a univocal and constant determination of the 
resilience of an ecosystem) as well as for the design of management systems 
(because of the relevant knowledge that they are able to bring to bear to the problem, 
which among other things lowers transaction costs).
If maintaining or increasing the resilience of the DDBR (which includes the social, 
economic, and ecological systems) becomes the strategic objective for the DDBRA, 
then one of the key features of the fishery management regime that the DDBRA is 
engaged in planning must be that it is adaptive. This means that all those engaged in 
the management of the DDBR fishery must be able to recognise changes in the 
systems that they are operating in and adjust the rules and regulation that govern 
their interaction. These adjustments can be both reactive to external or internal 
changes in the system as well as proactive, in the sense that there may be 
opportunities to improve the social, economic, or ecological systems in a way that is 
more desirable (increased resilience, or better income opportunities, etc.) There is no 
agreement over whether these changes are gradual or have a pattern of stability or 
little change is all of a sudden replaced followed by a period of rapid change and re­
configuration. There is agreement, however, that the changes are unpredictable.
Such a revised role for the DDBRA within the DDBR poses challenges for the 
management planning process (especially allowing and even seeking different 
viewpoints because there is much evidence (including from the Danube Delta) that 
those who manage a resource system reduce the variety of institutions engaged in 
the management process, incorporating a great range of competing objectives 
instead of a narrow MSY which did not even consider economic criteria) and it also 
implies that the DDBRA must undergo a transformation process where the old 
framework (centred around the models first developed by Antipa at the turn of the 
Century) on which the narrow carrying capacity interpretation as MSY rests, is 
transformed into a new shared social reality about the aims of the DDBR and the role 
of the DDBRA.
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Chapter 5 The effects of organisational structure on the work 
of DDBRA managers
This chapter examines the organisation of the DDBRA at its different levels and how 
it affects the work of the staff. I have organised my analysis as follows: first I consider 
two theories that deal with differentiation of work according to different hierarchical 
levels in an organisation: Stratified Systems Theory (Jaques, 1996) and the 
Competing Values Approach (Rohrbaugh and Eden, 1990). These provide 
frameworks for analysing decision problems faced by DDBRA managers at different 
levels. I then use Mintzberg’s theory relating to the specific effects of bureaucracies 
on strategic management (Mintzberg, 1989) in order to examine decision making by 
managers in the DDBRA.
5.1 Work at the different managerial levels of the DDBRA (Stratified 
Systems Theory)
According to Jaques (1996), the leading developer of Stratified Systems Theory 
(SST), the number of managerial layers required in an organisation depends on the 
complexity of the work performed. For Jaques, complexity is a function of three 
things: (i) the number of variables that have to be dealt with in a given time, (ii) the 
clarity and precision with which they can be identified, and (iii) their rate of change. 
Jaques argues that for an organisation to function efficiently, the complexity of the 
work that an employee is accountable for must match the mental processing capacity 
of that individual, and that the individual’s role within the organisation must be at the 
appropriate managerial stratum (managerial hierarchy level). In other words, there 
must be congruence between the complexity of the work to be done to perform 
particular tasks, the ability of the individual working on it, and the managerial 
hierarchical level at which he is working. An organisation where these and some 
other principles40 are observed, he calls a “Requisite Organisation”.
40 Jaques’ (1996) work on the “Requisite organisation” also covers “leadership practices” (which refers 
to the relationship between managers differentiated by one stratum and covers teamworking, context 
setting, planning, task assignment, personal effectiveness appraisal, merit review, coaching, selection 
andinduction, deselection and dismissal, and continual improvement), pay scales, functional alignment, 
human resource management, and many other factors. The focus here, however, is on better 
understanding task complexity, the work by different managerial levels (in particular as it relates to 
strategic management), and organisational factors that will help or hinder effectiveness of individuals’ 
work.
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In the next three sub-sections I first explain how Jaques proposes to measure the 
mental processing capacity of individuals, and the complexity of information and 
roles. That enables me to determine a second set of factors relevant to the different 
levels of complexity of the problems encountered in the DDBRA and the managerial 
levels of managers that must be dealing with them.
5.1.1 Work complexity and human capability
The first step in the analysis of work at the different managerial layers in an 
organisation is a precise distinction between task, role, and work (Jaques 
1996:13&18). A task is an assignment to produce specified output within a given 
completion time and allocated resources. Role refers to the position that an individual 
occupies in the organisation. Work refers to the exercise of judgement and the 
making of decisions for the purpose of performing a task.
Jaques argues that the judgement and decision making to which he refers in his 
definition of work take place at two levels. One is through articulated ideas that 
constitute knowledge that can be communicated to others. Beneath this level of 
articulated ideas or knowledge is a second level which Jaques calls “mental 
processing”. Mental processes do not take place in verbal form, but are unconscious 
or intuitive. Jaques combines these two levels and argues that “all human thinking, 
and therefore all human work, is a continual interplay between non-verbal mental 
processes and the knowledge which we use to direct and focus those processes” 
(Jaques, 1996:20). This leads Jaques to conclude that since human decision making 
contains both knowledge and non-verbalised ideas, the key difference between 
decision making and mechanical calculation is that persons cannot, beforehand or 
afterwards, state all the reasons why they made a particular decision.
Having proposed a definition of work which refers to mental processing of information 
as a defining characteristic, Jaques goes on to argue that one can analyse the 
differences in the work done at different levels of an organisation through a 
combination of three elements: (i) the method of mental processing used at a 
particular stratum, (ii) the complexity of the information needing to be processed at 
that stratum, and (iii) the complexity of the particular tasks pursued. Jaques also 
proposes that the maximum time within which tasks need to be completed can be 
used as a universal measure for task and role complexity. Analogously, the 
maximum time span that individuals feel comfortable working with reflects their 
mental processing capacity. Before using Stratified Systems Theory to analyse the 
DDBRA, I first outline the three components of complexity proposed by Jaques.
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5.1.1.1 Mental Processing Methods
From studying the way people argue about decisions they care about, Jaques and 
Cason have inferred four distinct methods of mental processing (Jaques, 1996:22):
Declarative Processing: positions are argued by bringing forward a number of 
separate reasons individually, without making connections between them. This 
method of processing has a “disjunctive, declarative quality
Cumulative Processing: positions are argued by bringing together a number of 
different ideas, which only make the case when combined. This method of 
processing has a 1 pulled-together, conjunctive quality.”
Senal Processing: positions are argued for by bringing together a number of different 
ideas and linking them in a logical sequence, so that each reason in the series sets 
the condition that leads to the next reason.
Parallel Processing: positions are argued for by examining a number of different 
options, each arrived at by means of serial processing, and useful points from one 
position are taken from one less favoured to bolster another more favoured position.
5.1.1.2 Information Complexity
Jaques has identified five levels of information complexity. The information at each 
level may be processed by the four types of mental processing outlined above. The 
importance of information complexity lies, according to Jaques, in the fact that people 
vary in their data processing capability. Those in higher managerial roles are able to 
handle more data and turn them into information more than those in lower positions.
Jaques argues that there are five ways in which people transform data into 
information. These correspond to the following five levels of information complexity:
Pre-Verbal: concrete information expressed in pre-verbal infancy in the form of 
gestures and physical contact with objects.
Concrete Verbal: Thoughts and language as observed in children where thoughts 
and words are connected ostensively to the things thought about or referred to.
Symbolic Verbal: Thoughts and words no longer have to refer to tangible entities, but 
instead are used as symbols which can be construed and worked with as though 
they themselves were the things. This is the world of most of the workforce, from 
shop floor to middle management (Levels l-IV in Table 5-2).
Conceptual Abstract Thoughts and words are abstract in the sense that they refer to 
other thoughts and words, rather than to things. According to Jaques, while such
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conceptual abstract thoughts and words pull ideas together, they do not help in 
problem solving unless they “reach through their symbol word content to real things”. 
This is the world of Senior Management in large organisations (Levels V-VIII in Table
5-2).
Universals: This level of abstraction is universal in the sense that users reformulate 
all current thoughts and language (this is the world of genius).
5 . 1.1.3 Role complexity and the “ Time span of a role ”
The third element in Jaques’ (1996) framework for the analysis of work at different 
managerial hierarchy levels, after mental processing capacity and information 
complexity, is the most readily measurable. In essence, he argues that complexity of 
the managerial roles in an organisation increases in discontinuous steps as one 
moves up the hierarchy.
According to Jaques, even if the staff of an organisation are pursuing the same 
objectives (such as the development of a sustainable fishery management system), 
the role complexity faced by managers pursuing these objectives depends on the 
number of variables they have to deal with, how clearly these variables can be 
identified, and the rate at which the variables change (i.e. the complexity of work). As 
one moves up the managerial hierarchy, managers are concerned with a greater part 
of the whole system and need to deal with more variables, which are more 
ambiguous, and which change more quickly. This is why Jaques maintains that “the 
complexity of a problem does not lie in the complexity of the goal, but in the 
complexity of the pathway that has to be constructed and then traversed in order to 
get to the goal”41 (Jaqtles, 1996).
One of Jaques’ best known achievements relates to his early empirical work in which 
he analysed the maximum target-completion times of tasks at different managerial 
levels. Jaques found that there is a strong correlation between the longest time that 
managers have been allotted to complete various tasks (the “time span of the role”), 
the hierarchical level that these managers are working in, their mental processing 
capacity, and the information complexity that they handle (see Phillips, unpublished). 
This means that the maximum complexity of a task that will be found in a particular 
role (which is a combination of the mental processing capacity and information 
complexity) may be determined by the time-span of the role. The reverse is also true.
41 Jaques illustrates this point with the analogy between getting the first wagon train to California from 
St. Luis and flying a plane to California. The first was, he claims, much more complex.
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(This relationship is summarised in Table 5-1). This conclusion also means that 
“there is one particular category of complexity specific to each organisational 
stratum” (Jaques, 1996:64, emphasis in original).
Table 5-1 Time span and maximum complexity of task




VII 20+ years Serial Conceptual Abstract
VI 1 0 - 2 0  years Cumulative Conceptual Abstract
V 5 - 1 0  years Declarative Conceptual Abstract
IV 2 - 5  years Parallel Symbolic Verbal
III 1 - 2  years Serial Symbolic Verbal
II 3 months -1  year Cumulative Symbolic Verbal
I 1 day - 3 months Declarative Symbolic Verbal
Source: Jaques (1996)
It should be noted however, that there may be differences between the way that 
official organisational charts and the way that employees actually assume that the 
organisation works, the system as it actually functions, and what the organisation 
structure ought to look like (Jaques, 1996:33-42). Figure 5-1 illustrates an example of 
an official chart (called the “Manifest Chart”) in which there are too many hierarchical 
levels. Such a situation can occur, for example, when there is no differentiation 
between the pay grade system (whose purpose is to establish pay and status bands, 
and which is supposed to allow for merit recognition), and the accountability and 
reporting system. In the absence of a system of managerial strata the grading system 
often becomes the managerial system as well. However, people won’t really respect 
such an over-hierarchization, and they will tend to circumvent the imposed reporting 
system and instead report to the managers one stratum above them (this is the 
“Extant System” in Figure 5-1). The problem is that the roles are not well specified, 
communication is discouraged, and as a result, work in the organisation suffers. If the 
organisation were to be organised in the “Requisite” manner (see Figure 5-1 again), 
then the working environment would be much improved and made more productive.
162




(How it actually works)
21M Requisite











By combining problem complexity, task complexity, information complexity, mental 
processing capacity, and time span, it is now possible to summarise Jaques’ 
Stratified Systems Theory, which underlies the “Requisite Organisation”, and which 
provides precise hypotheses about the nature of work in different strata of an 
organisation. I have summarized these relationships and provided examples of the 
corresponding positions within the DDBRA in Table 5-2.
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Table 5-2 Features of Stratified Systems Theory and Requisite Organisation
Stratum Operational Level - Position 








Task Complexity Time Focus for 
Planning
VII Corporation - CEO 20+ years Serial Conceptual
Abstract
Strategic Options: alternative routs to 




VI Corporate group - Executive
vice-president






Whole wide world data accumulation 
& diagnosis
12 Year Concept 
Programme
V Subsidiary - Managing Director 
DDRBA: MrTarhon, Governor
5 - 1 0  years Declarative Conceptual
Abstract
Practical judgement of immediate & 
downstream consequences of 
changes anywhere in the system
7 Year Critical 
Tasks
IV Division - General Manager 
DDBRA: Mr Baboianu, 
Executive Director
2 - 5 years Parallel Symbolic Verbal Parallel Processing & Trading Off 3 Years Projects
III Unit - Department manager 
DDBRA: Mr Constantin, 
Manager Licensing and 
Regulation Section
1 - 2 years Serial Symbolic Verbal Construct alternative routes to goals 18 Months 
Developments
II Section - First-line supervisor 
DDBRA: Mr Eduard Ene - 
Resource Evaluation Section
3 months -1  
year
Cumulative Symbolic Verbal Data accumulation & diagnosis 6 Months 
improvement
I Shop floor - Clerical worker 
DDBRA: Laboratory assistants
1 day - 3 
months
Declarative Symbolic Verbal Direct Judgement Daily to Weekly 
Outputs
Source: adapted from Jaques (1996)
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5.1.2 Applying Stratified Systems Theory to the DDBRA
There are two ways in which I propose to apply Stratified Systems Theory (SST) in 
the analysis of the management problems in the DDBR: first, as a theory that 
provides one possible interpretation of the management planning difficulties 
observed as a function of the types of work relationships.
The second way in which I apply SST to the DDBRA is to differentiate, in a way that 
goes beyond the fact that there were multiple objectives and uncertainty, between 
the different types of judgements that DDBRA managers needed to make. This is 
useful as it provides a possible explanation for the unexplained differences observed 
at different levels management that Keeney (1994) reported..
5.1.2.1 Analysis of DDBRA organisational chart
Figure 5-2 shows the organisational chart of the DDBRA before the EBRD Technical 
Assistance project started. It shows that the DDBRA was supposed to have 225 
employees, of which 110 were in the Guards and Inspection Department. In 1993, 
approximately 100 of these posts were not filled, including 35-40 posts of technically 
qualified people such as biologists, chemists, foresters, and a lawyer. There were 
three main reasons for this shortfall. First, the Governor had been unwilling to recruit 
the whole staff complement because the DDBRA law had not yet been approved. 
Secondly, there was no office accommodation for them (in fact even the existing 
head-office staff was distributed across two office buildings in Tulcea). It was difficult 
to attract senior people to come to live in Tulcea, not least because of the difficulty of 
finding reasonably priced accommodation (EBRD, Euroconsult, and IUCN, 1993).
In addition to the lack of important personnel and the fact that the existing personnel 
were not housed together, the main difficulties in the operation of the DDBRA, were 
associated with a rigid bureaucratic management system in which “decisions were 
passed on to ever higher levels of management” (EBRD, Euroconsult, and IUCN, 
1993:26). To overcome these impediments a re-organisation was proposed by the 
EBRD project in which additional departments were created with usually fewer staff 
in each, so as to create “more efficient units that can work as teams” (EBRD, 
Euroconsult, and IUCN, 1993:26).
The organisational structure that was eventually adopted is shown in the chart in 
Figure 5-3. The overall trend was to decrease the number of staff working at the 
head office and to increase the field presence. The rationale for the latter was to 
change the operations of the Corps of Guards from primarily policing functions to
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facilitation, interaction with local communities and visitors, and carrying out of basic 
survey and data collection.
Figure 5-2 Original organisational structure of the DDBRA, before 1993
Stratum
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EBRD, Euroconsult, and IUCN (1993:27)
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Figure 5-3 Organisational structure adopted, end of 1993
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Source: Goriup and DDBRA (1994)
By using Stratified Systems Theory, the analysis in EBRD, Euroconsult, and IUCN 
(1993), and my own observations, we can ascertain the following:
Within the original organisational structure (as it was before 1993), Figure 5-2, the 
Governor was working with four departments: the “Technical” Department (which was 
in fact responsible for all aspects of natural resource management, except for 
enforcement); the External Relations Department (where the absence of a director 
indicates that it was not considered at the same level as the other departments), the 
“Economic” department (which was largely concerned with DDBRA administrative 
matters such as accounting, inventory, etc.), and the Guards and Inspection 
Department.
The organisational changes first proposed by the EBRD project consultants in the 
draft report (EBRD, Euroconsult, and IUCN, 1993) were put forward for discussion at 
the Inception Conference of the project in May of 1993. Nine departments were 
proposed. Along with smaller, more flexible departments, it was proposed to raise the 
position of the Director of the Planning, Policy, and Investments Department to that of 
Deputy Governor (above the positions of the other Departmental Directors). Later in
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the year, after the DDBRA law was passed, the organisational structure illustrated in 
Figure 5-3 was eventually agreed to (though the staffing numbers were frequently 
changing).
Overall there were five managerial strata, as indicated in Figure 5-2 and Table 5-3, 
and the DDBRA was not requisitely organized because there were significant 
differences between the official organisational structure (Figure 5-3) and the way the 
DDBRA actually operated. One piece of evidence is that the actual structure could 
not really function because there were important departments, such as Planning and 
Strategy, where all positions (except for the Executive Director who was supposed to 
head it) were vacant.
5.1.2.2 Role relationships and work complexity at the five strata o f the DDBRA
Following Phillips (1992:6) we can expect that managers at the different levels have 
different ideas about what constitutes strategy because they have different time 
horizons. According to Jaques (1996), the perception of a manager about what he or 
she considers the relevant time frame for planning can be used as an indication 
about the manager's mental processing capacity and whether or not he is employed 
at the appropriate stratum. Without the concepts of time-span and individual capacity, 
it would be difficult to explain why commonly observed disagreements about plans 
and strategies arise. Phillips (unpublished:7) argues that the various strata of 
managers emphasize either the use of data or judgement in decision making more. I 
will now summarize the relationship between role relationships and task complexity 
at each of the seven strata that SST claims exist. Stratum III, IV, and V are of 
particular relevance in DDBRA because as I report in Chapter 8, the Decision 
Conference that I organized and the workshops that led up to it involved these levels 
(Table 5-3 below relates staff of the DDBRA to the different managerial strata).
Stratum I (Direct Action Tasks): This refers to first-line manual or clerical work. The 
time-span of these roles is between 1 day and 3 months. “At Stratum I an individual 
proceeds along a prescribed linear pathway to a goal, getting continual feedback in 
order to proceed, and using previously learned methods for overcoming immediate 
obstacles as they are encountered, or else reporting back” (Jaques, 1996).
Tasks of this kind can be accomplished with the symbolic verbal order of information 
complexity and using declarative mental processing. Uncertainty is reduced by trying 
out different ways of accomplishing the task, a ‘touch-and-feel’ approach that relies 
heavily on judgement (Phillips, unpublished:4).
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Stratum II (Diagnostic Accumulative Tasks): Refers to first-line managerial work, and 
what is usually described as specialist work done by graduates (engineers, scientists, 
therapists, etc.). The time-span of these roles is between 3 months and 1 year. “At 
Stratum II an individual not only overcomes immediate obstacles by direct action as 
they are encountered but must also be able to reflect on what is occurring so as to 
note things that might indicate potential problems and obstacles; and they must 
accumulate, (verbalise) and consciously sort such data to diagnose emerging 
problems, and initiate actions to prevent or overcome the problems identified.” 
Phillips (1992) argues that this means that at Stratum I, uncertainty is dealt with 
through predictions. Tasks of this kind can be accomplished with the symbolic verbal 
order of information complexity and cumulative mental processing.
Stratum III (Alternative Serial Paths): This refers to managers of units small enough 
for all of its members to be able to recognise one another; “senior” or “chief 
engineers, scientists, etc., or many lawyers and doctors. The time-span of these 
roles is 1 year to 2 years. Since this stratum is of particular significance in my work in 
the DDBRA, I quote at length two descriptions of what work at this stratum means:
“In order to get on with work, including both overcoming obstacles 
and diagnostic accumulation, the person must first consider the 
situation and work out alternative pathways or routes by which the 
problem might be resolved. In particular, he/she must find a path 
that stands a chance of coping with short-run requirements (say a 
week or a few months), while at the same time providing the initial 
stages of a realistic path towards longer-term goals that could be a 
year or more ahead. The person must be able to change to 
alternative paths if the initial choice of paths turns out 
unsatisfactory.”
In short, “at Stratum III, you must not only use direct judgement plus 
diagnostic accumulation, but must also be able to encompass the 
whole process within a plan that has a pathway to goal completion 
that you have worked out in the first place - and have pre-planned 
alternative paths to change to if need be” (Jaques, 1996)
Phillips (1992) argues that this means that Stratum III managers need to employ
forecasting systems that are either based on experience and judgement of trends, or
on statistical forecasting systems. Since the time-span is no longer than two years,
the forecasting would work quite well if the environment in which they operate was
not very complex. However, in the case of DDBRA, which operates in an unusual
context of rapid social, organizational, economic, an<| natural change, the reliability of
such a forecasting system would not be very high.
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Table 5-3 Selected Staff Profile
DDBRA Department Job Title Stratum
Planning, Policy & Investment Director /  Deputy Governor (1) I I I / IV
Personal Assistant (1) II
Administration Liaison Officer (1) II
Financial Analyst (1) II
Business Liaison Officer (1) II
Communications/Audit Officer (1) II
Clerical Support Staff (4) I
Natural Resource Assessment and Director (1) III
Monitoring Personal Assistant (1) I / I I
Clerical Support Staff (3) I
Monitoring Section Section Head (1) I I / I I I
Scientific Staff (5) II
Technical Support Staff (5) I
Research Co-ordination Section Section Head (= Director) III
Contract Manager (1) II
Environmental Manager (1) II
Legal and Regulatory Director (1) III
Legal Secretary (1) I / I I
Licensing Director (1) III
Technical Assistant (1) II
Licensing Clerks (6) I
Source: building on EBRD, Euroconsult, and IUCN (1993:30-31)
Stratum IV  (Parallel Processing Tasks): This refers to Product
Development/Sales/Production General Managers or to project managers, 
researchers, analysts. At this Stratum one moves from direct management to general 
management. The time-span of this role is 2 to 5 years. Such managers construct a 
number of serial pathways (and alternatives) that all run at the same time and are 
interconnected in some way. Stratum IV managers can either pursue a number of 
sub-projects simultaneously and connect them themselves, or manage a number of 
subordinates, and work at keeping them synchronised, resourced, on schedule, as 
well as guiding any or all of them into alternative paths when necessary. In short, “at 
Stratum IV you have to parallel process several interacting projects, pacing them in 
relation to one another in resourcing and in time. You must make trade-offs between 
tasks in order to maintain progress along the composite route to the goal.”
According to Phillips (unpublished:4), the 2 - 5 year time-span is too long for 
forecasts to be relied upon, even if the operating environment is quite stable. That is 
why uncertainty is dealt with through the construction of portfolios of departments 
and systems that balance out unexpected failures or delays. Models might be 
constructed in order to predict where the organization might go in the near future, but 
overall decision making at this stratum relies more on judgement than on data 
(Phillips, unpublished:5).
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Stratum V (Unified Direct Action): This refers to the management level where “human 
beings construct unified whole systems” and the time span of this role is between 5 
and 10 years. By “unified” and “whole” system, Jaques refers to the Systems Theory 
definition of “intact and complete in itself and operating in an unbound environment”. 
Full-scale business units are located at this level. It is similar to Stratum I in the 
sense that one needs to take direct action to problems as one encounters them, and 
it involves declarative mental processing. However, the big difference compared to 
Stratum I is that information of conceptually abstract complexity needs to be 
processed. Stratum V managers must be able to:
• “judge the likely impact of changes or events (from both inside and outside 
the business unit system), on any and all parts of the system;
• pick out those parts where the impact is likely to be important;
• trace the likely 2nd and 3rd order consequences of these impacts;
• and sustain an active anticipation of what changes are likely to unfold.” 
Phillips (unpublished) argues that managers at this level use scenarios and exercise 
their own judgement in creating those scenarios in order to develop strategies that 
are robust enough for unanticipated events.
Stratum VI (Cumulative Processing/Conceptual Abstract): This refers to managers 
who manage at one level higher than the single unified system. Complexity thereby 
increases to another level and the time span of this role is between 10 and 20 years. 
Like Stratum II, accumulation and screening the relevance of data is important, but 
here the data are conceptual abstract in complexity (e.g. political, economic, social, 
technological, intellectual) and needs to provide insight about the workings of the 
wider environment in which the business units operate so as to be able to feed it 
back to the corporation and business units.
Stratum VII (Serial Strategic Options): This refers to the executive leadership of large 
corporations. Their work relates to judging the needs of society, nationally and 
internationally. The time-span of this role is more than 20 years. Like Stratum III 
paths and alternatives must be constructed (serial mental processing), but here they 
are conceptually abstract, and are at the scale of whole business units (develop new 
ones, develop some, divest in others, joint ventures, mergers). “Strategic option 
pathways must be constructed as a series of conceptual abstract intangible sets, 
since even the near-term choice points have to be construed in terms of their long­
term intangible context, and all of the sets making up the pathway have to be 
analysed in relation to one another.”
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5.1.3 Stratified Systems Theory applied to Team Work and Planning
According to Stratified Systems Theory, one of the key conditions for effective 
managerial work is the existence of a requisite structuring of organisational layering 
into strata. Furthermore, the level of individual capability in a stratum must match the 
corresponding role complexity. Thus, the mental processing method of the manager 
must be one category above that of the immediate subordinates, all of whom are in 
roles at the next lower stratum. Jaques defines a manager within an organisation that 
employs people as a person who “is held accountable for the outputs of others, for 
sustaining a team capable of producing those outputs, and for giving effective 
leadership to that team” (Jaques, 1996:35).
Two (of ten) leadership practices that Jaques describes for effective leader- follower 
relationships between managers and subordinates are particularly relevant in the 
context of this thesis: managerial team working and planning.
Jaques (1996:100) submits that there are three types of content for a meeting 
between managers and subordinates: current information exchange, discussion out 
of which the manager will take a decision; and exploration of a difficult problem, 
without a decision being made. Jaques also argues that although the manager and 
the subordinates may be working as a team, this does not imply that the group 
makes decisions. The making of decisions (as well as context provision, direction 
setting, priority indications) is the clear accountability of the manager. Therefore, 
informed decisions are taken by managers in the light of the knowledge, expertise 
and perspectives of the subordinates.
With regard to planning, (which he defines as “a judgement about the best way to go 
about achieving an intended goal” (Jaques, 1996:102)), Jaques extends his analysis 
of work at the different organisational strata (1996:102-104). Iterative discussion 
between different management strata in the planning process is essential because in 
that way plans are integrated at different levels, and it provides managers with the 
information necessary to develop plans. However, while subordinates (and other 
support services with in the organisation) assist managers, they do not decide the 
plans (“not even to decide the options for the managers to choose from”). The reason 
is that “no subordinate can have the necessary capability and time-horizon to think 
out plans at the manager’s level of complexity” (Jaques, 1996:103). If subordinates 
did decide on the plans, it would result in truncated planning proposals and because 
subordinates use shorter time horizon than their managers, opportunities which exist 
in the longer term would not be considered.
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5.2 Competing Values Approach and Stratified Systems Theory
In a paper which focuses on an analysis of the match between a decision-support 
consultants choice of method (or mix of methods), consulting style, and the 
organisational setting of the client, Rohrbaugh and Eden, (1990) argue that “the 
dominant values that receive expression in each stratum (of Stratified Systems 
Theory) can be linked directly to alternative models of organisational analysis 
described by Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983).” (see Figure 5-5). They also argue that 
the appropriateness of the consultant’s method(s) and style, “must be consistent with 
the predominant concerns of the organisational stratum involved” (Rohrbaugh and 
Eden, 1990:45).
The Competing Values Approach (CVA) framework (see Figure 5-4) proposes four 
“middle range models of organisational analysis” (Rohrbaugh and Eden, 1990:40): 
(a) a model of internal processes that focuses on “information management and co­
ordination as the means by which stability and equilibrium can be developed as 
organisational outcomes of primary interest”; (b) a model of rational goals that 
focuses on “planning and objective setting as a means by which productivity and 
efficiency can be improved as models of primary interest”; (c) a model of open 
systems that focuses on “flexibility and readiness as the means by which source 
acquisition and growth can be increased as organisational outcomes of primary 
interest”; and (d) a model of human relations that focuses on “cohesion and morale 
as the means by which the value of human resources can be made greater as an 
organisational outcome of primary interest.”
In the CVA framework the above mentioned models of organisational analysis are 
related to:
“the four functional prerequisites of any system of action” as identified by Parsons, 
(1959): (a) the integrative function; (b) the goal attainment function; (c) the adaptive 
function; and (d) the pattern maintenance and tension management function.
The two general models of organisational analysis identified by Gouldner (1959) are: 
(a) the “rational model” with an emphasis on formal, planned behaviour, and (b) the 
“natural system model” with an emphasis on flexible, spontaneous behaviour. In the 
CVA framework these two models are combinations of the open systems and human 
relations models which reflect “instrumental concerns” (i.e., differentiation of 
organisational parts), while the combination of the internal process model and the 
rational goal model reflect “consummatory concerns” (i.e., integration of parts).
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Figure 5-4: The Competing Values Approach (CVA) framework
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Source: Rohrbaugh and Eden (1990)
The conclusion that Rohrbaugh and Eden (1990:45) propose as a result of the 
juxtaposition of SST and CVA (see Figure 5-5), is relevant in this review of 
organisational theory, planning, and work of this chapter. “Stratum V and VI clients 
will not be well served by consultancy practice that views better co-ordination and 
information management as a primary solution principle. Similarly, stratum II and III 
clients would be expected to reject consultancy practice that emphasises maintaining 
flexibility and continuing adaptations.”
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bureaucratic model fits the DDBRA best, and I conclude with a summary of 
Mintzberg's hypotheses of the strategy development and adaptation process in 
bureaucracies.
5.3.1 Organisational configurations
In Mintzberg’s model (1989) (illustrated in Figure 5-6), any large organisation is made 
up of six parts: the operating core (generating products and services), a strategic 
apex (at least one manager who oversees the whole system), a middle line (which is 
the hierarchy of authority between the operating core and the strategic apex), 
technostructure (analysts, external to the hierarchy of line authority), support staff 
(providers of internal services), and ideology (or culture, which encompasses 
traditions and beliefs that distinguish it from other organisations). An organisation 
thereby has a number of employees who form an “internal coalition” (which 
determines the distribution of power), but there is also an “external coalition” that 
exerts influence on decisions and actions of the organisation from outside. This 
external coalition is made up of groups such as owners, unions, suppliers, clients, 
partners, competitors, and “all kind of publics, in the form of governments, social 
interest groups, and so forth.” The external coalition can be passive, dominated by 
one active influencer, or divided.
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Mintzberg (1989:110-115) argues that the many attributes of an organisation in 
practice combine to form only seven basic types of organisations depending on 
which one of the six basic parts of the organizations exerts the dominant influence 
(Mintzberg (1989) also argues that in reality organisations may also be combinations 
of these types, or be in transition from one configuration to another - see Figure 5-7):
1. If the strategic apex exerts the dominant pull to lead, retain control over decision 
making, and co-ordination is achieved through direct supervision, then the 
configuration is called the entrepreneurial organisation.
2. If the technostructure exerts the dominant pull towards rationalisation, 
standardisation of work processes, and there is limited horizontal
177
decentralisation,42 then the configuration is called the machine organisation. This 
the configuration that best describes the DDBRA.
3. If middle managers exert the dominant pull towards balkanisation of the structure 
in search for autonomy, then the configuration is called the diversified 
organisation.
4. If members of the operating core exert the dominant pull towards professionalism 
in order to minimise the influence that others (colleagues and administrators) can 
have on their work, then the professional configuration is created.
5. If support staff exert the dominant pull towards collaboration order to involve 
themselves in the central activity of the organisation, or when the distinction 
between line managers, analysts, support staff, or operators becomes blurred, 
then the innovative configuration is created.
6. Once ideology goes beyond “pulling the members of an organisation together” 
and dominates other considerations, and the standardisation of norms becomes 
the primary co-ordinating mechanism, then the missionary configuration is said to 
emerge.
7. When no one part of the organisation, or no one mechanism of co-ordination 
dominates, then the forces of conflict are always in danger of pulling members 
apart. Mintzberg calls this the political configuration.
42 Horizontal decentralization is the “extent to which formal or informal power is dispersed out of the line 
hierarchy to non-managers (operators, analysts, and support staffers)" (Mintzberg, 1989:105.
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Table 5-4 Mintzberg’s Typology of Organizations
Configuration Prime Co-ordinating 
Mechanism















































5.3.2 Conditions of the bureaucratic or machine organisation
The essential attributes of the “machine” organisation, according to Mintzberg 
(1989:133), are highly specialised and routine operating tasks, very formalised 
communication throughout the organisation; large-size operating units; reliance on
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the functional basis for grouping tasks; relatively centralised power for decision 
making; and an elaborate administrative structure with a sharp distinction between 
line and staff. A number of reasons for the emergence of bureaucratic organisations 
have been mentioned above, but an additional factor, particularly important in the 
Danube Delta, is the presence of strong external control. Even if the environment is 
not stable, or does not favour standardisation of work, a bureaucratic or machine 
organisation may emerge because “they must be accountable to the public for their 
actions. Everything they do ... must be seen as fair, and so they proliferate 
regulations” (Mintzberg, 1989:138).
Middle managers in the "machine" organization have three functions according to 
Mintzberg (19:
(i) to resolve problems and conflicts that arise due to lack of informal 
communication in operations (or transfer them further up the hierarchy to a 
level where common supervision is able to deal with them by authority);
(ii) to work with staff analysts (the technostructure) to incorporate set standards 
into the operating units;
(iii) to support vertical information and feedback flow in the organisation. Even 
though staff of the technostructure do not have formal authority, their power to 
influence the work of operators emanates from the setting of standards (i.e. 
the rules and regulations which make the high degree of specialisation 
possible).
The principle of division of labour, and with it specialisation and formal role 
differentiations that inhibit collaboration require very strong control and co-ordination 
capabilities throughout the organisation.
“All this suggests that the machine organisation is a structure with 
an obsession - namely control .... The obsession with control 
reflects two central facts about these organisations. First, attempts 
are made to eliminate all possible uncertainty, so that the 
bureaucratic machine can run smoothly, without interruption, the 
operating core perfectly sealed off from external influence.
Secondly, these structures are ridden with conflict; the control 
systems are required to contain it” (Mintzberg, 1989:135-136).
The necessity to contain conflicts and to deal with disturbances within an
organisation where even mid-line managers are specialists means that the top
managers are usually the only generalists in the organisations. Furthermore, the “the
strategic apex of these organisations are concerned in large part with the fine-tuning
of their bureaucratic machine ..... and considerable power in the machine
organisation rests with the managers of the strategic apex.” (Mintzberg, 1989:136).
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The power of top management derives both formally from the chain of authority 
(which is strongly developed) but also informally, because it is only at the top that 
formally segmented knowledge of the organisation comes together.
The desire to work in simple environments, which are amenable to specialisation and 
repetition, means that bureaucratic organisations may act “aggressively to stabilise 
it.” (Mintzberg, 1989:138) The effect of this, in combination with the indispensable 
requirement of survival and the necessary efficiency, is that growth (instead of other 
primary tasks such as profit, or in the case of the DDBRA conservation and human 
welfare) of the organisation (i.e. the closed system that it represents) becomes the 
primary objective which makes power sharing (as in natural resource co­
management) very unattractive. If there a very strong outside influence (such as the 
Ministry of Forests, Water, and Environmental Protection in Bucharest, of which the 
DDBRA is a part) exists, then the whole organisation may become a ‘control 
instrument’ "...by appointing the chief executive, charging that person with the pursuit 
of clear goals (ideally quantifiable ...), and then holding the chief responsible for 
performance. That way outsiders can control an organisation without actually having 
to manage it” (Mintzberg, 1989:139).
5.3.3 Strategy and adaptation in the bureaucratic organisation
Understanding the dynamics that prevent adaptation by bureaucratic organisations is 
important in the context of this thesis because it may suggest leverage points as well 
as possible inherent limitations in the usefulness of Decision Analysis support. 
Mintzberg (1989:144-152) presents the following argument:
In theory, strategy in the bureaucratic organisation is supposed to be developed at 
the level of the organisation where the perspective is broadest, all information is 
integrated, and power most focused, namely the hierarchical top. Once developed, 
the strategies are then supposed to be refined by lower levels of the organisation and 
finally implemented. However, Mintzberg argues that strategies (as opposed to action 
plans) are best developed in a much less formal manner, and because strategy 
development relies on synthesis, while planning relies on analysis and 
decomposition, planning may actually impede strategic thinking.
There are at least four reasons why changes in strategy are very difficult in the 
bureaucratic organisation:
1) When the emphasis is placed on separate analyses by various function units who 
work on the principles of increased efficiency and perfection of narrowly defined
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tasks, questioning of operating assumptions, innovation, transformation, and 
synthesis are not promoted or encouraged (they may even be penalised).
2) Great efforts are required to produce a functioning bureaucracy where role, task, 
and control systems are put into place to produce specific outcomes. Continued 
refinement of the system over time results in uniqueness and integration that is 
so tight that when avoided changes eventually become inevitable the system 
disintegrates. “Thus does success eventually breed failure” (Mintzberg, 
1989:147).
3) Changes in the operating environment call for changes in strategy. However, as 
the different specialised operating sections are not able to solve their problems, 
these get “bumped up” the hierarchy, leading to overload at the top managerial 
level. To integrate, reconcile, and develop solutions, strategies, managers need 
appropriate information and intimate knowledge of the areas of business. 
However, the different functional groups “package and filter” information 
differently, stripping it in particular of qualitative aspects, and pass it up the 
hierarchy with delays. The managers therefore seek to develop alternative 
information channels but this raises the transaction costs still further.
4) As a result, those who are supposed to formulate strategy do not have full and 
sufficient information, while those who are supposed to implement, face an 
environment that is different from that predicted by those who formulated the 
strategy (either because strategy was ill-informed, or because the environment is 
changing).
To break out of this mould, the bureaucratic organisation must change its 
configuration during the time of fundamental strategy reformulation. Mintzberg (1989) 
suggests that short of demise, there are two possible temporary re-configurations: (i) 
entrepreneurial, when a single leader develops a vision and strategy, which he/she 
guides closely in implementation (this configuration favours quick turnaround 
changes); (ii) innovative configuration, where the lower levels of the organisation 
develop strategies which are integrated and championed by middle management 
(this configuration favours slower revitalisation of organisations).
Mintzberg (1989) concludes: “overall, the machine organisations seem to follow what 
Miller and Friesen (1984) call a "quantum theory” of organisation change. They 
pursue their set strategies through long periods of stability (naturally occurring or 
created by themselves as closed systems), using planning and other procedures to 
do so efficiently. Periodically these are interrupted by short bursts of change, which 
Miller and Friesen (1984) call “strategic revolutions”.
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5.4 Conclusions
According to Stratified Systems Theory one needs to differentiate between the 
complexity of the strategic objective pursued by the DDBRA with respect to fishery 
management (development of a management system that increases or maintains the 
resilience of the DDBR) and the role complexity of different managerial levels within 
the DDBRA. In other words, while the DDBRA is pursuing a joint strategic objective, 
the complexity of the tasks that the managers of the DDBRA need to deal with differs 
in accordance with the managerial stratum that they are working in. This is important 
because it enabled me to differentiate between the different types of judgments made 
by the different levels of managers. I could therefore determine what type of decision 
support was most appropriate for them.
The need to match the choice of decision support to the organizational setting of the 
client has been identified before. The work of Rohrbaugh and Eden (1990) is 
particularly relevant because they show that the Competing Value Approach (CVA) to 
organizational analysis matches (or can be combined with) SST. It showed that the 
main concern of the Executive Director (Stratum IV) is with planning, objective setting 
and the evaluation of alternatives which enhance the productivity and efficiency of 
the DDBRA so that it will attain its goals (strategic objectives). This is why Stratum IV 
will not be well served by consultancy practice that sees information management 
and co-ordination, or the maintenance of flexibility or organizational growth as the 
primary solution principles.
While my work with the DDBRA largely supports this hypothesis about different
managerial needs and their acceptance only of a narrow range of management
approaches that are consistent with the pulls dominant in their organisational
configuration, it also poses a serious challenge. If fishery management planning work
for the DDBR is focused on setting objectives and evaluating alternatives for the
achievement of these objectives, is it possible to increase the DDBRA’s capacity to
manage for increased resilience? Adaptive Evironmental Management and
Assessment (AEMA), New Institutional Economics (NIE), and Cultural theory (CT) all
argued that resilience requires flexibility and adaptation. I dealt with this in the DDBR
by: (i) focusing on development of an institutional framework that contains the
requisite variety of institutions (using New Institutional Economics and Cultural
Theory for very specific proposal for what requisite means and by specifying relevant
objectives and using adaptation as an objective - see Figure 7-7); (ii) ensuring that
the assessment contained a variety of viewpoints in order to guard against too
narrow a focus and institutional bias. For this part, AEMA, CT, and SST can be
employed as a framework for guiding the selection of different viewpoints in an effort
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to ensure that views are not excluded. The most novel thing about this suggestion is 
that it includes both variety from within as well as from outside the DDBRA.
While SST provided insights into differences in judgement and decision making tasks 
at the different levels of an organization, and outlined the effects of managerial role 
relationships that are not requisitely structured, Mintzberg’s framework is useful for 
analysing the effects on strategy making, planning, and management of different 
types of organizations. I have argued that within that framework, the DDBRA best fits 
the description of a “bureaucracy”. In order to control and co-ordinate the narrow 
specializations of the operating core, the administrative functions mirror the 
specializations.
The existence of a bureaucracy for the management of the Danube Delta, which I 
have shown to be a dynamic environment seems not to make sense at first because 
the latter does not favour standardization of work. However, there are two 
explanations for this: first, the DDBRA is part of the Ministry for Water, Forests, and 
Environmental Protection which is itself a bureaucracy. Secondly, since the DDBRA 
is an organization which has been imposed from the outside (as it has not developed 
out of an agreement between stakeholders to coordinate and inform their activities) 
its legitimacy rests primarily on the argument that it is in the interest of the local and 
international community. However, since there was no direct accountability 
mechanism between the DDBRA and the people it was supposed to serve, 
guidelines, standards, and regulations (such as carrying capacity, MSY, etc.) 
proliferated.
Two conditions of the bureaucracy are especially relevant within the context of this 
thesis. First, due to extensive specialization and formal role, collaboration between 
departments within the DDBRA and as well as between the DDBRA and other 
organizations on fishery management is very difficult. Secondly, the primary way of 
enabling specialized work to go on is by seeking to eliminate uncertainty (because 
otherwise the policies would need to be more contingent and flexible). The easiest 
way to prevent uncertainty from affecting the work of the technical staff of the 
DDBRA is to seal it off from external influences. That also means that only the top 
managers in the DDBRA (specifically, the Executive Director and the Governor) are 
generalists, and also that the one preoccupation that came to dominate the DDBRA 
was to increase its operating efficiency.
As a result:
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1) it is very difficult for the DDBRA to manage adaptively (because that would 
require it to be sensitive to emergent changes and patterns of development within 
the social, economic, and natural systems of the DDBR);
2) the DDBRA's preoccupation with efficiency also means that it does not favour 
power-sharing in some co-management arrangements, as suggested in Chapter 
4;
3) the development of management strategies that are sensitive or appropriate to 
the social, economic, and ecosystem conditions is very difficult because the top 
managers, through whom all the information in the bureaucracy is supposed to 
be synthesized, receive information that is filtered, packaged in different ways by 
the different functional groups, and delayed.
To break out of this vicious circle, Mintzberg suggested that the DDBRA would need 
to (temporarily) change its configuration during the time of fundamental strategy 
reformulation, such as the development of a fishery management strategy 
appropriate for the Biosphere Reserve. The two possible re-configurations are the 
entrepreneurial configuration, when a single leader develops a vision and strategy, 
which he or she guides closely in implementation, or the innovative configuration, 
where the lower levels of the organization develop strategies which are integrated 
and championed by the middle management.
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Chapter 6 The Use of Decision Conferencing for Strategic 
Management Support
6.1 introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the use of Decision Conferencing in support 
of strategic management. Since Decision Conferencing is a Multiple Criteria Decision 
Analysis approach, and therefore shares many methodological similarities with the 
Multiple Stakeholder Approach that I have discussed in Chapter 3, I concentrate on 
the one aspect that I argue is most important within the context of this thesis: the 
rationale for and method of incorporating or addressing the institutional setting within 
which problem solving takes place.
Like other decision analysis approaches, Decision Conferencing uses coherence of 
preferences as the definition of rationality and more specifically, the Expected Utility 
Theorem as the prescriptive method for integrating value and probability judgements. 
The use of decision theory and the prescriptive use of Expected Utility Theorem are 
conditional in the sense that the decision maker desires his preferences to conform 
to the five axioms specified in Chapter 3. Like the other decision analysis approaches 
DC also assumes that breaking a decision problem down into a value and probability 
part aids decision makers to gain insights into the problem and facilitates a 
systematic manipulation of decision problem components.
6.2 Overview of Decision Conferencing
Decision Conferencing (DC) is a Group Decision Support System (GDSS) invented in 
the late 1970s by Cameron Peterson at Decisions and Designs Inc., USA, which in 
its current form draws on experience and research from information technology, 
decision analysis, group processes and behavioural studies of actual decision 
making (Phillips, 1988:213). "The goals of decision conferencing are to develop 
among the participants a shared understanding of the issues, to create a sense of 
common purpose, and to gain commitment to action" (Phillips, 1988).
Decision Conferences are intensive two or three day sessions in which a group of 
people work, with the assistance of at least one facilitator and a decision analyst, in a 
structured way at modelling participants' judgements by talking to each other and by 
using a computer to analyse the implications of their modelled judgements so as to 
gain insight into the problem faced and be able to decide on how to proceed. The
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work takes place in a carefully selected location away from the clients' organisational 
environment.
Phillips (1988:214) describes the stages of a typical Decision Conference thus:
Stage 1: before the Decision Conference begins, the facilitator meets with the client 
to establish the nature of the problem and to determine whether a Decision 
Conference is appropriate. If it appears that a Decision Conference is suitable for the 
problem, then the facilitator assists the client to set objectives for the decision 
conference, identify “key players”, determine what preparation is required of the 
participants, and agree on the main points that should be included in the invitation 
letter to the participations.
Stage 2: The Decision Conference is started with a brief introduction of the purpose 
and the desired outputs by the manager to whom the facilitator reports, and this is 
followed by a brief presentation by facilitator in which he sets out the process and the 
methods that will be employed in the Decision Conference. The participants are then 
asked to discuss the issues and concerns that are the subject of the Conference. 
While the participants attempt to formulate the nature of the issues, for example 
development of a strategy, evaluation of a few alternatives against many objectives, 
project or budget prioritisation where there are usually few major objectives but many 
alternatives, etc), the facilitator needs to decide whether exploration in depth of a few 
issues or a less thorough discussion of a wide range of issues will best help the work 
of the group.
Stage 3: The facilitator chooses a generic structural form to represent the issues, and 
the group members begin to provide the content that is used in constructing the 
model. As the model develops, the facilitator draws it out on a whiteboard or on a flip 
chart in the room, while the analyst inputs the model to the computer. Both data and 
subjective judgements are added to the model and the computer output is projected 
onto a screen so that all participants can see the results.
Stage 4: “These initial results are rarely accepted by the group. Modifications are 
suggested by participants, and different judgements are tested. Many sensitivity 
analyses are carried out; gradually, intuitions change and sharpen as the model goes 
through successive stages" (Phillips, 1988).
Stage 5: Once the this process of revision and elaboration stabilises, the model has 
served its purpose, and the group concentrates on summarising the key issues and 
conclusions. The Decision Conference ends with the development of an action plan 
so that when participants return to work, they can begin to implement the solutions.
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According to Phillips (1986:193-194) there are four “basic rules” for Decision 
Conferences:
First, in order to ensure that the groups solves the right problem and does not leave 
out important objectives, the decision maker (i.e. the person who is accountable for 
the decision must be present. Secondly, all the major problem owners must be 
present in order to ensure that all legitimate viewpoints on the problem are 
represented, as well as to moderate the influence of dominant people. A third rule in 
Decision Conferences is that no papers or printed materials are used on the first day, 
because Phillips argues that prepared materials often hide the real problem. The 
fourth, and final basic rule, is that the problem addressed must be a live one because 
hindsight biases are so sever that it is not possible to do a retrospective analysis as if 
it were current, and judgement about hypothetical problems will be ill-informed.
6.2.1 Relevance of Decision Conferencing to DDBR
Since the late 1970s Decision Conferencing has been applied to a wide variety of 
problems, ranging from strategy development to option evaluation, investment 
portfolio prioritisation, and impact estimation of highly uncertain events. These 
applications occurred in many different areas of business, as well as military, 
medical, and charity fields and some public policy problems. Environment 
management applications have been quite rare - the only three I have been able to 
discover use versions of Decision Conferencing that are so different from the more 
standard Decision Conferences described by Phillips which use the Expected Utility 
model as their modelling basis (for example in Phillips (1984b), Phillips and Phillips 
(1993), and Phillips (unpublished-a)) that I will not discuss them here in depth. 
Hamalainen and Leikola (1995, and forthcoming) report on work they have done with 
Finnish parliamentarians on energy policy in sessions that lasted only a few hours 
(as opposed to the usual duration of days) while Vari and Rohrbaugh (1996) report 
on work in Hungary on the development of a long-term national environmental 
agenda.
The main features of the Decision Conferencing that suggest that the approach is of 
great relevance in the case of the DDBRA’s management planning are the following:
1. While decision analytic work with individuals is not excluded, a central aspect of 
Decision Conferencing is that analysis is done in a workshop format where group 
interaction is promoted and facilitated using well-developed theories of group 
processes. (Phillips and Phillips, 1993) The techniques and procedures that the 
facilitator uses a number of techniques and procedures drawn from social
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analysis (Rowbottom and Billis, 1978), group feedback analysis (Heller, 1969), 
group process work (Gustafson etal., 1973; Rice, 1965, 1969), and soft systems 
analysis (Checkland, 1981), as well as the Strategic Choice Approach (Friend 
and Hickling, 1987).
2. Analysis work usually consists of two or three intense days using on-the-spot 
modelling assisted by information technology (usually at least a computer) 
directly with the decision makers or problem owners rather than much longer 
periods ranging from weeks to months of analysis by the decision analyst for 
decision maker as usual in the MSDA approach. This does not preclude 
preparatory or follow-up work with individual decision makers, experts, or 
stakeholders, nor the use of a series of decision conference workshops.
3. The expected results of the DC include coherent preference judgements, 
individual insights to decision problem, improved alternatives, an increased 
commitment for action and enhanced communication between those who 
participate, like the MSDA approach, but the creation of “shared social reality” 
(Phillips, 1984) as a pivotal outcome is unique to DC.
4. It may be possible to consider a cross-functional, inter-departmental, and inter- 
organisational decision conference workshop to be a temporary reconfiguration of 
the DDBRA bureaucracy into an “innovative configuration” as suggested by 
Mintzberg (1989) and argued in Chapter 5, because lower level managers of the 
DDBRA would be encouraged to assist in the development of strategies which 
are then integrated and championed by the middle or higher management.
5. Decision analysts in decision conferences work in teams of two or three where at 
least one of the analysts takes a clearly defined role of facilitator. Furthermore, 
the facilitator usually has some training in group processes.
The central argument of the MSDA approach is that environmental problems, 
including the kind encountered in the DDBR fishery, include a mixture of value and 
uncertainty dimensions that are so complex that decision analyst should work with 
experts, stakeholders, and decision makers separately. A colliery of this argument is 
that they do not expect advantages from working in groups.
I argued in Chapter 4 that MSDA decision analysts could reach their conclusion on 
the basis of the following assumptions:
• The experts role should be limited to factual judgements that can be used to 
predicts the effects of alternatives on the value dimensions which are specified by 
stakeholders or decision makers.
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• Work with stakeholders separately to elicit their values for the purpose of 
informing decision makers.
Given that the DC approach is so different, the following questions arise: why should 
(and under what circumstances could) decision makers, stakeholders, and the 
experts meet and work together in relatively short time (days) compared to the MSDA 
process (which can take weeks or months)?
In the remainder of this Chapter I will answer each of these questions in turn on the 
basis of the literature available, and in the conclusions (Chapter 9) I will re-evaluate 
them using the insights resulting from my application of DC in the DDBRA. For the 
first question I need to be more precise about the assumptions and methods used by 
Decision Conferencing.
6.3 Rationale of Decision Conferencing
In the literature three related components can be distinguished in the rationale for 
Decision Conferencing. The first, most succinctly presented in Phillips (1988), relates 
to the requirements of good communication and a sense of common purpose if 
management through responsibility delegation is to work. This is, as I have shown in 
Chapters 2, 4 and 5 very relevant in the case of the DDBRA. The second component, 
originally presented in Phillips (1984b) and extended in Phillips (1992; unpublished- 
b), relates to his assertion that all decision problems are social problems where there 
exist multiple perspectives onto a problem and where the resolution and/or joint 
action requires the creation of a new shared social reality. This component is most 
relevant in the case of the DDBRA, because it addresses specifically the question of 
what is being modelled, namely the problem owners’ subjective understanding of the 
problem instead of physical reality. The third component of the rationale for Decision 
Conferencing is derived from experimental evidence.
The first set of experimental evidence that I will be referring to is the work at the 
Decision Techtronics Group (DTG) at the Rockefeller Institute of Government, State 
University of New York (Mumpower and Stewart, 1996; Reagan-Cirincione, 1992; 
Reagan-Cirincione, 1994; Reagan-Cirincione and Rohrbaugh, 1992a; Reagan- 
Cirincione and Rohrbaugh, 1992b; Vari and Rohrbaugh, 1996). This group is 
particularly interested in the conditions under which a group of experts are able to 
outperform the best individual members of a group. They describe decision 
conferencing as a facilitated group work structured into an “estimate-feedback-talk” 
process. They report that groups can outperform individuals as long as the
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interaction process is carefully managed and group members are aided in making 
judgement with appropriate problem structuring models.
The second set of experimental evidence that I will be referring to is Phillips (1998), 
who showed that behavioural aggregation of expert judgements about uncertain 
variables produces consensus probability distributions that are different from 
statistical aggregation and are to be preferred, particularly when the uncertain 
quantities which need to be estimated evoke bias. A third set of experimental 
evidence for the suitability of Decision Conferencing for assisting managers at 
different organizational strata can be found in Chun (1992). In that PhD thesis Chun 
shows, on the basis of an evaluation of a survey of past participants in Decision 
Conferences, that Decision Conferences are particularly effective for managers in 
Stratum IV and higher (using the Stratified Systems Theory terminology).
6.3.1 Delegation of responsibility and the requirements of effective group work
A manager is accountable for his own work as well as that of his subordinates. There 
are two types of managerial style: either delegation of specific tasks to subordinates 
or delegation of responsibilities to subordinates where the manager specifies only 
what needs to be done, in what time, and to what standard but not also how to do the 
task. The first, and older, style is more centralised, and is characterised by top-down 
communication, whereas the alternative, and newer, style is more collegial, involves 
more dialogue, and relies on periodic performance reviews (as opposed to 
continuous review in the centralised management style).
Delegating responsibility has the advantage that the motivation of subordinates is 
increased by the greater sense of ownership, responsibility, and accomplishment. A 
disadvantage, however, is that the sense of ownership can be become so strong that 
“fiefdoms” are built up, which inhibit lateral communication and prevent good team 
functioning. Without good communication and team working towards a common goal 
there is the danger that although each subordinate may be optimising his or her 
resources, this may not be optimal overall. Phillips (1988; 1995) likens this to the 
Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968) taking place in organisations.
A great problem in managerial work is therefore the conflict between the efficient use 
of limited resources in the pursuit of a common goal, which is done easier with task 
delegation (i.e. centralised management), and real ownership of the work, which is 
achieved through responsibility delegation (i.e. decentralised management). Phillips 
(1988:209) argues that improved communication and a sense of common purpose 
among the management team are required to secure the advantages of responsibility
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delegation and at the same time ensure that resources are used as effectively as 
possible.
6.3. L1 Work in Group Decision Support Systems
One way of achieving this improved communication and sense of common purpose 
is through Group Decision Support Systems (GDSS), in which information technology 
is employed to support the work of groups. According to Phillips (1986), two styles of 
GDSS have emerged. First, those that provide a network of computers and where a 
central screen displays individual computer screens or aggregate information in order 
to facilitate group communication. DeSanctis and Dickson (1987) is an example of 
this style. The second style, Decision Conferencing, provides a problem-solving 
environment that is group-centred, is primarily intended to help managers consider 
uncertainty, form preferences, make judgements, and take decisions.
Phillips (1988) argues that DeSanctis and Dickson’s (1987) view of group work is too 
narrow; as they consider that “the most fundamental activity of group decision 
making is interpersonal communication” and that “the primary purpose of a DGSS to 
be to improve group communication activities.” Phillips argues that this is wrong, and 
that more is required than simple communication. Decision theory tells us that if we 
want to make coherent decisions, then we must take into account two features that 
characterise all choice situations: uncertainty and preferences. That means that the 
work of individuals in groups should involve more than communication, they are 
engaged in problem solving where they need to consider uncertainty, form 
preferences, make judgements and take decisions.
This decision theoretic approach complements that of Jaques very well, because 
Jaques (1976) defined work as “exercising discretion within prescribed limits.” The 
first component of this definition relates to the psychological component of work (the 
“exercise of discretion”) and decision theory provides a more specific view of what 
this exercise of discretion entails, while the second part of Jaques’ definition relates 
to the organisational context which imposes limits on the scope of that discretion. 
According to Stratified Systems Theory (SST), the organisational limits on discretion 
open out as one progresses up an organisational hierarchy (see discussion in 
Chapter 5). In other words, the scope of the manager’s work is greater than that of 
his subordinates, and so he is in a position to ascertain if the work of his 
subordinates is in line with the overall organisational objectives.
Meetings between a manager and his direct subordinates are quite frequent and are 
important because the meetings serve to set the context of work, contribute to mutual
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understanding, sharing of values, and generate “maximum commitment by all to the 
achievement of commonly valued goals” (Jaques, 1996:100). In Chapter 5 I 
discussed the conditions specified in SST for effective team work and planning. I 
pointed out that there are three types of content for a team meeting: “first, everyone 
is providing current information; second, discussions out which the manager will take 
a decision; third, brainstorming discussions for exploration of difficult problem, 
without a decision made.”43 (Jaques, 1996:100) Phillips’ (1988) concept of work in 
groups applies to all three types of meetings. Decision Conferencing, however, is 
probably particularly well suited for the second and third type of meeting because it 
extends beyond information sharing (for which other support systems, including 
Management Information Systems for example, could also be applied equally well). 
In the following discussion I will use the second type of meetings, those result in a 
decision by the manager.
6.3.1.2 Uses o f decision analytic models
Having specified how he understands the work in groups and why the sense of 
common purpose that may be achieved through group work is important, Phillips 
(1988) goes on to argue that (i) decision analysis is suitable for modelling the issues 
that concern a group and (ii) that during the work of the group one needs to manage 
the process of work in addition to content and structure.
Phillips (1988:211-212) identifies three main reasons why decision analysis is useful 
for modelling issues in work groups:
1. Wooler (1987) has shown that senior executives lack a common language for 
discussion of strategic issues. Frequently there is no shared understanding of 
terms such as mission, vision, goal, objective, strategy, option, scenario, or risk. 
Decision theory can be used to fix the meaning of these terms in a way that 
contributes to communication and subsequent model development. In Phillips’ 
(1988) words, “decision analysis provides a language that participants can 
share.”
2. Since most problems, in both private and public sectors, involve multiple 
objectives one needs to consider trade-offs between objectives in order to find a 
solution. Considering such trade-offs, and establishing priorities is difficult with
43 This classification applies to managerial accountability hierarchies (such as the DDBRA), but that in 
the case of other types of organisations, such as clubs, partnerships, community groups, collegial 
groups, groups may also take decisions. See also Phillips and Phillips (1993:535).
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words alone because that requires comparison of objectives that have very 
different attributes. These obstacles can be overcome through the use of multi­
attribute models. In a sense, the decision theoretic model can be used as “a 
grammar for manipulating meaning” (Phillips, 1988).
3. The effect of using a model for problem solving is that it “provides structure to 
thinking” because it shows how the issues interrelate. In the words of Phillips 
(1988), “the model is the expression of the language, and it shows how the 
grammar should be used.” There are many different models that can be used. 
They range from decision trees (which is model form traditionally associated with 
decision analysis), to multi-attribute value or utility models, event trees, fault 
trees, influence diagrams, Bayesian models, and credence decomposition 
models (see Phillips (1989) for a more extended review). Models based on 
theories other than decision analysis have also been used in decision 
conferences, for example social judgement theory (Hammond et al., 1986), or 
systems dynamics modelling (Richmond, 1987).
Phillips (1988) argues that two multi-attribute value model forms seem to 
accommodate most of the concerns expressed by senior managers: evaluation 
problems (which are characterised by a few options such as strategies, projects, 
choices, systems, etc, and many objectives) and resource allocation problems 
(where there are only few objectives but many options, or ways of allocating 
resources).
The goal in evaluation problems is to find an overall ordering of the options. This can 
be achieved by scaling the options on all the objectives separately, assigning relative 
importance weights to the objectives, and then taking a weighted average of the 
individual scales. In resource allocation problems, the goal is to find the best way of 
allocating a fixed resource, such as people, material, or money. This can be achieved 
by creating a small multi-attribute model for each budget category in which different 
resource levels are evaluated against the objectives, then assessing relative 
importance weights across the budget categories and the objectives, and combining 
all models into one efficiency curve that shows the overall best allocation for any 
given level of resource.
In the course of this modelling work managers and sub-ordinates discuss and agree 
trade-offs in light of identified strengths and weaknesses, opportunities, and threats 
in the areas over which they have responsibility. The work in the group thereby 
serves to create an understanding of the problem that incorporates the viewpoints of 
all those present, and therefore provides the sense of common purpose requirement
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for management through responsibility delegation discussed earlier. If the group work 
results in a decision, such as to adopt a particular strategy, the manager, and not the 
sub-ordinates, or the group as a whole, needs to take it as only he can be held 
accountable for it.
6.3.1.3 Facilitators manage structure and process but not content
While decision analysis models may be useful for structuring thinking and managing 
content, the process by which the group works is also important because the process 
by which a group works should change as content develops, but process also effects 
content. This observation leads Eden (1990) to argue that group decision support in 
which organisational or group processes are dealt with separately (e.g. sequentially) 
from group model building exercises is different from decision support in which both 
aspects are dealt with in tandem. In Eden's view, the outcome of an intervention in 
group decision making is not the addition of process and modelling outcomes, but 
instead it may be represented by a multiplicative relationship between process and 
modelling. “The multiplier is the imposition of designed intervention that explicitly 
accounts for process and content issues together. Process management is informed 
by the analysis of content, and the analysis of content is informed by the analysis of 
process issues" (Eden, 1990:49).
As an illustration of the differentiation between content and process intervention 
consider Table 6-1 and Figure 6-1. Other good reviews can be found in Chun (1992) 
and Phillips and Phillips (1993).
Table 6-1: The foci of observation and intervention
Task Interpersonal
Content Formal agenda, goals Who is doing what to whom



















Table 1: The different roles in 3rd-party intervention Source:
Hickling (1995:1)
Phillips’ (1988) conclusion about need to manage both process and content leads 
him to argue that to do this effectively one needs knowledge of behaviour in groups:
■It is helpful to know how the inevitable anxieties that arise when 
individuals work in groups can affect the group, how groups 
impose roles on individuals who may find themselves acting on 
behalf of the group, how different assumptions may operate 
covertly to influence the group’s behaviour; how deflections from 
the task at hand can be managed with effective facilitation. 
Research on group processes has identified conditions and 
situations that increase the ability of groups to solve problems 
effectively (Bion, 1961; Higgins and Bridger; Low and Bridger, 
1979; Menzies, 1970), and it is knowledge of small group 
functioning that is used by a facilitator to help a group achieve its 
goals."
6.3.2 Requisite Models as representations of a shared social reality
A second explanation for Phillips’ view of the goals of Decision Conferencing can be 
found in his assertion that there can be no ‘objective’ problem external to the 
observers. Instead, “each person in a group creates an internal representation of the 
problem (Cliff and Young, 1968; Phillips, 1982; Phillips, 1984a), bringing to bear on 
the initial problem statement any experience and knowledge that seems relevant, 
and it is in a group setting like a decision conference that the different perspectives 
become apparent” (Phillips, 1984b:33). The purpose of modelling in a group setting 
in Phillips' view is to capture the value judgements of the group in relation to the 
advantages and disadvantages of different alternatives. Even though no person in a
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group would necessarily agree with all the judgements, “the model is expressing a 
social reality that is evolving as the group works” (Phillips, 1984b:32).
In other words, the models used for problem solving in decision conferences are not 
representations of ideals or standards, because the models are usually very 
incomplete, but they are sufficient to produce insights and problem resolutions, nor 
are they representations (or descriptions) of objects external to the participants. 
Instead, they are “models ‘about’ the judgements of the group”. They “express a 
shared social reality” and are “merely the working agreement among members, some 
of whom may temporarily be suspending their disagreements with parts of the model, 
to see whether their differing positions will affect the overall evaluation in subsequent 
sensitivity analyses. If these differences are acknowledged by the group and are held 
as alternative representations, then there may be several social realities in existence 
at any one time” (Phillips, 1984b:32-33).
In order to attain this generative function (facilitating the subsequent construction and 
management of a new reality) not all aspects of the problem need to be captured by 
the model. Instead, Phillips (1984b) argues that the model of the social reality needs 
to be developed in form and content only to the point at which participants can solve 
the problem.
A key feature of the requisite model development process is that it uses the sense of 
unease among problem owners about the results of the current model as a signal 
that further modelling may be needed. Work progresses by examining discrepancies 
between holistic judgement and model results through, for example, sensitivity 
analyses; model content or form are modified until no new intuitions about the 
problem emerge. In this process flexible computer programmes are useful because 
participants are able to examine, for example, if disagreement between individual 
assessments make a difference in the final result.
Phillips (1984b) calls models that represent, or can simulate, everything that is 
required to solve a particular problem “requisite”. Such requisite models are 
representations of a shared social reality that are simpler than reality in three 
respects (Phillips, 1984b:35):
1. elements of the social reality that are not expected to contribute significantly to 
solving the problem are omitted from the model;
2. complex relationships among elements of the social reality approximated in the 
model (for example through additive value structures); and
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3. distinctions in either form or content at the level of social reality may be blurred in 
the model (because as Savage (1954) has argued, even though models are 
small-world representations of a grand-world, they are also idealisations resulting 
from a necessary blurring of grand-world distinctions).
Table 6-2 Features of requisite decision models and the process of generating 
them
Definition A model is requisite when its form and content are sufficient to solve 
the problem
Representation Requisite models represent a shared social reality
Generation Is achieved through iterative interaction among specialists and 
problem owners
Process Uses sense of unease arising from discrepancy between holistic 
judgements and model results in sensitivity analyses
Criterion Model is requisite when no new intuition arise
Model status Requisite model is at best conditionally prescriptive
Goal To serve as a guide to action, to help problem owners construct new 
reality
Source: Phillips (1984b:40)
6.3.2,1 Validation of requisite models
Even though the models developed in Decision Conferences do not even 
conditionally prescribe action, as they are only meant to assist analysis and be a 
guide to action (in the sense of enabling individuals and groups to find solutions to 
problems and decide what to do next - even if that means getting more information), 
there is still the question as to how to judge their validity. The overriding criterion in 
Decision Analysis is the coherence of the process by which a decision is taken, and 
not whether the hoped for consequences materialise. Phillips (1984) argues that any 
validation process must itself be a “more or less complete” multi-attribute utility model 
that uses both experimental and control groups to provide data for comparing 
performance on certain criteria, but they would also use human judgement to assess 
performance on other criteria (in other words it is a requisite validation model)44. The 
reason why this is does not lead to a circular argument is that the structure and the 
content of the two multi-attribute models is different (even though their form is the 
same).
44 According to Phillips (1984:43) “one could also argue that for science the to-and-fro of confrontation is 
seminars, conferences and scientific journals, attest to adversarial processes operating like sensitivity 
analyses on validation models".
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Humphreys and McFadden (1980) found that a MAU-based decision aid is judged to 
be most useful in cases where the correlation between initial model and holistic 
judgement is low. Within in the context of Decision Conferences this makes sense 
because low correlation is expected at the start of the modelling process, with high 
correlation necessarily emerging at the end when the model is requisite. Since the 
discrepancy between holistic judgement and model result is used to refine the model, 
validity cannot be judged by reference to correlation between these variables. "When 
the correlation is high, the resulting MAU model provides a good description of 
judgements that is already so well-understood by the people making them that the 
model is of little use in helping them construct a new reality” (Phillips, 1984b:41). This 
shows quite a significant difference between the Decision Conference and the MSDA 
approach; in the latter realistic description seems to be of more concern. Even 
though the use of Decision Analysis for creating innovative solutions (in Phillips’ 
terms this could be a “a new reality”) is considered to be one of the most valuable 
uses of Decision Analysis in the MSDA literature, there is insufficient concentration 
on this aspect in MSDA.
Phillips (1984:43-45) offers the following four guidelines for the development of the 
requisite model in order to ensure its subsequent adequacy in validation:
First, one must ensure that a variety of views are represented in the Decision 
Conference: “The main safeguard against the creation of idiosyncratic, even 
eccentric, models is the same as for science: reliance on adversarial processes. A 
key requirement of decision conferences is that the problem owners must represent a 
variety of viewpoints. ... Experience with decision conferences suggests that the 
adversarial process helps participants to broaden their individual perspectives on the 
problem, to change their views, to invent new options acceptable to everyone, in 
short, to create a model that fairly represents all perspectives.”
Secondly, one must be aware of the influence that norms, values, expectations, 
assumptions about what is acceptable and unacceptable, that pervade all 
organisations (see Peters and Waterman (1982) or Schein (1992)) exert in positive 
but also negative ways on the analysis process. Phillips stresses that the decision 
analyst who is minimally invested in the outcome of the decision conference and who 
has the benefit of the experience of working in other organisations, is in a better 
position than the group members to recognise these effects and counteract the 
negative influences (for example by enabling less vocal members to bring their views 
to bear). Holding the decision conference away from the organisation also assists in 
minimising the effects of the company’s climate.
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Thirdly, one must ensure that the models constructed are requisite for the 
organisational stratum that is being assisted by the decision conference (Chun, 1992; 
Jaques, 1976, 1996; Rowbottom and Billis, 1978; Humphreys and Berkeley, 1983). 
Requisite models for different managerial strata differ in both form and content 
because the nature of work changes as one moves from one level to the next higher 
one in an organisation. The decision analyst therefore also needs to shift to the 
appropriate level in facilitating the work of the different strata.
Phillips (1984:45) points out that his choice of decision analysis as the source for 
requisite decision models is a value judgement that is predicated on the assumption 
that model coherence is a major attribute of important in construction as well as 
validation of the model. Table 6-2 shows that Phillips’ theory of requisite decision 
models does not require agreement with his judgement. In the next sub-section I 
shall indicate that other model sources, such as social judgement analysis or 
simulation modelling have also been used.
Since this thesis is about the uses of decision analysis for the development of 
management strategies for the DDBR fishery I will not attempt to compare decision 
analysis with other decision aids, but instead conclude the presentation of Phillips’ 
rationale for decision conferencing with his observation that decision analysis can 
provide both guidance for the assessment of input parameters that is based on much 
experimental work of behavioural decision processes (see for example the work of 
von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986) presented in Chapter 3). Furthermore, the use of 
decision theory enables work group members, facilitators, and decision analysts to 
easily change the structural form of the model because all decision analytic model 
structures (from decision trees, to influence diagrams, multi-attribute models, etc) are 
consistent with decision theory.
6.3.3 Experimental evidence for benefits of Decision Conferencing
The third component of the rationale for decision conferences is built around an 
argument that attempts to show that facilitated work groups, which are structured into 
an “estimate-feedback-talk” process, produce better judgements than initial “pre­
meeting” work with one or two group members. Like Phillips, the Decision 
Techtronics Group (DTG) at the Rockefeller Institute of Government at the State 
University of New York, acknowledges the shortcomings and biases to which 
individuals are prone when working alone or in groups, but their aim is to identify the 
conditions under which individuals working in groups can excel.
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6.3.3.1 Groups can outperform individuals
Reagan-Cirincione (1994) argues that there are two main issues that need to be 
addressed in order to avoid the findings of Forsyth (1990) and McGrath (1984) about 
the superior accuracy of individual work. The first concerns productivity losses due to 
faulty interaction processes (see Steiner 1972; Janis 1972; Janis and Mann, 1977). 
The second concerns productivity losses due to inappropriate responses to the 
cognitive complexity of the judgement task by the group (see for example discussion 
of von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986) against group work in Chapter 4).
In order to improve group performance and in Reagan-Cirincione's (1994) words, 
raise “accuracy in group judgement” (note that this may be different from Phillips’ 
emphasis on the creation of “shared social reality” which enables a group to build a 
“future reality”) both interaction process and problems with cognitive processing need 
to be dealt at the same time.45
Reagan-Cirincione's (1994) study aimed to investigate the value of an iterative 
“estimate-feedback-talk” procedure (Reagan-Cirincione, 1992) which is very similar 
to Decision Conferences as it provides both process and cognitive process support 
through the use of group facilitation, decision modelling, and information technology. 
Her claims concerning the role and effects of these three elements is similar to that of 
Phillips (1984b; 1988) and Phillips and Phillips (1993). The main difference between 
Reagan-Cirincione's and Phillips' approach is that the former does not mention the 
effects of and ways for dealing with covert group life dynamics, nor the generative 
aspects of requisite modelling as Phillips (1984b; 1992) do.
Table 6-3 outlines the steps in Reagan-Cirincione (1992) study. The task involved the 
development of a judgement policy46 to predict the average salaries of teachers in
45 Hackman and Morris (1975:93) asserted that “interpersonal interventions are powerful in changing 
patterns of behaviour in the group - but that task effectiveness is rarely enhanced (and often suffers) as 
a consequence", whereas procedure-oriented intervention directed at improving cognitive processing 
“often may be helpful in improving effectiveness on the task immediately at hand, bur rarely can they be 
incorporated readily into the ongoing process of the group." In response, Eils and John (1980:269) 
concluded: “if Hackman and Morris are correct, the obvious next step is to develop and test 
interpersonal and procedural techniques in concert with one another” (quoted in Reagan-Cirincione, 
1994:248-249).
46 A “judgement policy" refers to the method by which multiple pieces of information (predictors or 
“cues”) are integrated by an individual or group to form one or more judgement (Hammond et a/., 1986). 
The development of a judgement policy requires the specification of the relative importance of each cue 
in predicting the criterion, as well as the functional relation between each of the cues and the criterion, if
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different states of the USA (using demographic and economic data), and to predict 
the number of games that baseball teams won during a season (using selected team 
statistics). Participants worked both individually as well as in groups. This study 
demonstrated that small, interacting groups were able to perform significantly better 
than their most proficient members on decomposed judgement tasks when aided by 
an enhanced, iterative, “estimate-feedback-talk” process (80% of the experimental 
groups outperformed their most proficient members) (Reagan-Cirincione, 1994:265). 
By comparing the judgement accuracy at different stages of the process and with 
control groups, the study showed also that this improved group performance was 
achieved only when both the process of group interaction and cognitive processing 
were supported in tandem.
Table 6-3: Overview of "estimate-feedback-talk" intervention process
Individual
Estimate Specification of weights and functional relations of predictors Holistic judgments
on 25 cases
Feedback Display of statistically estimated weights and functional relations
Estimate Reconciliation of statistically estimated and intuitively specified weights and
functional relations
Group
Feedback Display of reconciled weights and functional relations
Talk Facilitated group discussion
Estimate Facilitated specification of weights and functional relations Facilitated holistic
judgments on 25 cases (each judgment followed by predicted judgment)
Feedback Display of statistically estimated and intuitively specified weights and functional
relations
Talk Facilitated group discussion
Estimate Facilitated respecification of weights and functional relations Facilitated holistic
judgments on 25 cases (each judgment preceded by predicted judgment)
Feedback Display of statistically estimated and intuitively specified weights and functional
relations
Talk Facilitated group discussion to final consensus judgment policy
Source: Reagan-Cirincione (1994:252)
The main difference between the experimental groups using the “estimate-feedback-
talk” procedure and Decision Conferences is that the latter, by definition, involves
groups of people who with a stake in a pressing organisational problem. Reagan-
Cirincione (1994:267) is therefore cautious in drawing conclusions regarding the
correct weights and functional relations are specified for every cue, the judgements predicted by the 
policy will be as accurate as possible, given the proportion of explainable variance in the criterion (i.e. 
the multiple R2). (Reagan-Cirincione, 1994:251)
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efficacy of Decision Conferencing based upon the results of ad hoc groups in her 
study. However, Reagan-Cirincione argues that management groups and executive 
teams must also be concerned with the accuracy of their assessments and 
evaluations. Her findings suggest that a simple averaging technique for aggregating 
individual judgements can only be justified when errors are randomly distributed, but 
that “mathematical aggregation schemes starkly fail when prospective group 
members share some systematic bias. Since it is impossible to know how much bias 
is evoked by actual judgement tasks, particularly forecasting tasks that require the 
assessment and weighting of a number of variables, it is prudent to assume that any 
important judgement task for an organisation may evoke a great deal of bias” 
(Reagan-Cirincione, 1994:267).
6,3,3.2 Behavioural aggregation produces results different from any statistical 
aggregation
Phillips’ (1998) study also investigated the effects of group versus individual 
elicitations of probability distributions. I indicated in the discussion of the assessment 
of probability distributions from experts in Chapter 3 that in the MSDA approach 
statistical aggregation of different expert judgements is favoured because there 
seemed to be no satisfactory behavioural aggregation method, a fact that led von 
Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986:136) to argue that one should “not bother to get the 
members together unless group pressures or other social factors make it necessary”.
The importance of Phillips’ (1998) study, I believe, lies in the fact that he presents 
evidence that “a statistical average of individual judgements does not represent the 
shared, constructed social reality of a consensus distribution.” A key assumption 
underlying this assertion is that participants in work groups come with labile values 
about the issues in question (Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein, 1988; Fischoff, 
Slovic, and Lichtenstein, 1980) and that “in the process of exchanging knowledge 
and expertise participants’ uncertainties are shaped and generated, allowing them to 
construct a group consensus distribution which represents the social reality of their 
collective expertise” (Phillips, 1998). That is why a consensus distribution is “a group 
product, not an amalgamation of individual distributions. If individual views really are 
labile, then even the group process of constructing the consensus distribution could 
affect the individual’s views, with the result that individual distributions assessed after 
the consensus distribution might show further convergence.” (Phillips, 1998:2-3)
Phillips worked with two groups of experts to assess the rate at which carbon steel 
corrodes as an input into a risk analysis conducted by Nirex (a private company
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whose shareholders are the producers of radioactive waste in the UK), in order to 
ascertain whether a proposed repository (Sellafield) was complying with the 
Government regulation that the chance of the most exposed person suffering serious 
radiation-induced health effects should not be larger than one in a million 
(Department of the Environment et al., 1984). He took each of the groups of experts 
in one-day facilitated work group session (similar to that of a Decision Conference in 
that it used a facilitator, information technology, and decision analytic models) 
through a 31-step process based on Stael von Holstein and Matheson (1979) revised 
for use in groups.
Phillips (1998:14) argues that the results of his work support the following five 
hypotheses:
1. Group discussion leads to convergence of individual probability 
distributions whose variances increase as information is exchanged 
and assumptions are surfaced.
2. The assessment process is itself generative, i.e., insights, new ideas, 
shifts in problem framing, new concepts, etc., can all occur during the 
process. In other words, the process is not simply one of measuring 
or quantifying existing beliefs, it helps to form those beliefs.
3. Consensus distributions exhibit important properties that are different 
from statistical averages.
4. Differences between groups are mainly due to different conditioning 
assumptions.
5. Behavioural aggregation is preferable to statistical aggregation. A 
consensus distribution represents the shared understanding of a 
collection of experts, and, as shown in this experiment, it can be 
different from any statistical average of individual views. This 
difference could matter in a probabilistic risk analysis, particularly for 
an uncertain quantity that evokes considerable bias. As Reagan- 
Cirincione (1994) has shown, the group can provide a corrective for 
the bias, with the result that the consensus distribution would be 
located at a more extreme position than any individual distribution or 
average. This experiment showed that a new factor was introduced 
and accepted by the group during the elicitation of the consensus 
distribution. Thus, a full behavioural approach may be needed to allow 
the group to arrive at a better result than either their best member or 
any average (Phillips, 1998:14-15)
The implications that Phillips (1998:15) draws for practice are as follows:
1. Behavioural aggregation can reduce overconfidence in assessed probability 
distributions.
2. A structured, facilitated process is required to obtain good probability judgements.
3. “Averaging individual probability distributions is less defensible than modelling 
uncertainty about the uncertain quantity.
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4. The choice between statistical or behavioural aggregation must take account of 
the use to which the resulting distribution is put, and this requires appreciation of 
what the distribution represents. An uncertain-quantity-average represents the 
central tendency of the experts; a probability-average represents the spread of 
opinion of the experts; a consensus distribution represents the collective and 
shared understanding of the experts.... Although each participant said they could 
support the consensus distribution, most gave individual distributions that were 
somewhat different. Thus, the individual can sign on to the collective while still 
maintaining a different personal view. The difference is attributable to the 
conditioning events, not the probability assessment itself
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Chapter 7 Managing the DDBR fishery management strategy 
development intervention
7.1 Introduction
In the previous Chapters I discussed the problems that the DDBRA faced in the 
fishery sector and showed that there were several different opportunities for the 
application of decision analysis in support of their task of developing an improved 
management strategy for the fishery sector.
One of the problems with the predominant, MSDA, approach to environmental 
management planning that I identified was its lack of attention to the institutional 
setting within which the analysis was to take place. In the case of the DDBRA, I 
argued that the problems of multiple objectives, uncertainty, and many stakeholders, 
were compounded by (i) the specific historical development of fishery management 
(from Antipa, through collectivisation, to central planning, and then rapid changes 
which in 1993 led to the beginnings of a management regime that was based on the 
auctioning of scientifically determined fishing quotas for different zones), and (ii) the 
specific organizational characteristics of the DDBRA.
This Chapter starts out with an examination of the two DDBR fishery sector studies 
(Staras, 1994; and de Graaf and Staras, 1994). These two studies were prepared by 
the Scientific Director of the DDI (Staras) and the foreign fishery management 
consultant (de Graaf) in order to form the basis of the four sectoral management 
planning workshops organized by the EBRD technical assistance project in August 
and September of 1994. I argue that the conclusions of these studies had the effect 
of shifting the discussion in the DDBR management planning process from one that 
was dominated by technical concerns about how to integrate many complicated and 
uncertain variables and objectives that I presented in Chapter 2, toward a higher- 
level systemic debate about the appropriateness of different fishery management 
strategies. I also present evidence from the management planning workshops in 
which these studies were discussed that indicates that the rift between the fishery 
scientists' understanding of management and that of the DDBRA was very deep. The 
second section then deals with my preparation of the Decision Conference.
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7.2 The work on the fishery sector during the EBRD project
7.2.1 The EBRD projects’ management planning workplan
The workplan for 1994 revolved around two main activities. The first, was to complete 
the outstanding projects initiated in 1993 to assist the development of the 
management capacity of the DDBRA. These included (Goriup and DDBRA, 
1993:11):
1. Conversion to computerised accounts/MIS system;
2. Recruitment for important vacancies in the DDBRA using secondments/trainees;
3. Provision of local training in management skills and languages;
4. Overseas study tours;
5. Assistance to the Project Implementation Unit for the EBRD Investment Portfolio;
6. Enhancement of DDBR legislation.
The second set of activities, which are more relevant for this thesis, were focused on 
the development of management policies and projects for the DDBRA which together 
would form the “DDBR Integrated Management Plan” (Goriup and DDBRA, 1993:2).
Through discussion between the Resident Advisor and the Executive Director, the 
original method of work, which would have relied largely on “prescriptive 
management documents” (Goriup and DDBRA, 1994:1) by international sectoral 
experts, was changed because it was found to be inappropriate. The rationale behind 
the change was the realisation that the problems were “too complex and the site 
simply too large to cover in the few weeks available for each expert.” The revised 
approach was “to instigate and institutionalise long-term consultation and planning 
processes rather than produce detailed prescriptive management documents” 
(Goriup and DDBRA, 1994:1; see also Goriup and DDBRA, 1993).
The specific “products” sought through the alternative strategy were as follows:
i. “a consultation document proposing management policies and projects for the 
DDBRA;
ii. an organisation, namely the DDBRA itself, which having co-ordinated the 
formulation of the management policies and projects, understood their 
opportunities and limitations, and had sufficient confidence to change them in 
the light of new information and circumstances;
iii. an example of how to develop capacity for, and community participation in,
protected area management that could serve as a model for other areas in
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Romania, as well as elsewhere in Europe, and which enhances Romania’s 
credibility and reputation for upholding its international commitments” (Goriup 
and DDBRA, 1994:1).
The process through which this was to be achieved is outlined schematically in 
Figure 7-1 and the schedule is presented in Table 7-1. The main elements of the 
planning process were sectoral studies undertaken first by Romanian experts, joint 
work between foreign sectoral experts and Romanian counterparts, and a series of 
five workshops organized by the DDBRA with the help of the EBRD team. The 
sectoral studies commissioned from Romanian experts were to summarise existing 
knowledge about the field and also provide an initial set of policy and project 
proposals (for the fishery this was Staras (1994)). These sectoral studies and their 
recommendations were then refined or elaborated with the assistance of a foreign 
expert into “zonal policy briefs” (for the fishery these were (de Graaf and Staras, 
1994a; and 1994b)). The five sectoral studies undertaken were: (i) hydrology (8 
weeks) to support workshops 1, 2, and 3; (ii) fisheries (6 weeks) to support 
workshops 1, 3, and 4; (iii) tourism (5 weeks) to support workshop 3; (iv) reedbed 
management (3 weeks) to support workshop 3; and (v) low-input agriculture (3 
weeks) to support workshop 4. Ecological input into each of the studies and overall 
co-ordination was provided by the Resident Adviser. The zonal workshops were as 
follows:
1. Coastal and Marine Buffer Zone (22-24 August 1994)
2. Strictly Protected Areas (29-31 August 1994)
3. Freshwater and Terrestrial Buffer Zones (6-8 September 1994)
4. Sustainable Economic Development Zones (12-14 September 1994)
To my knowledge the policy briefs were not, as Figure 7-1 suggests, disclosed to the 
public by the Information Section of DDBRA. Instead, public participation only came 
in the form of field trips (which all sector experts undertook), invitation of stakeholders 
to the workshops, and the attendance of the media at press conferences held at all 
workshops. The selection of workshop participants (around 30 at each workshop) 
was made at the discretion of the workshop convenors and they included 
researchers active in the area from a variety of research institutes and universities, 
state agency representatives, local political bodies such as a Prefecture and 
commercial company directors. However, not all accepted the invitations and actual 
attendance was lower. In the case of the Coastal and Marine Buffer Zone Workshop 
only about 20 persons participated.
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At each of the zonal workshops, the “zonal policy briefs” were presented by the 
Romanian experts, and then the policy and project recommendations that they put 
forward were discussed in question and answer sessions that were moderated by the 
convenors. Discussions continued to the point where the original policy and project 
proposals were modified or amended and some consensus about the wording 
emerged. The policies and projects that were elaborated at each of the four zonal 
workshops were then collated by the Resident Advisor and the Executive Director.
The final cross-thematic workshop took place about one month after the zonal 
workshops (18-20 October, 1994). It was attended by members of the project 
steering group (see Appendix, Section 10.3) and was originally intended to be up to 
five days long (see Goriup and DDBRA, 1994). However, in the event, this workshop 
was just as long as all the other ones: two full work days and half a day for 
arrival/registration/departure. Close to fifty persons were invited to this workshop, and 
attendance was higher than in the zonal workshops. Most of the participants had 
already attended one of the zonal workshops, but in addition, the IUCN, EBRD, and 
Members of the International Steering Group were also present, as were the 
members of the Scientific Council (see organizational chart of DDBRA in Chapter 5). 
Even though local political bodies and commercial company directors were invited, 
their attendance was very poor.
After this workshop, the Resident Advisor continued to work with the Executive 
Director of the DDBRA to synthesise the sectoral studies, the zonal policy briefs, and 
the policies and project chosen and amended at the final workshop. That work 
resulted in the publication of the “Draft Management Objectives for Biodiversity 
Conservation and Sustainable Development in the Danube Delta Biosphere Reserve, 
Romania” (Baboianu and Goriup, 1995). This document was intended to serve three 
purposes: first, it specified the policies and projects that the DDBRA was going to 
pursue between 1995 and 1999 (with a review in 1997). Secondly, it was to serve as 
a public consultation document that would focus discussion and provide an outline of 
the work that led to the adoption of the policies and projects. Thirdly, it was supposed 
to provide a way of co-ordinating the many research activities that were under way in 
the DDBR at the time, and which could be initiated in the future as international 
awareness about the DDBR increased.
I will describe the organisation and rationale of the fishery management workshops 
that I organised in greater detail in Section 7.3. Here it is useful to note, however, that 
my fishery management workshops were not formally part of the management 
planning process though they were fully endorsed by the EBRD project managers 
and the DDBRA. I scheduled them such that they gained from the momentum of the
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other planning work, and this made it possible for the foreign fishery expert to 
participate. That meant, however, that they took place during a period when 
everybody was very busy (Table 7-1 shows the number of activities taking place 
during that period).






AND ASSOCIATED PROJECTS 




Coordination o f 
SECTORAL STUDIES 
carried out by 
Foreign/Romanian Experts
Agree Policies and 
formulate Projects
ZONAL WORKSHOPSWORKSHOP CONVENORS 
Resident Adviser's team 
Romanian Counterparts
Prepare and refine 
ZONAL POLICY BRIEFS
Select and brief 
WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS
Source: Goriup and DDBRA (1994:3)
210
Table 7-1 Schedule of Management Planning work in DDBR
JUN JUL
Management Planning Workshops
[1] Coastal/Marine Buffer Zone
[2] Strictly Protected Areas
[3] Freshwater/Terrestrial Buffer Zones
[4] Sustainable Economic Development Zones




Economics Researcher (“LSE student”)
Romanian Sectoral Experts
Foreign Sectoral Experts [Workshop involvement]
(a) Hydrologist [1,2,3]
(b) Fishery Management [1,3,4]
(c) Tourism [3, 4]
(d) Reedbed Management [3]
(e) Low-input Agriculture [4]
Fishery Management Workshops 
(organised by Axel Kravatzky)
Preparatory Session I 
Preparatory Session 11 
Preparatory Session III 
Decision Conference
Source: based on Goriup and DDBRA (1994:4)
AUG OCT









Five major workshops were organised, which dealt with the Marine Area, the 
Sustainable Economic Development Zones, the Buffer Zones, and the Strictly 
Protected Areas individually. At these workshops the current status of knowledge 
was summarised, specific objectives developed, and individual projects specified 
through which the development objectives for the areas could be achieved.
In the final workshop, to which members of the International Steering Committee 
were invited, the outputs of the individual workshops were reviewed and the first 
integrated Management Plan put together. All of the objectives and associated 
projects were reviewed and collated, priorities were set by consensus, and an action 
plan for the DDBRA agreed for the next five years (with a major review due after two 
years).
The explicit intention of the EBRD project team was to conduct this management
planning process in an open and participatory manner, and to “provide a valuable
model to many other Romanian developments in these times of transition and
challenge”. In the development of the Inception Report, seminars were held for
particular interest groups (fishing, reed harvesting, agriculture, forestry, shipping,
water sanitation, tourism, education, as well as NGOs, Voluntary Nature
Conservation bodies, the Tulcea Chamber of Commerce and Industry). The Tulcea
211
District Council members, the Prefect, and parliamentarians took part in the 
discussions leading up to the establishment of the DDBRA and its operation.
7.2.2 Fishery Sector Studies and Proposals
Many of the themes of the Fishery Sector Study (Staras, 1994) have already been 
presented in Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis and they are essentially summaries of 
the work done by the DDI for the DDBRA (e.g. Navodaru, 1992; Navodaru et a/.,
1993). The sectoral study did, however, include three sections which contained some 
new material which was very important for this thesis. Two of those three sections 
with new material dealt with specific management activities of the DDBRA, and in the 
third conclusions about management objectives and projects were put forward.
In the following sections I show that Staras (1994) and de Graaf and Staras (1994a; 
1994b) presented two very powerful arguments:
First, Staras (1994) argued that the fisheries management strategy the DDI and 
DDBRA had been working on was, in effect, unfeasible and incoherent. I will also 
argue that the fact that none of the proposals regarding fisheries management put 
forward by Staras (1994) were accepted in the workshops, is evidence for my 
hypothesis that there was quite a deep rift between the fishery scientists’ 
understanding of management and that of the DDBRA.
Secondly, de Graaf and Staras (1994b) presented evidence that the restoration 
efforts underway and proposed for the DDBR were, in fact, not necessarily in accord 
with the objectives of the Biosphere Reserve. This was a very stark and powerful 
hypothesis because the evidence was persuasive and completely undermined the 
prevailing belief in a self-evidently good and desirable natural balance. However, this 
belief was so fundamental to the DDBRA’s management approach that further 
research into the matter, as proposed by Staras (1994) and de Graaf and Staras 
(1994a), could be accepted in the workshops without much discussion.
For me, these developments meant that the problem of developing a management 
strategy for the fishery had shifted from initially focusing on ways of integrating many 
complicated and uncertain variables and objectives (as presented in Chapter 2) 
towards enabling the DDBRA to constructively work with DDI and other stakeholders 
to transform their existing management strategy into one that was coherent and 
feasible.
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7.2.2.1 Analysis o f the DDBRA’s fishery management approach
The fishery sector study by Staras (1994) is a 36 page document, of which fewer 
than three pages make specific reference to management policy issues facing the 
DDBRA.47 The arguments that Staras (1994:29-31)he did make are as follows 
(translated by this author):
Law NR 82/1993 (the Law for the DDBRA) specified that the DDBRA was given the 
authority to manage the fishery through concessions to authorised economic agents 
and had to give the local population priority. In 1994 the DDI developed the 
documentation necessary for the 25 fishing zones in lakes, 20 on the Danube river, 
and 4 on the coast of the Black Sea. The documentation they prepared consisted of 
the delimitation of the fishing zones, establishment of maximum fishing limits for 
different species, the formulation of rules governing the method of fishing, and the 
duties of both parties. The rationale underlying that work was presented as follows by 
Staras (1994):
• By issuing concessions, the DDBRA will be able to obtain data on fishing effort, 
landed catch, fishing gear used, and catch per unit of effort. These are needed to 
devise models of sustainable production that can be applied more easily, and 
with greater accuracy, in the diverse conditions of the DDBR. Applying some 
models for the Danube and the Black Sea seem to be one of the problems that 
are harder to resolve.
• Economic agents will be interested in the stability and optimal exploitation of the 
fish resource, and thereby participate in the attainment of the objectives of the 
Biosphere Reserve.
• Through the leasing system the state will be able to get a revenue of about 
US$580,000 per year, and that will enable the DDBRA to sustain a research and 
investment programme for the improvement of the DDBR fishery.
• While the priority given in law to the local population in leasing will encourage the 
privatisation of fishermen as family associations, the current system of leasing 
does not encourage individual privatisation of fishermen.
• The appearance of private companies has resulted in an increase of the number 
of fishermen fishing with the authorisation of the DDBRA on the Danube river has 
also led to an increase in fishing by these on other fishing grounds that were not
47 In light of my analysis in Chapter 2 of the way fishery biologists see their role (providing scientific 
inputs but not policy judgements) this was not very surprising.
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used by the state companies until 1990. These private companies fish the whole 
year round [presumably violating the prohibition period]. This will lead to an over­
exploitation of the fish resources since fish conglomerate during certain 
development stages (reproduction, over-wintering, or feeding), but also because 
the ecological conditions in lakes worsen at certain times (low water levels, higher 
water temperatures, etc.)
• It seems necessary that the DDBRA should organise (for itself) an efficient 
system of data collection and control at the landing of fish by fishermen and the 
wholesale of fish to the market.
“In the opinion of the author of this study, the current concession system needs to be 
seen only as a first step towards moving to the system of selling fish licences. This 
will only be possible after the accumulation of some data regarding fishing effort and 
catch per unit effort in each of the fishing zones” (Staras, 1994:30).
Staras’ (1994:30-31) analysis of the trends and shortcomings of management of the 
DDBR fishery comes to the following conclusions/observations:
• The DDBRA does not have a department specialised in the monitoring of the way 
in which the main resource that it is administering is used. There is no database 
regarding the quantities of fish caught in the different fishing areas, the evolution 
of species, the number and types of gear used, or the effort used. The database 
of the DDI is not complete enough for the purposes of management.
• The DDBRA is issuing licences to fishing companies that include specific 
restrictions. However, these restrictions are not communicated to the actual 
fishermen employed by the companies. Fishing companies seem not to be 
interested in the protection of the fish resource, relying solely on the enforcement 
of the restrictions by the DDBRA ecological guards (wardens). Fishing companies 
own the fishing gear and issue licences to their fishermen as though it were their 
God-given right or only a matter of formality. This system needs to be re­
assessed.
• Illegal trade and poaching are common because the market price of fish is 5-6 
times greater than the value that fishermen receive from the companies for the 
fish they land at the collection points. This situation will not change until the 
fishermen become the owners of fishing gear and title-holders of the fishing 
rights.
• The DDBRA’s wardens deal mostly with poaching, less with the enforcement of 
fishing regulations (mesh size, minimum length of fish caught, fishing of species
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other than those specified, etc). The wardens have a lot of presence in the DDBR 
and they should also be employed in the monitoring, including sampling work for 
fish stock assessment.
• There does not exist an up-to-date fishing law in Romania. It is necessary to work 
with fishery managers from outside the DDBR to advocate a fishing law that 
promotes the interests of the DDBR. There are endangered fish species that are 
uselessly protected on the DDBR territory, because they are intensely fished 
outside that territory.
• The fish stock assessment methodology needs to be improved by applying the 
most appropriate methods to the specific conditions present. In order to ascertain 
the state and trends in fish populations, fish stock assessment studies are 
needed.
In the conclusion of his fishery sector study, Staras (1994:32-33) put forward a
number of management objectives and projects (see Figure 7-2).
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Figure 7-2: Proposed Management Objectives and Projects
1) Restoration and conservation of habitats:
a) Reduction of nutrient pollution of Danube rive water. Integration of DDBR interests
with the national and international organisations with respect to the Danube and the
Black Sea.
b) Restoration of flood areas in the lower Danube and the Danube Delta.
• Project: Study on the current use of endyked areas in the DDBR and the lower 
Danube floodplains in order to determine management alternatives.
c) Improvement of the water circulation system in the canals and lakes
• Project: continue with project of the same name
2) Conservation of some species
a) Prohibiting of fishing of endangered species in buffer zones of DDBR and the 
development of some international conventions for the protection of some species 
that migrate in the Danube.
b) Feasibility study for the construction of a Sturgeon hatchery in the DDBR.
• Project: continue with project of the same name.
c) Identification and conservation of some pristine habitats in the buffer zone and in 
some of the fish polders in which there still there still are some fish populations of 
endangered species.
• Project of the same name.
3) Legislation and regulations
a) Collaboration with fishery managers from outside the DDBR to put forward a Draft Fishery 
Law which should take into account the fishery management interests of the DDBR.
b) Improvement of the system by which fishing rights are allocated.
• Project: Study regarding the possibilities and avenues for the privatisation of the 
fishing in the DDBR (with foreign assistance).
4) Monitoring, Administration, and Research
a) Improvement of the DDBR fishery monitoring system
• Project: Training of DDBRA and wardening staff regarding the requirements of 
DDBR fishery management;
b) Implementation of specific fishery management objectives in the DDBR
• Project: Case study regarding the management of the fishery in two 
representative zones of the DDBR (with foreign assistance).
c) Improvement of fish stock assessment
• Project: Adoption of appropriate methods for the evaluation of stocks in the 
Danube and the Delta lakes (with foreign assistance)
d) Identification and monitoring of the factors which control the state of the fish resource
• Project: Improvement of hydrological factors in the main waterbodies of the 
DDBR
• Project: Research on the factors that influence stock recruitment
e) Evaluation of the state of other aquatic animal populations of economic interest (cray 
fish, frogs, mussels) and the possibility of their exploitation
• Project of the same name.__________________________________________
Source: Staras (1994:32-33)
7.2.2.2 The effects of eutrophication on fish communities
The foreign fishery consultant (Mr de Graaf) arrived in Romania at the time when the 
local fishery experts were finishing their report (Staras, 1994). Their joint work on the 
“policy briefs” for the management planning workshops resulted in two papers (de 
Graaf and Staras, 1994a; 1994b) and field visit notes (as well as a brief analysis of 
fish farming which showed that most fish farming is unprofitable due to poor soil 
conditions and the large size of the fish farms that makes them very difficult to 
manage effectively).
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I deal first with de Graaf and Staras (1994b) in which the two experts argue that there 
is a correlation between the changes in species and the nutrient content of water 
(especially phosphate and nitrogen). Figure 7-3 summarises the relationship that has 
been reported elsewhere (Grimm and Backx, 1992), and that seemed to be present 
in the DDBR fishery as well (de Graaf, 1994:8) (the process is explained below and 
illustrated in Figure 7-4 and Figure 7-5):
• When the concentration of phosphate is below 0.04 mg/litre, the water is clear, 
there are few macrophytes (submerged plants), perch is the dominant predatory 
fish species.
• When phosphate concentration varies between 0.04 and 0.1 mg/litre the 
availability of nutrients increases and with it the number of macrophytes. At this 
phosphate level the water is still clear and the major fish communities are pike, 
tench, and white fish. This best describes the situation in the Danube Delta until 
the mid 1970s. Macrophytes were present and were providing shelter for 
predatory species such as pike, while the extended vegetation near the 
embankment provided breeding and nursing places for tench and pike.
• At phosphate concentrations above 0.1 mg/litre macrophytes disappear and the 
water becomes green because of the increased presence of blue-green algae. In 
eutrophic waters (i.e. waters too rich in nutrients) the major fish communities are 
bream, roach, and pike-perch. As Figure 7-4 shows, around 1976 the phosphate 
load for the Danube Delta surpassed 0.1 mg/litre and eventually reached 0.2 
mg/litre in 1985. At such high phosphate loads algae grow so quickly that oxygen 
shortages develop in the water, which kills off fish, and the sunlight penetration is 
reduced to such an extent that the macrophytes disappear. As a result, pike and 
tench are replaced by bream, roach, and pike-perch. The mechanism behind this 
change was understood only relatively recently (Lammens et a/., 1985). Under 
eutrophic conditions bream, which normally feeds on chironomids that live in the 
bottom layer of water bodies, switch to filtering zooplankton out of the water. As a 
result the zooplankton population is kept relatively low, which in turn leads to 
more rapid growth of algae (as less zooplankton are feeding on algae). The 
waters therefore become increasingly green and turbid. “The ultimate effect of 
eutrophication is that the ecosystem changes completely; the water becomes 
turbid, macrophytes are disappearing, the wildlife and bird communities are 
changing and this is exactly what happened in the Danube Delta” (deGraaf, 
1994:10).
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Figure 7-3: Fish communities and their relation with phosphate load
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Source: de Graaf and Staras (1994b) and Grimm and Backx (1992:8).









Source: de Graaf and Staras (1994b:9)
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Figure 7-5: Changes in Species Composition & Water Quality in Danube Delta
Fishery, 1960-1992
Source: Fischer (1993:14) & de Graaf (1993a:6)
Species Composition in DDBR, 1960-1992
■  Other Species 
D Danube Shad
□  Sturgeon
□  Pike F^rch or Zander
■  Perch
■  Sheat Fish
□  Pike 
E  Fitofagi
□  Roach
■  Prussion Carp
□  Tinea tinea
□  Carassius carassius
□  Common & White Bream
□  Common Carp
Two implications of this hypothesis are of significance within the context of this 
thesis. First, in the work of the DDI up to that point a wide variety reasons for the 
observed changes in fish communities were put forward without any indication of 
which were more likely (see Chapter 2). With this analysis about the effects of 
eutrophication on fish communities, the environmental factors seemed to gain some 
dominance over the others. This conclusion undermined the predominant view that 
fishing activity was the main factor influencing fish stocks and that without fishing, 
there would be a natural balance that would keep fish stocks constant over time.
The second important implication of this hypothesis dealt with the proposed 
restoration programmes in the DDBR. The construction (over the past few decades) 
of dykes for fish and agricultural polders has resulted in the landscape of the Danube 
Delta not looking very “natural”. Furthermore, many of the canals dredged for the 
collection of reed, and for various water circulation improvement programmes were 
considered to be against the prescriptions of Antipa, who argued that the general 
flow of water in the Danube Delta should be from west towards the Black Sea. These 
two factors, together with fact that a sizeable canal dredging and earth moving 
industry had built up over time in the Delta, led to most staff for the DDBRA and the 
DDI vigorously supporting the attempts to “restore” the Delta to some undefined more 
“natural” state by closing canals which were deemed to harm the right type of water 
flow and to break down dykes so as that polders were flooded again.
While the details of the canal building and closing activities were never fully disclosed 
or discussed with the EBRD consultants, the DDI had established a polder
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restoration programme that was endorsed by the consultants who prepared the GEF 
Biodiversity Programme (Huntington Technical Services Ltd and Partners, 1993) and 
this programme was going to receive substantial financial support under that 
programme.
The questions that de Graaf and Staras (1994b: 10-11) raised about the restoration 
programme is that most of the “clear water systems” which provide habitats for 
perch-type fish communities (see Figure 7-5 and Figure 7-3) are located in 'un­
natural’ looking polders where the entry of polluted Danube water is limited or 
completely blocked off. If the dykes are broken down nutrient rich water would enter 
these systems and the effects of eutrophication described above would destroy the 
last habitats of pike and pike-perch fish communities. This led de Graaf and Staras to 
conclude that “from an ecological point of view it is maybe better to replace the term 
'restoration of fish polders’ with the term ‘protection of original ecosystem by bio­
manipulation’. Bio-manipulation is added because several actions have to be 
undertaken in order to keep the original system if the hydrological regime in the 
polders is changed. The major actions are: (i) keep the nutrient load of the in-flowing 
water low; (ii) avoid that the bream population becomes dominant; (iii) maintain the 
macrophyte association” (de Graaf and Staras, 1994b: 10-11).
The most significant implication of this analysis, I believe was that it provided a 
tangible48 and scientifically sound example of the arguments in Chapter 4 about the 
necessity to make value judgements in environmental management and about 
ecological equilibrium shifts. But besides illustrating the inherent limitations of the 
ability to use science for prescriptive purposes (because it does not say which 
system is better overall, and instead only what the likely effects are of different 
systems), it also indicates the need for value judgements about trade-offs. The effect 
was quite fundamental: it challenged the dominant assumption that the DDBRA's 
cability to control the development of ecosystems, the paradigm about what can be 
considered ‘natural’ and ‘good’, and the method by which the DDBRA made 
decisions.
This hypothesis about the effects of eutrophication on fish communities was the only 
piece of sectoral analysis that was discussed in any detail in the Draft Management 
Objectives for Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Development in the DDBR 
publication that resulted from the management planning process (Baboianu and
48 “Tangible" because the pictures taken during an aerial survey of the DDBR clearly showed how the 
waters in polders was dark and clear, while that of the canals was light green, indicating the presence of 
algae, which thrive in nutrient rich water.
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Goriup, 1995). However, my analysis of the management objectives that were 
actually put forward in the Management Planning Workshops (next sub-section) 
indicates that this input alone fell short of changing the thinking of the DDBRA.
7.2.2.3 Proposals put forward at the Management Planning Workshops
The second policy brief (de Graaf and Staras, 1994a) was a summary of (Staras,
1994) with some additional notes by de Graaf. First, the main additions to the 
proposal:
• The total market value of the fish caught in the Delta is probably around 
US$6.2 million (if the total real catch is 8,000 tonnes per year). The DDI staff 
of 3 fishery biologists and 2 field workers is not sufficient if the aim is to 
establish or manage a fishery that is sustainable in the long term (the number 
may be sufficient if the aim is only biological research).
• It may be advisable that the DDI should also use a holistic (Schaefer, 1954 
and 1957) method for stock assessment (monitoring total catch in different 
areas, and the effort used) so as to establish Catch per Unit Effort indices 
which indicate how the fish catch effort developed over time.
• It is important that different persons/institutions be responsible for data 
collection and regulation enforcement because accurate and direct monitoring 
of the fishery can be done only if those studying the fish catch are neutral and 
enjoy the trust of the fishermen.
• The fisheries management regime in effect at the time suited fishing 
companies because the DDBRA did not actually charge them for the licences 
and with the low operating costs, they were still profitable. Fishermen are also 
satisfied because they do not have to buy their own gear and “they make their 
living by selling a part of the probably high valued species directly to the 
market.” However, “the DDBRA should not be happy, as this system provokes 
a complete mess in monitoring of fisheries and in sustainable harvesting of 
the fish stocks” (de Graaf and Staras, 1994a:9). That is why they are not sure 
to what extent the decline in fisheries output over the previous three years is 
a real decline or a decline in registered catch. However, de Graaf and Staras 
(1994a) did not go on to suggest how one should deal with this problem 
beyond the problem statements contained in Figure 7-2 and the 
recommendation to separate monitoring and enforcement activities.
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While de Graaf and Staras attended all the management planning workshops, the 
discussion of the proposed fishery management objectives occurred in the fourth 
Management Planning Workshop (“Sustainable Economic Development Zones”). 
This was the only workshop where they presented their work in a formal way (rather 
than informally during the discussion part of the workshops). There are a number of 
points to be made about the workshop:
Attendance was poor: even though a total of 30 persons from seven institutions were 
invited (3 from MWFEP, 8 DDBRA, 4 Euroconsult, 6 DDI, 5 Company Directors, 2 
Chamber of Commerce, 1 County Counsel, 1 RomSilva), attendance over the two 
days was limited to DDBRA, DDI, and EUROCONSULT staff. It was noted that the 
company directors did not come as this was a problem throughout the management 
planning work. The DDBRA Executive Director and the EUROCONSULT project co­
ordinator were the convenors.
1. The one-hour presentation of the fishery sector study by Dr Staras was followed 
by a two-hour unstructured discussion in which the DDBRA was essentially 
stunned because the fishery managers said that they cannot give them the 
prescriptions that they want and that they do not see their role to make the 
decisions that the managers are supposed to make.
2. No formal or explicit methodology for the selection of management policies or 
management projects was used. In fact, much of the potential conflict about 
priorities had been avoided by drawing up a very long list of management policies 
and projects.
3. Most of the proposals were adopted with few modifications which resulted from 
discussions and which the workshop convenor (Mr Fischer) summed up.
4. It was interesting to analyse which ones could not be agreed to: legislation and 
regulation, and the first three points of Monitoring, Administration and Research 
(i.e. points 3a, b, and 4a, b, c). Instead, the following management policy and 
associated projects was agreed to (DDBRA, 1994): “Institute a system of 
management for the sustainable utilisation offish resources. (Management Policy 
18)
• Analyse the existing management of fisheries and develop options for 
improvement (Project Reference 18.1).
• Select and apply a system of licensing fishing based on: catch limit, fishing 
effort, permitted species and selective methods; and the obligation of 
economic agents to forward data on catch per species, number of nets, etc.,
and fishing effort to the DDBRA (Project Reference 18.1)”.
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5. Mr de Graaf s humorous note (shown in Figure 7-6) indicates what he perceived 
the main dilemma was: suggestions for an elaborate command and control 
management system that, in the view of the fishery scientists, did not take 
account of the limitations imposed by the nature of the fishery and the 
management requirements.
Figure 7-6 Impromptu humour on DDBR fishery management
SEMINARQLE DE PLANIFICARE A MANAGEMBNTLULUI
Management objective: Improvement of fisheries resources
Problem: It has been observed that high valued and protected fish species do not follow the rules as has
been set by die ARBDD during the last years conference.
Management solution: Scientific research executed inPikeland (Stiuca et aJ, 1993) proofed that a highly hierar­
chic community awareness can be created within the fish popuiatiqg by mating use of die so 
called ‘police fish* and under water traffic lights. Essential for such an awareness creation 
is a good training of 'police fish* and a good connection system for the traffic lights. For the 
.latter it has been proofed optic fibres covered with ecological grown reed functions the best 
(Tulcea et al., 1988).
Project Name: Training of Pike as a "police fish*
Proposed activities:Piks will be train in police activities at the police fish ' t r aining centre in tfoN ya 
(Pikeland).
Project duration: 3 years
Implementing agencies: ARBDD, DDI with technical assistance of CARPACONSULT.
Necessary support:Interpreters with a sound knowledge of international fish languages and »"<”  water 
microphones.
Source: de Graaf (15 Sept. 1994).
Notes: “ARBDD” is the Romanian acronym of DDBRA; “Stiuca” means pike in 
Romanian, and this is also the name of the Director of the DDI.
Other observations.
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1. Uncertainty and difficulties of judgement in fish stock assessment were not 
prominent. This is further evidence that transformation in the problem 
understanding had taken place - it had moved from questions of technical 
scientific assessments to management policy.
2. There was a big difference in the understanding between the fishery scientists 
and the managers. Both sides seemed to be trying to do their best as perceived 
from their own institutional and departamental perspectives, but for the overall 
fishery, it was leading to failure. The certainty about their positions that had set in 
over the previous 2-3 years was beginning to shake a little bit because of their 
continued failures to develop a management system that lived up to their 
expectations. While this seminar managed to bring up some issues and direct the 
discussion in a new direction, it did not manage to provide a new consensus.
3. No clear and coherent fishery strategies were discussed, but instead it was 
recognised that there were many inter-dependent decisions (in the sense that a 
decision in one area affected decisions in another one).
4. There was no agreement about what the goals or strategic objectives of the 
DDBRA were. A good example of this was the fact that the Governor did not 
agree with many of the proposal put forward in the other areas discussed at the 
seminar, such as tourism or agriculture. He saw the DDBRA as having primarily a 
role of conservation based on scientific prescriptions, but what was put forward 
were measures, such as helping in marketing (e.g. labelling), which put the 
DDBRA in the role of facilitators of sustainable economic development. In his 
view, the DDBRA was a conservation agency and not economic development 
agency, and if people did not make as much money as they could within the 
scientifically determined limits for conservation, then that was their problem.
My only comment during that workshop was to publicly announce that in that very 
week we had started a process (see Table 7-1 on page 211 for the timing; I describe 
this process in the first part of Chapter 8) in which we had begun to evaluate different 
fishery management options. The Governor said that he was open to all suggestions 
and particularly keen to resolve the fishery problems, but although he endorsed the 
workshops we were undertaking I felt that he remained sceptical.
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7.3 Preparing the Decision Conference intervention
7.3.1 Choosing the Decision Analysis Approach
Up to the point when de Graaf, the foreign fishery expert, arrived in August of 1994 
before the Management Planning Workshops, I was considering two types of 
interventions. The first option was an MSDA intervention through I would have 
developed a decision analytic model with the input of experts and stakeholders. In 
particular, I would have tried to incorporate the NIE design principles and transaction 
cost criteria into the model and then interview fishermen, DDBRA, DDI, local 
government, and other stakeholders to get the probability data (and make sure that 
all the value dimensions were captured). If things worked out well, I planned to also 
include a decision conference for behavioural aggregation of disagreements in the 
assessment.
The second option was a Decision Conference, for the reasons that I have discussed 
earlier in this Chapter. Even though I was not yet sure on which aspect of the fishery 
would be addressed at the Decision Conference, the following factors persuaded me 
gradually to choose this option.
The Director of Licensing at the DDBRA (Mr Constantin) worked on regulations for 
fishery and other sectors, but repeated attempts to find out what was really going on 
failed. Maybe because they had not actually summarised it. The essence of what I 
got was that it was a cumbersome process that involved the DDI doing the technical 
studies etc. (as described in Chapter 1). Not even de Graaf was able to get more 
precise information on the fishery management regime than that included in Staras’ 
report.
The fact that the DDI and especially the DDBRA went on with their normal work and 
ideas (canal dredging, auction preparation, etc) suggested that another piece of 
analytic work was unlikely to affect the DDBRA's management approach very much. 
Nevertheless, it would have been interesting to find out if the fact that the MSDA 
model would have been based on issues that they themselves had raised and 
evaluated, would have altered the DDBRA's staff usual position in which they ignore 
the work of consultants on the basis of claims that their conclusions do not apply in 
the Danube Delta as they does not understand the realities of the DDBR.
The fact that objectives and policies were used interchangeably in the management 
planning workshops as well as in Baboianu and Goriup (1995), could be seen as an 
inconsequential error or imprecision. However, I believed that the fact this mistake 
fited so well with the condition of bureaucracies as described by Mintzberg, (1989)
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and Gunderson, Holling, and Light (1995), it was probably more than coincidence 
(see Chapters 4 and 5). It stood for the tendency of organisations such as the 
DDBRA, to pursue policies for their own sake rather than for the goals or objectives 
that they were originally meant to achieve.
Mr Goriup, the resident advisor of the EBRD technical assistance programme argued 
(personal communication) that time and resource constraints can partially explain 
why the management planning workshops did not work out that well. A US$4.5 
million Global Environmental Facility (GEF) project was becoming operational and 
the DDBRA and DDI had to manage it. This proved to be quite a distraction from long 
term planning, as it took up much of the time of an already short-staffed organisation, 
and it reduced the attractiveness of the proposed loan by the EBRD (rather than the 
grant from the GEF through the World Bank). This situation made also Decision 
Conferencing more attractive, because it involved much less time than a MSDA 
process.
The emphasis in Mr de Graafs work in the DDBR had been to point to the inter­
relatedness of the factors that make up a management regime, with emphasis on the 
fact that a top-down system is unlikely to work because of the great costs involved 
and the many possibilities of circumvention, and that it was better to try and design a 
system in which the interests of the fishermen were taken into account.
This is relatively easy to state in theoretical terms, but the situation in practice was 
one of one dominated by confusion, secrecy, and mistrust.
7.3.2 Experimenting and building support through the Sinoie Lagoon decision 
analysis
I organised and facilitated on the evenings of August 23rd and 24th, at the occasion 
of the “Coastal and Marine Buffer Zone Management Planning Seminar”, some 
decision analysis work on management options for Sinoie Lagoon. The problem 
there was rapid coastal erosion and the threat to an important fish species through 
potentially rapid increases of water salinity.
The purpose of this work was to (i) provide a multidisciplinary evaluation of an 
important management concern; (ii) provide me with an experience of my first 
decision conference; and (iii) build support for the Decision Conference planned for 
later in the year.
Among the recommendations put forward from that workshop were (DDBRA, 1994): 
•  Improve the ecological status of Lake Sinoie (Management Policy 28).
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• Undertake a study on the evolution and current situation of Lake Sinoie to 
establish the optimum conditions for the management of biodiversity (Project 
Reference 28.1).
• Design and construct hydrotechnical works to allow the discharge of fresh water 
directly from Lake Razim (Project Reference 28.2).
I discussed the outcomes of the Sinoie workshop with the Resident Advisor, with the 
Executive Director, and with L.D. Phillips. Through those discussion I learned that 
important elements had been left out of the analysis. I also realized that I did not 
have a good handle on managing the process (including the fact that I had mixed 
content and process consultation). As a result, L.D. Phillips directed me to the work 
of Schein (1987) on Process Consultation, and Friend and Hickling (1987). This:
a) confirmed my conviction that it was important to adhere strictly to a process 
intervention,
b) expanded my understanding of the puzzling observation that even though 
there was disconfirming information that the current approach and the one 
they were working did not work, they still went ahead or could not stop the 
process,
c) enriched the range of techniques from which I would be able to choose and in 
particular enhanced my techniques for handling process issues when the 
problem solving process is drawn out over a longer period of time,
7.3.3 Process Consultation
The basic premise of Schein in Process Consultation (Schein, 1987) is that 
consultants (as well as managers) can take on different roles in their relation with 
clients (or subordinates) as they attempt to influence situations toward desired goals 
in the human system in which they intervene.
“In a technologically complex society neither managers nor consultants can really
give commands or tell others what to do. Even in medicine, specialists and surgeons
are finding themselves in complex relationships with their patients where they are
helping those patients to make a beneficial decision rather than just ‘ordering’ a given
procedure. This point appears paradoxical, because, one might reason, the more
complex the world, the more dependent we become upon experts to tell us what to
do since we do not understand ourselves how things work. The problem is that,
because we do not understand, when the expert tells us what to do, we often
misunderstand or mistrust what we are told, and then either do it wrong or are afraid
to do it at all. So the expert leams the hard way that just having expertise does not
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guarantee that one can influence others. A more realistic model of management as 
well as consulting is to see the process as one of intervening facilitatively to 
accomplish agreed upon goals” (Schein, 1987:9).
The central premise of Schein's (1987) process consultation model is that the client 
needs to retain control (and therefore "ownership") of content in the problem solving 
process and that the consultant only intervenes on issues relating to the process of 
problem solving or structuring of the problem (see also Table 6-1).
“Even if the consultant feels he or she knows exactly what is wrong and what to do 
about it, such diagnosis and prescriptive ideas should probably be withheld early in 
the process for three basic reasons: 1) the consultant is most probably wrong to 
some unknown degree because of the likelihood that there are hidden cultural, 
political, and personal factors operating; 2) even if the consultant is right, the client is 
likely to be defensive, to not listen or deny what is being said, or to argue, or to 
misunderstand and thereby undermine the possibilities of solving the problem; and 3) 
even if the client accepts the consultant’s diagnosis he probably fails to learn how to 
do such a diagnosis in the future himself’ (Schein, 1987:30).
By involving the client in the process of diagnosing what may be wrong, and in the 
process of generating a solution, Schein (1987) claims that the chances of finding an 
appropriate solution that will be implemented, and that the client leams the skills of 
problem solving are maximised. Furthermore, since diagnosis and intervention 
cannot be separated in practice, process consultation needs to be guided by 
intervention theory and not diagnostic theory. Since, according to intervention theory, 
any interaction between client and consultant constitutes an intervention (even if the 
purpose is thought to be only diagnosis), there are often limitations on what 
questions can be asked by consultants, of whom they can be asked, what 
terminology is used in asking them.
Schein (1987:20) argues that what process consultation best fits those situations 
where people are troubled but neither know what the problem is or what kind of help 
they should be seeking. The most important pre-requisite for the process to begin 
constructively is some intent on the part of someone in the organisation to improve 
the way things are going.
7.3.3.1 Initiating and managing change
The situation in the DDBR fishery required change. However, I was rather concerned 
about the readiness of the DDBRA to actually undertake real transformation with 
regard to the fishery because staff just seemed to go on with their usual work. This is
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why I needed to better understand what a process of change entailed. I have already 
discussed some of the issues in Chapter 5, relating them in particular to strategy 
formulation, and in Chapter 6 when I discussed Decision Conferencing.
According to Schein (1987) the process of change consists of three stages (see 
Table 7-2): (i) unfreezing, where the motivation and readiness is to change is 
created, (ii) changing, and (iii) refreezing.
Table 7-2 A three-stage model of the change process
Stage 1.
I
Unfreezing: Creating motivation and readiness to change through
a. Disconfirmation or lack of confirmation
b. Creation of guilt or anxiety
c. Provision of psychological safety
Stage 2. Changing through cognitive restructuring: helping the client to see 
things, judge things, feel things, and react to things differently based on 
a new point of view obtained through
a. Identification with a new role model, mentor, etc.
b. Scanning the environment for relevant information
Stage 3. Refreezing: helping the client to integrate the new point of view into
a. The total personality and self-concept
b. Significant relationships
Source: Schein (1987:93)
Three elements are necessary for the unfreezing stage to be successful:
a) The client needs to recognise that results have fallen short of expectations. The 
problem is that this information usually comes from outside the organisation or 
from information that higher level managers provide to subordinates, peers, or 
superiors. Communicating disappointment is difficult because it is threatening to 
face and if either the communicator or the recipient faces this threat, he or she 
will distort the information so that face can be saved (and thereby self-esteem 
preserved). Mintzberg’s work suggests that this is a particular problem in the 
bureaucracy because of the poor communication within the organisation. The 
work of Gunderson, Holling, and Light (1995) also supports this view because 
they found that bureaucracies are quite intent on implementing and refining (or 
concentrating on efficiency gains rather than evaluating the strategy, in 
Mintzberg's (1989) terminology).
b) Data that disconfirms expectation needs to become significant. That occurs only 
when some important goal or objective is not being met (this induces anxiety), or 
when some important ideal is being violated (this induces guilt). In the case of the 
DDBRA, the DDI, and the consultants what seemed to happen was that the 
different actors had different objectives or goals, and this meant that different sets 
of information were seen as significant and anxiety or guilt were raised in
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response to different things. That was another reason (besides the ones 
mentioned in Chapters 6 and 7) why it I saw it as important to work in a group 
setting.
c) Disconfirming information that has been deemed significant will only be accepted
if it does not involve personal humiliation and loss of face or self-esteem. In other
words, a condition must be created in which it is possible for a person to feel
specific guilt or anxiety without feeling worthless as a whole person, because
otherwise he will find a defence mechanism that distorts or in some other way
counteracts the disconfirming information. There is no standard formula for
creating psychological safety, and Schein (1987) recommends that the consultant
worry about “face” and be very careful not to exacerbate the feeling of being at a
disadvantage that the client already may have by virtue of admitting a problem.
My approach to creating this psychological safety was to offer assurance about
the effectiveness of the workshop format, that we were going to deal with the
issues that concern them, that we would have a small core group of people
working over time together (see Section 7.3.4), and that the fact that de Graaf
assured them that the difficulties they were facing were “normal” by international
standards. This strategy of having Mr de Graaf take the role of content expert and
myself as process consultant also created sufficient neutrality to be able to
facilitate the Decision Conference.
“The three consultant roles - expert, doctor, and process 
consultant - each have a key contribution to make. The expert 
and the doctor are most likely to be useful sources of 
disconfirmation and to be able to induce guilt or anxiety, to see 
how a given client situation if failing to meet important targets 
and how this should cause the client to want to do things 
differently. The reason these two models are not more 
successful in causing change, however, is that they often do 
not create enough psychological safety to permit the client to 
accept the information. Hence no real unfreezing occurs until 
the more process oriented process consultant creates enough 
psychological safety” (Schein, 1987:105).
I would argue that the second stage (cognitive restructuring) is quite well covered in
the Decision Analysis (particularly in the literature that I reviewed for the Decision
Conferencing approach).
Refreezing refers to that portion of the change process where, according to Schein, 
(1987), a new point of view is embedded both in the person’s own psychic life space 
and in the organisational relationships. By ensuring that the client remains the 
problem owner through the change process, it is more likely that the client will 
choose accept those parts that fit into his personality. Schein argues that this is 
important because otherwise the client will, at best, attempt to implement the
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recommendations in a stilted way which makes them seem incongruent and leading 
to disconfirmation and the erroneous conclusion that the suggestions were wrong. 
However, a compatibility/fit with the client’s own personality are not sufficient for 
successful implementation because the new view or the recommendations may 
violate the expectations of other around the client (his boss, peers, sub-ordinates, 
etc) to such an extent that they either not reinforce them or actually disconfirm them. 
In other words, the process of change and implementation must be managed 
carefully if the client’s new perceptions, attitudes, and behaviours are to survive.
7.3.4 The Strategic Choice Approach
The Strategic Choice Approach (SCA) is a planning and decision making approach 
developed by Friend and Hickling (1987) to enable groups of individuals representing 
different organisational departments, expertise, institutions to work together in a 
transparent, cyclical, and task oriented way on decision or planning problems that 
facilitates the incremental development of plans and the management of uncertainty 
(both visible, such as reports, and invisible, such as increased understanding and 
commitment). SCA belongs to a set of Soft Operations Research Approaches (for an 
overview see Rosenhead, 1989).
My primary interest in this approach derived from Friend and Hickling's (1987) 
detailed discussion of the practicalities of managing the SCA approach as it 
contained a lot of very pertinent advice on issues such as choosing and organising a 
work room, managing the flip charts in a way which allows members of a work group 
to participate actively in analysis, to producing records of the meetings. This was 
important because of my lack of experience in facilitating workshop processes.
As I studied Friend and Hickling (1987), I decided that one more aspect of SCA could 
be employed in my work, without straying too far from my primary task which was to 
evaluate the use of decision analysis. This was related to my earlier argument about 
the fact that one of the issues that had struck me as my analysis of the DDBRA’s 
management problem progressed was that the planning process that they were 
engaged in did not take the inter-relatedness of the elements of the fishery 
management strategy sufficiently into account. For example, the DDBRA’s decision 
on what to base the licensing fee on determines the incentives faced by fishermen 
about what proportion of their catch they would report. At the same time, the DDI 
decided to adopt the VPA method for determining fish stocks, and reliability of that 
method is a function of the fish catch reported.
In SCA, option schemes (alternatives) are developed by starting with an analysis of a 
range of Decision Areas (“opportunities for choice in which two or more different
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courses of action can be considered”). The next step is to establish working 
assumptions about the usefulness of consider the choice of alternative within each 
Decision Area in relation to choices made in other Decision Areas. By systematically 
determining the compatibility (or incompatibility) of different options within 
interconnected Decision Areas, it is then possible to develop a set of Decision 
Schemes (i.e. alternatives that are composed of different combinations of options 
within Decision Areas). Within the context of this thesis it is not necessary to go into 
further details about how these Decision Schemes are evaluated or refined, nor into 
the approach of SCA of managing uncertainty, because we did not use those 
elements of the approach in the workshops and due to task and space limitations of 
this thesis.
I will report in the next Chapter that we did use the concept of Decision Areas and 
that it was a useful mechanism for eliciting the elements of the licensing scheme that 
was in operation at the time as well as the one which the DDI and DDBRA were 
working on. Most importantly, this elicitation led to the production of much 
disconfirming data, which created enough guilt and anxiety so as to lead to the 
withdrawal of the licensing scheme that the DDBRA was about to submit to the 
Ministry of Privatisation for approval (myself and Mr de Graaf learned about that only 
in the course of the workshops that I organized), and thereby create the necessary 
conditions for the Decision Conference work to take place.
7.3.5 The formal agreement to hold the Decision Conference on Fishery 
Management
As indicated throughout the thesis so far, the fishery management problem was very 
peculiar. Even though there was a general dissatisfaction with the existing situation, it 
was not clear what the problem really was. Fishery management seemed on one 
hand to be stuck in very detailed analyses of particular issues (and this inhibited 
effective action from taking place), while at the same time the regulation department 
of the DDBRA simply pressed ahead with the design of regulations, practically 
ignoring the fact that the whole point of the two-year EBRD technical assistance 
project was to assist them in with development the most appropriate form of 
management for the fishery of this Biosphere Reserve.
Since DeGraaf had come for the first time, and the seminar process for the 
Management Planning Sessions was prepared, it became increasingly clear to me 
that there was the opportunity to engage the consultant and the others through the 
means of a Decision Conference.
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I got the agreement of the Governor, the Executive Director, the EBRD project team, 
and the fishery consultant to hold a Decision Conference with the following three 
objectives (elaborated in in Figure 7-7):
1. Enable the DDBRA to make a coherent policy choice.
2. Enable the DDBRA to transform their existing fishery management strategy.
3. Facilitate collaborative work between different departments within the DDBRA 
and between the DDBRA and other organisations.
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In order to overcome the problem with my lack of experience in organizing and 
facilitating Decision Conferences (I had facilitated one -  Sinoie, and observed one 
conducted by L.D. Phillips in London), I obtained the agreement of the London 
School of Economics to pay for Mr Peter Hall, an experienced Decision Conference 
facilitator associated with the LSE, to facilitate the conference in the DDBR together 
with me.
In the next chapter I will report on a three-day workshop series that I organized in 
preparation of the Decision Conference and on the two-day Decision Conference 
itself.
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Figure 7-7: Objectives of my intervention
1. Enable the DDBRA to make a coherent policy choice, in which they:
1 .a assess all value dimensions that they consider relevant and their relative 
priorities (this means that they are able to also consider aspects that they 
have so far not incorporated into previous analyses such as economic 
considerations, Biosphere Reserve objectives, value judgements of other 
stakeholders, and common-pool resource management design principles)
1.b consider the likelihood of events, their causes, effects, and relationships
1 .c integrate and manipulate data efficiently and effectively
1 .d assess different alternatives and if possible develop new innovative 
alternatives that are more preferred than the ones already identified
1 .e deal with disagreements about value, likelihood, or preferred alternative 
judgements in a generative way
1 .f avoid biases resulting from heuristisc employed in judgement
1 .g generate commitment to action (in the sense of knowing what to do next)
1 .h generate a type of understanding of the problems and preferred
alternatives that enables them to legitimate their choice of action
2. Enable the DDBRA to transform their existing fishery management strategy 
in which the DDBRA’s role was to determine a narrowly defined carrying 
capacity constraint (Maximum Sustainable Yield) and to command and enforce 
management activities, toward a co-management role aimed at maintaining or 
increasing the resilience of the social, economic, and ecological systems that 
constitute the DDBR. This meant that the strategy development process needed to:
2.a Create the motivation and readiness to change through
2.a.i identifying data that disconfirm the viability of the existing strategy, 
2.a.ii making this data significant by contrasting it important objectives 
or ideals of management
2.a.iii providing psychological safety
2.b Facilitate cognitive restructuring that includes:
2.b.i the development of a new shared social reality (needs to be social 
because it is strategy for co-management role which implies 
delegation of responsibility)
2.b.ii analysis of appropriate common-pool resource management 
regime features/elements
2.b.iii different view points so as to ensure robustness of the 
management strategy
2.c Facilitate the embedding of the new point of view into the psychic life 
space of employees of (at least) the DDBRA and in organisational 
relationships by ensuring that they remain owners of problem throughout 
the process.
3. Facilitate collaborative work between different departments within the 
DDBRA and between the DDBRA and other organisations so as to ensure that:
3.a the process of work is sufficiently flexible to respect time constraints
3.b social tragedies are avoided by working towards:
3.b.i serving the needs and capacities of different stratum managers
3.b.ii making responsibility delegation possible______________________
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Chapter 8 The DDBR fishery management Decision Conference
8.1 Introduction
In the preceding Chapters I have discussed the situation in the DDBR, the objectives 
of EBRD technical assistance project, the specific problems that the DDBRA had to 
deal with in designing and implementing a fishery management regime for the DDBR, 
alternative decision analysis approaches, the reasons why I chose to apply the 
Decision Conferencing approach, and the preparation of my intervention.
In this Chapter I discuss the work in the fishery management Workshops leading up 
to the Decision Conference, the Decision Conference itself, and the presentation of 
the results at the final integrative management planning Workshop of the EBRD 
project. The main question that I seek to address in this Chapter concerns the extent 
to which the process and the techniques that I employed enabled the DDBRA 
Executive Director and the persons whom he chose to help him develop, decide on, 
and promote a preferred fishery management strategy for the DDBR.
8.2 Preparatory Workshops
The main task of the preparatory fishery management Workshops that I organised 
was to create the motivation and momentum for the Decision Conference. These 
day-long Workshops took place on September 5th, 12th, and 16th 1994.49 Their main 
purpose was to prepare the Decision Analysis Conference that I report on in Section 
8.3.
As already discussed in Chapter 7 , 1 had obtained agreement from the Governor and 
the Executive Director of the DDBRA as well as the Resident Advisor of the EBRD 
project to hold a Decision Conference to develop and assess different management 
strategy options for the DDBR fishery but there were two major problems. First, the 
DDBRA was pressing ahead with working out the details of a concessioning system 
whose elements were not made public, and of which the consultants, who were 
supposed to help, knew little more than that it contained controversial elements and 
that the DDI scientists had reservation about it. Secondly, it was not clear to the 
Executive Director what exactly we would be dealing with in the Decision Conference
would like to thank Ms Gabriela loan, Ms Diana Bota, and Mr Eduard Ene for their help in translating 
the posters of the workshops.
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and at the same time I did not have training in facilitation; also LSE resources were 
limited to providing a Facilitator for only one Decision Conference.
I therefore suggested to the Executive Director that we start the process with one or 
more exploratory Workshops in which we analyse the individual decisions that 
constitute the DDBRA’s fishery management strategy. Together with the Foreign 
Fishery Consultant of the EBRD team, I argued that such an analysis would enable 
us to determine which decisions would most usefully be analysed through the 
Decision Conference.
Concerning the participants in the Workshop, I suggested to the Executive Director 
that it would be best if he formed a Core Group that would meet throughout the 
process and that further participants be asked to attend or consulted as the work 
progressed. I also suggested to the Executive Director that, since it was he who was 
ultimately accountable for the strategy that would be recommended on the basis of 
the analysis, it was most important that all those persons whose view he would like to 
take into consideration be present at the Workshops, but that he should also ensure 
that view points from outside of DDBRA and DDI should also be represented. In the 
event, ignoring my advice, he decided to invite only participants from the DDBRA, the 
DDI, and the EBRD project.
Since this was only a preparatory Workshop, and I felt that the main task was to 
create the motivation and readiness to change, I did not regard it as a serious 
drawback. With the exception of the Mr de Graaf -  the Dutch fishery consultant - only 
a variety viewpoints from within the DDBRA and DDI were represented (see Table 
8- 1).
Table 8-1 Participants at Preparatory Workshops
Dr Grigore Baboianu Executive Director, DDBRA
Dr Mircea Staras Scientific Director & Fish Biologist, DDI
Mr Nicolae Constantin Licences Department Director, DDBRA
Dr Ion Munteanu Natural Resources Department Director, DDBRA
Mr Ene Eduard Scientific Officer, Natural Resource Department, DDBRA
Mr Gertjan de Graaf Fishery Expert, EUROCONSULT
Mr Axel Kravatzky Facilitator, EUROCONSULT & London School of Economics
For the location of the Workshop I had suggested that we leave the DDBRA 
headquarters in order to create some distance from the DDBRA environment and to 
ensure that we were not disturbed. This proved not to be possible, because the 
nearest suitable venue would have required a boat ride and so involved more time. I 
obtained the assurance of the Executive Director that we would ask the participants
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not to be interrupted during the Workshop, and eventually we decided to hold it in the 
conference room of the DDBRA in Tulcea. We moved out all unneeded chairs and 
tables, so that there was sufficient room to move about. Refreshments were provided 
in the room. W e also removed pictures from the walls and left only a map of the 
DDBR so that there was ample room on the walls to display flipchart sheets. During 
the Workshop we worked mostly on the flipcharts on an aisle, but all participants 
were encouraged to make use of coloured markers to correct or make additions to 
the posters sheets already created on the walls.
Both Romanian and English were used in the Workshop, but in keeping with the 
objective of ensuring that the Romanian participants remained the problem owners, 
all posters were written in Romanian (either by myself or by participants). The 
majority of the discussion was in Romanian, and Dr Baboianu and Dr Staras usually 
translated for Mr de Graaf. I used both Romanian and English in facilitating the 
Workshop.
W e also agreed that the discussions in the Workshops would remain confidential until 
we agreed otherwise.
8.2.1 Session 1: Agreeing on whether or not there is a problem
The session started with the Executive Director welcoming the participants50, 
outlining the purpose of the Workshop, and introducing me as the Facilitator. I then 
outlined the process which I proposed for the Workshop. I pointed out that throughout 
this process those present would form a core group that worked together closely, but 
which could invite others to participate in the Workshop or consult others in between 
Workshops. I also emphasized that I was only in the role of Facilitator (and not as 
‘economics researcher5 as they had previously thought of me), concerned only with 
process issues.
To start the analysis process, I first proposed that participants think of all the major 
Decision Areas, which I defined (following Friend and Hickling (1987)) as: 
“opportunity for choice in which two or more different courses of action can be 
considered”. The response I got to this suggestion was not very encouraging as most 
hesitated in responding or thinking about the fishery management strategy/planning 
in that way. I explained more about the Decision Areas concept, and where the 
analysis would lead to, but then decided to work towards the Decision Areas, using a 
‘bottom-up5 approach, (i.e. building an objective hierarchy by starting with the lower
50 Dr Munteanu was unable to attend the first session.
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level objectives and then grouping them into increasingly higher levels (Watson and 
Buede, 1987).
I therefore used the following question: “What do we need to know in order to 
develop a sustainable fisheries management plan for the DDBR?” Participants were 
responsive to this question and discussion became lively.
At first Mr de Graaf outlined the general method for fishery management from a 
fishery science point of view: “one follows the stocks, observerves what with stocks 
over time, and on the basis of this makes decisions and develops a management 
plan. This overall plan is translated in into regulations and then the regulation is 
implemented”. Dr Baboianu picked up on this introduction and said: “let us make a 
management plan for sustainable fishery on the data that exists”. However, Dr Staras 
surprisingly announced categorically: “we can’t do that because we do not have the 
data! We can rely on the data we do have only 30-60%, we need effort data, we don’t 
have the data on catches in different areas -  at present we only have some idea on 
larger areas, such as Razelm.”
Mr de Graaf continued by drawing attention to the problem of economic prices: “What 
about economic prices? I also bring in the point of view of the fisherman, because 
that’s what the fisherman uses to make his decisions.” The difficulty that participants 
had with this line of enquiry was well captured by Dr Staras’ concentration on the 
relatively minor point of what the price of transport of fish from the cherhana to the 
market was -  as they had not incorporated economic considerations into their 
analysis they were repeatedly tempted to make lists of shortcomings without 
following through with the implications of these points.
A similar pattern emerged with regard to Mr de Graafs first point (“first follow your 
stocks”): if information on stocks for different zones was needed, then how do we 
define zones, Dr Staras and Baboianu asked? “Lakes, hydrological units?” Following 
this question de Graaf explained that it depends on what monitoring system is 
eimployed (the analytic, stock based approach of the VPA, or the more hollistic 
Schaeffer method which focused on catch). “But fish migrate between lakes” Dr 
Staras continued. “What about the natural mortality of fish? This also needs to be 
taken into account” Mr Constantin interjected. Dr Baboianu repeatedly came back to 
Dr Staras’ first point -  the problem is that available data "does not reflect reality" -  
“what is the minimum level of monitoring needed? Maybe we try to be very exact and 
detailed using a system that is very expensive?” Mr de Graaf emphasised that it was 
most important to know what the total catch was. Dr Baboianu concluded that it will 
be very important to find out what percentage of fish was not reported.
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Dr Staras and Dr Baboianu’s comments and conclusions suggest they had already 
started to acknowledge to themselves that their fishery management approach was 
severely flawed because on all of the points that were raised and discussed with 
respect to the information necessary for management (see Figure 8-1) there were 
major question marks and problems. Mr Constantin was still exploring different ways 
in which existing data could be used to shed some light on the information needed for 
management. For example, he was wondering if one could not use some indicator 
species to judge the overall state of the fish stock (something which both Dr Staras 
and Mr de Graaf said was not possible -  either because there were too many 
different options and no scientific agreement or because it could not yield the 
information necessary for harvesting decisions as opposed to ecological health of a 
system).
Among the other fishery management aspects discussed were institutional 
requirements (the need to separate monitoring (data gathering) and enforcement 
activities because fishermen would be less inclined to accurately report information 
about their catch if they knew they might be penalised), as well as trade-offs that 
need to be made when choosing between different monitoring methods (e.g. 
between accuracy, intended users, and costs).
Figure 8-1: Information needed for Management
Session 1, 5 September, 1994 
Poster 2
Information needed for Management
Elements Explanation Problems /  Questions
* Monitoring of zones * catch
* effort (nr of fishermen & 
gear)
* species
* For what size areas?
* Which are representative zones?
* Need to standardise effort 
measurement
* Do we need to take special 
account of economically valuable 
species?
* Which are the areas for 
reproduction?
* Monitoring of complexes
* Monitoring Method * through stock (VPA)
* through catch 
(Schaefer)
* VPA + Schaefer
* What accuracy is required?
* W hat are the differences in data 
requirement?
* Who does the monitoring? * How is it organized? * What kind of monitoring?
* How is the monitoring done?
* Different interpretations of 
monitoring!
* How are the data used? * Can other institutions or 
the public use it?
* What are the financial 
restrictions?
* What influences the 
accuracy of data reporting?
* Catch
* Effort
Note: this, and the following figures are literal translations and representations of the posters 
developed in the course o f the workshops.
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I then asked them what factors they thought were responsible for this lack of 
information for management? Initially Mr Constantin and Dr Baboianu argued, with 
the support of all other local participants that there is a “psychological tendendency” 
to refuse to say the truth. This, they thought was related primarily to the the history of 
living under the Ceausescu regime. I continued to repeatedly probe what the effects 
of telling the truth would be at present, and it was Dr Baboinau who first said that “it 
has to do with the payment of taxes.” In the subsquent discussion and elaboration, 
two main reasons were identified why catch and effort data were so unreliable.
The first reason for unreliable data, they argued while summarizing their points as on 
the flipchart as shown in Figure 8-2, relates to the economic incentives facing the 
fishermen, fishing companies, and wholesalers. On average, there is a 500% 
difference between what fishermen get from the companies that employ them and 
the retail price of the fish. Furthermore, Dr Staras argued that in practice rights to 
fishing areas are not clearly delineated nor are the rights and duties of fishing strictly 
enforced. As a result, fishermen illegally sell a substantial proportion of their fish 
directly to wholesalers. Mr Constantin elaborated by adding that “fishermen use 
primarily the gear from companies but do not deliver all their catch at the cherhana”. 
Mr de Graaf concluded that “this system suits all three groups involved”. The 
fishermen face few risks and are able to make a living (the risk of being caught is low 
because the DDBRA has limited resources to enforce the regulations, and the risk of 
over-investment in gear is also minimized because they get their gear from their 
employers, the fishing companies). The fishing companies know that the fishermen 
sell part of their catch illegally but tolerate the situation because they are able set 
monopoly prices and in that way can even cover their losses from fish farming, and 
wholesalers, who do not have to invest much in their operations are able to live 
comfortably on the difference between what they pay the fishermen and their sales 
on the wholesale or retail market.
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Figure 8-2: Economic incentives
Fishery workshop, September 5, Poster 3 
Economic Incentives
* 500% difference (average) between what the fishermen gets per kg and retail price
* vagueness in the delimitation of fishing areas (both in terms of fishing right and in the protection of
that right)
* current system suits the following groups:
Fishermen: are employees of companies and get gear from the companies (no expenditures, little 
risk) and sell on black market (against which there is hardly any enforcement).
Companies, know that fishermen sell on the side, but they can survive, even though they are
inefficient and top-heavy because they can set monopoly prices.
Wholesalers: buy from companies as well as from fishermen and are able to live well on the mark up.
(Investments, bureaucracy, loss from fish 
farming, salaries and benefits)








(Smaller investments than the state 
companies, and smaller overheads.)
Fisherman
The second reason for unreliable data on fishing that participants identified related to 
the organisational system, and in particular to the way in which recommendation 
were implemented and data about the effects of regulations were distorted along the 
chain of information flow. Figure 8-3, which illustrates the information flow system 
and its shortcomings, was drawn up mainly by Mr. Constantin, the Director of the 
Licensing Department, the person in charge of developing the licensing system.
In theory, the management system was supposed to operate like the closed linear 
system shown at the bottom of Figure 8-3. In practice, Mr Constantin explained, even 
the data about those fish that were actually delivered to the fish collection point 
("Cherhana”, which are owned and operated by fishing companies) were distorted -  
Dr Baboianu used the estimate of 20% being reported. Mr Constantin emphasized 
that due to lack of training, the lack of any proper recording system, and a general 
lack of interest, the fishing companies (and in particular their personnel at the fish 
collection points) introduced mistakes regarding the total quantity of fish delivered to 
them, the composition of the catch in terms of species and length of individual fish, in 
what zones of the DDBR the fish were caught, with what gear and in how much time.
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The result was that the DDBRA had, in effect, no real information or control over the 
actual fishing activity. This was quite a devastating conclusion, and even though it 
was not surprising to anyone, I sensed an uncomfortable feeling among most 
participants because it was stated so clearly that the data they were using was 
inadequate for the management system they wanted to implement.
Figure 8-3: Organisation of Information Flow
Fishery Workshop, September 5, Poster 4
Organisation of Information Flow (and its influence on fishery data)







- Wholesale Fish Traders
Legend:
—► Information Flow 
Flow of Fish
Errors at Cherhana
(Fish Collection Point) regarding:
* Total quantity caught
* Species caught
*  Zones where fish caught
* What gear employed
These problems arise because of:
* lack o f training
*  lack o f any proper recording system
* lack o f interest
Summary o f Organisational Shortcomings:
1. DDBRA has no control over the quality o f information
2. Lack o f data about fishing effort
3. Lack o f interest by Fishermen, cherhana, and Fishing companies 
in provision and analysis o f fishing data
4. Actual fishing activity is not controlled
Gathering & Sorting 
of data
w Analysis of 
dataw W Conclusions
Recommendations Implementation
Monitoring and Enforcement <
Notes: Theoretically, all information about fish catch was supposed to come through 
the DDBRA to the DDI. In practice, the DDI collected most information themselves 
from the companies (hence the broken line 5b) as well as through some experimental 
fishing.
Having established what information fishery management ought to be based on I led 
participants to continue with a more detailed analysis of exactly how the present and 
proposed management systems were falling short of providing what was needed. 
The next phase was important for two reasons: first, neither the existing management 
system nor the proposed one were ever deary captured on paper, there were no
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summaries of them, and no one person seemed to be in a positition to explain them 
fully. In order to improve and innovate, it was important to be clear on what existed.
The second reason for the importance of the next phase was that we were still in the 
first, or what Schein (1987) calls the “Unfreezing” stage of the change process (see 
Table 7-2, page 229). In the first step of the day we established what information 
management ought be based on we established a clear goal that because it was not 
being met started arouse anxiety among participants. By taking the process further 
and continuously comparing and contrasting the existing and porposed management 
system to the the management principles they had elaborated, I was also seeking to 
establish an important ideal that was capable of bringing up feeling of guilt among 
participants when violated. By end of this process consistent evidence was being to 
emerge that all participants had started to “unfreeze”.
Before assessing the regulation framework that the DDBRA and DDI had been 
working on for the whole year, we turned to the regulation system in effect at the 
time. Participants started to analyse the existing regulation system in relation to the 
five main components drawn out by Mr Constantin and shown in Figure 8-4. Dr 
Staras, who was in charge of the fish stock assessment at the DDI, explained that 
there were two possible ways to determine a Total Allowable Catch (TAC): through 
Virtual Population Analysis (VPA), which uses experimental sampling in different 
fishing zones to obtain data about fish stocks, and the Schaefer method (Schaefer, 
1954; 1957) which uses landed catch statistics. He argued that three factors 
prevented the DDI from establishing meaningful TACs: (i) there are many 
environmental factors that could affect fish mortality which so far have not been 
integrated into the analysis; (ii) catch statistics were unreliable; (iii) in both methods 
one needed to relate catch statistics to effort data in order to establish TACs, but that 
the information that they had was very inadequate.
Discussion then turned to the concessioning system through which individual fishing 
companies obtained exclusive use of fishing zones. For the most part the fishing 
zones consisted of whole lake complexes (systems), but for larger lakes or the 
Danube river, this meant that a continuous water body was divided up into different 
areas. The problem with this arrangement, Dr Staras argued, was that it was not 
consistent with the behaviour of either fish or fishermen. Fishing in open waters is a 
hunting activity and fishermen follow the fish which migrate between different areas 
(either within the same lake or between water bodies). Fishermen also used to fish in 
different areas depending on the season (for example, fishermen from the Black Sea 
used to join the Danube river fishery in the winter). Romanian participants also
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explained to Mr de Graaf that individual fishermen had traditional areas for passive 
gear that only they fished, while with active gear there were no traditional zones and 
fishermen moved around. The effect of this regulation element was twofold.
First, fishermen and fishing companies did not respect the regulation (and this was 
another factor why they did not accurately report what fish they caught where). 
Second, since it was obvious to all involved in the fishery that dividing up a lake into 
different areas is not practical, they tried to give concessions for whole lakes. This 
meant that only larger and established companies with sufficient gear, manpower, 
and capital had a real chance of obtaining the concessions (in Figure 8-4 auctions 
are mentioned, but in reality no real auction had taken place yet; instead fishing 
companies were allocated concessions on the basis of tradition and the number of 
gear and persons they employed).
The remaining three regulation elements referred to specific gear and fishing 
restrictions. The notes in Figure 8-4 explain what they consisted of and what the 
identified problems were.
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Figure 8-4: The Existing Regulation System
Fishery Workshop, September 5, Poster 5
E x is tin g  R e g u la t io n
Legal basis: Law 12 /1 9 7 4 , Law 82 /  1993, Government Decision 248 /1 9 9 4  
Since 1993 the following management system is in effect (up to 1990 a “state plan” was used):
R egu lation
Elem ents
Explanation P roblem s / Im plications



















xperimental sampling by zones
nalysis
ulated Effort + reported catch => 
AC
,edure for Schaefer method: 
/linimum 10 year data on catch 
nd effort
Calculate catch/effort ratio
^  I ------- -^------►
optimum Effort
* Environmental influences need to 
be taken into account
* Calculated effort & reported catch 
are sources of error.
=> C an't be used (information lack)
* Environmental influences need to 
taken into account
* Effort data inadequate
* Catch statistics inaccurate
=> C an't be used (information lack)
2 Establish Fishing 
Zones
* As far as possible lake complexes
* Several zones in same lake
* Fish migrate
* Goes against principles of fishing 
(where seasonal migration 
important)
* Because of the large size of the 
zones only large companies will 
have real access at the auction.
3 G ear restrictions * Mesh size
* Gear type
* Areas of fishing
* Many fishermen have their own 
gear but because they are not 
allowed to own any, they must use 
it clandestinely.
4 Regulation for 
individual species 
protection




* Applicable only in DDBR (but for 
e.g. migrating sturgeon intensely 
fished outside DDBR, and trawlers 
used in other parts of Black Sea)





- time period fished
- quantity caught by species
- areas fished
- number of boats used
- number of gear used
- number of man-days fished
* inconsistency in record keeping
* mixing of species
* false quantities
* inaccurate record keeping
* total nr. owned by company & not 
those actually used
* total no. in company & by zones
* inaccurate (overestimation)
After having established what the regulation system in effect at the time consisted of
and having realized and written down that every single component of the system had 
severe problems, we turned to the proposed regulation system.
The Director of the Licensing Department (Mr Constantin) took us through the 
different elements of the regulation system as shown in Figure 8-5. The first element
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discussed was the proposed concessioning of contracts for fishing in zones. At this 
point a lengthy discussion took place because there were different understandings of 
what the law required or allowed. Eventually the following transpired: according to 
Romanian law the DDBRA can only auction concession contracts for certain areas 
and the resources they contain. In the case of the DDBR this meant that DDBRA 
would auction fishing rights for areas for which the DDI established a Total Allowable 
Catch. Since an area might have multiple uses (eg. tourism and reed harvesting) the 
exclusivity of the concessionaire’s rights would be limited to the Total Allowable Fish 
Catch. In order to give smaller fishing companies or incorporated individual fishermen 
the possibility of obtaining a fishing area, the DDBRA had earlier in the year (March) 
proposed to establish 51 fishing areas, ranging from large to very small lakes. In 
response to this proposal fishermen and fishing companies came to protest at the 
DDBRA.
One of the problems aired was the fact that small fishing areas would yield too few 
fish to support a fishermen for the whole year. The other problem was that the 
proposed concessioning of zones would prevent fishermen from moving between 
different fishing areas with the seasons, as they have done in the past. In response, 
the DDBRA tried to estimate the annual fish yield which would enable the average 
fisherman to live per year. They arrived at the figure of between 5 and 10 tonnes of 
fish. They then thought of establishing a large number of small fishing areas, and 
auctioning off packages of fishing areas so that fishermen would be able to catch 
sufficient fish and fish in different areas. For example fishermen from the Black Sea 
able to fish on the Danube in the winter months.
This did not work out either, apparently because this would have required a 
tremendous organizational and administrative effort from the DDBRA, they were not 
really convinced that it would work, and there was also the risk that if the actual fish 
catch in a fishing zone turned out to be lower than the TAC calculation assumed, 
there was the danger that fishermen would be almost forced to overexploit it. 
Furthermore, Dr Baboianu was adament that the DDBRA did not have the 
responsibility to provide fulltime employment in the fishery for all who considered 
themselves fishermen. Instead, the DDBRA should establish how much fish a 
particular area can yield and develop a mechanism through which the right to fish 
that area can be attributed in a fair way. Mr Constantin, on the other hand, explained 
that he was mostly concerned with possible objections by fishermen who could argue 
that their area does not contain enough fish for all to make a living.
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At the time of this first Workshop, a total of 49 fishing zones had been established 
(25 in lakes of the DDBR, 20 on the Danube river, and 4 on the Black Sea part of the 
DDBR). As Figure 8-5 indicates, participants perceived the main problem with this 
proposal to be that it favoured larger companies rather than traditional family-based 
fishing. The other problem that Dr Staras mentioned and to which the other 
participants agreed to was the way the fishing zones were established -  “the use of 
the ruler is the biggest problem -  but if this is what the Governor wanted, what can 
we do?” (see Figure 8-4 for illustration).
Most of the remaining time of this first Session was then spent discussing the 
proposed concession fee (element 4 in Figure 8-5). Two aspects of the concession 
fee were noted: first, companies who wanted to bid for the rights to fish in an area 
had to make a sealed offer to the DDBRA about how much more than a minimum of 
18% of the value of the estimated TAC, calculated at the current unprocessed 
average fish price level, they were willing to offer as a fee for the concession. The 
bidder who offered the highest percentage would win. The second element, however, 
is that the company that obtained the contract would be required to pay only 10% of 
the promised concession fee in advance. The remaining 90% of the fee would be 
paid during the fishing season and would be a function of how much fish the 
company actually caught. Enforcement of this arrangement was to occur through 
self-reporting by the companies and one specialised inspector for the whole DDBR!
Theoretically, private companies should be favoured by this arrangement because 
having lower overhead costs they should be able make higher bids than state 
companies. Participants noted, however, that this was unlikely to happen in practice. 
In fact, Dr Baboianu was worried that there would be no private sector participants at 
all in the auctions, mainly because the fishing areas were too large for them. The 
other major observation, first put forward by de Graaf, was that the proposed 
concession fee would act as a disincentive for accurate reporting of fish catch. 
“Surely”, de Graaf argued, “a profit maximising fisherman or fishing company would 
seek to declare as little catch as possible so as to avoid paying taxes - just like 
anywhere else in the world”. The other participants could see his point but were 
unsure what realistic alternatives there could be.
The implication for the proposed regulation system as whole was, however, that 
there was no reason to believe that this system would yield the information they 
thought was necessary to manage the fishery in a sustainable way.
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Figure 8-5: The Proposed Regulation System
Fishery Workshop, September 5, Poster 6 
Proposed Regulation System 
(Concessioning of zones with resource)
Elements Explanation Problems / Implications
1 Concession contracts for 
zones (limiting rights only 
to fish resources)
* It possible that only larger companies 
(state) can participate at auction 
because zones quite large. Many, 
smaller, zones are difficult to administer. 
This contravenes the traditional family 
nature of fishing in DDBR.
2 Concessioning through 
auction
3 Contract length 5 years * 3 years is too little for duties 
given (which include 
restocking waters with 
fingerlings)
* 10 years may be too inflexible 
for the DDBRA
4 Concession fee
* minimum 18% of TAC 
for auctioned zone
* calculated at current
unprocessed fish price level.
* state companies have large overheads 
-> private companies may be favoured
* in function of landed 
catch (max. TAC, min 
18%)
* 10% in advance * Fee with minimum leads to false (profit 
maximising) declarations 
=> Management impossible
5 Total Allowable Catch 
(TAC)
* Established through VPA 
method
* accurate data essential!
6 Duties
* fishing method * For active, passive, seasonal 
fishing. Only through 
traditional methods (DDI 
establishes these)
* maintenance of zone * Access ways
* Protection of reproduction 
areas
* Selective Repopulation
* placing, marking of gear * Visibility & ownership * Often invisible now
* access ways * Traditional canals & existing 
fish collection points
* Prevent re-entry into area after landing 
catch
* max. fishing effort (nr. 
gear, boats & usage)
* Based on last years 
declarations
* Private gear was not declared => 
underestimation
* rules for access to zone * Taking account of other 
activities in zone.
* Can be changed at any time.






* According to law * Poaching occurs at night
At the end of the Session we agreed to meet again the following week to identify 
decision areas more systematically, to specify options for each decision area, and to 
determine a decision focus. We did not plan to evaluate the possible alternatives, 
leaving that instead to the Decision Conference in the following month.
From the perspective of the objectives of my intervention (see Figure 7-7 page 235), 
this first Workshop Session had established two important points:
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First, the motivation for change had been initiated. By outlining and explaining the 
problems of the current and the expected regulation system for the first time in a 
systematic form on paper, and openly coming to the conclusion that the proposed 
regulation system were not going to enable the DDBRA to manage the fishery in a 
sustainable way, all the essential conditions for creating a motivation and readiness 
to change had been established.
The second important point of the Session was that effective collaboration between 
different departments of the DDBRA and between the DDBRA and DDI had been 
initiated. Participants felt satisfied that some progress had been made because a lot 
of ground had been covered, and they very much enjoyed the facilitated way of 
working as it allowed them to concentrate on content and discussion, while I ensured 
that group maintained its focus on the primary task. Evidence for this constitutes the 
fact that they explicitly supported me when I interrupted discussions that had started 
to get stuck and urged them to make a note of it move on.
8.2.1 Session 2: Decision Areas and Options
Between the two Workshop Sessions I met with de Graaf. We tried to include some 
more technical issues that de Graaf was concerned about, but also to experiment 
with the Strategic Choice techniques and to reflect, analyse, and anticipate the 
direction that we were going to take in the next Workshop session. I took one of the 
products of that experimentation, the poster with the Decision Areas and their 
options, into the next Workshop but very soon found out that participants did not 
really like working with them, and instead preferred to continue from where they left 
off.
The session started with a review of the work we had done the last time we had met. 
Dr Munteanu, the Director of the Natural Resource Department, who was unable to 
attend the previous session was briefed by Dr Baboianu and myself on what we had 
discussed the last time. One of the reasons why this could be done reasonable 
quickly was that we had displayed the posters along the wall, and could refer to them 
and pick out the most important points. Nevertheless, it took almost an hour of 
explanation and discussion between Dr Munteanu and the other participants before 
they all felt comfortable of each other's understanding as to where they had reached 
so far.
The main task of this session was to identify all the opportunities for choice between 
two or more different courses of action (Decision Areas) and to develop a full, but still 
realistic, list of options open to the DDBRA. One could have then evaluated the
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compatibility of the different options with each other and in that way generated a wide 
variety of different regulation packages for further evaluation. My idea behind this 
approach was to show that the proposed regulation scheme was only one of many 
more schemes open to the DDBRA. More specifically, my expectation was that this 
process would have further emphasised the point that there were very important 
inconsistencies in the proposed regulation scheme and that there are, in fact, 
alternative schemes that avoid them. If time had allowed, I planned to return to 
consider the aims of the regulation scheme, which we briefly discussed at the 
beginning of the first session, in order to elicit some more specific objectives of 
fishery regulation.51
The first Decision Area we discussed was labelled “Auction Type?” (see Figure 8-6). 
The form of notation was adopted from Friend and Hickling (1987). W e noted that it 
was possible in principle to auction concessions for zones for the exclusive use of 
one company (as in the proposed regulation) or to auction concessions for a certain 
amount fish to several different companies within the same zone. The discussion of 
this point was rather long, but informative, as participants explained to each other 
their different understandings of how fishing operated in practice.
My main mode of intervention was to repeatedly ask what other decisions needed to 
be taken into account if they had to decide between the options they identified within 
each Decision Area. In this way we identified fourteen Decision Areas. As this 
analysis progressed, I realised that some of the options specified for the Decision 
Areas were not properly defined (for example, the options listed under “How do we 
protect the recruits?” were not strictly alternatives because they would always be 
employed in some combination), while some Decision Areas could be better 
specified (example “What gear ownership do we promote?” was probably better 
thought of as a Comparison Area (in the language of Strategic Choice) or an 
objective (in decision analytic terms)). There were also some Decision Areas, such 
as “what auction zone?” and “what type of monitoring?” which were probably too 
specific compared to the other issues that we were dealing with.
The main reason why I did not insist on specifying the Decision Areas more 
consistently is that an important transformation in the understanding and thinking of 
participants took place through this analysis and they were able to interpret the notes 
on the flip chart sufficiently well. The transformation that I am referring to relates to
51 However, in the event there was not enough time for that, but we dealt with that in the Decision 
Conference.
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the fact that participants were able to see that there were two generic roles open to 
the DDBRA: in addition to a command-and-control role which the DDBRA had been 
assuming until then as the only possibility, it was also possible that the DDBRA 
would adopt a more facilitative role, in which its ‘policing’ role was reduced and co­
operation with fishing companies and fishermen increased. There are several 
underlined notes in Figure 8-6 that indicate this second role.
We ended this session by agreeing that we would briefly meet one more time to 
decide on the specific objectives and dates for a Decision Conference in which we 
would develop alternative regulation options which we would evaluate against 
common objectives and which we would present for further discussion or adoption at 
the Final Interdisciplinary Management Planning Workshop in the middle of October.
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Figure 8-6: Decision Areas
o
Fishery Workshop, 12 September, poster I a,b 
Decision Areas
oortunity for choice in which two or more different courses of action can be considered
Label Decision Area Options
1 Auction Type? What auction type? * One zone for each agent
* Multiple aaents within one laraer zone -> better for 
enforcement.
2 Zone? What auction zone? * Lakes & Danube in Delta (Econ & Buffer Zone)
* Razim & Sinoie Complex (Econ Zone)
* Danube Arms (Econ Zone)
* Black Sea (Econ Zone)
3 Tax? What concession Tax? * None
* In fish
* Lump Sum Fee on TAC
* As a calculated equivalent
* As a proportion of caught fish
4 Contract? What Terms of Contract? * Length:
* 3 years (short)
* 5 years (medium)
* 10 years (long)
* tradeable /  non-tradeable
* Facilities offered by DDBRA
* restocking fingerlings
* environmental investment facilities
* tax exemptions
5 Duties? What type of Duties? * Only duties
* Duties linked with benefits (incentives)
6 Gear? What type of gear 
ownership do we 
promote?
* Economic agent ownership?
* State companies
* Familv associations






* Min. Catch size
8 Stock? How do we protect the 
stock?
* Regulation of effort (gear) or/and Total Allowable 
Catch




* 70% control & 30% incentives
* 30% control & 70% incentives
10 Enf. Who? Who will do the 
enforcement?
* DDBRA
* Other enforcement bodies (police, financial police)
11 Mon. Type? What type of monitoring? * Razim /  Sinoie
* North Danube Delta
* South Danube Delta
* Danube River
* Black Sea
12 Mon. Method? What Monitoring Method? * Virtual Population Analysis (VPA)
* Schaefer Method
* VPA & Schaefer
13 Mon. Who? Who does the 
monitoring?
* DDBRA effort & DDI stock
14 Performance? How do we monitor the 
performance of the 
concessioning system?
* Through researchers
* From the DDBRA
* Through the fishermen
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8.2.2 Session 3: Agreeing on the details of the Decision Conference
Looking back at the schedule of events summarized in Table 7-1 of Chapter 7, one 
can see that the Sustainable Economic Development Zones Workshop was held the 
day after the second session of the Workshops I organized on the fishery. I had 
already indicated in Chapter 7 that all the proposals made by the fishery experts, as 
presented in (Staras, 1994) and (de Graaf and Staras, 1994) were adopted, with the 
exception of those relating to licensing.
Though I expected that, it was still a good confirmation of the fact that we were 
working on a very important point. I was also very pleased that the Governor, Mr. 
Tarhon, had publicly given us the authority to work on the development of a fishery 
regulation scheme. However, I was not expecting the following:
W e met, as agreed in Session 2, at Dr Staras’ office to establish the dates for the 
Decision Conference and to agree on its objectives. Dr Staras, Mr de Graaf, Dr 
Baboianu, and Mr Constantin were present. Once we started to talk about 
participants, and timing, Mr Constantin announced that he would not be able to 
attend because that was exactly the time that he had to be in Bucharest at the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Privatization to present the concessioning 
system for approval. We were all quite surprised, most of all Mr de Graaf and myself, 
because it so clearly went against what we had established in Session 2.
We enquired about how this was possible and Mr Constantin’s view (maybe 
supported by the others) was that our work on the fishery management issues was 
important, interesting, and worthwhile, but the DDBRA had submitted the request to 
meet with those Ministries a long time ago, and it takes many months before 
meetings are granted. Furthermore, postponing this meeting would mean that it 
would be impossible to organise a concession auction for the next season (in spring) 
because even arranging for a new meeting with the ministries would probably not 
take place till the new year. Mr de Graaf and myself argued that it was their, and in 
particular the Executive Directors’ choice. If they went ahead and submitted the 
proposal we would see no point in continuing with this process, and Mr de Graaf 
would not return to Romania as agreed. After a short but intense moment, Dr 
Baboianu and Mr Constantin decided to withdraw the proposal and Mr Constantin 
announced that he would not go to Bucharest after all. I believe that this was the 
moment when the readiness to change had really been established.
After this session I met with the Executive Director of the DDBRA and we discussed 
the details of the upcoming Decision Conference. There were two main issues that
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needed to be dealt with: first, what the intended goal of the Decision Conference 
would be, and secondly, who would participate.
The Executive Director of the DDBRA decided that he wanted to focus on the 
licensing aspects because he thought that this was the most contentious and difficult 
aspect of the fishery management strategy. The specific objectives that we agreed 
on for the Decision Conference were as follows:
1. To review the progress made in the three preceding Workshop Sessions.
2. To establish long term fundamental objectives for inland and marine fishery 
management.
3. To agree on a set of preferred strategies for achieving the objectives.
4. To agree on a set of proposals for licensing inland fishing which will be presented 
for consultation at the Interdisciplinary Management Seminar on October 19 and 
to agree also on how these will be presented. If time allows, to consider wider 
strategies for fishery management.
5. To agree on the actions necessary to implement objectives 3 and 4.
We discussed participation at the Decision Conference and I earnestly pressed Dr 
Baboianu to consider inviting at least two higher level managers of private fishing 
companies, higher level managers from state fishing companies, NGOs, and other 
persons from the DDBRA, DDI, and others from Ministries who would be in position 
to criticise decisions or whose assistance he would like to have in deciding on the 
new licensing strategy. The persons Dr Baboianu invited are shown in Table 8-2.
Table 8-2: Participants at the Decision Conference
Dr Grigore Baboianu Executive Director, DDBRA
Dr Mircea Staras Scientific Director & Fish Biologist, DDI
Mr Nicolae Constantin Licences Department Director, DDBRA
Dr Ion Munteanu Natural Resources Department Director, DDBRA
Mr Eduard Ene Scientific Officer, Natural Resource Department, DDBRA
Mr Ernst STrbu Lawyer, DDBRA
Mr Cristocea Director, Tulcea Fishing Company & Vice President of 
Romania’s Fishing Company Association
Mr Gertjan de Graaf Fishery Expert, Euroconsult
Mr Peter Hall Decision Conference Facilitator, Enterprise LSE
Mr Axel Kravatzky Facilitator, Euroconsult & London School of Economics
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Following the choice of objectives and participants for the Conference I briefed Mr 
Peter Hall, the facilitator from the London School of Economics, and we agreed on 
the wording of a calling notice for participants (see Appendix, Section 10.1). In that 
invitation we outlined the objectives for the Conference and emphasized that the role 
of the facilitators is to assist with the process of analysis and decision making. We 
suggested that participants prepare a key-word outline of different options together 
with their advantages and disadvantages.
Mr Hall arrived two days before the Decision Conference so as to have time to meet 
with Dr Baboianu as well as members of the EBRD project team and left the day 
following the Conference.
8.3 The Decision Conference Workshops
The Decision Conference took place on the 12th and 13th of October 1994 in the 
conference room of the DDBRA. Mr Hall took the lead in facilitating and my role was 
that of co-facilitator and decision analyst. In the following description of the Decision 
Conference whenever I speak of "we", I refer to Mr Hall and myself. Both Romanian 
and English were used during the conference and I was also the main translator 
(since not all participants spoke English).
Dr Baboianu welcomed the participants, explained the objectives of the Decision 
Conference as I have shown them on page 256. Subsequently Mr Hall outlined the 
process that we were going to use over the next two days. Rather than continuing 
straight from where we had reached at the end of the preparatory Workshop 
Sessions, we asked participants to briefly describe some of the main concerns that 
they wanted addressed in this Decision Conference. We summarized the discussion, 
in keywords on a flip chart (see Figure 8-7). This made it easier for the 3 participants 
who did not take part in the previous sessions to link into the process and the group, 
allowed all to start contributing (for example Mr Cristocea added his concern that 
“that there was already legislation and regulation for fishery management, but that 
this needed to be applied in practice”) and helped everyone to start thinking about 
objectives (I have discussed the reasons why this is important at length in Chapter 3 
and 6).
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Figure 8-7: Initial Key Issues and Working Agreements
Initial Key Issues
True estimates of fish stock.
System of licensing.
Fit resource law to requirement in fisheries 
management 
Solution for 3 aspects:
a) protecting resources
b) economic use of resource
c) legislation
How to protect fish species of high economic 
value.
Howto apply current regulation in full.
To establish maximum sustainable yield levels. 
Data reported by fishermen poor.
To find the best way and time through regulation 
to achieve sustainable fish resource. 
Sustainable harvesting of fish resources. 




Context of likely overall DDBRA strategy
Currently 40-50% of the high value fish are sold 
unreported on the black market 
Time scale of strategy at least 5 years
First consider from fisheries management point of 
view then consider legal aspects and political 
acceptability 
Current legal position:
1. Only companies may be licensed
2. Only one licence per zone ( area)
In order to assist the group to stay focused we asked them to establish some 
assumptions that they all agreed to for this Decision Conference (these are indicated 
in Figure 8-7 under the heading “working agreements”).
The “focus on licensing” agreement was put forward by Dr Baboianu, as he wanted 
to ensure that the workshop did tackle the most thorny issue, while also 
acknowledging that there were other important issues to consider at another 
occasion. Mr Constanting added that he wanted the group to agree to focus on what 
would be likely developments in the overall DDBRA strategy, as opposed to 
proposals that look good but which are not implementable. In order to avoid renewed 
lenthy discussions about fish catch numbers, Dr Staras and Mr de Graaf proposed to 
start with the shared agreement that 40-50% of the fish catch is not reported.
It was significant that there was a consensus among the participants who were part 
of the preparatory workshops on wanting to evaluate the management options first 
from a fisheries management point of view and only afterwards introduce the existing 
legal and political constraints. It indicated that they were willing to go beyond their 
previous preoccupation with prevailing constraints. When we asked the group what 
time scale they wanted to consider, Dr Baboianu said without much hesitation “5 
years”. There was some laughter because the communist regime had frequently 
referred to 5year development plans, but even on reflection this was time frame that
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Dr Baboianu was most comfortable with. His choice of the five year planning horizon 
also confirmed the hypothesis that he was a Stratum IV manager (see Chapter 5).
The group then went on to discuss the relationship between the objectives of the 
fishery and those of the DDBR. Participants defined the strategic objective of the 
DDBR to be: “Nature conservation and the restoration of fisheries resources.” In 
terms of the fishery, participants identified three subsidiary objectives through which 
the main objective of the DDBR would be achieved:
• Biodiversity Protection: To protect existing fish populations with a high ecological 
value and restore the previous natural balance.
• Fishing Regulation: To achieve a licensing system which maximises the 
conservation value52 of the fish biodiversity.
• Sustainable Use: To maximise economic potential and to achieve sustainable use 
of the fishery resources for local fishermen.
8.3.1 The First Model
Having established these three subsidiary objectives for fishery management in the 
DDBR, we then turned to develop licensing options and to evaluate them. This 
process started with resume given by myself of the preceding fishery sector 
Workshops (referring to the posters from those Workshops were displayed on the 
walls of the conference room), highlighting their different stages and the main 
conclusions.
8.3.1.1 Developing the first set o f alternatives
The following phase of the workshop dealt with the development of a first set of 
regulation alternatives. As indicated in the invitation to the decision conference (see 
Appendix 10.1 on page 316) all participants were asked to think of realistic 
alternatives. Their proposals show what aspects of fishery management they found 
important, it gives an indication of their values, and the perspectives with which they 
entered this process.
We started by asking participants to summarise the licensing scheme in operation at 
the time (which we called the Current system) and the one that the DDBRA and DDI
52 The term “conservation value” was introduced by Mr de Graaf as he explained that conservation 
meant "wise use”, and that the fishing regulation should aim to maximise the value of both the caught 
fish and that left in the water.
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had been formulating for the past year (which we called the Proposed system). By 
noting the features that participants used to describe and discuss these two 
schemes, we drew up a list of key differences. There were three main categories of 
features: the type of licence (for an area with a certain catch limit, for a certain time 
period, what fees were charged, etc); who was conducting the actual fishing activity 
(state companies with fishermen as employees or associations, small companies, or 
individual fishermen who owned their own gear); and how the fish was distributed 
and marketed (through companies at fixed prices, or auctions).
Participants identified many problems (already indicated in Figure 8-7) with these two 
proposals. We then asked participants to suggest other options that would address 
their concerns and have a better chance of achieving the fishery management 
objectives. As participants described and explained their preferred options we 
summarized them in two ways. First, we summarised them through an Option Name 
and a brief narrative, as shown in Table 8-3. Secondly, we noted the components 
that they mentioned, and set them down as "Key Differences” on four adjacent flip 
chart sheets, so that all the options and their differences were summarised in a table 
like format (see Table 8-4 page 273).
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Table 8-3:The first set of fishery licensing options
Option 1 
Current System
Twenty one licences are issued by the DDBRA free of charge. Those 
who obtained licences often pass them on to others and as result 
probably about 130 'companies' are operating in the DDBR. 
Enforcement of quotas is difficult, and management is impossible 





DDBRA staff had worked together with the DDI on this for the past 
year and they had withdrawn it from the approval process, pending 
the result of this Decision Conference. In total 50 concession 
contracts (licences) were prepared, giving exclusive fishing rights for 
certain areas, and only companies are allowed to participate in the 
auction. The highest bidder agrees to pay a percentage of the value 




Licences, for fishing quotas, are auctioned directly to fishermen who 
pay a fee on the quota they obtained. Fishermen auction their fish at 
the 'cherhanas' to achieve the best price. The state fishing 
companies become service companies taking only a small 




Licences, for quotas and areas, are auctioned only to companies. 
The companies’ distribution/marketing system is improved by 
opening more retail outlets, thereby increasing their income, and 




Licences, for areas, are auctioned to companies and fishermen 
associations. Fishermen own their gear or lease it from the 
companies, who would also auction the fish for the fishermen. The 





Licences have a contract length of 20 years and are made 
transferable and inheritable. The idea is to introduce more 





During the groups discussion with the Governor the importance of 
rapid implementation was re-emphasised. Therefore, only the most 
important change was made to option 2: the licence fee is a fixed 
lump sum on the quota and not on the eventual fish caught.
Initially, four main alternative options emerged: Dr Staras and his colleague from the 
DDI (Mr Navodaru) proposed a licensing system in which quotas (instead of fishing 
areas) were auctioned Directly to the fishermen, and the licence fees being based 
on the total quota obtained (i.e., the Total Allowable Catch) instead of on the fish 
landed. They argued that this would ensure that the data reported was more accurate 
because fishermen had nothing to lose from declaring their real catch. Furthermore, 
they proposed that fishermen should be allowed to own their own gear and choose 
the Cherhana to which they delivered the fish. This licensing system would thereby 
combine modern fish stock assessment with the traditional Cherhana system that
was in effect before the Communist period (specifically the Cherhana system in 
operation at the time of Antipa, 1890s to 1940s).
The Director of the Tulcea Fishing Company (Mr Cristocea) suggested auctioning 
licences for either areas or fishing quotas, depending on the size of the fishing areas 
in question. He also argued that as the fishing companies were presently undergoing 
a transition and that as competition between companies increased and their loss- 
making fish farming operations were taken out of operation, they would be able to 
improve their Distribution and retail operations, thereby increasing their own 
revenues also enabling them to pay fishermen more for their catch. While he did not 
express a clear preference for either licences for areas or quotas, the perspective 
which made this possible was most clearly expressed in his estimation how many 
licences would need to be issued under the prosposed system: between 1-30. In 
other words, there would be a consoldidation of the current fishing companies -  even 
up to point of re-creating something like the former “Centrala Delta Dunarii”53
The Director of Licensing at the DDBRA (Mr Constantin) proposed to improve the 
Current system by allowing fishermen to own their own gear and to form 
Associations which could compete with the fishing companies in the auction. In 
order to reduce the price differential between the retail price of fish and what they 
receive from the Cherhanas of the fishing companies, the latter should be assisted in 
developing a wholesale auction system of the fish that fishermen delivered to them. 
This was therefore only a slight modification from the Proposed system -  the most 
significant point being that associations would be included in the auction.
The fishery consultant (Mr de Graaf) argued that neither the Current nor the 
Proposed licensing system gave enough incentives for profit competition at the 
Margin because the contract length of licences was too short for individual fishermen 
or companies to feel secure about any possible investments (either in gear or in 
resource husbandry). He, like the participants before him, built on the proposals 
made by others and suggested that the contract length should be extended to around 
20 years and be transferable or inheritable. This would mean that if the DDBRA 
decided that it was necessary to reduce effort, they would need to buy back licences 
rather than simply withdrawing them or lowering the TAC below what they really 
thought was appropriate. After hearing the explanation for the making licences 
transferable and inheritable, Dr Staras and Mr Navodaru ammended their proposed
53 This is the name of the monopoly company that conducted all economic affairs in the Danube Delta 
during the Ceauseco regime -  see Chapter 2.
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alternative to include this feature as well. Mr de Graaf also explained that he put 
forward this particular alternative so as to represent the point of view of the eventual 
resource user. More specifically, he said that only if contract lengths were sufficiently 
long and tradeable, could the more productive fishing companies prove themselves 
afford to buy up licences of those who were less competitive.
In the early afternoon of the first day, the Governor joined the Decision Conference 
participants for about one hour. Dr Baboianu explained the process we were 
engaged in and asked him to give us a brief overview of his main concerns. The 
Governor explained that he was very glad that we analysed the problem in such a 
systematic and rigorous way because he felt that fishery was one of the most 
important and difficult problems that the DDBRA was dealing with. He emphasized 
that he wanted to “bring order” into the fishery, that management needed to be based 
on scientifically established facts, and most importantly, that action was urgently 
needed. Following this intervention by the Governor, participants developed an 
Improved version of the Proposed licensing system. The main idea was to replace 
single most damaging feature of the Proposed system -  namely making the license 
fee a function of the declared catch -  with a fixed lump sum fee on the TAC of the 
auctioned zone..
8.3.1,2 Developing an Objectives Hierarchy
In order to elicit the set of objectives against which to evaluate the licensing 
alternatives, we asked participants to discuss the trade-offs that a choice between 
the alternatives implied, why they preferred one over another, and other similar 
questions. Note that this process is not like the one recommended in the MSDA 
approach (see Chapter 3), where all participants list their different concerns. The 
emphasis here was on creating a shared understanding out of a reflective discussion 
on the key trade-offs.
In the course of that discussion, we, the Facilitators, noted (through keywords on flip 
chart) a series of different value dimensions that emerged. W e then asked 
participants to reflect on these, add to them or change, and then to formulate these 
as objectives with a direction of preference and attributes through which they could 
be measured. Participants specified the following six objectives:
• "LEGAL DIFFICULTY: Minimize the extent to which current laws need to be 
changed or amended". Initially it seemed as though alternatives would either 
fall within the law or not, but Mr Sirbu pointed out for some alternatives, such
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as Association, the Government would only need to make an amendment by 
issuing a Government Decision.
• "ILLEGAL TRADE: Minimize the black market fish trade, measured through 
the expected price differential between wholesale market price and what 
fishermen receive when delivering fish at the fish collection points".
• "TIME: Minimize the time required for implementation of the first auction of 
licences, measured by the amount of preparation needed by the DDBRA, 
DDI, fishing companies or associations".
• "BIODIVERSITY: Maintain or increase the diversity of the fish stock in the 
ecosystem, measured by the extent to which the licensing system 
encourages selective fishing" (i.e. what species are caught, what size/age, 
and respect for prohibition periods).
• "SUSTAINABLE INCOME: Maximise the degree to which the licensing 
scheme promotes the sustainability of income for the local population through 
the maintenance of the fish stock (ie, protect the overall fish stock, as 
opposed to diversity of the fish stock, from overexploitation) and the access of 
local fishermen to it."
• "DATA COLLECTION: Maximise the degree to which the licensing scheme 
promotes access to data on total effort and total catch, as measured by the 
price and organizational incentives faced by fishermen and fishing 
organisations."
Before ranking these objectives in order of importance, we sought to ensure that the 
objectives satisfied the mutual preference independence condition that is necessary 
in a simple additive Multi-Attribute Utility Model. For this we asked several questions 
about participants’ preferences between two attribute levels on one objective while 
holding a third attribute scores on an different objective constant (see Chapter 3 for 
more details about the technique). For most objectives this condition was satisfied 
without any major difficulty, but for two it required some careful thinking and precise 
definitions.
In the case of the BLACK MARKET and DATA COLLECTION objectives, participants 
(especially Mr Constantin and Dr Staras) insisted that these were two different 
dimensions (eg. illegal trade can be low but data availability still poor due to 
organisational problems), and that the definitions they eventually agreed on, enabled 
them to make preference statements such as ‘we prefer to reduce black market trade 
even if this diminishes data on total effort and catch are available.’ In the case of the
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BIODIVERSITY and SUSTAINABILITY objectives, a re-definition was necessary 
because initially both objectives included the attribute measure of staying within the 
TAC, but it was not easy to distinguish between the effects on biodiversity and total 
fish stock (the latter primarily thought of in terms of as the basis of incomes).
Having alerted participants to the dangers of double counting or the incoherence 
which could be brought about through preference aggregation through addition in 
cases where preference independence did not exist, and the care that was needed to 
take when evaluating alternatives (see Chapter 3 for more details), we proceeded to 
suggest to the participants that it seemed to us, the Facilitators, that participants also 
talked of one further trade-off: the need or the difficulties of short term 
implementation of a licensing strategy, and the features of the licensing schemes in 
terms of a longer term considerations. We pointed this out to the participants and 
they found it a helpful intervention. As a result, they then proceeded to group the six 
objectives into Short Term (ST) and Long Term (LT) Strategy objectives. The result 
was that participants had developed the first objectives hierarchy (shown in Figure 
8-8).
One of the most interesting aspects about this hierarchy of multiple objectives was 
that it reflected a change in perception, or a transformation in their view of the fishery 
management problem, because from this point on all participants felt much more 
comfortable in talking about future management strategies even in the light of current 
restrictions and limitations. It transformed in particular the difficulty of the legal 
constraints, which led some to argue earlier that it was futile to discuss licencing 
aspects which did not strictly fall within the current law. The effect was greatest with 
Mr Constantin because once his initial key concerns about the whole process -  
namely legal considerations and the time frame for implementation were noted, he 
did not mind exploring other avenues.54 The grouping also enabled Mr Cristocea, the 
company director, to go along with the evaluation as he argued that “we will see what 
happens when we give these objectives weight and when we compare the 
alternatives.”
54 Evidence that those were his main concerns can be found in the details of his proposed alternative, 
Association, as detailed in Table 8-. The main difference to the Proposed and Current alternatives 
was that the number of licences increased from 50 to 60 (in other words about 10 associations would 
also be allowed to participate). Keeping the other features as in the Proposed and Current alternative 
meant that they would score highest on LEGAL and TIME objectives.
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Figure 8-8: First Objectives Hierarchy and Weights
Licence





LEGAL DIFF TIME SUSTAINABL
Note: This is a screenshot of the computer generated diagramme that we displayed 
in the Decision Conference (HIVIEW for Windows). The boxes with numbers refer to 
importance weights (see Section 8.3.1.3)
8.3.1.3 Evaluating the Alternatives
The evaluation of alternatives consisted of three stages: first, they compared the 
alternatives on each of the objectives separately, then they assigned importance 
weights to the objectives, and in the third stage, participants explored the 
inconsistencies between the model results and their intuition about which options 
were most preferred. For the third stage we used three main techniques: maps of 
various parts of the model, sensitivity analysis and direct comparisons of option pairs.
Our explicit intention in employing this process was to explore any differences in 
opinion in a constructive, or generative, way. We emphasised that participants were 
not asked to reach compromise positions with regard to any particular score, but that 
the aim was to develop a consensus licensing strategy for the DDBRA which took 
into account their concerns and differing views on what was desirable and likely to 
happen.
To illustrate the process by which participants assessed the relative preference 
between licence scheme options on each of the objectives, I will use the example of 
the ILLEGAL TRADE and BIODIVERSITY objectives (see also Figure 8-9). In the
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preference scales used, 100 represented the most preferred option, and 0 the least 
preferred. For example, on the ILLEGAL TRADE objective, Association was scaled 
at 60 because participants judged the difference in illegal trade reduction compared 
to that of Current (0) to be one and a half times as important as its difference from 
Direct (100). Similarly the importance of the difference in illegal trade reduction 
between Association (60) and Proposed and between Proposed and Current (0) 
was judged to be equal. As a result, Proposed was scaled at 30. To ensure 
consistency and an equal-interval scale, other differences between intuitively 
estimated illegal trade reductions were compared and revisions were made so that 
the scales reflected the group’s views accurately. In the case of Distribution, only 
the Director of the Tulcea Fishing Company argued that there would be significant 
reduction in illegal trade reduction (giving it therefore a score of 50 - others argued 
that illegal trade under Distribution would be closer to Current) and so we noted 
that for further exploration through sensitivity analysis.
Figure 8-9 Illegal Trade and Biodiversity Scores, 1st Model
ILLEGAL TRADE
Options Data
(T ) Current 0
(2 ) Proposed 30
(3 )  Direct 100
(4 ) Distribution 50
(5 ) Association 60
(8 )  Margins 80
(7 )  2 Improved 60
1 0 0 “— CD
^ ®
75 ■ y ®
50 -— 0
25 — ©
o - — ®
BIODIVERSITY
Options Data





(3 ) Direct 100
75 -
0  Distribution 60
(5 ) Association 100
50
(6 ) Margins 80
(7 ) 2 Improved 80 25 -
Note: these are screenshots from HIVIEW for Windows that we displayed during the 
Decision Conference.
In the case of the BIODIVERSITY objective, participants judged the options Direct 
and Associations which relied largely on licences for quotas were most preferred 
because they allowed fishermen to move between lakes and therefore were most 
encouraging of selective fishing. The Current system was judged to be worst in this 
respect (as on all other objectives). The effects on selective fishing brought about by 
options Proposed and Distribution, which introduced some degree of control to the 
fishery, were judged to be more than half as important as the effects on selective 
fishing brought about by the most preferred option (Direct and Association). Using 
similar reasoning, participants thought that the effects of Margins and 2 Improved 
should be rated at 80 (halfway between the effects of the most preferred options and
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Proposed and Distribution because even though they were using area licences, the 
licence fees were based, like the most preferred options, on the TAC of the area and 
not on the declared fish catch - the latter, they thought, would encourage black 
market activity in which prohibited fish sizes or species were more easily traded).
While participants rated their relative preference between options separately on all 
objectives, we asked them to ignore the relative differences in importance of the 
objectives themselves. In other words, all preference scales were of equal size - from 
0 to 100.
The complete model and the notes made during the Decision Conference of the 
rationales for the different scores are presented in Appendix 10.4 (starting on page 
321). Among the most noteworthy dynamics were the following: on the TIME 
objective Distribution received a very high score of 90% at the urging of the 
Company Director because he insisted that it would take very little time for the 
companies to improve their retail networks. Others, particularly Mr de Graaf, were 
more skeptical that the conditions could be brought about so quickly. The score was 
highlighlighted for subsequent sensitivity analysis.
The discussion on the BIODIVERSITY turned out to be significant in two respects. 
First, the need to be exact about what is meant by Biodiversity, and which parts are 
valued enabled participants to explain to each other what they had in mind when they 
used that term. For Dr Baboianu biodiversity referred to the Danube Delta ecosystem 
before the intervention of man. For Dr Staras it had more to do with the total number 
of fish species and especially the number economically valuable species. For Mr de 
Graaf it was the clear water species whose habitats were endangered by eutrophic 
Danube water. For Mr Munteanu it was the total number of species. For Mr Cristocea 
it was the maintenance or re-establishment of the traditional mix of species that used 
to caught in the Danube Delta.
The second reason why the discussion was important is by giving Direct and 
Association 100% DDBRA and DDI participants realized that one of their most 
important objective could be realized even when they were not fully in control of the 
whole process/information (for example, with Association it was quite likely that 
illegal trade would still prevail (that is why Association scored only 50% on that 
objective)) -  here Biodiversity was more a function of the interest of the individuals 
rather than the rigour of the DDBRA enforcement. This realization made the idea of 
co-management which Mr de Graaf had been speaking about much more palatable 
or imaginable. This was re-enforced by Mr Constantin’s explanation that one of the 
reasons why the Current system was bad for BIODIVERSITY was that through the
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prevailing subleasing practice individual fishermen and companies did not know who 
was allowed to fish were and so “peer enforcement” became impractical.55
In the next step, we asked them to assign relative importance weights to the 
objectives (i.e. rescale the preference scales themselves). For this task they needed 
to consider two aspects at once: first, how large the difference between the most and 
least preferred option on a particular objective was, and secondly, how much they 
cared about the objectives themselves. To facilitate this judgement, we employed the 
“swing weight method” (see for example von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986). The 
initial question we put to them was as follows: “Imagine that all objectives were at 
their worst possible level - according to the judgements you made so far, in the 
DDBR this happens to be the level of the Current scheme. If you were able to 
change only one to its best level, and all others remained at their worst, which one 
would it be?”
Figure 8-8 shows that participants judged all three of the Short Term Implementation 
objectives to be of the same, highest (100), importance, while among the Long Term 
Strategy objectives only the difference in swing from its worst to the best level on the 
BIODIVERSITY objective was considered to be equally important (i.e. 100). 
Participants rated DATA COLLECTION at 80 and SUSTAINABLE INCOME at 60.
Sensitivity analysis showed that in all cases Margins came out as the apparently 
preferred choice and that the proportion of overall weights (out of 100) that needed to 
be placed on any one of the objectives to had be increased by more than three 
orders of magnitude in order to get the preferred choice to switch (mostly to Direct -  
only for LEGAL objective Margin dominated throughout, and for the TIME objective 
the switch was to 2 Improved).
Participants were surprised to see how robust the outcomes were. Another aspect 
which Mr de Graaf drew to the attention of his colleagues in the workshop was that 
the weights they had allocated thus far represented a rather “technocratic” or 
“conservative” set of priorities. As evidence he used the fact that the one criterion 
which dealt with the direct interests of stakeholders, namely SUSTAINABILITY of 
income, received the lowest weight. The others took this comment seriously and 
eventually Dr Baboianu responded by saying that the lower weight they did not mean 
to say that it was not important, but that they merely followed the instructions given
55 Mr Cristocea used that same explanation to argue that with the Distribution alternative where there 
would be fewer companies in operation, the confusion would be cleared up and enforcement made 
more easy and consequently BIODIVERSITY conservation significantly aided.
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by the facilitators, namely to indicate the extent to which they wanted to the objective 
to influence their decision in view of the difference of the impact their final choice.
Since there was only one hierarchical level in this model which could be more easily 
evaluated using a visual representation of the judgements already made (shown in 
Figure 8-11), we assigned equal weight to the ST and LT objectives level, and 
proceeded to the next phase of the evaluation process.
Up to this point Mr Hall and I facilitated the groups’ work by working mostly with flip 
charts which we continued to post on the walls of the conference room for easy 
reference and amendment. As we were building the model on paper, Mr Ene 
assisted us by entering the same information on a laptop computer into HIVIEW, a 
Multi-Attribute Utility Theory decision analysis programme developed at the LSE 
specifically for use in Decision Conferences.
Figure 8-10: LT Strategy Scores and Weights - model 1
\ * U f f ~ ~ ■ P ]
Add
BRANCH W G H T
Proposed Distribution M arg ins  
Current D irect Association 2 Im proveiC U M
*  B IO -DIV 100 0 60 100 60 100 80 80 20.8
*  SUSTAINABL 60 0 60 100  50 70 80 60 12.5
* DATA COLLEC 80 0 40 100 50 80 80 60 16.7
TOTAL 0 53 100 54 86 80 68 50.0
Figure 8-10, is a screenshot of that programme, and it shows the window in which 
importance weights are entered (in the WGHT column). The programme also 
normalizes the weights, by dividing each by their sum so that the numbers add up to 
1.0, and then displays a weighted average of the scales, using these normalised 
weights, in the TOTAL row of the figure. The last column, CUM (standing for 
'cumulative weight'), showed the calculated overall weight that each criterion had in 
the complete model. This screenshot also showed the preference scores assigned to 
the alternatives on each objective, and could be used in this way for consistency 
checks.
In this way, the weighted averages of all Long Term Strategy (LT) objectives 
provided a single LT scale, and similarly a single Short Term Implementation (ST) 
scale was constructed. Using these index figures, we then displayed a scatter plot of
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ST Implementation versus LT Strategy, see Figure 8-11, which showed all licensing 
schemes in terms of different abilities to satisfy the ST and LT objectives.







Direct was the most attractive in terms of LT Strategy objectives, while Margin was 
most preferred in terms of the ST Implementation objectives. If the decision analytic 
model developed up to that point would have been requisite (see Chapter 6), then 
the prescription of the model would have been that one of these two licensing 
schemes should be chosen. As the sensitivity analysis shown in Figure 8-12 
indicates, when equal weight is given to ST and LT objectives, then option 6 
(Margins) is preferred. In fact, Margins would have been the preferred option as 
long as LT objectives were considered as up to three times more important than ST 
objectives. Figure 8-12 also shows that licensing scheme 7, 2 Improved, dominated 
licensing schemes 1, 4, and 2, on both LT and ST objectives. These implications 
were somewhat surprising to participants and this indicated that the model was not 
yet requisite (either some objectives were missing or an objective could be somewhat 
re-defined).














Total weight on LT STRATEGY
After examining the sensitivity of this outcome to differences in views noted earlier, 
we proceeded to examine the relative strength of options through pair-wise 
comparison of different licensing scheme options. Figure 8-13 illustrates one such 
comparison.
Figure 8-13 Comparing the weighted preference differences of the Direct and 
Margins licensing scheme options
D irect v s  M arg ins
O  MDL o r d e r O  CUMWT O  DIFF ® W T D i S U M
LT STR A TEG Y BIO-DIV 20.8 20 4 .17 4 .17 —
ST IM P L E M T  ILL. TRADE 16.7 20 3 .33 7.50 —
LT STR A TEG Y DATA COLLEC 16.7 20 3 .33 10 .83 —
LT STR A TEG Y SUSTAINABL 12.5 20 2 .50 13 .33 —
ST IM P LE M T T IM E 16.7 - 9 5 -1 5 .8 3
ST IM P LE M T LEGAL D IFF 16.7 -1 0 0 -1 6 .6 7
100 .0 -1 9 .1 7
On aggregate, Margins was preferred to Direct because it scored much better on 
two of the six objectives (TIME and LEGAL DIFFICULTY). As a result of the 
discussion centred around those objectives, participants started to wonder if it was 
not possible to create some other licensing scheme which combined the relative 
strengths of both options. Furthermore, it seemed that the existing objectives omitted 
some important considerations: under the Margins option licences were issued for a 
much longer time (20 years instead of 5 years in Direct) and this meant that there 
was much greater security of investment for fishermen or companies who considered 
participating in auctions, while from the DDBRA’s point of view, this difference also 
meant that the technical and administrative difficulties increased (since long term
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licences meant that any effort reduction needed to be executed through buying back 
licenses).
At the close of the first day we briefly reviewed the steps we had gone through in 
developing the model, gave participants printouts of the HIVIEW model (preference 
scores, objectives, weights, sensitivity analyses, and pair-wise option comparisons), 
and agreed to meet the next morning. The task for the next day was to build on the 
progress made thus far, to develop better licencing strategies, and to agree on a 
option that the Executive Director could put forward at the Final Management 
Planning Workshop the following week.
In terms of the overall transformation process and the coherence of the decision 
making process the first decision conference day had achieved significant results. 
One of the most tangible outcomes had been a clarification and beginning of 
development of shared understanding of what biodivirsity conservation meant in the 
DDBR. It was also surprising that only two options (Direct and Margins) dominated 
the others and that by choosing one over the other one had to give significantly 
greater weight to either ST or LT. The discussion about what alternatives assisted 
with the conservation of biodiversity and the fact that the results as presented above 
were derived from a model in which they had placed such great weight on the more 
conservative dimensions, were probably encouraged participants to try to make the 
model more complete so that it reflected their intuition better, to make some more 
differentiated judgements with respect to scores as well as weights, and to 
experiment with some more innovative alternatives.
Figure 8-14: Score summary of model 1
Proposed Im p. D istrib P. M argin  
BRANCH W t Current D irect Association 2 Im proved C um W t
ST Im plem ent 50 29 75 36 44 45 91 82 50.0
LT Strategy 50 0 58 100 56 88 80 71 50.0
TOTAL 14 66 68 50 66 86 77 10 8 .0
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Table 8-4: Fish Licensing Options
Nr Option Name Auction Type Fee on 
What







1 Present Situation One per zone 
with sublease












gear and boats. 
Fishermen may 
own or rent gear 
only if in private 
companies.
Average / kg: 
Fishermen 200; 
Interest 200; 
Investments 200; O&M 
150; Salaries & Social 
150; Profit 150; 
Wholesale price 1050; 
Consumer price 2000
2 Current Proposal: 





















as 1 as 1 as 1












600 Auction at 
'Cherhana'
Free market Fishermen own or 
rent
Cherhana' takes 10% 
for distribution and 
service
4 Area/Quota licensing 
for companies with 











as 1 as 1 only that 
fishermen receive more 
since company sells for 
more
5 Area licensing to
fishermen
associations
as 2 as 2 as 2 as 2 60 as 3 as3 as 3 as 3
6 Area licensing with 
profit competition & 
invest, security




as 2 as 3 as 3 Smaller companies 
and fishermen own 
gear and boats
as 3
7 Area licensing with 
quota fee
as 2 as 3 as 3 as 2 as 2 as 2 as 2 as 2 as 2






as 3 as 3 as 3
but 10 years
400 as 3 as 4 as 3 as 3
9 Phased strategic: best 
within law + 8 as pilot




as 8 as 8 as 2
but 1 year
50-100 as 2 + Pilot 8 as 4 + 
competition 
by pilot
as 8 as 2 except for those 
owning gear or in pilot
Note: Options number 8 and 9 in this table refer to the options developed on the second day (described in Section 8.3.2)
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8.3.2 The Second Model
8.3.2.1 Developing new options and identifying additional objectives
At the start of the second Decision Conference day, participants began to develop an 
8th option by trying to combine all the best features of the previous seven. The 
process of identifying these “best” features involved both systematic comparison of 
option pairs (as illustrated in Figure 8-10,Figure 8-11, Figure 8-13, and Table 8-4), as 
well as more intuitive and holistic judgements about desirable features. This option 
was supposed to represent the management option that participants considered most 
appropriate for the DDBR in the longer run, and towards which the DDBRA should 
work. The key difference to previous occasions where they talked about how the 
fishery should be managed (perparatory workshops and first decision conference 
day) was that now they were attempting to derive from their previous analysis a 
description of how they would thought the fishery could and should be managed in 
about 5 years time. A 9th Option, which was modification of the 8th was also 
developed, and it had the advantage of allowing the DDBRA to implement it 
immediately (see also Table 8-5).
Strategically the Best option would be one in which both zones and quotas were 
auctioned. For larger lakes or lake complexes, licences should be based on quotas 
and several fishing companies or associations would be given access within it. For 
these resource systems the DDBRA together with the DDI determined the annual 
TAC. For smaller lakes or lake complexes, licenses should be for the area. The 
rationale behind this is that individual fishermen or their families would form an 
association (so that they can participate in the auction) and they would be given the 
responsibility for 10 year periods to look after the fish stock (building on options 
Direct, Association, and Margins).
This particular combination was first put forward by Dr Baboianu. Mr Constantin and 
Dr Staras then supported his proposal explaining that for the purpose of ensuring that 
the fish stock is maintained it was sufficient if they received accurate information on 
the landed catch and the effort with which that was obtained. Mr de Graaf went to on 
to comment that this was precisely what he had in mind when he referred to co­
management, and that his experience in Bangladesh, Vietnam, and Africa suggests 
that the proposal was feasable. Mr Constantin, with support from Mr Munteanu, also 
explained that fishermen's associations were in a better position than individual 
fishermen employed by larger fishing companies to take on the responsibility of
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enforcing their own fishing rules because they would be in more frequent and regular 
contact with each other, most likely be from the same village. Furthermore, given the 
10 year contract then their interest is to enforce and monitor the activities of their 
fellow fishermen so as to ensure that the yields of the areas their association had 
access to would be maximized. The main role of the DDBRA in such a co­
management arrangement would be to provide some monitoring and enforcement 
support, and to give scientific advice when necessary. The fee for both quota and 
area licences in this scheme would be based on the TAC and not on the catch 
declared (as in options Direct, Association, and 2 Improved). The DDBRA would 
encourage fishing companies to allow the fishermen they employ to own their own 
gear and to improve their marketing and distribution network (as in options Direct, 
Distribution, Association, Margins). Both of these measures were designed to 
improve the efficiency of the fishery economy in the sense that it would encourage 
greater competition, reward quality in product and service, and reduce the price 
differential between what the fishermen gets and the wholesale price.
One of the problems was that participants realized that there were not many ways in 
which the DDBRA could actually ‘encourage’ fishing companies to initiate or follow 
through with such a change by using the command-and-control measures relied on 
so far. Instead, Dr Baboianu and Dr Staras thought that once fishermen and 
companies would experience the benefits a new regulation would bring, then they 
would be more inclinded to go ahead with it and transform their own role. The 
problem, however, was how to minimize the resistance to any change? On the basis 
of this discussion we suggested that they were probably talking about another 
criterion that should be added to the objective hierarchy: “political acceptability”.
A further criterion that had also emerged from the earlier discussion had to do with 
the different levels of “bureaucracy” in the administration of the licensing scheme as 
Mr Constantin was discussing the procedures and difficulties associated with the 
different alternatives. Mr Cristocea was mostly observing and reflecting while the 
Best Strategic alternative was being developed. However, once the question of the 
10 year time frame for the license came up, he became more involved and made 
reference to the comparison between Direct and Margins on the previous day where 
it was noticed that the longer the time frame, the greater the security of the
56 Participants did not actually use the terms “transaction costs”, but they did refer to this idea as they 
described many of the features that I discussed in the NIE Section in Chapter 4.
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investment. This is why he favoured the inclusion of this aspect as an additional 
criterion in the objective hierarchy. The three additional objectives were defined thus:
• "POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY: Maximise the political and social acceptability 
of the licensing scheme." This objective would be measured through the 
extent to which it eliminates conflicts of interest in short term or provides 
means to deal with them (i.e. the latter is one part of transaction costs or NIE 
principles: conflict resolution mechanisms).57
• "BUREAUCRACY: Minimise the administrative complexity of the licensing 
scheme, as measured by the complexity of the designing, implementing, 
enforcing, monitoring, and updating licensing system" (i.e. transaction costs).
• "SECURITY FOR INVESTMENT: Maximise the extent to which the licensing 
scheme secures the investments made by auctioneers, as measured through 
the length of the contract and the transferability and inheritability of the 
license."
Before turning to the evaluation of this licensing scheme against all nine objectives, 
participants created a 9th option, which they wanted to be better on at least three of 
the five ST objectives: it needed to fall within the current law, be politically more 
readily acceptable, and take less time to implement. The option they created was as 
follows:
Initially the DDBRA re-designates the 50 fishing areas that it has already identified so 
as to include a series of smaller lake complexes which a single fishermen association 
could bid for. In order to gain momentum for transformation, as well as gain some 
concrete experience and evidence for the feasability of Best Strategic, the DDBRA 
and DDI initiate at the same time a pilot programme for a limited area in which they 
auction quotas directly to individual fishermen or associations. The second part of the 
pilot programme is to experiment with different ways of organizing the auctioning of 
fish at a fish collection point (cherhana). In both cases, the fees for the license are 
based on the TAC and paid in monthly instalments that are indexed to avoid 
depreciation through inflation. The contract length of the license is limited to one year 
in order to set a clear signal that this is a Phased introduction of the Best Strategic 
licensing scheme.
57 As Appendix 10.5 shows, participants used mainly first part of attribute in sense of minimizing 
resistance to implementation of scheme, but second part can also be seen in option 9.
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Table 8-5 The second set of licensing schemes
Option 8 
Best Strategic
Auction by zone and/or quota. For smaller lakes that contain 
several allocated quotas seek and promote active collaboration in 
management with the fishermen (co-management). The licence 
fee is fixed and based on the quota auctioned (paid in instalments 
which are indexed). The licence is for a longer term (10 years), as 
well as transferable and inheritable. The character of the state 
companies shifts to distribution and service (due to market 
conditions and economies of scale). They allow fishermen to own 




One licence per zone is auctioned. There are small zones, 
suitable for fishermen associations (which form themselves into 
companies in order to be able to participate in the auctions).
The licence fee is based on the quota the auctioned zone 
contains (the fee is payable in advance in indexed instalments).
The contract length is short (1 to 3 years) in order to allow for 
possible adaptations in the law and prevent system rigidities 
taking root.
Start Option 8 as pilot scheme by changing one cherhana to an 
auction house (ensuring it is large enough to be economically 
feasible).
Do everything necessary to move as quickly as possible towards 
Option 8.
8.3.2.2 Re-evaluating the licensing strategies
Having two further licensing strategies and additional objectives in the model meant 
that all options had to be re-evaluated on all the objectives and new importance 
weights had to be assigned. The final objectives hierarchy is shown in Figure 8-15 
and an example of the evaluation of options against individual objectives is illustrated 
in Figure 8-16. These figures illustrate three important aspects of the Decision 
Conference process.
First, it was very easy and quick to make the changes to the objectives hierarchy, the 
preference ratings and the weights, and then to work with model results (discussed 
below). One of the positive effects this flexibility was that the momentum of the 
group's work could be maintained.
Secondly, importance weights were more varied than in the first model of the first 
Decision Conference day, and this reflected greater ability of participants to 
differentiate between objectives, more familiarity with the method and the techniques, 
but also a real transformation of their understanding. Most significant was the
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discussion surrounding the allocation of a weight of 50 to POLITICAL ACPT. Dr 
Baboianu argued that he had come to realize that the fishermen, the companies, etc 
were basically resistant to any change -  it did not seem to matter too much what the 
content of the proposed change was. Furthermore, he emphasized that for him the 
“management point of view” which had started to figure highly in the discussion since 
the preparatory workshops was very important because he thought the DDBRA has a 
wider responsibility to society than simply catering to individual interests in the short 
term. The other participants agreed, referring specifically to the disillusionment that 
they had all developed the over the past few years.58
Thirdly, we took special care to capture the participant's rationale for their 
preferences and weightings. These notes were used when participants re-examined 
the ratings for consistency and were then available when the model was printed as 
an aid memoire for the rationale used.
Figure 8-15: Final Objectives Hierarchy and Weights
Licence
30 70
ST Implement LT Strategy
100100 100 100
SustainabilityPolitical Acpt 
Legal Difficult Illegal Trade
Time BIO-DIV
Data CollectnBureaucracy Secu Invest
58 Because much was promised since the revolution of 1989, but little had actually been accomplished
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Figure 8-16: Illegal Trade Criterion





( | )  Direct 100
(4 )  Distributn 40
(5 ) Association 50
Margins 80
(7 )  2 Improved 50
(8 ) Best LT 100





By how much w i l l  i l l e g a l  t r a d e  
( b l a c k  m a r k e t )  b e  r e d u c e d ?
M o s t  p r e f e r r e d :
3 + 8  ( 1 8 0 % )  -  t h r o u g h  a u c t i o n i n g  
s y s t e m  f i s h e r m e n  w i l l  be  a b l e  t o  
s e l l  a t  m a r k e t  p r i c e  ( - 1 0 %  
c o m i s s i o n ) ;  b e c a u s e  f e e  i s  o n  q u o t a  
money w o n ' t  b e  l o s t  b y  d e c l a r i n g  
f u l l  c a t c h .
L e a s t  p r e f e r r e d :
1 (0 % )  “  f i s h e r m e n  o b t a i n  much m ore  
b y  s e l l i n g  i l l e g a l y  (fc i t  i s  
t o l e r a t e d  by c o m p a n i e s ) .
O t h e r s :
5 + 7  (541%) -  f e e  i s  on  q u o t a  b u t  
p r i c e  d i f f e r e n c e  r e t a i l
Figure 8-17: Short Term Implementation Scores
A ’__ ___ ___
Reset | Add |
BRANCH WGHT
Proposed Distributn Margins Best LT 
Present Direct Association 2 Improved Phased CUM
* Legal Difficult 100 0 100 0 0 50 100 100 0 88 7.3
*  Political Acpt 50 1 50 40 40 40 90 70 90 100 3.7
*  Illegal Trade 100 0 30 100 40 50 80 50 100 60 7.3
*T im e 80 10DI 100 0 90 20 75 100 0 85 5.9
*  Bureaucracy 80 90 0 100 20 40 60 40 100 50 5.9
TOTAL 37 57 49 36 41 81 72 55 75 30.0
In the column furthest to the right (CUM) the cumulative weights of the four ST 
Implementation attributes are listed. They indicate the proportion of weight the 
attributes have in the overall model. Some of the notes taken during the scoring 
process, indicating why the various scores where given, are listed below:59
"Political Acceptability: To what extent is the licencing scheme politically and socially 
acceptable? To what extent does it eliminate conflicts of interest?
59 A complete report of the entire second model and the online summary made for all the alternative 
rating is presented in Appendix 10.5 .
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Most preferred: 9 because it is introduced gradually. The pilot experiment will most 
probably demonstrate that with this licensing scheme there will be a net gain for 
everyone: professional fishermen will earn just as much or more than they currently 
do; fishing companies, who will need to be restructured anyway, have a viable future 
as distributors (auctioning & retail if they want to) and servicing companies. A good 
case can be made for its appropriateness from a fisheries management point of view.
Least preferred: 1 (1%)60- while many gain from the current confusion, everybody can 
gain from a clarification of the status quo (either consolidating current position or 
more substantial changes)
Others: 2 (50%) - intermediate between 9 & 1. Companies would consolidate 
position, fishermen could continue with current practices (employment + benefits + 
money from selling on black market). Not very dramatic changes from current 
situation. 3+4+5 (40%) - a little bit worse than 2 because: under 3 radical change for 
companies and likely conflict between companies and fishermen; under 4 fishermen 
will not gain very much more; under 5 associations would have to compete with 
companies who have monopolistic position. 7 (70%) - like 2 but more justifiable from 
management point of view. 6+8 (90%) - just as good as 9 but it is not gradual, and 
legally not possible.
Figure 8-18: Long Term Strategy Scores
■ ■ m M W M L
Reset ] Add |
BRANCH WGHT
Proposed Distributn Margins Best LT 
Present Direct Association 2 Improved Phased CUM
* BIO-OIV 100 0 50 80 50 80 60 60 100 100 20.6
*  Secu Invest 70 0 20 80 60 60 100 20 90 90 14.4
*  Sustainability 70 0 50 83 42 58 67 50 100 100 14.4
*  Data Collectn 100 0 40 100 50 80 80 60 100 100 20.6
TOTAL 0 41 87 50 71 75 50 98 98 70.0
Figure 8-19 shows the strategy options plotted in terms of their ST Implementation 
LT Strategy objectives. As expected, strategy 9 was in the top right hand corner, 
meaning that it was most preferred on both ST and LT objectives. It was just as good 
as 8 on LT, and while a little bit worse than 6 on ST Implementation, but much better
60 The score of “1%" is the result of entering the score for the alternative using the graphical input device 
on the ‘thermometer" scale.
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on the LT Strategy than the latter. Depending how much weight one placed on ST 
and LT, one would adopt either Margins or Phased. Best is not possible due to the 
current legal position.
Sensitivity analysis, such as that illustrated in Figure 8-20, showed that Phased 
(option 9) was preferred with a relative importance weight of 50% of the model on ST 
Implementation, and that option 6 would become most attractive if this weight were 
increased to over 75% of the total importance in the model. While there was some 
discussion over what the appropriate ratio should be, none of the participants thought 
that more than three quarters of the model weight should be placed on ST 
Implementation (and only 25% to LT Strategy). In fact, participants were convinced 
that more weight should be given to LT objectives.
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Figure 8-20: Sensitivity Analysis on Weight given to ST Implementation
©
Total weight on ShortTerm Implementation
With respect to the positions of the key stakeholders in this Decision Conference the 
following observations can be made:
For Mr Cristocea, the Director of the Tulcea Fishing Company and Vice President of 
the Association of Romania’s Fishing Companies, the phased introduction and the 
prospect of a longer term license were key factors that made it possible for him to 
support Phased Strategic. Another important aspect that enabled him to move from 
the rather conservative alternative Distribution from which he started in this process, 
was the fact that Phased Strategic was so robust to rather extreme changes in 
ratings and weights. For Mr Cristocea the worst case scenario of the Phased 
Strategic would have been that over the coming year new companies would form 
and the competition intensified.
For Dr Baboianu, the Executive Director of the DDBRA, the key was that he had a 
feasable licensing scheme for the medium term that has been examined rigorously 
from all key perspectives: fishery science, administration, commercial interest, and 
international experience. Equally important was that he had a concrete way in which 
that could be achieved. The pilot project was particularly important because it 
presented the possibility for gaining experience with a different type of organisation 
and if successful, it might provide the necessary reference point that could be used to 
indicate that the DDBRA was serious and change could be positive.
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For Dr Staras, the most positive aspect of the Decision Conference process must 
have been that he had been engaged in very productive work with both the 
administration and private industry. Judging by the information that he had been 
contributing in the preparatory workshops and the Decision Conference, and the fact 
that in none of the reports he wrote on the fishery and “the conditions for sustainable 
exploitation through fishing” (Navodaru et al. 1993) did he ever discuss or follow 
through on the implications of missing data and the other inconsistencies in the 
approach and recommendations, we can safely assume that he must have been 
harbouring serious frustrations. Being able to develop a feasible approach together 
with the colleagues with whom he would have to follow on in future and having 
developed a shared understanding of each others positions, constraints, and 
expectations must have enough to raise expectations for future development as well 
as relieving.
For Mr Constantin, the person who displayed the greatest resistance to the process 
in the third preparatory workshop, and who was very anxious about the 
mechanic/process details of actually submitting a new licensing scheme soon to 
authorities was fully supportive of the Phased Strategic because it provided a clear 
goal that built on his Association alternative and it was immediately implementable. 
He had also been able to explain to the other colleagues some of the challenges with 
which he worked with daily.
For Mr de Graaf, the foreign fishery consultant, had two main concerns from a 
content point of view: first to widen the working definition of what constituted 
biodiversity and how to protect it (not by building further canals). Secondly, that the 
management approach should take into consideration the perspective of the 
fishermen -  working with, rather than trying to find effective ways of coerceing 
fishermen. Phased Strategic fully addressed both of those concerns. Although this 
was the first time that he conducted his intervention in such a participatory way, the 
fact that his entire report (de Graaf, 1994) was centered around the Decision 
Conference, the objectives developed, alternatives that were worked out, the 
assessments, and the conclusions that one could draw from it.
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As a result of the analysis participants came to the following conclusions:
1) Phased Strategic was the preferred licensing strategy.
2) This strategy was not sensitive to the proportion of weight given to Short Term or 
Long Term objectives.
3) The strategy was not sensitive to the weight accorded to legal, time, or data 
collection.
4) Margins and Best Strategic were the next preferred licensing options.
5) The characteristics of strategies 9, 6, and 8 were:
a) taxing the quota licensed and not the catch obtained.
b) improved distribution through
i) auctioning the caught fish
ii) state fishing companies become distribution and service companies
c) reduction of the price differential between the retail price and that obtained 
by the fishermen
d) ensure that the fisherman have the possibility of owning their gear and boats
e) ensure that licences are tradable and inheritable.
6) Recommend that licences be given to active local fisherman only.
In order to help participants to keep the momentum gained through the conference, 
and to ensure that the necessary follow-up steps were taken in a coordinated way, 
we helped participants to draw up the following “commitment package” (Table 8-6):
Table 8-6: Commitment package agreed to at end of the Decision Conference
Nr Action By Whom By When
1 Write the report de Graaf Saturday, 15.10.94
2 Legal Contribution Sirbu Friday, 14.10.94, P.M.
3 Test the solution with Staras 
and Constantin
Baboianu Friday, 14.10.94, AM
4 Presentation to Governor Baboianu
Kravatzky
Sat, 14.10.94, Evening





6 Modify the current proposal Constantin 2 Weeks











Figure 8-21: Description of the preferred option (Phased)
The concept is to use a practical phased introduction of the new licensing scheme.
Initially we will use the existing proposal so that there is no delay in its introduction.
The only modification is that the tax will be raised on the quota given in the license 
given for each zone, not the fish caught.
The licence for each zone will be sold in an auction to existing companies and new 
companies, if local active fishermen wish to form a company.
It is our firm recommendation that licenses are only given to active local fishermen.
Initially the licenses will be for one year only so that the scheme can be developed 
once the necessary legislation has been made to allow for individual fishermen (or 
groups of fishermen) to obtain licenses for quotas.
Within each zone multiple quotas will then be possible if the area of the zone is too 
large for one quota. In such cases the DDBRA will encourage the co-management of 
the fish resources.
After gaining government approval, a pilot scheme will be established based on a 
cherhana, with an economical feasible fishing area.
The purpose of this scheme will be to establish the practical rules for an auction 
house by selling the fish caught by individual fishermen direct to the retail trade. The 
auction house will charge only a small handling charge so that the fisherman gets the 
highest possible price for his catch.
In parallel both state and private companies which get the first licenses will be asked 
to improve their efficiency, and to offer fishermen the option of owning or renting their 
gear and boats if they want to, so that the fishermen get 50% of the selling price 
instead of 10% as at present.
Also, the companies will be helped by improving the retail trade with local shops to 
sell the fish direct to lessen the margin between what the consumer pays and what 
the fisherman gets.
After one or two years, with the experience of the pilot scheme, the existing proposal 
will be changed and the licenses made for a ten year period, transferable and 
inheritable, so that investment will be attracted and the investor will have security.
Ultimately the aim is to move to a free market with true competition to ensure 
economic efficiency and fair distribution of profit, through a licensing scheme that 
builts on the rich traditions of the Danube Delta.
I will evaluate the Decision Conference in detail on all the objectives set out for it (see 
Figure 7-7, page 235) in the Conclusions Chapter. In the next two sections I report on 
the events and the developments that took place after the Decision Conference.
Unlike the MSDA approach, and even most reported Decision Conferences, the 
effectiveness of my intervention should not only be judged by the coherence of the 
decisions made (this is the core and standard criterion of all decision analysis work 
and it does constitute my first major objective). Instead, I also sought to:
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Objective 2: “Enable the DDBRA to transform their existing fishery management 
strategy... toward a co-management role aimed at maintaining or increasing the 
resilience of the social, economic, and ecological systems that constitute the DDBR.” 
One would therefore expect that if a transformation did take place then, at a 
minimum, one should be able to observe that all of the following elements which 
were all addressed in the Decision Conference were followed-up on and continued:
• Institutional effects (eg. incentive structures) should continued to be taken into 
account;
• There should be significant changes in the way the fishery is organized (ie. it 
should not only be a ‘transformation on paper5)
• Analysis of fishery data should remain more coherent -  now that they have 
brought in the effects of the black market this needs to be sustained.
Together with the experience at the International Management Seminar (see next 
section), one of important functions of the second half of the second decision 
conference day was, from a transformation point of view, one of “refreezing” -  that is 
incorporating a new point of view into their personal worldview, and into the 
significant relationships with other.
8.3.3 Presentation at the "Integration, Law, and Implementation" Workshop
A week after the Decision Conference, I was asked by Dr Baboianu (who was co- 
chairing the workshop) to present the results of this Decision Conference at the 
"Integration, Law, and Implementation" Workshop which was also the end of the 
Management Planning process of the EBRD technical assistance project. Since the 
Governor of the DDBRA had often emphasized that he wanted to hear about 
solutions and not problems, I decided to start my presentation with an outline of the 
Phased Best licensing scheme. Only afterwards did I present the process by which 
we had reached that conclusion. This was a mistake, because he and others who 
were not present at the Decision Conference did not seem to be able to follow my 
reasoning on this contentious issue. Phillips (personal communication) later told me 
that such a negative reaction is common if one does not take great care in explaining 
process, though not necessarily all the details, by which the group arrived at their 
conclusions.
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However, in the event Mr Constantin, the Director of Licensing at the DDBRA, got up 
in the middle of my presentation and asked if he could take over and explain. Without 
making reference to the overhead presentation which I had been using, he explained 
all the reasons why the DDBRA needed to change their strategy, and that it was 
possible to move forward with the Pilot project, that it was better to charge the tax on 
the TAC rather than on the catch landed. There were only a few questions of 
clarification before discussion moved on to the proposals from the other Sectoral 
Studies (agriculture, reed harvesting, tourism, etc). The following were the 
management objectives that the Seminar agreed to for the DDBRA:
Figure 8-22: Fisheries Management Objectives adopted for DDBR
Economic Objective #24:
Institute a system of management for the sustainable utilisation of natural resources.
#24.1 1 Analyse the existing management of fisheries
and develop options for improvement between 1995 and 1996
#24.2 1 Select and apply a system of fishery licensing between 1995 and 1997
#24.3 1 Implement a licensing system and set bag limits for hunting game species between
1995 and 1997
Economic Objective #25
Develop and improve fish farming on the basis o f economic efficiency.
#25.1 2 Evaluate the existing situation of fish farming and make recommendations about
alternative methods of management between 1996 and 1997
#25.2 2 Encourage investment in deterrent techniques for protecting fish farms from
piscivorous birds between 1996 and 1997____________________________________________
Source: Baboianu and Goriup, 1995
8.4 The effects of the Decision Conference
The first question that can be asked with regard to the effects of the Decision 
Conference is whether the actions agreed to in the "commitment package” were 
carried out:
1. Mr de Graaf to “write the report” -  this was completed in the week following the 
conference and I have referred to his report as de Graaf (1994). This report 
constituted the formal submission of the foreign fishery consultant. The rationale 
of the objectives, the alternatives, a summary of the discussions and a 
description of the recommended Phased Strategic alternative constituted the 
essence of it. It was supplemented by some additional comments that drew on 
the consultants work in de Graaf and Staras (1994,1994a) which I have referred 
to in Chapter 7.
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2. Mr Sirbu to develop the “legal contribution” -  this was completed before the 
"Integration, Law, and Implementation" Workshop. It constituted just a note that 
addressed the laws which governed fishery management at the time, and some 
additional comments clarifying the differences in the process by which 
Government Decisions and ammendments to the law would be obtained.
3. Dr Baboianu to “test the solution with Dr Staras and Mr Constantin” -  both of 
these participants had to be absent for some time during the afternoon of the 
second Decision Conference day and the other participants wanted to be sure 
that these two crucial participants were fully in agreement with the recommended 
alternative. Dr Baboianu reported that he had spoken to them before the 
"Integration, Law, and Implementation" Workshop and that they agreed.
4. Dr Baboianu and Mr Kravatzky to make “presentation to the Governor” on the 
recommended Phased Strategic alternative -  only Dr Baboianu met with the 
Governor in the following days. According to Dr Baboianu the recommended 
alternative constituted one of the points that they discussed in preparation of the 
"Integration, Law, and Implementation" Workshop. No particular decision was 
taken as a result of those discussions.
5. Dr Baboianu and Mr Kravatzky to “consult at the Management Seminar” -  as 
mentioned in the previous section, Dr Baboianu was one of the chairpersons at 
the "Integration, Law, and Implementation" Workshop and I was given the 
responsibility to present the outcomes.
6. Mr Constantin to “modify the Current proposed” alternative -  Mr Constantin 
reported (personal communication) that he had made modifications but that it was 
redundant because the Current system was not replaced until 1997 -  that was 
an scheme that was consistent with the Phased Strategic alternative but strictly 
speaking not the same (see further details below).
7. Dr Baboianu and Dr Staras to “begin negotiations for the pilot project” -  under 
the existing law the DDBRA was not allowed to give associations a license for 
fishing. The pilot project of the Phased Strategic alternative proposed such an 
arrangement and thus it was necessary for the DDBRA and the DDI to consult 
with the MoE on the specific modalities of how that could be done. In the course 
of the preparation of the Pilot project (see next point) this was done during 
December 1994.
8. Mr de Graaf, Mr Fischer, and the DDI to “formulate the pilot project” -  by January 
1995 a four year joint project proposal by Euroconsult, Nefisco, DDBRA, DDI,
Agriculture University of Wagenigen, and the State Fisheries Institute IJmuiden 
(Netherlands) was submitted to potential funding agencies (EC, World Bank, 
EBRD, among others) (Euroconsult et al, 1995). The project sought to improve 
the overall fisheries monitoring system and to use the pilot project cherhana to 
experiment with the licensing system so that it can be introduced for the whole 
DDBR in three years time. Funding for this particular project was not obtained. 
Instead Euroconsult became engaged again in the DDBR through the GEF 
Biodiversity project (providing training in procurement and other project related 
training activies).
On the basis of this evidence one can conclude that there was almost a complete 
follow-through on the actions agreed to in the “commitment package”. The most 
significant shortcomming was that the auction of fish licences for a one year period 
where the fee would be charged on the estimated yield of the area (rather than on 
then on the landed catch -  i.e. the first part of the Phased Strategic scheme) was not 
implemented.
Mr Munteanu, the Director of the Natural Resources Department of the DDBRA, 
reports61 that the Government approved only in 1996 a Government Decision with 
respect to the concessioning system for the fishery and other natural resources. 
However, in the fall of 1996 national elections were held in Romania and the 
Government changed. As a result of that change a new Governor for the DDBRA 
was installed and in 1997 the earlier Government Decision withdrawn.
Within these circumstances the Current licensing system continued to operate 
between 1995-1997. Thus individual fishing companies were issued licenses for 
specific zones and quantities of fish by species in accordance with the calculations of 
the DDI and with the approval of the Tulcea Judet Council. They were required to pay 
between 5-10% tax on the catch of the previous month and the collected money went 
to the state budget. State companies were usually not able to pay their dues though 
private companies paid immediately.
In the second half of 1997 the DDBRA changed the licensing scheme: rather than 
issueing general licenses to companies who then handed licenses down to their 
fishermen, the DDBRA issued separate licenses to individual full-time professional 
fishermen. In a first round 800 licenses were issued. The choice of 800 was in
61 E-mail to author dated March 20 & 28, 2000
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keeping with the Phased Strategic alternative were it was decided that only “active 
local fishermen” should be issued licences.
Companies were not happy with this move as they were also using seasonal 
fishermen (about 400-500). However, the DDBRA drafted a Government Decision 
which was approved in September 1997 (HG516/1997) according to which licenses 
could be issued to fishermen employed by companies, indpendent fishermen, and 
seasonal fishermen.
According to Mr Munteanu, “the DDBRA tried to be an opener of avenues in this 
direction [co-management], at present the only place in Romania where licences are 
issued [directly to fishermen] by an adminstration. ... The guidance for this decision 
was derived to about 70-75% from the management studies of the DDI, and it 
received both the acceptance of specialists as well as political support. The strongest 
arguments for taking this decision were:
• The very low price given to fishermen by the state companies for fish, ca. 10-15% 
of the market price;
• Breaking of the state company monopoly which ruled the fishery both in terms of 
price as well as fishing effort (as they were using a very large number of seasonal 
fishermen who were in reality fulltime fishermen but to whom the company had no 
obligations);
• Protection of the fishermen and obliging companies to employ and fulfill their 
[social security] obligations vis-a-vis the fishermen.” (Munteanu, 28 March 2000)
By 1998 a total of 1,686 permits had been issued. “The effect of this action has been 
that fishermen migrated from the large state companies to the existing private 
companies or to others that entered this activity. In this way, while the number of 
state companies remained the same, the number of private companies that offered 
better prices to fishermen grew very much (about 50 companies in 1999). 
Independent fishermen and family associations of fishermen have also appeared 
(about 50) who are delivering their fish at private fish collection points.” (Munteanu, 
20 March 2000) Dr Baboianu also reports (personal communication) that only one 
state fishing company, Jurlivoca SA, had made significant advances before 1997 in 
transforming its own role in the sense of allowing fishermen to buy/own gear and in 
return receive higher prices for the fish they deliver. Table 8-7 presents a summary of 
the developments.
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Table 8-7: Reported Catch, State Company, Private Company, and 
Associations statistics 1994-1999
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Fish catch 
State (tonnes)
6,285 4,996 3,573 3,329 3,300 2,341
Fish catch 
Private (tonnes)
266 78 97 177 376 890
State co’s 13 14 13 13 14 14




Source: Ion Munteanu (Director of Natural Resources Department, DDE
Officially reported fish catch continues to decrease, and in 1999 it reached a record 
low of 2,341 tonnes.62 Mr Munteanu attributes this to the difficult economic situation 
through which Romania is passing at the moment, the fact that there are only 6 
DDBRA inspectors for the whole Delta, and that only 26 tonnes of Danube Shad 
instead of the usual 500-600 tonnes were caught. The solution to the problem would 
be an updated fisheries law, a coherent national fisheries policy and realistic prices 
paid to fishermen. (Munteanu 20 & 28 March 2000)
However, the fisheries research conducted at the DDI has also transformed in a very 
significant way and now researchers are no longer working with the officially declared 
figures alone. Figure 8-23 illustrates that although the official numbers are going
62 A recently published article in The Guardian Newspaper (Thorpe, 2000), describes a much bleaker 
picture, claiming that "the delta is fished out". The article suggests a terminal decline in fish yield. 
Thorpe does not give any indications as to why that might be the case. However, the reader could infer 
two reasons: (i) there are no more fish; or (ii) means to catch them are failing (ie licensing problems). 
Both of these inferences are wrong. Figure 8-23 and Table 8-7 present the opposing claims made by the 
DDBRA and the DDI: only the proportion of reported fish catch has decreased. The fact that the number 
of fishing companies and associations is increasing is also not supportive of Mr Thorpe's claims. 
Furthermore, there are other claims in Mr Thorpe’s article that can be easily cross checked, and which 
further damage his credibility. Thorpe (2000) also claims, for example, that the pelican's food supply was 
ruined by drainage schemes through which fishing polders were created. This is wrong, the fact is that 
under Ceaucescu fishermen were issued with bullets to shoot pelicans and cormorans because pelicans 
and cormorans were feasting in the fish in the fishing polders (fish polders are heavily stocked shallow 
water bodies). The DDBRA has stopped this practice and fishermen are now complaining about the 
protection of these birds. An example of other wrong and misleading claims by Mr Thorpe are that "the 
biosphere began breaking holes in the dykes three years ago" (i.e. according to him 1997) thereby 
"giving back 5,000ha to the water". In fact, the DDI and DDBRA started this process in 1993 with Babina 
polder (2,400ha) and then in 1996 the second polder, Cernovca (1,580ha), see Tudor (1997) or 
Kravatzky et al (2000) for details.
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down, once the black market is taken into account (the black part of the stack-bars) 
then the total catch is in the region of 8,400 tonnes.
Figure 8-23: Official catch statistics over the previous 12 years with black 
market corrections for previous 4 years
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pietei negre pe ultimii ani.
Source: Navodaru and Staras (2000:72)
I have argued repeatedly in earlier chapters that the methodology and approach that 
the DDI were using was not up to the task of dealing with a situation like that 
encountered in the Danube Delta. I had reached that conclusion after careful 
examination of the reports they had produced over 4 years and the methodology they 
had relied upon.
The fact that for the first 4 years of the DDBRA’s and DDI’s existence no economic or 
institutional aspects were incorporated in their (or anyone else’s) analysis of the 
Danube Delta fishery, that there were no other interventions that dealt with fishery 
management between 1994 and 1995 besides the workshops that I report on in this 
chapter, and the fact that in the second quarter report of the DDI fishery scientists 
Navodaru and Staras (1995) extensively report on and analyse the institutional 
setting and the economic forces that drive the fishery, lead me to conclude that the 
Decision Conference process had significant impact.
For example, Figure 8-24 shows how Navodaru and Staras (1995) describe the 
existing and proposed system for fish circulation. The structure and way of illustration 
is remarkably similar to Figure 8-2 and Figure 8-3. I interpret the fact that there are 
some difference in content and illustration as evidence that the workshop participants 
remained owners of the problems and solutions and that were willing and able to 
develop the analysis further.
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Figure 8-24: Current and proposed system of fish circulation mechanism
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Source: Navodaru and Staras (1995: 41)
In the subsequent years the DDI scientists went further and in 1997 they produced 
concrete estimates of black market figures (see Figure 8-25) estimates of how much 
gear is really used in the DDBR (see Figure 8-26). This was the first time that
293
uncertain information was taken into account in the analysis of the DDI and DDBRA.
This is important because for a number of reasons:
• the coherence of the their decision making process dramatically improved;
• it shows that something that had been ignored for the past 5 years which
something like an “unspeakable” aspect could now be openly and officially be 
addressed;
• the way the information was collected suggests that some change in attitute and 
approach had taken place: in addition to routine data collection from the official
fish collection points and fishing companies, the DDI scientists systematically
observed and interviewd fishermen, traders, etc, went out and counted nets, etc.
Figure 8-25: Estimates of black market percentages in the DDBR
STRUCTURA CAPTURILOR
ZONELE INVESTIGATE
CANTITATEA DE PESTE 
ABSORBITA DE PIATA NEAGRA
Fig. 1 Dimensiunea pietei negre a pestelui 
pescuit de pescarii profesionisti
Source: Navodaru and Staras (1997:76)
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The information they gained in this process allowed them to get a much more 
realistic and believable understanding of what was happening with the fish stock (see 
for example Figure 8-27 which illustrates that in reality the diversity of species is 
much greater -  especially economically valuable species such as pike perch (stiuca) 
appear again in significant proportions).
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Figure 8-27: Structure of fish catch by species according to official statistics 
(left) compared to observation and interview data (right) in 1996
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si observatii (dreapta),in 6 zone reprezentaiive din Deltei Dunam in ar.U -96
Source: Navodaru and Staras (1997a:79)
This evidence shows, therefore, that after the decision conference workshops the 
DDI and DDBRA were willing to give up, to a large degree, their previous insistence 
on a command-and-control type of management approach. Even though it still 
remains unsatisfactory that so much of the catch goes unreported, by starting to 
implements significant elements of the Phased Strategic alternative and by changing 
their research method to suit63 significant progress has been made.
In 1997 the DDBRA and DDI also started to implement the pilot fishing association of 
the Phased Strategic alternative which operates its own fish collection point 
(cherhana) and recently its financial feasibility has been analysed (de Graaf and 
Rowney, 2000).
The programme originated from the study on “sustainable fishehes 
management and options of fish licensing in the Danube Delta” 
carried out in 199464. The basic conclusion was that sustainable 
management of fishehes resources in the Danube Delta can only be
63 Institutional, economic, uncertainty issues have found their way into the heart of their management 
research, and this has, of course, also enabled them to expand their stock assessment methods. Since 
1997 the DDI has started to use Schaefer method in addition to the VPA/Berverton-Holt method.
64 De Graaf (1994)
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ach ieved  through co-m an ag em en t o f this resource b y  its m a jo r  
stakeholders.
The first steps h ave  therefore b een  m ade in the  direction o f  
sustainable m an ag em en t o f fish resources. This rem ains a  long  
term  g o a l a n d  its ach ievem ent will require a  change in attitude  
tow ards m an ag em en t o f  natura l resources both from  the D D B R A  
a n d  the f is h e r m e n (d e  G ra a f a n d  R ow ney, 200 0 :1 -2 )
The main conclusion of the study is that at least 30 fulltime fishermen need to be part
of an association for it to be financially feasable. The analysis was also helpful in
providing a model through which one can perform basic business planning
calculations. The DDBRA and DDI have found that over the past two years they have
been approached with increasing frequency by fishermen who are interested in
forming their own associations and companies but who need assistance or guidance
with the basic mechanics of forming and operating such organizations. There is
therefore still much room for improvement in the service that the DDI and DDBRA
play but the overall development of fishery management is in a promising direction.
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Chapter 9 Conclusions about the use of MCDA for the 
development of adaptive fishery management strategies
9.1 Introduction
In this Chapter I present my conclusions about the three study questions that I posed 
in the Introduction of the thesis in relation to my experience the DDBR. In Section 9.4 
I evaluate the extent to which the Decision Conference described in the previous 
Chapter was able to achieve the objectives that I set out in Figure 7-7 of Chapter 7.
9.2 Adequacy of previous MCDA applications
The essence of the criticism of Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis in the fishery 
management literature is captured by Pearse and Walters (1992). They claim that the 
fatal problem with the application of Decision Analysis to fishery management (and 
by implication most of environmental management) is that one cannot make a 
defensible choice about whose utility function ought to be encoded since due to the 
public nature of fishery resources, there are many decision makers. My work 
responds to this criticism at two levels. At one level, I have argued that the criticism is 
wrong. I have shown in the review of the Decision Analysis literature in Chapters 3 
and 6 that decision analysts do not seek to determine utility functions for society, nor 
do they claim to be establishing prescriptive recommendations. Instead, DA seeks to 
assist decision makers in structuring problems and problem solving process in a way 
that helps them to consider uncertainty, multiple objectives, form preferences, and 
develop options, and make decisions. My analysis of the proposals in the DA 
literature for dealing with the problems of fishery management suggests that many of 
them would be useful in practice and they have helped to better understand the 
problems.
At a deeper level, however, the underlying problem that Pearse and Walters' (1992) 
point to is that those who decide or are being asked to decide about risk, are not the 
same as those who bear the risks. Even though this is the same problem that the 
MSDA literature is using to justify their own approach (see Chapter 3), I do not 
believe that it has been adequately dealt with so far.
Using MSDA in a case such as the DDBR, would have meant that one would have 
developed a very sophisticated model in an attempt to determine a Maximum 
Sustainable Yield estimate on which to base the management system (following
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either an approach similar to that of McDaniels (1995), or one would have followed 
the outline of the full MSDA as presented in Chapter 3). However, the result would 
still have been very divergent views, that would have been dealt either by presenting 
different options and sensitivity analyses to the DDBRA which show by how much 
estimations, weights, or preferences had to change in order to produce a change in 
the order of preference for different options by different stakeholder groups, or 
through some form of statistical aggregation.
However, neither of the outcomes would have satisfied the DDBRA because in the 
management approach that they were using, values and opinions of different 
stakeholder groups did not matter very much: fish either were over-exploited or they 
were not, and scientific enquiry should determine which was the case. There was 
therefore only a small chance that they would have perceived such a report 
differently from the others that they received and change their approach because of 
it.
Nevertheless, any systematic (or reasonably comprehensive) evaluation of fishery 
management options in a case such as the Danube Delta would have needed to 
assess at least some co-management options (even if it would be still largely 
government driven (see Figure 4-6, page 152, for the range of different types 
relationships between Government and fishermen that have been classified as co­
management). I have also shown that the management of the DDBR by the DDBRA 
was on the extreme side of command and control, (coupled with a perception that 
anything else besides state control would lead into a political, administrative, 
technical quagmire). This system was sustained by a view of nature that there must 
be a critical point (in the form of a MSY or carrying capacity) and if they only found it 
(and only they could do that) they would be able to manage on a rational basis. That 
is why the DDBRA not did not even want to know about other options and certainly 
not share power with those who have been poaching so far.
The DDBRA scenario is a good example for the wider dilemma that the existing 
Decision Analysis literature relating to fishery management (and resource 
management more generally) has frequently faced and not been able to resolve 
satisfactorily:
• on the one hand they are unable to live up to the expectations of those who 
would like to see a unequivocal answer (not even for the natural science part 
is that possible because even there scientists may differ quite dramatically in 
their interpretation of the evidence). I have given examples of theories that 
suggest that this a systemic problem that will always crop up because
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according to their evidence complex ecosystems (and other open systems as 
well) interactions are such that change is discontinuous and unpredictable 
(see Adaptive Environmental Management and Assessment, Chapter 4).
• on the other hand, they do not take their own conclusion about the value of 
their contribution to its logical endpoint: if the separate utility functions created 
through the stakeholder utility models and expert probability assessments end 
up being useful because they can be used to "facilitate the invention of new 
compromise solutions" and "the models become a vehicle for dialogue and 
communication" (von Winterfeldt, 1992:338), then why limit this 
communication to reports? Or if they do bring stakeholders together then why 
not deal with stakeholder interaction as carefully as with probability elicitation 
and utility encoding?
Within this context, it is particularly unsatisfactory that the one Decision Analysis 
approach which deals with effective communication between workshop participants, 
namely Decision Conferencing, has not been used or referred to.
9.3 The importance of Institutional context
I have shown through my examination of the fishery management problem in the 
Danube Delta Biosphere Reserve (Chapters 2 and 7) and by review of the fishery 
management from a wide variety of disciplines Chapters 3 and 4) that there is 
frequently the need to develop innovative management systems that take account of 
local conditions (natural and social), and which have a greater ability to adapt as 
natural or social conditions change. My review of the literature and the situation in the 
DDBR also suggests that a move away from command and control management 
toward some form of co-management has the potential to make the relationships 
between central administrations and beneficiaries more effective.
I have identified three main problems with the development of adaptive management 
systems, the first two I already mentioned in the previous section:
1. there is often great uncertainty and very different interpretations of the 
evidence (about the natural and the social system).
2. managing the interaction between stakeholders, experts, and managers both 
within and between organisations effectively is not straight forward
3. generating social innovation in which existing roles of individuals, 
departments, and organisations are transformed does not happen easily.
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I have come to the following conclusions about the importance of institutions with 
respect to the use of Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis and the above three 
problems:
The use of Decision Analysis improves the handling of uncertainty because it 
provides a coherent and systematic method for the assessment of a large variety of 
variables (this is not a new finding, but in light of the fact that there is not much 
evidence that Decision Analysis has actually been used for the assessment of 
uncertainty in fishery management it warrants re-statement). Until now, however, the 
question about the most effective way of dealing with situations where there are very 
different interpretations of the same evidence for natural resource management 
questions has not been resolved. I have shown in Chapter 3 that the MSDA literature 
has suggested either the use of some form of mathematical averaging or that the 
difference in assessment be carried forward throughout the analysis in order to 
provide a framework for discussion. One of the contributions of my research to this 
question has been to point out that there is evidence (presented in Chapter 6) that 
facilitated work groups that are structured into a "estimate-feedback-talk" process 
(Reagan-Cirincione, 1994) can enable individuals to perform better than when 
working alone and that consensus distributions constructed in a Decision Conference 
setting are different from statistical averages generated by individual judgements 
(Phillips, 1998). Furthermore, I have shown that there are a number of theories which 
put forward different hypotheses about how the institutional context within which an 
individual operates can have effects on that person's viewpoint without him or her 
being aware of that (see Adaptive Environmental Management and Assessment and 
Cultural Theory reviews in Chapter 4, and Stratified Systems Theory, Competing 
Values Approach, and Mintzberg's Organisational forms in Chapter 5). Since 
robustness is an important characteristic of adaptive management strategies, it is 
important for Decision Analysts to be aware of the effects of the institutional setting 
when they are seeking to capture the widest variety of viewpoints in the analysis 
process.
With respect to the effective management of the interaction between stakeholders, 
experts, and managers both within and between organisations, I have limited my 
analysis to only one type: face-to-face interaction in a workshop setting. The 
importance of the facilitator's role in managing the process and structure of group 
interaction has been captured well by Phillips and Phillips (1993) but there is no 
evidence that decision analysts operating in approaches other than Decision 
Conferencing use a theoretical base for their management of the participant's
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interaction (even though the importance of process is acknowledged - e.g. von 
Winterfeldt, 1992).
I have also shown that the position of clients within an organization should be taken 
into consideration by decision analysts because it can help them choose appropriate 
decision support methods and they can better guide the selection of participants for 
the task. For example, there were five managerial strata within the DDBRA. The 
Executive Director was a Stratum IV manager. Jaques (1996) hypothesis that the 
time-span of a Stratum IV manager is 2-5 years and the time focus for planning of 
this position is 3 years coincided with the time frame chosen for the Decision 
Conference for the DDBR fishery. This also provides an hypothesis, for the 
differences in concern among those engaged in the strategy development process. 
While Scientific Staff (Stratum II) was concerned with operational problems up to one 
year in advance which could be dealt with through prediction, Section Heads 
(Stratum III) were concerned with possible events over 1-2 years which need 
primarily a statistical forecasting system to deal with uncertainty, the Executive 
Director (Stratum IV) was concerned with more general management questions 
which would be dealt with developing a number of different options or alternative 
paths to achieve the strategic objective of the DDBRA. Assistance with judgemental 
tasks rather than data analysis for prediction or forecasting are more appropriate for 
this stratum. The Governor of the DDBRA is a Stratum V manager concerned with a 
time span of 5 to 10 years, the whole system of the DDBRA and its position or role 
within the DDBR, and in particular with judging the likely impacts of changes or 
events both from within the DDBRA and from its environment (the DDBR and 
beyond). Stratum V managers would find the use of scenarios most helpful in their 
attempts to deal with uncertainty so that they can evaluate the robustness of 
strategies and identify possibly critical impacts of developments (see also Phillips, 
unpublished).
With respect to the third difficulty of developing adaptive management strategies,
namely the transformation of the roles that individuals, department, or organisations
play, consideration of the institutional context can assist the application of Decision
Analysis as well. The DDBR case study illustrates this point well. In Chapter 5 I
concluded that the DDBRA best fits the Mintzberg's (1989) description of a
"bureaucracy” (or "machine organisation"). Much of the DDBRA's work was highly
specialized, communication within the DDBRA was very formalized, and tasks were
grouped on a functional basis rather than problem basis. There is nothing inherently
wrong with that as bureaucracies perform important functions (see for example
Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997). However, in the case such as the DDBR where the
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command and control approach to fishery management was inadequate65, their role 
within the management of the DDBR needed to change.
The challenge for decision analysis was two-fold: first, a mechanism needed to be 
found to enable the DDBRA to overcome their pre-occupation with efficiency (see 
Chapter 5 why this is a common problem in bureaucracies) and re-evaluate the 
broader options, including some form of co-management.Secondly the DDBRA's role 
could only truly transform if the role of the fishing companies and the fishermen also 
changed (specifically, the DDBRA could not gain partners for co-management if the 
potential partners were not willing or able due to a lack of trust, skills, or 
organisational capacity to transform their own role).
While it is interesting and instructive to ascertain what such a strategy might have 
been, it was really for the managers of the DDBRA to decide whether or not they 
should continue by trying to improve the operating efficiencies their existing 
approach, or whether they needed to fundamentally transform their strategy in light of 
the changes of the social, economic, and ecosystem. It was important for the DDBRA 
managers to be engaged in that analysis because only they had the necessary 
knowledge for the DDBR (of course, they could and should consult with others, such 
as the fishery consultant of the EBRD technical assistance project if they believed 
that they needed assistance). Furthermore, unless they, the policy makers for the 
fishery of the DDBR supported the strategies, no action would have been 
undertaken. Another reason why it was important for the DDBRA managers to be 
engaged in the analysis was that the process of deliberation, discussion, and 
analysis was educational. New meanings and understandings were forged, and 
these, together with the experience of having developed them, are important for 
adapting the management strategies in the face of the inevitable changes to the 
fishery management system in the future.
9.4 Conclusions about application of Decision Conferencing in the 
DDBR case study
Figure 9-1 is essentially the same as Figure 7-7 in Chapter 7 and lists the objectives 
that I believed the Decision Conference in the DDBR needed to achieve. Here I
65 The tension between the DDBRA's organisational form and the challenges of managing an inland 
fishery in a wetland that experiences great and rapid variations is brought out in the following quote: “To 
see these organisations as adaptive to a turbulent, dynamic, very changing environment is to indulge in 
fantasy.” (Perrow, 1972:199, quoted in Mintzberg, 1989)
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discuss the extent to which the objectives have been achieved and present ways of 
improving future applications of Decision Conferencing in the context of the 
development of adaptive fishery management strategies.
Figure 9-1: Objectives of Decision Conference intervention for adaptive fishery 
management strategy development
1. Coherence policy choice
1 .a assess all value dimensions that participants consider relevant and their 
relative priorities
1.b consider the likelihood of events, their causes, effects, and relationships
1 .c integrate and manipulate data efficiently and effectively
1.d assess different alternatives and if possible develop new innovative 
alternatives that are more preferred than the ones already identified
1.e deal with disagreements about value, likelihood, or preferred alternative 
judgements in a generative way
1 .f avoid biases resulting from heuristics employed in judgement
1 .g generate commitment to action
1.h generate a type of understanding of the problems and preferred alternatives
that enables them to legitimate their choice of action
2. Transformation of existing fishery management strategy
2.a Create the motivation and readiness to change by
• identifying data that disconfirm the viability of the existing strategy,
• making this data significant by contrasting it important objectives or 
ideals of management
• providing psychological safety
2.b Facilitate cognitive restructuring that includes:
• the development of a new shared social reality
• analysis of appropriate common-pool resource management regime 
features/elements
• different view points so as to ensure robustness of the management 
strategy
2.c Facilitate the embedding of the new point of view into the psychic life space 
of employees and in organisational relationships by ensuring that they 
remain owners of problem throughout the process.
3. Facilitate intra-and inter-organisational collaboration
3.a the process of work is sufficiently flexible to respect participants' time
constraints
3.b social tragedies are avoided by working towards:
• serving the needs and capacities of different stratum managers
• making responsibility delegation possible___________________________
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Objective Set 1: Coherence of policy choice
1.a) assess a ll value dim ensions that participants con sid er re levant a n d  the ir 
relative priorities
In my analysis of the problems of fishery management in the DDBR I had 
identified a number of key issues from the fishery management literature as well 
as DDBRA managers, DDI scientists, and other stakeholders that were not being 
incorporated into the analysis. Furthermore, the assessment of management 
options against the criteria that were identified did not address the difference in 
relative importance of criteria explicitly. As a result, the management options 
developed were incoherent in the sense that they were not consistent and 
contained contradictions.
As a decision analyst with some knowledge about the content issues of the client 
I was trying to assist, during the Conference in the DDBR I repeatedly faced the 
temptation to point out issues that I thought should be considered, or relate 
experiences with fishery management from other parts of the world. Phillips and 
Phillips (1993) pointed out that if the facilitator contributes to content he 
undermines the effectiveness of his role and the work of the group suffers (for 
example, he looses the ability to reflect on the process, may be drawn into the 
group's deliberation, or cause group members to feel "de-skilled").
Before the Conference I had discussed this danger with Peter Hall, the facilitator 
from the London School of Economics who took the lead in facilitation. We 
agreed that I would refrain from making direct content contributions. 
Nevertheless, it is quite likely that my own views still influenced the discussions 
because in the process of translating between the Romanian participants and the 
Mr Hall and I may have emphasized some issues more than others.
Since the Decision Conference, I have gained much more experience with 
facilitation and have become more knowledgeable about the group process and 
decision analysis literature. As a result I have also gained more confidence in the 
process. I would recommend that facilitators draw to the attention of their client 
any content concerns they may have in a preliminary meeting, but that they 
restrain strictly from making content contributions while they are in the role of 
facilitator.
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1.b) consider the likelihood of events, their causes, effects, and relationships
In the Decision Conference we did not elicit probabilities of different events in a 
formal manner. Instead, we relied on holistic judgements by participants. 
Structuring the licensing options in relation to key features (see Table 8-4) and 
evaluating the options against the range of objectives enabled participants to 
consider likelihood, discuss causes, effects, and relationships in an adequate 
way. It is possible that a different group of participants would have preferred to 
work with uncertainty in a more explicit way. This situation illustrates the concept 
of requisite decision modelling well.
1. c) in tegrate  a n d  m anipulate  d ata  effic iently a n d  effectively
The account of the Decision Conference process in Chapter 8 shows that the use 
of flipcharts and a laptop computer with a liquid crystal display screen enabled us 
to help the group structure and manipulate data efficiently and effectively. As we 
were working in a room that was not as conducive to Decision Conferences as 
conference rooms that are specially designed for the purpose, I found the advice 
given by Friend and Hickling (1987) on how to work in a low-technology 
environment particularly helpful.
1.d) assess different a lternatives a n d  if  possible develop n ew  innovative  
alternatives th a t a re  m ore p re fe rred  than the ones a lread y  identified
The fact that participants were able to develop innovative alternatives in an 
iterative assessment process is brought out in the account of the Decision 
Conference. However, I am not satisfied that we, the facilitators, handled the 
process through which the management objectives were established in the most 
effective way. Although the two objective hierarchies developed over the two 
days captured the main concerns of the participants, I suspect that we could have 
spent some additional time developing a more systematic objectives hierarchy 
that paid greater attention to the relationship between Biosphere Objectives and 
fishery management objectives, as well as between what Keeney (1992) calls 
"Fundamental" and "Means Objectives". In that way, participants might have 
been able to identify additional useful features for the preferred alternative (see 
Section 3.2.2).
1.e) d e a l with d isagreem ents  a b o u t value, likelihood, o r p re fe rred  alternative  
ju d g em en ts  in  a  generative  w a y
306
The first requirement for the achievement of this objective is not to be afraid to 
invite participants who have contentious or different viewpoints to the 
Conference. In fact, one of the key arguments presented in this thesis has been 
that the facilitator should help his client identify groups or individuals who hold 
different viewpoints. A second requirement is that the facilitator enables all 
participants to express their viewpoint in the Conference and by helping 
participants develop higher level perspectives of the problem.
1.f) avo id  b iases resulting from  heuristics em ployed  in ju d g em e n t
The literature about heuristics and biases is quite developed (see Kahnemann, 
Slovic, and Tversky, 1982). There is, however, debate about the extent to which 
work in groups helps or hinders performance by individuals (see discussion in 
Chapter 3 and 6). In the DDBR Decision Conference we sought to help 
participants by making cross-checks on preference rating differences and 
importance weight judgements. However, I am not able to advance the debate on 
the basis of this case study.
1.g) g en era te  com m itm ent to action
Generating "commitment to action" is presented as a key feature and main 
objective of Decision Conferences (see Phillips, 1988; Chun, 1992). The 
evidence from this case study supports this claim to a large extent. The follow- 
through on the “commit package” agreed to has been quite high. I have shown 
that over the past 4 years many elements of the Phased Strategic alternative 
have been implemented.
The biggest questions arise from the fact that the DDBRA was not able to 
implement the auction of fisheries licences as forseen or to institute and change 
in the tax on the landed catch. I have reported the evidence that suggests that 
the DDBRA and DDI have repeatedly tried to organize the auction.
Having received Government approval in 1996 for a coherent natural resource 
concessioning system which was then withdrawn after that years' general 
elections where the Governing party, and equally important, the Governor 
changed was a serious blow to the transformation efforts of the DDBRA and DDI.
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However, the fact that the DDBRA was then able to develop an innovative 
licensing alternative that maintained the spirit and thrust of the Phased Strategic 
alternative and which was implemented in 1997 is evidence for commitment to 
action, adaptability, ownership of problem, and transformation of thinking on the 
part of the Decision Conference participants.
Nevertheless, one issue that had been agreed on has not yet been acted on: 
fishermen should be taxed on the quota of their license and not on the catch they 
report landed (because the existing system provides financial incentives for 
fishermen to report less than their full catch). The main constraints which have 
prevented this action can be summarized as legal/technical and political (Dr 
Baboianu, Mr Constantin, Dr Staras, personal communication). The Romanian 
legal system does not provide any leeway for the execution or regulation of 
economic activity. This means that Romania's laws do not provide legal 
'bounderies' of what is allowed, and within that people can do what they want. 
Instead, for any activity to be legal, that precise activity or form of regulation must 
have been specified in law. That is why the Government Decision of 1996 and its 
subsequent withdrawal were so significant. Another implication is that the 
DDBRA, the DDI, and the Director of the Tulcea fishing company's commitment 
to a change in the licensing strategy are necessary but not sufficient. They in turn 
must work to convince the MWFEP, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of 
Finance, and the Ministry for Privatization. Those in turn must present their case 
to the Government or in Parliament where the necessary decisions are taken or 
laws are passed.
The legal/technical difficulty referred to above derives from the fact that the 
DDBRA and DDI had to break new ground for Romania when they specify a new 
taxation system for natural resource utilization licences. The political difficulty 
stems from the fact that in different licencesing or taxation schemes, benefits and 
costs are distributed differently (this is the reason for including, for example, the 
"Political acceptability" or "Security of investment" objectives in the decision 
model, see Section 8.3.2.1).
Given these constraints, there are three additional options through which 
commitment to action generated through the Decision Conference may have 
been supported:
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(i) technical support: once the Decision Conference participants reached 
the decision on their preferred option, technical support in the area of 
developing the technical details of the license and taxation scheme 
would have helped them to prepare their arguments to the various 
ministries and governmental bodies. I have argued in Section 2.4.1 
that the fact that one could not find any description of the licensing 
procedure in operation before the Decision Conference indicated that 
it was difficult, and maybe not possible, to apply existing fishery 
management methods in circumstances such as those encountered in 
the DDBR. In addition to that, it could also have been seen as an 
indication of technical difficulties faced by staff. Intervention at this 
level was beyond the scope of this thesis.
(ii) wider involvement of stakeholders: I have described the constraints 
faced in the engagement of stakeholders in the Decision Conference 
and how the decision for the those who did participate was taken in 
Chapters 7 and 8. Nevertheless, wider stakeholder involvement would 
have created a more widely shared social reality.
(iii) Follow-up workshops: once the DDBRA had transformed its fishery 
management strategy (see further comments on this specific point 
below), it may have been useful if it had arranged further workshops 
with stakeholder groups such as the Ministry officials, company 
directors, and the Tulcea Judet Council. This would have been one 
way of dealing with the fact that Dr Baboianu, the person for whom we 
worked in the Decision Conference, chose to invite a narrow group of 
stakeholders to the Decision Conference (see Chapter 8). The primary 
aim of such workshops could have been the systematic development 
of shared understanding of the each others concerns and the 
development of mutually agreed to strategies. It was not feasable to 
organize such meetings within the week that between the Decision 
Conference and the presentation of the results at the "Integration, 
Law, and Implementation" Workshop (see Section 8.3.3). However, it 
may have been possible to be more specific about the process by 
which fisheries management objectives adopted for the DDBR (see 
Figure 8-22) were to be implemented.
All three of these options would have reduced the risk that all stakeholders faced 
as they moved towards mutually beneficial options and greater interdependence.
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1.h) generate a type of understanding of the problems and preferred alternatives 
that enables participants to legitimate their choice of action
Most of the evidence from the Decision Conference and the events that followed 
suggests that this objective has been achieved. The evidence I presented in with 
respect to the "commitment to action" objective could be seen to apply under this 
heading as well. However, since the decision models generated in Decision 
Conferences are meant to be requisite representations of participants shared 
understanding of the problem being dealt with, means that persons who did not 
take part in the Decision Conference are unlikely to easily understand the 
reasoning behind them. To prevent negative reactions to the models one might 
be tempted to develop more comprehensive decision models in the Conference. 
That is not advisable, as it is likely to compromise the achievement of the other 
objectives of the Decision Conference. If participants find it necessary to present 
the decision model developed during the conference for the purpose of 
legitimating their choice of action they need to at least present an outline of the 
process through which the model was developed.
Objective Set 2: Transformation of existing fishery management strategy
The DDBRA’s fishery management strategy needed to be transformed from one in 
which in the role of the DDBRA was to determine a narrowly defined carrying 
capacity (Maximum Sustainable Yield) and to command and enforce management 
activities, to a co-management role aimed at maintaining or increasing the resilience 
of the social, economic, and ecological systems that constitute the DDBR. Building 
on Schein's (1987) three-stage model of the change process, I have also argued, 
that in order to achieve this objective the Decision Conference needed to achieve the 
following three sub-objectives:
310
a) Create the motivation and readiness to change by
• identifying data that disconfirm the viability of the existing strategy,
• making this data significant by contrasting it against important objectives 
or ideals of management
• providing psychological safety
b) Facilitate cognitive restructuring that includes:
• the development of a new shared social reality
• analysis of appropriate common-pool resource management regime 
features/elements
• different view points so as to ensure robustness of the management 
strategy
c) Facilitate the embedding of the new point of view into the psychic life space of
employees and in organisational relationships by ensuring that they remain
owners of problem throughout the process.
Evidence from the Decision Conference suggests that the first set of these objectives 
were achieved. In my account of the preparatory workshops I indicated that evidence 
was beginning to accumulate that the existing and proposed strategies were not 
viable. However, it was not until the Decision Conference, when the existing strategy 
and the one that DDBRA and DDI were proposing were compared with alternative 
options against the objectives that they had specified for fishery management in the 
Biosphere Reserve, that the full significance of the shortcoming was realised. The 
graphs generated with the HIVIEW programme that compared all the options in their 
performance on the Short Term Implementation and Long Term Strategy objectives 
(see for example Figure 8-11), proved to be a very powerful tool in this process. The 
Decision Conference process also provided the necessary psychological safety in the 
form of the agreement by all participants to respect each other views and 
confidentiality. The establishment of clear boundaries for the conference in terms of 
task, time, and work territory were also essential elements that contributed to the 
psychological safety of participants.
The evidence presented so far has shown that a shared social reality was created in 
the Decision Conference. In terms of the consideration of common-pool resource 
management options, and the transformation toward a co-management regime, the 
preferred licensing scheme contained following significant elements: the licences that 
were to be auctioned in the following year were to be issued for only year (so give 
fishermen's associations some time to prepare for bidding), redesign of the 50 fishing 
areas in the DDBR so that it included smaller lakes which a single fishermen's 
association could manage (once they have formed into a legal entity), and the 
implementing a pilot scheme in which a fish landing point becomes an auctioneer of 
fish (this would give smaller fishing associations the means to distribute their fish 
more effectively and thereby make their activity more viable. The Decision
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Conference contained a greater variety of stakeholders and viewpoints than previous 
management planning attempts. Nevertheless, the variety of stakeholders and 
viewpoints could have been increased if a representative of a fishermen's association 
would have participated directly.
I have already commented on our (the facilitators) attempt to ensure that the 
participants remained the problem owners throughout the process. The evidence 
presented in the Section on the effects of the Decision Conference in the previous 
Chapter futher confirms the existence and the degree of the transformation that had 
taken place. Among the most positive results has been that the management 
analysis and policy had become much more coherent, realistic, and frank. There 
were, of course, many unexpected challenges and development that the DDBRA and 
DDI had to face. The evidence suggests that the Decision Conference process had 
been at least instrumental in helping to generate a sufficiently deep understanding 
and belief in the underlying objectives and preferred solution that the staff were able 
to create innovative development avenues that were broadly in line with the Phased 
Strategic alternative.
Objective Set 3: Facilitate intra- and inter-organisational collaboration
a) the process of work is sufficiently flexible to respect time constraints
b) social tragedies are avoided by working towards:
• serving the needs and capacities of different stratum managers
• making responsibility delegation possible
I had indicated in Chapter 5 that the DDBRA was severely understaffed (especially in 
the managerial positions) and in Chapter 7 during the time of management planning 
process of the EBRD technical assistance programme staff of the DDBRA were 
strained because there were many demands on their time. While we tried to be as 
flexible as possible in terms of the scheduling of the Decision Conference, we 
insisted that during the days of the Conference participants would not be disturbed. 
The main rationale behind this insistence was, in addition to the fact that it would aid 
participants' concentration, that it would aid the transformation process as I have 
outlined it within the context of the previous set of objectives (creating the boundaries 
necessary for effective group work).
Decision Conferences usually take place away from clients' work environment in 
order to create some distance to everyday problems. Even though we were not 
disturbed during the two days, in retrospect I should have insisted that the 
Conference not take place at the DDBRA headquarters - particularly in view of the 
fact that the views were so entrenched and a thorough examination of relationships
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between the represented stakeholder groups was necessary. A location such as the 
retreat at Uzlina, inside the Danube Delta, would have been ideal because it would 
have meant that the Conference was residential and therefore would have given 
participants the opportunity to discuss informally in the evening.
Hardin (1968) spoke of the inevitability of the "Tragedy of the Commons" in relation 
to scarce resources that are used in common because of a divergence between 
individual and collective rationality. Phillips (1988) referred to a similar phenomenon 
in organisations where managers of different departments are all engaged in 
optimising the use of resources within their own areas of responsibility, but 
collectively (for the organization as a whole) resources are not maximised. In the 
case of the DDBR a similar problem occurred: the Licensing Department of the 
DDBRA worked very hard on the development of a better management system for 
the fishery, so did the Natural Resources Department, as well as the fishery 
scientists of the DDI, fishing companies and many others. Yet, collectively, the result 
of these efforts was far from satisfactory. In such a situation it is very tempting to 
impose a greater degree of central control in order to solve this dilemma. However, 
just as in the case of Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons" for which it has been 
shown that improved communication between resource users can resolve the 
dilemma (see Chapter 4), so can improved communication and a shared sense of 
understanding also improve collaboration within and between organisations. The 
Decision Conference has provided a unique opportunity for a small number of 
managers to exchange views and leam much about each others' views, roles, and 
problems. It would be too much to claim that the Decision Conference has led to the 
complete avoidance of social tragedies even between the Departments and 
organisations that have participated, but the collaboration between stakeholders has 
been improved in a limited but important way.
9.5 Conclusions
The use of Decision Conferencing in the development of the fisheries management 
plan for the DDBRA produced a new fisheries management strategy that was 
consistent with the objectives of the Biosphere Reserve. This strategy, developed by 
participants, was more coherent than all the previous attempts at management 
planning as it incorporated all the considerations that were thought to be important. 
For example, the effects of the illegal trade in fish, which until then had been left out 
of all formal analyses.
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The fishery licensing scheme developed was more robust than previous schemes 
because it considered the viewpoints of a greater variety of stakeholders. This aspect 
might have been further improved by also directly incorporating the viewpoints of 
fishermen associations. Another key decision maker, the Governor of the DDBRA, 
was also not able to participate fully. His brief intervention in the Conference was 
positive, as it provided the opportunity for him to share his perspective, concerns, 
and to indicate the direction in which he thought fishery management in the DDBR 
should develop. Fuller participation would have made it possible for him to engage in 
the transformation that took place in the Conference. Nevertheless, the greater 
robustness of the scheme, combined with the improved understanding of different 
stakeholder positions and the perspectives of different disciplines and departments 
(in short the shared social reality that was generated) also meant that essential 
requirements of adaptive management were created.
On the basis of my review of the proposals in the Multiple Stakeholder Decision 
Analysis (MSDA) literature, and the limited number of applications of (MSDA) to 
environmental management problems, I concluded that it would also have been 
possible to apply MSDA in the DDBR. MSDA would have made great strides in the 
systematic integration of uncertainty and the objectives of different stakeholders into 
fishery management analysis. However, unlike Decision Conferencing, MSDA does 
not deal with the institutional context within which management strategy development 
takes place. In the case of the DDBRA, the use of MSDA, in the format which has 
been advocated until now (where institutional context is not considered) would have 
been more likely to have produced an informative report and learning for the 
participating individuals. It is unlikely that it would have led to the transformation of 
the DDBRA's management approach and the development of an adaptive fishery 
management strategy.
The Decision Conferencing methodology may be improved if more attention is paid to
what constitutes “diversity of viewpoints”. I have shown in Chapter 6 (Section 6.3.2.1)
that in Decision Conferencing "the main safeguard against the creation of
idiosyncratic, even eccentric models is the same as for science: reliance on
adversarial processes. A key requirement of Decision Conferences is that the
problem owners must represent a variety of viewpoints" (Phillips 1984:43). However,
despite the incorporation of apparent diversity, there is still the need to guard against
representing only similar viewpoints. One possible way of addressing this danger is
by using Cultural Theory and Stratified Systems Theory to assist in the selection of
participants. Both theories are practical and provide clear and consistent accounts of
what diversity means. At present, the use of Cultural Theory is still contentious (see
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Krimsky and Golding, 1992) and there are alternative theories relating to diversity 
(see for example Trist and Murrary, 1990) that would need to be evaluated.
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10 Appendices
10.1 Callnote for the DDBR Decision Conference
Decision Analysis Workshop 
on a Fishery Management Strategy 
for the Danube Delta Biosphere Reserve Authority
As a result of three workshops on the Danube Delta Fishery held on 5, 12, and 16 
September it was agreed to hold an intensive decision analysis workshop in the week 
of October 10th in order to agree on a realistic management strategy for the 
Biosphere Reserve fishery.
The workshop will be held over two full days:
When: Wednesday 12.10.94 and Thursday 13.10.94.
Where: DDBRA Meeting Room
Time: 8:30 -17:30 with group lunch and dinner.
The objectives of the workshop are:
1 Review the progress made in the previous three sessions.
2 Establish Long Term fundamental objectives for marine and inland fishery 
management.
3 Agree on a set of preferred strategies for achieving the objectives.
4 Agree on a set of proposals to put to the decision making group and for 
consultation, and on the format and way that these will be put forward.
5 Agree on the actions necessary to implement objectives 3 & 4.
Before the first session on Wednesday, 12.10.94, please think through your views on 
several realistic alternative approaches we could take. Please make a two page 
summary (using keywords) of these alternatives for discussion and what their 
particular advantages /  disadvantages are (in relation to: objectives for fishery 
management, current implementation possibilities, etc.)
The workshop will be facilitated by Peter Hall (who is a Decision Analysis consultant 
from the London School of Economics). He will be assisted by Axel Kravatzky. The 
role of Mr Hall and Kravatzky is only to help you with the process of analysis and 
decision making. The success of this workshop depends on your contribution to the 
content.
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Please make all necessary arrangments to keep your diary for Wednesday and 
Thursday free of all other commitments so that you will not be disturbed for the 
period of those two days.
The participants at the workshop will be:
Baboianu, Grigore 
Staras, Mircea 









10.2 The Author's Terms of Reference
Terms of Reference for the Economics Researcher 
Executant: Mr Axel Kravatzkv
Period: mid-November 1993 to end September 1994
Programme Area: DDBRA Planning, Poilcy and Investments Department
Objectives
1. To carry forward economic and management analyses of the most
important economic sectors in the delta to determine possible 
investment opportunities that meet DDBR objectives.
2. To describe and evaluate the economies of villages in and
immediately around the DDBR, and their interdependence with 
Tulcea, Constanta and other major towns, as a basis for future 
management planning.
3. To describe and evaluate the management implications of the current
and any future planned transport (road and water) system within the 
DDBR-
4. To compile and assess the extent and quality of existing information
pertinent to management planning within the DDBR.
5. To assist the Resident Adviser and other members of the Danube
Delta Environmental Management Programme team in carrying out 
their work (e.g. translating at meetings) and to transfer expertise to 
appropriate staff of the DDBRA Planning, Policy and Investment 
Department.
Guidance
The EBRD consultant economist has collated and carried out preliminary analyses of 
the major economic activities within the DDBR. In terms of natural resource use, 
these basically comprise fishing, agriculture and reed harvesting. Given the over­
riding importance of the fishing sector, and the potential for rapidly increasing its 
productivity and enhancing local employment, representing an early opportunity to 
demonstrate the benefits of environmentally sustainable development, the first
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priority of the Economics Researcher will be to carry out a detailed evaluation of the 
activities and management competence of companies engaged in fishing. A 
tabulation of relevant companies against various asset and performance criteria will 
be drawn up to assist identification of those companies with the best prospects of 
being able to receive and utilise investments for improving fishing productivity within 
environmentally sustainable limits.
Similar exercises will be carried out in other sectors as time and circumstances allow.
The EBRD consultant economist has collated existing demographic data from 
villages within and around the DDBR. However, these data cannot be properly 
interpreted in the absence of information concerning the principal economic activities 
carried out by the inhabitants, and their access to markets, goods and services in 
Tulcea, Constanta and elsewhere. This situation in turn impedes devising 
environmentally sustainable development policies relevant to the needs of the local 
population. Accordingly, the Economics Researcher will visit the principal population 
centres within and around the DDBR in order to obtain the information required. This 
will be done in collaboration with the socio-economics team of the DDI.
It is known that the Danube River is a major international navigation thoroughfare, 
and that a road network within the DDBR is virtually absent. However, there are 
demands to improve road communications within the DDBR (principally to connect 
Chilia Veche with Tulcea), and to increase the network of canals for boat traffic. The 
Economics Researcher will therefore describe and evaluate the management 
implications of the current and any future planned transport (road and water) within 
the DDBR.
Information about the DDBR which is highly relevant to management planning has 
been collected by a variety of bodies (nationally and internationally) over a number of 
years. Much of this information is held by the DDI, but as was demonstrated by the 
GEF Project Preparation team during 1993, significant resources exist in Bucharest 
and Constanta, as well as in France, Germany and Austria (among other countries). 
The Economics Researcher will initiate a process for identifying the sources and 
types of information held, and where feasible evaluate the quality of this information.
It is essential that the Economics Researcher should not work in isolation, but ensure 
that there is a transfer of knowledge and expertise to appropriate staff of the DDBRA, 
especially those in the Planning, Policy, and Investment Department. In line with this 
policy, the Economics Researcher will convene, in association with the London
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School of Economics, a decision facilitation conference focusing on one of the areas 
of investingation described above.
Schedule of Outputs: 1994
April: Investment profiles of fishing companies operating in the DDBR
May: Evaluation of current and potential transport systems
June: Economic profiles of villages in and around the DDBR
July: Decision facilitation conference
September: Annotated inventory of information types and sources pertinent to
management planning of the DDBR
10.3 Project Personnel
Project Steering Group
Ing. Eugen Tarhon, DDBRA Governor
Representative of MWFEP
Mr Gerry Muscat, EBRD
Mr Gerard Fischer, Euroconsult
Ms Liz Hopkins, IUCN
International Advisers
Dr M. A. Clark (Broads Authority, UK)
Prof L. Pons (University of Wageningen)
Dr P Dugan (IUCN)
Dr E Maltby (University of Exeter)
EBRD Technical Cooperation Team, to December 1993 
Project Coordinator Mr Gerard Fischer (Euroconsult)
Resident Adviser: Mr Paul Goriup (lUCN-World Conservadon Union)
Legal Experts: Dr Lothar Guntling and Prof Mircea Dutu 
Administration Expert: Mr Ronald Boesaart 
Accountant Mr Cezar Catarglu 
Participatory Planner Mr Michael Douse 
Economists: Mr Gerard Fischer and Mr Axel Kravatzky 
Training Expert: Dr Willem Rodenburg 
Procurement Expert: Mr Douglas Murray-Jones
DDBRA Secondments: Ms Adina Gradea, Mr Sorin Cismaru, Ms Gabriela loan 
Short-term Project Assistants: Ms Mihaela Albota, Ms Adriana Dinu
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10.4 HIVIEW Report of 1st Decision Conference Model
Hiview for Windows - c:\axel\phd\ddbr\ddbrwksh\fishery\fmodel\fisheng2.hvw 
Model created 11/10/94 
Model Text66
The fundamental objective that the adopted licensing scheme must fulfil is:












21 licences issued by DDBRA. No fee. Licences subcontracted to others (approx 130 
‘companies’ active). Enforcement difficult, management impossible due to inaccurate 
information.
PROPOSED (Option 2)67
50 licenses that give exclusive fishing rights for certain areas. Auctioned only to 
companies. The highest bidder agrees pay a percentage of the value of the fish 
caught.
DIRECT (Option 3)“
Licenses for quotas auctioned direct to fishermen who pay a fee on the quota they 









66 Translated from Romanian by Axel Kravatzky
67 Proposed by Dr Baboianu, Mr Constantin, and Dr Staras.
68 Proposed by Dr Staras.
price. The current state companies become service companies taking only a small 
percentage of the sale price.
DISTRIBUTION (Option 4)'9
Licences, for quotas and areas, are auctioned only to companies. Companies 
improve distribution by opening more retail outlets, thereby increasing their income, 
and fishermen are paid more. Otherwise like PROPOSED Option.
ASSOCIATION (Option 5)70
Licences for areas auctioned to companies and fishermen associations. Fishermen 
own their gear or lease it from the companies. Companies also auction the fish for 
the fishermen. Companies serve as distributors and service companies to the 
fishermen.
MARGINS (Option 6)71
Licences have a contract length of 20 years and are made transferable as well as 
inheritable. The idea is to introduce more competition for profit as well as provide 
incentives and security for investments.
2 IMPROVED (Option 7)n
Make only the most important change to PROPOSED in order to implement rapidly. 
Licence fee is a fixed amount on the quota and not on the eventual fish caught.
Summary Report
CURRENT Proposed Direct Distributn Associatio
n
50
Margins 2 Improved Cum Wt
ST Implement 
Legal Difficult
0 100 0 0 100 100 18
ST Implement 
Illegal Trade
0 30 100 50 60 80 50 18
ST
Implement Time
100 100 0 90 20 95 100 14
LT Strategy 
BIO-DIV
0 60 100 60 100 80 80 21
LT Strategy 
Sustainability
0 60 100 50 70 80 60 13
LT Strategy 
Data Collectn
0 53 100 54 86 80 68 17
Total 14 66 68 50 66 86 77
69 Proposed by Mr Cristocea
70 Proposed by Mr Constantin.
71 Proposed by Mr deGraaf.
72 Based on Governor (Mr Tarhon) intervention.
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Structure











* * * * * * * *
Name Weight % weight Cum wt
License ST Implement 50 50 50
ST Implement Legal Difficult 100 36 18
ST Implement Illegal Trade 100 36 18
ST Implement Time 100 36 18
License LT Strategy 50 50 50
LT Strategy BIO-DIV 100 42 21
LT Strategy Sustainability 60 25 13
LT Strategy Data Collectn 80 33 17
Scores
* * * * * *
Short Name : Legal Difficult 
Long Name : Legal Difficulty
By how much must the current laws be changed in order to introduce the licensing 
scheme?
The current law stipulates that: (a) only companies can participate in the auction; (b) 
only areas can be auctioned (and not quotas).
Most preferred:
2+6+7 (100%) - All fall within the current law.
Least preferred:
1 (0%) - zones are auctioned but with sublease, which is not legal.
3+4 (0%) - quotas are not allowed.
Others:
5 (50%) - associations are currently not allowed but required amendment to the law 
would not be too difficult to obtain.
Scale: Preferences 
Scale Type: Identity
Option Score Normalised Weighted
1 CURRENT 0 0 0
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2 Proposed 100 100 18
3 Direct 0 0 0
4 Distributn 0 0 0
5 Association 50 50 9
6 Margins 100 100 18
7 2 Improved 100 100 18
Short Name : Illegal Trade 
Long Name : Illegal Trade
By how much will illegal trade (black market) be reduced?
Most preferred:
3 (100%) - through auctioning system fishermen will be able to sell at market price (- 
10% commission); because fee is on quota money won’t be lost by declaring full 
catch.
Least preferred:
1 (0%) - fishermen obtain much more by selling illegally & companies tolerate it. 
Others:
5+7 (50%) - fee is on quota but price difference retail price-fishermen still very large
6 (80%) - retail-fishermen price difference reduced, but because zones are auctioned 
(which favours larger companies state companies) who have not much reason to 
maximise efficiency.
4 (50%) - retail-fishermen price difference reduced, but not very much because state 
companies have not much pressure to maximise efficiency. Also, license fee on 
catch so more profitable to sell illegally.
2 (30%) - like 4 but nor even retail-fishermen price difference reduced.
Scale: Preferences 
Scale Type: Identity
Option Score Normalised Weighted
1 CURRENT 0 0 0
2 Proposed 30 30 5
3 Direct 100 100 18
4 Distributn 50 40 9
5 Association 60 50 11
6 Margins 80 80 14
7 2 Improved 60 50 9
Short Name: Time
Long Name : Time nec. for impltn
How much time is required for implementation?
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Most preferred:
1+2+7 (100%) - there is enough time before the auction to introduce the necessary 
changes to the rules.
Least preferred:
3 (0%) - require change to the law which takes a lot of time.
Others:
4 (90%) - it takes time before companies could improve their retail network, but 
otherwise like 2.
6 (95%) - it takes time for some smaller companies to form themselves and acquire 
the necessary capital to participate in the auction.
5 (20%) - it takes time to make an amendment to the law so that associations to 




Option Score Normalised Weighted
1 CURRENT 100 100 14
2 Proposed 100 100 14
3 Direct 0 0 0
4 Distributn 90 90 13
5 Association 20 20 3
6 Margins 95 75 14
7 2 Improved 100 100 14
Short Name: BIO-DIV 
Long Name: BIO-DIVERSITY
The support of the improvement of diversity of fish population, as indicated by: 
-Overfishing
-Selective fishing (species, size, prohibition times).
Note: under auctioning system marketing becomes more important than on black 
market => it pays to bring in only quality fish.
Most Preferred:
3+5 (100%) - Fishermen and their associations are given direct control and 
responsibility -  easier enforcement & self-interest.
Least preferred:
1 (0%) - fish is extracted in an undifferentiating manner. There are not enough 
fishermen to overfish currently, but the mesh size used is very small. There is no 
control over gear used. Because of subleasing it is not clear who can fish where, so 
that control is difficult.
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Others:
2+4 (60%) - there are fewer companies and it is clear who is allowed to fish and they 
have a legal basis for this right. All gear will have to be marked so that at least some 
of the small mesh gear will be withdrawn. Companies have to pay a minimum (or 
18% of catch) so that they will probably want more fish from the fishermen to be 
declared. But still substantial illegal trade - species mix and too young fish.
6+7 (80%) - Large improvements from long term investment protection concern + 
marketing; large improvement from quota fee system.
Scale: Preferences 
Scale Type : Identity
Option Score Normalised Weighted
1 CURRENT 0 0 0
2 Proposed 60 50 13
3 Direct 100 80 21
4 Distributn 60 50 13
5 Association 100 80 21
6 Margins 80 60 17
7 2 Improved 80 60 17
Short Name: Sustainability
Long Name : Sustainability of income
Assuring sustainable income for the local population. Key criteria:
- employment security
- availability of natural resource.
- do others, besides local professional fishermen, have access to the licences?
Most preferred:
3 (100%) - Licences are given exclusively direct to fishermen. They will try to fish as 
much as possible but they will monitor each other because the activity of others 
affects them directly.
Least preferred:
1 (0%) - Lack of control over fishing activity (either by authority or fishermen) can 
neither ensure local employment nor the maintenance of the fish stock.
Others:
7+2 (60%) - Fishermen will definitely have incentives to sell on the black market. Fish 
stock would be endangered by fishermen who continue to receive a salary in spite of 
the depletion of the fish stock for short run profits from the black market.
5 (70%) - Licence fee on landed catch will make it profitable to sell fish on the black 
market. This is somewhat counteracted by the cherhana auctioning system where 
they could get a good market price in a legal manner.
6 (80%) - The long term licences give incentives to protect the stock but the area 
licensing system is less desirable than the quota system.
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4 (50%) - Bigger state/ centralised companies are less likely to be able to control 
their fishermen. Fish stock would thereby diminish most.
Scale: Preferences 
Scale Type: Identity
Option Score Normalised Weighted
1 CURRENT 0 0 0
2 Proposed 60 60 8
3 Direct 100 100 13
4 Distributn 50 50 6
5 Association 70 70 9
6 Margins 80 80 10
7 2lmproved 60 60 8
Short Name : Data Collectn 
Long Name : Data Collection






3 (100%) - Data is collected at auction point. Fee on quota and no incentive to sell on 
black market. Each fisherman registers his gear & can be checked in field.
Least preferred:
1 (0%) - no accurate data is obtained due to economic disincentives, organisational 
problems, and confusion.
Others:
2 (53%) - some of the current confusion is clarified.
4 (54%) -  maybe better than proposed because companies run better.
5 (86%) - economic incentives for hiding data down and associations monitor each 
other.
6 (80%) - developed auction system / competition reveals more data.




Option Score Normalised Weighted
1 CURRENT 0 0 0
2 Proposed 53 53 9





Distributn 54 50 9
Association 86 80 14
Margins 80 80 13
2 Improved 68 60 11
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10.5 HIVIEW Report of 2nd Decision Conference Model
Hiview for Windows - c:\axel\phd\ddbr\ddbrwksh\fishery\fmodel\fisheng3.hvw 
Model created 12/10/94 
Model Text73
The fundamental objective that the adopted licensing scheme must fulfil is:














21 licences issued by DDBRA. No fee. Licences subcontracted to others (approx 130 
‘companies’ active). Enforcement difficult, management impossible due to inaccurate 
information.
PROPOSED (Option 2)74
50 licenses that give exclusive fishing rights for certain areas. Auctioned only to 
companies. The highest bidder agrees pay a percentage of the value of the fish 
caught.
DIRECT (Option 3)75
73 Translated from Romanian by Axel Kravatzky
74 CURRENTed by Dr Baboianu, Mr Constantin, and Dr Staras.
75 Proposed by Dr Staras.
329
Licenses for quotas auctioned direct to fishermen who pay a fee on the quota they 
obtained. Fishermen auction their fish through the cherhanas to achieve the best 
price. The current state companies become service companies taking only a small 
percentage of the sale price.
DISTRIBUTION (Option 4)76
Licences, for quotas and areas, are auctioned only to companies. Companies 
improve distribution by opening more retail outlets, thereby increasing their income, 
and fishermen are paid more. Otherwise like PROPOSED Option.
ASSOCIATION (Option 5)77
Licences for areas auctioned to companies and fishermen associations. Fishermen 
own their gear or lease it from the companies. Companies also auction the fish for 
the fishermen. Companies serve as distributors and service companies to the 
fishermen.
MARGINS (Option 6)78
Licences have a contract length of 20 years and are made transferable as well as 
inheritable. The idea is to introduce more competition for profit as well as provide 
incentives and security for investments.
2 IMPROVED (Option 7)re
Make only the most important change to PROPOSED in order to implement rapidly. 
Licence fee is a fixed amount on the quota and not on the eventual fish caught.
BEST LT (Option 8)
Auction by zone and/or quota. For larger lakes which contain several allocated 
quotas seek co-management. Fixed & indexed licence fee on the quota auctioned. 
Licence is for a longer term (10 years), transferable and inheritable. State companies 
shift to distribution and service (due to market conditions and economies of scale). 
State Companies allow fishermen to own and rent boats and gear. Only local active 
fishermen may be employed.
PHASED (Option 9)
76 Proposed by Mr Cristocea
77 Proposed by Mr Constantin.
78 Proposed by Mr deGraaf.
79 Based on Governor (Mr Tarhon) intervention.
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One licence per zone is auctioned. Include small zones, suitable for fishermen 
associations. Licence fee based on the quota of the auctioned zone, paid in indexed 
instalments. The contract length is short (1 year, max 3 years) to allow for 
modification of law and prevent intermediate system to take root. Start Option 8 as 
pilot scheme by changing one cherhana to an auction house. Do everything 
necessary to move as quickly as possible towards Best LT option.
Summary Report




Best LT Phased Cum Wt
ST Implement 
Legal Difficult
0 100 0 0 50 100 100 0 88 7
ST Implement 
Political Acpt
1 50 40 40 40 90 70 90 100 4
ST Implement 
Illegal Trade
0 30 100 40 50 80 50 100 60 7
ST Implement 
Time
100 100 0 90 20 75 100 0 85 6
ST Implement 
Bureaucracy
90 0 100 20 40 60 40 100 50 6
LT Strategy 
BIO-DIV
0 50 80 50 80 60 60 100 100 21
LT Strategy 
Secu Invest
0 20 80 60 60 100 20 90 90 14
LT Strategy 
Sustainability
0 60 100 50 70 80 60 120 120 14
LT Strategy 
Data Collectn
0 40 100 50 80 80 60 100 100 21
Total 11 46 75 46 62 77 57 85 91
Structure 














Name Weight % weight Cum wt
License ST Implement 30 30 30
ST Implement Legal Difficult 100 24 7
ST Implement Political Acpt 50 12 4
ST Implement Illegal Trade 100 24 7
ST Implement Time 80 20 6
ST Implement Bureaucracy 80 20 6
License LT Strategy 70 70 70
LT Strategy BIO-DIV 100 29 21
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LT Strategy Secu Invest 70 21 14
LT Strategy Sustainability 70 21 14
LT Strategy Data Collectn 100 29 21
Scores
* * * * * *
Short Name : Legal Difficult 
Long Name : Legal Difficulty
By how much must the current laws be changed in order to introduce the licensing 
scheme?
The current law stipulates that: (a) only companies can participate in the auction; (b) 
only areas can be auctioned (and not quotas).
Most preferred:
2+6+7 (100%) - All fall within the current law.
Least preferred:
1 (0%) - zones are auctioned but with sublease, which is not legal.
3+4+8 (0%) - quotas are not allowed.
Others:
5 (50%) - associations are currently not allowed but required amendment to the law 
would not be too difficult to obtain.




Option Score Normalised Weighted
1 CURRENT 0 0 0
2 Proposed 100 100 7
3 Direct 0 0 0
4 Distributn 0 0 0
5 Association 50 50 4
6 Margins 100 100 7
7 2 Improved 100 100 7
8 Bes tLT 0 0 0
9 Phased 88 88 6
Short Name : Political Acpt
Long Name : Political and Social Acceptability
To what extent is the licensing scheme politically and socially acceptable? To what 
extent does it eliminate conflicts of interest?
Most preferred:
9 (100%) - gradual introduction & potential for win/win (professional fishermen don't 
earn less than currently; fishing companies, who will need to be restructured anyway,
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have a viable future as distributors and servicing companies. A good case from a 
fisheries management point of view.
Least preferred:
1 (1%)- everybody can gain from a clarification of the status quo (either consolidating 
current position or more substantial changes).
Others:
2 (50%) - intermediate between 9 & 1. Companies would consolidate position, 
fishermen could continue with current practices (employment + benefits + money 
from selling on black market). Not very dramatic changes from current situation.
3+4+5 (40%) - a little bit worse than 2 because: under 3 radical change for 
companies and likely conflict between companies and fishermen; under 4 fishermen 
won’t gain very much more; under 5 associations would have to compete with 
companies who have monopolistic position.
7 (70%) - like 2 but more justifiable from management point of view.
6+8 (90%) - just as good as 9 but it is not gradual, and legally not possible.
Scale: Preferences 
Scale Type: Identity
Option Score Normalised Weighted
1 CURRENT 1 1 0
2 Proposed 50 50 2
3 Direct 40 40 1
4 Distributn 40 40 1
5 Association 40 40 1
6 Margins 90 90 3
7 2 Improved 70 70 3
8 Best LT 90 90 3
9 Phased 100 100 4
Short Name : Illegal Trade 
Long Name : Illegal Trade
By how much will illegal trade (black market) be reduced?
Most preferred:
3+8 (100%) - through auctioning system fishermen will be able to sell at market price 
(-10% commission); because fee is on quota money won’t be lost by declaring full 
catch.
Least preferred:
1 (0%) - fishermen obtain much more by selling illegally & companies tolerate it. 
Others:
5+7 (60%) - fee is on quota but price difference retail price-fishermen still very large
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9 (60%) - fee is on quota but price difference retail price-fishermen still very large. At 
least in pilot experiment full catch is declared and some wholesalers will start working 
auctioning house where activity is legal, quality maybe more consistent, and 
transaction costs lower.
6 (80%) - retail-fishermen price difference reduced, but because zones are auctioned 
(which favours larger companies state companies) who have not much reason to 
maximise efficiency.
4 (40%) - retail-fishermen price difference reduced, but not very much because state 
companies have not much pressure to maximise efficiency. Also, license fee on 
catch so more profitable to sell illegally.
2 (30%) - like 4 but nor even retail-fishermen price difference reduced.
Scale: Preferences 
Scale Type: Identity
Option Score Normalised Weighted
1 CURRENT 0 0 0
2 Proposed 30 30 2
3 Direct 100 100 7
4 Distributn 40 40 3
5 Association 50 50 4
6 Margins 80 80 6
7 2 Improved 50 50 4
8 Best LT 100 100 7
9 Phased 60 60 4
Short Name: Time
Long Name : Time nec. for impltn
How much time is required for implementation?
Most preferred:
1+2+7 (100%) - there is enough time before the auction to introduce the necessary 
changes to the rules.
Least preferred:
3+8 (0%) - require change to the law which takes a lot of time.
Others:
4 (90%) - it takes time before companies could improve their retail network, but 
otherwise like 2.
9 (85%) - like 2, but a government approval is required for the pilot part of the 
scheme.
6 (75%) - it takes time for some smaller companies to form themselves and acquire 
the necessary capital to participate in the auction.
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5 (20%) - it takes time to make an amendment to the law so that associations to 




Option Score Normalised Weighted
1 CURRENT 100 100 6
2 Proposed 100 100 6
3 Direct 0 0 0
4 Distributn 90 90 5
5 Association 20 20 1
6 Margins 75 75 4
7 2 Improved 100 100 6
8 Best LT 0 0 0
9 Phased 85 85 5
Short Name: Bureaucracy 
Long Name : Bureaucracy in admin
Bureaucracy in administration/monitoring and overall complexity of the licensing 
system. - complexity of the system.
Note: it is just as difficult to monitor 1000 fishermen directly whether there are 50 or 
600 licences.
Most preferred:
3+8 (100%) - Even though they involve 600/400 licences the schemes are based on 
straight forward principles
Least preferred:
2 (0%) - the system produces too many incentives for cheating and as a result 
managing it is difficult to enforce / implement.
Others:
1 (90%) - present system is already established but management principles not very 
satisfactory.
4 (20%) - almost a cumbersome as proposed but fishermen would be more 
cooperative.
5 (40%) -  requires more work than 4.
6 (60%) - though it involves more work from DDBRA the private sector is also more 
fully engaged in management.
7 (40%) - reducing the incentive to hide real catches makes it about twice as 
desirable as improved Distribution option.




Option Score Normalised Weighted
1 CURRENT 90 90 5
2 Proposed 0 0 0
3 Direct 100 100 6
4 Distributn 20 20 1
5 Association 40 40 2
6 Margins 60 60 4
7 2 Improved 40 40 2
8 Best LT 100 100 6
9 Phased 50 50 3
Short Name : BIO-DIV
Long Name: BIO-DIVERSITY
The support of the improvement of diversity of fish population, as indicated by: 
-Overfishing
-Selective fishing (species, size, prohibition times).
Note: under auctioning system marketing becomes more important than on black 
market => it pays to bring in only quality fish.
Most Preferred:
8+9 (100%) - in the short term 8 would be preferred, but in the next few years 
biodiversity won’t be affected through 9. In the long term they are the same and best.
Least preferred:
1 (0%) - fish is extracted in an undifferentiating manner. There are not enough 
fishermen to overfish currently, but the mesh size used is very small. There is no 
control over gear used. Because of subleasing it is not clear who can fish where, so 
that control is difficult.
Others:
2+4 (50%) - there are fewer companies and it is clear who is allowed to fish and they 
have a legal basis for this right. All gear will have to be marked so that at least some 
of the small mesh gear will be withdrawn. Companies have to pay a minimum (or 
18% of catch) so that they will probably want more fish from the fishermen to be 
declared. But still substantial illegal trade - species mix and too young fish.
6+7 (60%) - fishing is still done only by companies, but in 6 fishermen have less 
economic incentive to sell illegally (now auction) than in 7 (where companies 
distribution monopolists).
3+5 (80%) - quotas with auctioning, inheritability + transferability promotes selective 
fishing for marketing and investment protection . 5 is area fishing but with auctioning 
(therefore marketing) selective fishing is increased. Licences are obtained mostly by 
fishermen associations, where the individual fishermen have more responsibility for 




Option Score Normalised Weighted
1 CURRENT 0 0 0
2 Proposed 50 50 10
3 Direct 80 80 16
4 Distributn 50 50 10
5 Association 80 80 16
6 Margins 60 60 12
7 2 Improved 60 60 12
8 Best LT 100 100 21
9 Phased 100 100 21
Short Name : Secu Invest
Long Name : Security for Investment
The degree to which the licensing scheme provides security for investors so that they 
will not loose their investments in long run. Key criteria:
-contract length
-transferability and inheritability 
Most preferred:
6 (100%) - contract length is 20 years, transferable and inheritable.
Least preferred:
1 (0%) - licence for 1 year, not inheritable, not transferable.
Others:
8+9 (90%) - in 8 contract is for 10 years, inheritable, transferable. 9 is signals through 
the initial 1 year contract length (while the pilot is running - probably 3 years) that 
DDBRA is definitely not settling on a modified 2, but moving towards 8.
3 (80%) - 5 year contract, still inheritable and transferable.
4+5 (60%) - 5 year, not transferable and inheritable. In 4 companies will try to 
improve their situation by moving into retail and restructuring. In 5 fishermen 
associations will be quite keen on working hard.
2+7 (20%) - 5 years, not transferable and inheritable, state companies who have little 
incentive to strive for efficiency. Risky investment before they restructure.
Scale: Preferences 
Scale Type: Identity
Option Score Normalised Weighted
1 CURRENT 0 0 0
2 Proposed 20 20 3
3 Direct 80 80 12
4 Distributn 60 60 9
5 Association 60 60 9
6 Margins 100 100 14
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7 2 Improved 20 20 3
8 Best LT 90 90 13
9 Phased 90 90 13
Short N am e: Sustainability 
Long Name : Sustainability of income
Assuring sustainable income for the local population. Key criteria:
- employment security
- availability of natural resource.
- do others, besides local professional fishermen, have access to the licences?
Most preferred:
8+9 (120%) - In the long run 9 is the same as 8. Only local, active fishermen may be 
employed. Also best for fish stock maintainance.
Least preferred:
1 (0%) - Lack of control over fishing activity (either by authority or fishermen) can 
neither ensure local employment nor the maintenance of the fish stock.
Others:
7+2 (60%) - Fishermen will definitely have incentives to sell on the black market. Fish 
stock would be endangered by fishermen who continue to receive a salary in spite of 
the depletion of the fish stock for short run profits from the black market.
5 (70%) - Licence fee on landed catch will make it profitable to sell fish on the black 
market. This is somewhat counteracted by the cherhana auctioning system where 
they could get a good market price in a legal manner.
6 (80%) - The long term licences give incentives to protect the stock but the area 
licensing system is less desirable than the quota system.
3 (100%) - The fish stock is not as well protected as with 8+9 because licences are 
given exclusively direct to fishermen and it is therefore in their individual interest to 
fish as much as possible. They will monitor each other because the activity of others 
affects them directly.
4 (50%) - Bigger state/ centralised companies are less likely to be able to control 
their fishermen. Fish stock would thereby diminish most.
Scale: Preferences 
Scale Typ e: Identity
Option Score Normalised Weighted
1 CURRENT 0 0 0
2 Proposed 60 50 7
3 Direct 100 83 12
4 Distributn 50 42 6
5 Association 70 58 8
6 Margins 80 67 10
7 2 lmproved 60 50 7
8 BestLT 120 100 14
9 Phased 120 100 14
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Short Name : Data Collectn 
Long Name : Data Collection






3+8+9 (100%) - Data is collected at auction point. Fee on quota and no incentive to 
sell on black market. Each fisherman registers his gear & can be checked in field.
Least preferred:
1 (0%) - no accurate data is obtained due to economic disincentives, organisational 
problems, and confusion.
Others:
2 (40%) - some of the current confusion is clarified.
4 (50%) - this option goes beyond Proposed and also reduces some economic 
disincentive to hiding data.
5+6 (80%) - developed auction system /  competition reveals more data.




Option Score Normalised Weighted
1 CURRENT 0 0 0
2 Proposed 40 40 8
3 Direct 100 100 21
4 Distributn 50 50 10
5 Association 80 80 16
6 Margins 80 80 16
7 2 lmproved 60 60 12
8 BestLT 100 100 21
9 Phased 100 100 21
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10.6 Resident Advisor Report (extracts)80
No. 12. 26th August 1994
Sectoral Studies and Zonal Workshops
7. The sectoral experts team was completed with the arrival of Gertjan de 
Graaf to cover the fishery management study.
8. Under the coordination of Sarah Fowler, the first zonal workshop on the 
marine and coastal zone was held at Uzlina from 23-25 August. The 
participants included researchers, DDBRA staff, local politicians and 
representatives from fishing companies. The sectoral reports prepared by the 
Romanian counterparts were of a high quality, but as expected lacked clearly 
formulated management policies and projects. These were developed with help 
from the sectoral experts before and (more discreetly) during the workshop 
itself. The participants found the exercise very useful, and the outputs 
achieved a remarkable degree of consensus, even on previously highly 
controversial topics (e.g. proposals for more canals will in future be
subject to cost/benefit and environmental impact analyses before being 
commissioned).
9. As an adjunct to the above zonal workshop, Axel Kravatzky held two 
evening sessions to build a computer-aided decision analysis model 
concerning the future management strategy for Lake Sinoie. Previously a 
brackish lagoon, it has been sluiced and used as a sump for freshwater from 
Lake Razim for about 20 years. This led to the loss of the valuable mullet 
fishery and decline of biodiversity (especially a community of quartemary 
relict species). Three options were considered: (i) laissez-faire; (ii) 
continue existing management; (iii) revert the lake to a brackish lagoon. 
Interestingly, after vigorous discussion, (ii) was rejected as unviable and 
not fulfilling the DDBRA's mission to maintain biodiversity. The choice 
between (i) and (iii) was finely balanced, depending on what the costs of 
(iii) might be, and how threatened the relict species actually were. A 




In order to develop better alternative licensing schemes in line with the 
overall objectives of the DDBR, the executive director of the DDBRA (who had 
received some training in decision analysis during his foreign study tour) 
decided to call a decision analysis workshop where specialists and interest 
group representatives were brought together. The work method adopted was a 
series of three-day preparatory workshops, coordinated by Axel Kravatzky, 
and a two-day decision conference in which Peter Hall, a decision 
facilitator from the London School of Economics, attended as a decision 
analyst, with on-the-spot computer modelling using HIVIEW.
The participants in the decision conference were the staff of the authority, 
the DDRI, Gertjan de Graaf (fishery management consultant), a company
80 From: Paul Goriup rmailto:paul.qoriup@pop3.hiwav.co.uk1; Sent: Monday, April 03, 2000 11:35; To: 
axel@carib-link.net; Subject: Fisheries in DDBR
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director, and the DDBRA’s legal advisor. The conference opened with a 
discussion on the fundamental objective of the DDBRA and the group 
eventually agreed on the following formulation: "Nature conservation and 
restoration of nature (maximisation of conservation value)". They then went 
on to identify more immediate objectives, or means objectives, through which 
they were going to achieve the fundamental one.
All of the participants were able to formulate their own proposals, explain 
the rationale to the other participants, and modify them easily. The 
facilitator used the discussion about the advantages and disadvantages of 
these licensing schemes to construct a value tree that expressed the 
value-relevant objectives and established criteria for comparing alternative 
licensing schemes (Table 7).
Table 7: Criteria used to evaluate fish license schemes in the DDBRA
Short-term Criteria
• Is the scheme legal
•  Is the scheme politically and socially acceptable
• Does the scheme reduce use of the black market
• Can the scheme be implemented soon
• Is the scheme simple 
Long-term Criteria
•  Does the scheme protect biodiversity
• Does the scheme provide security for investment
• Does the scheme provide sustainable yields
•  Does the scheme provide sustainable employment
•  Does the scheme yield reliable management data
Each objective and criterion was individually weighted, such that each of 
the licensing schemes examined was eventually scaled according to its 
usefulness in the short- or long-term. Even though the participants were not 
able to resolve all their differences in opinion in the course of the 
conference, they did agree on a common solution that the executive director 
presented to the cross-thematic workshop, where it was approved. In brief, 
it was recommended that the proposed DDBRA fish licensing scheme should be 
implemented in two phases, as follows:
Phase 1 (initialisation)
•  The DDBR will be divided in to 50 fishing zones which will be licensed to one company on 
an annual basis (but a company may own more than one licence)
• The fishing zones will be distributed in each of the main geographic units of the DDBR 
(the main river channels, the delta proper, the Black Sea, and the Lake Razim/Sinoie 
complex) and the maximum allowable catch (MAC) will be related to the habitat and area 
of the zone concerned and specific in the licence
•  The licence fee will be a fixed sum proportional to the MAC, indexed for inflation and 
payable monthly
• The companies will employ the fishermen and pay them a fixed price for their catch. The 
catch is sold by the companies at wholesale market prices
Phase 2 (pilot scheme, tested for three years)
•  The MAC will be determined for each geographic unit in the DDBR and the number of 
licences available calculated given that each licence will permit a catch of 10 tonnes/year. 
In this way, individual fishermen and small companies will be able to compete for licences 
within any zone, where they will generally have freedom of movement. Area-based 
licences will be available only in small zones.
• The licence fee will be a fixed sum per tonne of catch, indexed for inflation and payable 
monthly. The licence will be valid for ten years and will be inheritable and transferable.
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•  Individual fishermen or companies will be the owners of the catch and may sell it directly 
to wholesalers.
Phase 2 can only be implemented on a large scale if the DDBR law is amended.
This is now being pursued by the DDBRA.
ABSTRACT FROM MANAGEMENT PLAN ADOPTED BY DDBRA IN 1994 (a table with 7 
columns)
ZONE POLICY
NO. MANAGEMENT POLICY PROJECT 
NO. PRIORITY PROJECT TITLE TIMING  
Economic #24
Institute a system of management for the sustainable utilisation 
of natural resources.
#24.1 1 Analyse the existing management of fisheries
and develop options for improvement. 95 -> 96
#24.2 1 Select and apply a system of fishery licensing. 95 -> 97
#24.3 1 Implement a licensing system and set bag limits for hunting game
species. 95 -> 97
Economic #25
Develop and improve fish farming on the basis of economic 
efficiency.
#25.1 2 Evaluate the existing situation of fish farming and make 
recommendations about alternative methods of management. 96 -> 97 
#25.2 2 Encourage investment in deterrent techniques for protecting fish 
farms from piscivorous birds. 96 -> 97
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